Court File No.

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF IMPERIAL TOBACCO CANADA LIMITED, AND IMPERIAL TOBACCO COMPANY LIMITED

Applicants

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANTS

March 12, 2019

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Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.

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ROBERT CAMPEAU, ROBERT CAMPEAU INC., 75090 ONTARIO INC., and ROBERT CAMPEAU INVESTMENTS INC. v. OLYMPIA & YORK DEVELOPMENTS LIMITED, 857408 ONTARIO INC., and NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA

R.A. Blair J.

Judgment: September 21, 1992 Docket: Docs. 92-CQ-19675, B-125/92

Counsel: *Stephen T. Goudge, Q.C.* and *Peter C. Wardle*, for the plaintiffs. *Peter F. C. Howard*, for National Bank of Canada. *Yoine Goldstein*, for Olympia & York Development Limited and 857408 Ontario Inc.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (June 25, 1992), Doc.34127/88, O'Connell J. (Ont. Gen. Div.), [1992] O.J. No. 1330 — referred to

Attorney General v. Arthur Anderson & Co. (1988), [1989] E.C.C. 244 (C.A.) - referred to

Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) — applied

Empire-Universal Films Ltd. v. Rank, [1947] O.R. (H.C.) - referred to

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.) — referred to

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) — applied

Weight Watchers International Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ontario Ltd. (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 5 C.P.R. (2d) 122 (Fed. T.D.), appeal allowed by consent without costs (1972), 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n, 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n (Fed. C.A.) — referred to

Weight Watchers International Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ontario Ltd. (1972), 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n, 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n (Fed. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 —

s. 11

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43-

s. 106

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r. 6.01(1)

Motion to lift stay under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act; Motion for stay under Courts of Justice Act.

R.A. Blair J:

1 These motions raise questions regarding the court's power to stay proceedings. Two competing interests are to be weighed in the balance, namely,

a) the interests of a debtor which has been granted the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, and the "breathing space" offered by a s. 11 stay in such proceedings, on the one hand, and,

b) the interests of a unliquidated contingent claimant to pursue an action against that debtor *and* an arm's length third party, on the other hand.

At issue is whether the court should resort to an interplay between its specific power to grant a stay, under s. 11 of the C.C.A.A., and its general power to do so under the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 in order to stay the action completely; or whether it should lift the s. 11 stay to allow the action to proceed; or whether it should exercise some combination of these powers.

Background and Overview

3 This action was commenced on April 28, 1992, and the statement of claim was served before May 14, 1992, the date on which an order was made extending the protection of the C.C.A.A. to Olympia & York Developments Limited and a group of related companies ("Olympia & York", or "O & Y" or the "Olympia & York Group").

4 The plaintiffs are Robert Campeau and three Campeau family corporations which, together with Mr. Campeau, held the control block of shares of Campeau Corporation. Mr. Campeau is the former chairman and CEO of Campeau Corporation, said to have been one of North America's largest real estate development companies, until its recent rather high profile demise. It is the fall of that empire which forms the subject matter of the lawsuit.

The Claim against the Olympia & York Defendants

5 The story begins, according to the statement of claim, in 1987, after Campeau Corporation had completed a successful leveraged buy-out of Allied Stores Corporation, a very large retailer based in the United States. Olympia & York had aided in funding the Allied takeover by purchasing half of Campeau Corporation's interest in the Scotia Plaza in Toronto and subsequently also purchasing 10 per cent of the shares of Campeau Corporation. By late 1987, it is alleged, the relationship between Mr. Campeau and Mr. Paul Reichmann (one of the principals of Olympia & York) had become very close, and an agreement had been made whereby Olympia & York was to provide significant financial support, together with the considerable expertise and the experience of its personnel, in connection with Campeau Corporation's subsequent bid for control of Federated Stores Inc. (a second major U.S. department store chain). The story ends, so it is said, in 1991 after Mr. Campeau had been removed as chairman and CEO of Campeau Corporation and that company, itself, had filed for protection under the C.C.A.A. (from which it has since emerged, bearing the new name of Camdev Corp.).

In the meantime, in September 1989, the Olympia & York defendants, through Mr. Paul Reichmann, had entered into a shareholders' agreement with the plaintiffs in which, it is further alleged, Olympia & York obliged itself to develop and implement expeditiously a viable restructuring plan for Campeau Corporation. The allegation that Olympia & York breached this obligation by failing to develop and implement such a plan, together with the further assertion that the O & Y defendants actually frustrated Mr. Campeau's efforts to restructure Campeau Corporation's Canadian real estate operation, lies at the heart of the Campeau action. The plaintiffs plead that as a result they have suffered very substantial

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damages, including the loss of the value of their shares in Campeau Corporation, the loss of the opportunity of completing a refinancing deal with the Edward DeBartolo Corporation, and the loss of the opportunity on Mr. Campeau's part to settle his personal obligations on terms which would have preserved his position as chairman and CEO and majority shareholder of Campeau Corporation.

7 Damages are claimed in the amount of \$1 billion, for breach of contract or, alternatively, for breach of fiduciary duty. Punitive damages in the amount of \$250 million are also sought.

The Claim against National Bank of Canada

8 Similar damages, in the amount of \$1 billion (but no punitive damages), are claimed against the defendant National Bank of Canada, as well. The causes of action against the bank are framed as breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and breach of the provisions of s. 17(1) of the *Personal Property Security Act* [R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10]. They arise out of certain alleged acts of misconduct on the part of the bank's representatives on the board of directors of Campeau Corporation.

9 In 1988 the plaintiffs had pledged some of their shares in Campeau Corporation to the bank as security for a loan advanced in connection with the Federated Stores transaction. In early 1990, one of the plaintiffs defaulted on its obligations under the loan and the bank took control of the pledged shares. Thereafter, the statement of claim alleges, the bank became more active in the management of Campeau, through its nominees on the board.

10 The bank had two such nominees. Olympia & York had three. There were 12 directors in total. What is asserted against the bank is that its directors, in co-operation with the Olympia & York directors, acted in a way to frustrate Campeau's restructuring efforts and favoured the interests of the bank as a secured lender rather than the interests of Campeau Corporation, of which they were directors. In particular, it is alleged that the bank's representatives failed to ensure that the DeBartolo refinancing was implemented and, indeed, actively supported Olympia & York's efforts to frustrate it, and in addition, that they supported Olympia & York's efforts to refuse to approve or delay the sale of real estate assets.

The Motions

11 There are two motions before me.

12 The first motion is by the Campeau plaintiffs to lift the stay imposed by the order of May 14, 1992 under the C.C.A.A. and to allow them to pursue their action against the Olympia & York defendants. They argue that a plaintiff's right to proceed with an action ought not lightly to be precluded; that this action is uniquely complex and difficult; and that the claim is better and more easily dealt with in the context of the action rather than in the context of the present C.C.A.A. proceedings. Counsel acknowledge that the factual bases of the claims against Olympia & York and the bank are closely intertwined and that the claim for damages is the same, but argue that the causes of action asserted against the two are different. Moreover, they submit, this is not the usual kind of situation where a stay is imposed to control the process and avoid inconsistent findings when the same parties are litigating the same issues in parallel proceedings.

13 The second motion is by National Bank, which of course opposes the first motion, and which seeks an order staying the Campeau action as against it as well, pending the disposition of the C.C.A.A. proceedings. Counsel submits that the factual substratum of the claim against the bank is dependent entirely on the success of the allegations against the Olympia & York defendants, and that the claim against those defendants is better addressed within the parameters of the C.C.A.A. proceedings. He points out also that if the action were to be taken against the bank alone, his client would be obliged to bring Olympia & York back into the action as third parties in any event.

The Power to Stay

14 The court has always had an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings whenever it is just and convenient to do so, in order to control its process or prevent an abuse of that process: see *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v.*

Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd., 1992 CarswellOnt 185

1992 CarswellOnt 185, [1992] O.J. No. 1946, 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 14 C.P.C. (3d) 339...

Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.), and cases referred to therein. In the civil context, this general power is also embodied in the very broad terms of s. 106 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which provides as follows:

106. A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.

15 Recently, Mr. Justice O'Connell has observed that this discretionary power is "highly dependent on the facts of each particular case": *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim* (unreported) [(June 25, 1992), Doc. 34127/88 (Ont. Gen. Div.)], [1992] O.J. No. 1330.

Apart from this inherent and general jurisdiction to stay proceedings, there are many instances where the court is specifically granted the power to stay in a particular context, by virtue of statute or under the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. The authority to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in the same court, under r. 6.01(1), is an example of the latter. The power to stay judicial and extra-judicial proceedings under s. 11 of the C.C.A.A., is an example of the former. Section 11 of the C.C.A.A. provides as follows:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

(a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;

(b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the com pany except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

The Power to Stay in the Context of C.C.A.A. Proceedings

17 By its formal title the C.C.A.A. is known as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors". To ensure the effective nature of such a "facilitative" process it is essential that the debtor company be afforded a respite from the litigious and other rights being exercised by creditors, while it attempts to carry on as a going concern and to negotiate an acceptable corporate restructuring arrangement with such creditors.

In this respect it has been observed that the C.C.A.A. is "to be used as a practical and effective way of restructuring corporate indebtedness": see the case comment following the report of *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B), and the approval of that remark as "a perceptive observation about the attitude of the courts" by Gibbs J.A. in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) at p. 113 [B.C.L.R.].

19 Gibbs J.A. continued with this comment:

To the extent that a general principle can be extracted from the few cases directly on point, and the others in which there is persuasive obiter, it would appear to be that the courts have concluded that under s. 11 there is a discretionary power to restrain judicial or extra-judicial conduct against the debtor company the effect of which is, or would be, seriously to impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business during the compromise or arrangement negotiating period.

(emphasis added)

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I agree with those sentiments and would simply add that, in my view, the restraining power extends as well to conduct which could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement.

I must have regard to these foregoing factors while I consider, as well, the general principles which have historically governed the court's exercise of its power to stay proceedings. These principles were reviewed by Mr. Justice Montgomery in *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance*, supra (a "Mississauga Derailment" case), at pp. 65-66 [C.P.C.]. The balance of convenience must weigh significantly in favour of granting the stay, as a party's right to have access to the courts must not be lightly interfered with. The court must be satisfied that a continuance of the proceeding would serve as an injustice to the party seeking the stay, in the sense that it would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court in some other way. The stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On all of these issues the onus of satisfying the court is on the party seeking the stay: see also *Weight Watchers International Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ontario Ltd.* (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 5 C.P.R. (2d) 122 (Fed. T.D.), appeal allowed by consent without costs (1972), 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n, 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n (Fed. C.A.), where Mr. Justice Heald recited the foregoing principles from *Empire-Universal Films Ltd. v. Rank*, [1947] O.R. 775 (H.C.) at p.779.

22 Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance, supra, is a particularly helpful authority, although the question in issue there was somewhat different than those in issue on these motions. The case was one of several hundred arising out of the Mississauga derailment in November 1979, all of which actions were being casemanaged by Montgomery J. These actions were all part of what Montgomery J. called "a controlled stream" of litigation involving a large number of claims and innumerable parties. Similarly, while the Olympia & York proceedings under the C.C.A.A. do not involve a large number of separate actions, they do involve numerous applicants, an even larger number of very substantial claimants, and a diverse collection of intricate and broad-sweeping issues. In that sense the C.C.A.A. proceedings are a controlled stream of litigation. Maintaining the integrity of the flow is an important consideration.

Disposition

I have concluded that the proper way to approach this situation is to continue the stay imposed under the C.C.A.A. prohibiting the action against the Olympia & York defendants, and in addition, to impose a stay, utilizing the court's general jurisdiction in that regard, preventing the continuation of the action against National Bank as well. The stays will remain in effect for as long as the s. 11 stay remains operative, unless otherwise provided by order of this court.

In making these orders, I see no prejudice to the Campeau plaintiffs. The processing of their action is not being precluded, but merely postponed. Their claims may, indeed, be addressed more expeditiously than might have otherwise been the case, as they may be dealt with — at least for the purposes of that proceeding — in the C.C.A.A. proceeding itself. On the other hand, there might be great prejudice to Olympia & York if its attention is diverted from the corporate restructuring process and it is required to expend time and energy in defending an action of the complexity and dimension of this one. While there may not be a great deal of prejudice to National Bank in allowing the action to proceed against it, I am satisfied that there is little likelihood of the action proceeding very far or very effectively unless and until Olympia & York — whose alleged misdeeds are the real focal point of the attack on both sets of defendants — is able to participate.

25 In addition to the foregoing, I have considered the following factors in the exercise of my discretion:

1. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the Campeau claim must be dealt with, either in the action or in the C.C.A.A. proceedings and that it cannot simply be ignored. I agree. However, in my view, it is more appropriate, and in fact is essential, that the claim be addressed within the parameters of the C.C.A.A. proceedings rather than outside, in order to maintain the integrity of those proceedings. Were it otherwise, the numerous creditors in that mammoth proceeding would have no effective way of assessing the weight to be given to the Campeau claim in determining their approach to the acceptance or rejection of the Olympia & York plan filed under the Act.

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2. In this sense, the Campeau claim — like other secured, undersecured, unsecured, and contingent claims — must be dealt with as part of a "controlled stream" of claims that are being negotiated with a view to facilitating a compromise and arrangement between Olympia & York and its creditors. In weighing "the good management" of the two sets of proceedings — i.e., the action and the C.C.A.A. proceeding — the scales tip in favour of dealing with the Campeau claim in the context of the latter: see *Attorney General v. Arthur Andersen & Co.* (1988), [1989] E.C.C. 224 (C.A.), cited in *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim*, supra.

I am aware, when saying this, that in the initial plan of compromise and arrangement filed by the applicants with the court on August 21, 1992, the applicants have chosen to include the Campeau plaintiffs amongst those described as "Persons not Affected by the Plan". This treatment does not change the issues, in my view, as it is up to the applicants to decide how they wish to deal with that group of "creditors" in presenting their plan, and up to the other creditors to decide whether they will accept such treatment. In either case, the matter is being dealt with, as it should be, within the context of the C.C.A.A. proceedings.

3. Pre-judgment interest will compensate the plaintiffs for any delay caused by the imposition of the stays, should the action subsequently proceed and the plaintiffs ultimately be successful.

4. While there may not be great prejudice to National Bank if the action were to continue against it alone and the causes of action asserted against the two groups of defendants are different, the complex factual situation is common to both claims and the damages are the same. The potential of two different inquiries at two different times into those same facts and damages is not something that should be encouraged. Such multiplicity of inquiries should in fact be discouraged, particularly where — as is the case here — the delay occasioned by the stay is relatively short (at least in terms of the speed with which an action like this Campeau action is likely to progress).

Conclusion

Accordingly, an order will go as indicated, dismissing the motion of the Campeau plaintiffs and allowing the motion of National Bank. Each stay will remain in effect until the expiration of the stay period under the C.C.A.A. unless extended or otherwise dealt with by the court prior to that time. Costs to the defendants in any event of the cause in the Campeau action. I will fix the amounts if counsel wish me to do so.

Order accordingly.

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TAB 2

I.I.C. Ct. Filing 44993399001

Canadian Red Cross Society — Court File Nos. 98-CL-002970, M29289 1. — Initial Order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act made July 20, 1998 by Blair J.

Re. The Canadian Red Cross Society/La Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Court File No. 98-CL-002970

— In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 — and — In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of the Canadian Red Cross Society/La Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge — The Canadian Red Cross Society/La Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge Applicant

Court File No. 98-CL-002970

ONTARIO COURT (GENERAL DIVISION) COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE MR.)	MONDAY THE 20{th} DAY
JUSTICE BLAIR)	OF JULY, 1998

Initial Order

THIS APPLICATION made by The Canadian Red Cross Society/La Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge (the "Applicant") for relief described in the Notice of Application herein was heard this day at Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Notice of Application, the Affidavit of Pierre Duplessis, sworn July 17, 1998, and the Consent of Ernst & Young Inc. as proposed Monitor of the Applicant, filed, and on notice to the parties indicated in the affidavits of service, filed, and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicant and other counsel, and on being advised that a number of persons who might be interested in these proceedings were not served with the Notice of Application herein.

Service

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the time for service of the Notice of Application and the Application Record herein be and it is hereby abridged and that the Notice of Application is properly returnable today and further that service thereof upon any interested party other than the persons served with the Notice of Application and Application Record is hereby dispensed with. This Application shall be treated as an *ex-parte* Application with respect to the following parties:

- (a) Parsons (Ontario class action, Court File No. 98-CV-141369);
- (b) Endean (British Columbia class Action, Court File No. C965349, Vancouver); and
- (c) Honhon (Québec class action, Court File No. 50006000016-960).

Application

2. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that the Applicant is a company to which the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "CCAA") applies.

Stay of Proceedings

3. THIS COURT ORDERS that, until and including August 19, 1998 (the "Initial Stay Termination Date") or further Order of this Court:

(a) any and all proceedings, including, without limitation, suits, actions, extra-judicial proceedings, enforcement processes or other remedies ("Proceedings") commenced, taken or proceeded with or that may be commenced, taken

or proceeded with by any of the Applicant's creditors, suppliers, contractors, lenders, customs brokers, landlords (including, without limitation, equipment lessors and lessors of real property), sub-landlords, tenants, sub-tenants, licensors, licensees, co-owners, co-tenants, governments of any nation, province, state or municipality or any other entity exercising executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory or administrative functions of or pertaining to government in Canada or elsewhere and any corporation or other entity owned or controlled by or which is the agent of any of the foregoing, or by any other person, firm, corporation or entity wherever situate or domiciled (collectively, "Persons" and, individually, a "Person"), against or in respect of the Applicant (whether in its own capacity or as trustee or agent), or any of its governors or officers, or in respect of any property, assets and undertaking owned by the Applicant or used by the Applicant in carrying on its activities, wherever located, whether held by the Applicant, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, as principal, agent, or nominee, beneficially or otherwise (the "Property"), whether pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA"), the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act* (the "WURA") or otherwise, are hereby stayed and suspended;

(b) the right of any Person to make demand or draw under any debentures, notes, bonds, letters of credit or instruments of similar effect, issued by or on behalf of the Applicant prior to the date of this Order, to take possession of, exercise rights of garnishment, foreclose upon or otherwise realize upon or deal with any of the Property, or to continue such actions or proceedings if commenced prior to the date of this Order, is hereby restrained;

(c) the right of any Person (including, without limitation, any authority with jurisdiction to levy realty taxes) to commence or continue enforcement, realization or collection proceedings in respect of any encumbrance, tax, lien, security interest, charge, mortgage, guarantee, atornment of rents, hypothecation, pledge or other security held in relation to, or any trust attaching to any of the Property, including the right of any existing creditor to take any step in asserting, perfecting or registering any right or interest (including, without limitation, any right to revendication or any right to repossession or stoppage in transit of any goods supplied or shipped to the Applicant, whether taken in the Province of Québec or elsewhere, and whether pursuant to the BIA or otherwise), is hereby restrained;

(d) all Persons having arrangements or agreements, written or oral, with the Applicant, whether the Applicant is acting as principal, agent, trustee or nominee, for the supply of goods and/or services (including without limitation the processing and supply of fractionated or other blood products) by or to the Applicant, or to any of the Property, whether managed or held by the Applicant in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, as principal, agent, trustee or nominee, beneficially or otherwise, including, without limitation, equipment leases, display contracts, license agreements, insurance contracts, distribution agreements, conditional sales contracts, charge and credit card agreements, bank and other operating accounts, management agreements, transportation contracts, shipping and carrier contracts, computer software and support systems, supply contracts, maintenance and service contracts and access or sharing of premises or common facilities arrangements with respect to any of the Applicant's locations or premises, are hereby restrained from accelerating, terminating, suspending, modifying or cancelling such agreements, arrangements or supply of goods or services, and from pursuing any rights or remedies arising thereunder, without the prior written consent of the Applicant or leave of this Court;

(e) without limiting the generality of the foregoing, all Persons are hereby restrained until further Order of this Court from discontinuing, interfering with or cutting-off any utility or required services (including telephone, facsimile or other communications services at the present numbers used by the Applicant in respect of any of the Property), the furnishing of oil, gas, water, heat or electricity, the supply of equipment, computer software, hardware support and electronic, internet, electronic mail and other data services, so long as the Applicant pays the normal prices or charges (other than deposits, stand-by fees or similar items which the Applicant shall have no obligation to pay) for such goods and services received by or provided to the Applicant on and after the date of this Order as same become due in accordance with present payment practices, or as may be hereafter negotiated from time to time, and that all such Persons shall continue to perform and observe the terms and conditions contained in any agreements entered into with the Applicant or in connection with any of the Property, as the case may be;

(f) all Persons are prohibited until further Order of this Court from terminating, cancelling, suspending, amending or withdrawing any licences (including, without limitation, lottery and other gaming licenses and licences required for the Applicant's ambulance, healthcare or blood-related activities), permits, approvals or rights issued or granted to the Applicant or in connection with any of the Property and which may be required by the Applicant to continue carrying on its activities, and from pursuing any rights or remedies arising thereunder;

(g) all Persons are restrained from exercising any right of distress, repossession, set-off or consolidation of accounts in relation to amounts due or accruing due in respect of or arising from any indebtedness or obligation of the Applicant as of the date hereof, or from retaining cheques and/or monies owing to the Applicant or to which the Applicant is entitled, or from retaining goods, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, any Property or any goods of the Applicant's customers held by any bailees, warehousemen, distributors, freight carriers, delivery companies or customs brokers and agents, in relation to or by reason of amounts past due to such persons, or customs duties and charges, taxes, freight, insurance, storage or other charges paid on behalf of the Applicant prior to the date hereof for which the Applicant has not reimbursed such Person;

(h) the right of any holder of any loan or securities of the Applicant to convert such loan or securities to other securities or property of the Applicant, be and is hereby restrained and all persons are restrained from the registration or re-registration of any securities owned by the Applicant into the names of such Persons or their nominees, or the exercise of any voting rights attaching to any securities owned beneficially or otherwise by the Applicant; and

(i) subject to the provisions of subsections 11.5(2) and (3) of the CCAA, no Person may commence or continue any action against a governor of the Applicant or any claims against governors that arose prior to the date of this Order relating to obligations of the Applicant where governors are under any law liable in their capacity as governors for the payment of such obligations, until a compromise or arrangement in respect of the Applicant, if one is filed, is sanctioned by the Court or is refused by the creditors or the Court.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS that no creditor of the Applicant shall be under any obligation after the date of this Order to advance or re-advance any monies or otherwise extend any credit to the Applicant except as otherwise provided in this Order; provided, however, that cash placed on deposit by the Applicant with any creditor from and after 12:01 a.m. (Toronto time) on the date of this Order, whether in an operating account or otherwise and whether for its own account or for the account of any other entity, shall not be applied by such creditor in reduction or repayment of amounts owing as of the date of this Order, or which may become due on or before the Initial Stay Termination Date or in satisfaction of any interest, fees, charges or other amounts accruing in respect thereof, and such cash shall be remitted to the Applicant.

5. THIS COURT ORDERS that, notwithstanding paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Order, any Person providing letters of credit, standby letters of credit or shipping guarantees (the "Issuing Party") at the request of the Applicant, shall be required to continue honouring letters of credit, standby letters of credit and/or shipping guarantees, issued on or before the date of this Order subject to the Issuing Party being entitled to retain bills of lading and/or shipping documents relating thereto until paid therefor. For greater certainty, the Issuing Patty shall be prohibited from terminating, suspending, modifying, determining, refusing to honour or cancelling such agreements, notwithstanding any provisions contained therein to the contrary, and the beneficiaries of such letters of credit, standby letters of credit or shipping guarantees, as the case may be, in accordance with their respective terms and conditions, without the prior written consent of the Applicant or without leave of this Court.

6. THIS COURT ORDERS that, from 12:01 a.m. (Toronto time) on the date of this Order to the time of the granting of this Order, any act or action taken or notice given by any of the Applicant's creditors or other Persons in furtherance of their rights to commence or continue realization or to take or enforce any other step or remedy, will be deemed not to have been taken or given, as the case may be, subject to the right of such Persons to further apply to this Court in respect of such step, act, action or notice given. The foregoing shall not apply to invalidate any registration by any creditor

which, during such period, effected any registrations with respect to security granted prior to the date of this Order, or which obtained third party consents in relation thereto.

7. THIS COURT ORDERS that, to the extent that any rights, obligations or time or limitation periods relating to the Applicant or the Property may expire or terminate with the passage of time, the term of such rights, obligations or periods shall hereby be deemed to be extended by a period of time equal to the duration of the stay of proceedings effected by this Order and any subsequent orders in these proceedings and, in the event that the Applicant becomes bankrupt or a receiver is appointed in respect of the Applicant within the meaning of subsection 243(2) of the BIA, the period between the date of this Order and the day on which the stay of proceedings in these proceedings is ended shall not be counted in determining the 30-day period referred to in Section 81.1 of the BIA, provided that this paragraph shall not be construed to extend the term of any lease that expires during the stay of proceedings.

8. THIS COURT ORDERS that all Persons having other arrangements or agreements, whether written or oral, with the Applicant, are hereby restrained from accelerating, terminating, suspending, modifying, determining or cancelling such arrangements or agreements, notwithstanding any provisions therein contained to the contrary, without the prior written consent of the Applicant or with leave of this Court. All such Persons shall continue to perform and observe the terms, conditions and provisions contained in such agreements on their part to be performed or observed. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, all Persons be and they are hereby restrained until further Order of this Court from terminating, suspending, modifying, cancelling, disturbing or otherwise interfering in any way with the present or future occupation by the Applicant of any premises leased, subleased or occupied by the Applicant, and the landlords of premises leased or subleased by the Applicant are hereby specifically restrained from taking any steps to terminate any lease, sublease, occupancy or other agreement to which an Applicant is a party, whether by notice of termination or otherwise, or to terminate any ancillary agreements or arrangements, including without limitation leasehold improvement arrangements with the Applicant, without the prior written consent of the Applicant or leave of this Court, subject to the obligation of the Applicant to pay rent for the period commencing with the terms of the particular lease for such premises.

9. THIS COURT ORDERS that, while the provisions of paragraphs 3 to 8 of this Order shall apply in accordance with their terms to stay any and all Proceedings or to restrain any matter provided therein that may be commenced or taken against the Applicant (including, without limitation, by any Person seeking indemnity from or contribution by the Applicant, or under any guarantee or similar instrument or any security therefor), nothing in this Order shall apply to stay, restrain or restrict any such Proceedings as against any co-defendants of the Applicant.

Possession of Property and Carrying on Activities

10. THIS COURT ORDERS that, subject to the terms of this Order, the Applicant shall remain in possession and control of the Property.

11. THIS COURT ORDERS that, subject to the terms of this Order, the Applicant shall continue to carry on its activities in a manner consistent with its objects and shall be authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ the agents, accountants, advisors, employees, contract employees, independent contractors, servants, solicitors and consultants currently in its employ and paid by the Applicant or any Person related to or affiliated with the Applicant, with liberty to retain such further agents, accountants, advisors, employees, contract employees, contract employees, independent contractors, servants, solicitors, assistants and consultants as it deems reasonably necessary or desirable in the ordinary course of its activities or for the purposes of the Plan or the carrying our of the terms of this Order, or otherwise subject to the approval of this Court.

12. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant shall be authorized and empowered to:

(a) act as trustee or agent, as the case may be, in respect of funds or other property (including, without limitation, funds or other property resulting from the Applicant's charitable, fundraising or gaming activities and from its domestic and international disaster relief and general aid programs) determined by the Applicant, acting reasonably in a manner consistent with its objects, to have been paid, conveyed or otherwise transferred to the Applicant on terms which impose a trust or agency relationship, whether the relevant transfer occurred prior to or after the date of this Order;

(b) in carrying on its activities on and after the date of this Order, to utilize the funds referred to in paragraph 12(a) in furtherance of the objects for which such funds were received by the Applicant, at all times in a manner consistent with its obligations as a trustee or agent; and

(c) act as administrator of any pension plan or plans which it maintains.

13. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that, without limiting the foregoing, neither the act of applying for this Order nor the granting of this Order shall disqualify the Applicant from:

(a) carrying on the operations of the national blood system pending the transfer of such operations (the "Blood System Transfer") to The Canadian Blood Services/Société Canadienne du Sang ("CBS") and Héma-Québec ("H-Q"); and

(b) carrying on its non-blood activities in a manner consistent with its objects and past practices.

14. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant shall be authorized and empowered to seek further and future advice and directions from this Court regarding various donor records which are contemplated to be transferred by the Applicant as part of the Blood System Transfer.

15. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant shall be entitled to exercise any rights of set-off and to claim any allowances or benefits which it is entitled m claim against amounts payable by the Applicant to any Person, including without limitation amounts payable to any supplier of goods or services or any landlord of premises leased or occupied by the Applicant and including rights arising in connection with any agreements or arrangements with suppliers with respect to marketing, installation of fixtures, research and development and any other similar arrangements or allowances.

16. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant shall remit or pay, in accordance with legal requirements, (a) any statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in right of Canada or of any province which are required to be deducted from employees' wages, including without limitation amounts in respect of employment insurance, Canada Pension Plan, Québec Pension Plan and income taxes ("Crown Priorities"); (b) amounts payable by the Applicant in respect of employment insurance, Canada Pension Plan, Québec Pension Plan and income taxes ("Crown Priorities"); (b) amounts payable by the Applicant in respect of employment insurance, Canada Pension Plan, Québec Pension Plan and income taxes taxes payable by the Applicant or its customers in connection with any sales of goods and services by the Applicant to such customers (collectively, the "Statutory Payments").

17. THIS COURT ORDERS that, subject to paragraph 18 hereof, the Applicant shall be entitled, but not required, to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the Applicant in carrying on its activities after the date of this Order and in carrying out the provisions of this Order, provided that such amounts shall not, from time to time, be materially different from the amounts set out in the Applicant's cash flow projections submitted to this Court on the date hereof.

18. THIS COURT ORDERS that, without limiting the generality of paragraph 17 of this Order, the Applicant shall pay the following expenses pending further order of this Court:

(a) the fees and disbursements of the Monitor (as defined in paragraph 34 hereof), including the fees and disbursements, if any, on a solicitor and its own client basis of counsel retained by the Monitor;

(b) the fees and disbursements, on a solicitor and its own client basis, of counsel retained by the Applicant in respect of these proceedings and the Plan;

(c) amounts to make such arrangements as may be necessary for payment of suppliers of goods or services actually supplied, delivered or provided to the Applicant on or after the date of this Order;

(d) all outstanding and future wages, salaries, employee and pension benefits, employee retirement plans, vacation pay, termination pay, severance pay and other like amounts accruing due to employees, contract employees, independent contractors, volunteers and externally recruited delegates engaged by the Applicant, including without limitation the reimbursement of business expenses legitimately incurred by such employees, contract employees, independent contractors, volunteers or delegates, provided that such amounts shall not, from time to time, be materially different from the amounts set out in the Applicant's cash flow projections submitted to this Court on the date hereof;

(e) any amounts from time to time required to be paid to The Toronto-Dominion Bank (the "Bank") under the Term Sheet (as hereinafter defined) or the definitive documents contemplated thereby; and

(f) amounts required to honour obligations under disaster relief vouchers issued by the Applicant for the benefit of needy individuals, whether such obligations arose before or after the date of this Order.

19. THIS COURT ORDERS that, without limiting the generality of paragraph 17 of this Order, the Applicant may pay the following expenses until further order of this Court:

(a) principal, interest and other payments to holders of security on the Property where the claim of the holder of such security is less than or equal to the value of the security held by such party or where the cash flow from such Property is sufficient to warrant such payments;

(b) all expenses reasonably necessary for the preservation of the Property including, without limitation, payments on account of insurance, shipping and security;

(c) all outstanding and future premiums on directors', governors' and officers' liability insurance; or

(d) any other amounts provided for by the terms of this Order.

20. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant shall have the right to:

(a) sell such of its Property as the Applicant deems appropriate, provided that any single sale of any assets or property exceeding the sum of \$1 million shall require the prior approval of this Court; and

(b) terminate such of its arrangements or agreements of any nature whatsoever, whether oral or written, as the Applicant deems appropriate and to make provision for any consequences thereof in the Plan.

Power to Borrow

21. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant is hereby authorized and empowered, subject to the existing rights of any creditors holding valid security and the rights of the Bank, to:

(a) borrow such additional funds as it may deem necessary on an unsecured basis; and

(b) grant such security as it may deem necessary to any lender providing new advances subsequent to the date of this Order, which security may rank ahead of any security in existence prior to the time of the making of this Order, if consents are obtained from the Bank and from all other secured creditors having an interest in the Property in respect of which such security is to be granted, provided that any security granted by the Applicant contrary to this

paragraph 21(b) shall be subordinate in all respects to the security held by the Bank as of the date of this Order (the "Existing Security"), to the Bank's Charge (as hereinafter defined), and to any security hereafter granted to the Bank in connection with the Term Sheet (as hereinafter defined).

22. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant is hereby authorized and empowered to borrow from the Bank such monies from time to time as the Applicant may consider necessary or desirable, pursuant to an operating credit facility up to the maximum principal sum of \$50,000,000, substantially on the terms and conditions set forth in the term sheet between the Applicant and the Bank dated July 10, 1998 (the "Term Sheet") referred to in the Affidavit of Pierre Duplessis sworn July 17, 1998, to fund the ongoing activities of the Applicant and to pay such other amounts as may be permitted by the terms of this Order and the Term Sheet.

23. THIS COURT ORDERS that, as security for the obligations and liabilities of the Applicant to the Bank under the Term Sheet, including without limitation the repayment of monies advanced by the Bank to the Applicant after the date hereof under the Term Sheet or the definitive documents contemplated thereby, together with interest, fees, charges and other amounts payable in respect thereof:

(a) all of the Applicant's present and future property, assets and undertaking are hereby charged in favour of the Bank (the "Bank's Charge"); and

(b) the Applicant is hereby authorized and directed to execute and deliver a debenture and a general security agreement (and a hypothec for registration in the Province of Québec) in favour of the Bank charging all of the existing and after acquired property, assets and undertaking of the Applicant, as well as any other security and ancillary documents contemplated in connection therewith under the Term Sheet (collectively, the "Bank's Security").

24. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Bank is hereby authorized and directed to take such steps as it may deem appropriate to register, record or perfect the Bank's Charge and the Bank's Security in all such jurisdictions as the Bank may consider appropriate, and that the Applicant is hereby authorized and directed to co-operate and give assistance to the Bank in that regard.

25. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant shall deposit, or cause to be deposited, all cash, cheques, notes, drafts, electronic funds, remittances or other similar items of payment into the existing bank accounts maintained by the Applicant (the "Existing Accounts"), as contemplated under the Term Sheet.

26. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Bank's Charge, the Bank's Security and the Existing Security (to the extent that the Existing Security secures advances made after the date hereof by the Bank under the Term Sheet) shall have priority over all present and future charges, encumbrances and security in the Property, whether legal or equitable, other than (a) any charge, encumbrance or security arising by operation of, and given priority over the security held by the Bank by, any applicable statute law and (b) any valid, perfected and enforceable security on the Property (other than accounts receivable and inventory and any documents and books related thereto) which was granted prior to the date of this Order.

27. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Bank shall be treated as an unaffected creditor in these proceedings, and that the stay of proceedings in this Order shall not apply to:

(a) the Bank's right to terminate the making of further advances to the Applicant under the Term Sheet and to make demand thereunder, and from exercising its rights and remedies with respect thereto and/or all security held in connection therewith;

(b) prevent the Bank from applying to this Court for the appointment of a receiver and manager and/or for the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy in connection with the enforcement of the Existing Security, the Bank's Charge or the Bank's Security;

(c) the right of the Bank to receive and apply all amounts received by the Borrower (other than trust funds) in accordance with the Term Sheet; or

(d) prevent the Bank from exercising its rights and remedies against the Borrower under the terms of the Existing Security, the Bank's Charge or the Bank's Security, in the event that (1) the Borrower is unable to complete the Blood System Transfer and to repay the Bank in full on or before September 30, 1998 or such later date as may from time to time be agreed to by the Bank, or (2) the funding provided from governments, the Canadian Blood Agency, CBS and H-Q is less than that contemplated by the cash flow projections filed by the Applicant in connection with these proceedings or if there is a material adverse deviation from the financial results set forth in those cash flow projections.

28. THIS COURT ORDERS that, if any event of default occurs under any of the documents held by the Bank:

(a) upon the application of the Bank, receiving orders shall be made against the Applicant with the deemed consent of the Applicant;

(b) the trustee in bankruptcy appointed pursuant to such receiving orders is hereby directed to enter into occupancy agreements with any receiver and manager appointed by the Bank or by the Court on the application of the Bank, with respect to such premises of the Applicant as the receiver and manager may request, provided that all occupation rent with respect to such premises for which the trustee in bankruptcy is liable shall be paid by the receiver and manager and such receiver and manager shall comply with all restrictions applicable to the trustee in bankruptcy relating to the use and occupation of the premises;

(c) to the extent that the trustee in bankruptcy registers any receiving orders or assignments in bankruptcy relating to the Applicant on title to any real property or immovable of the Applicant, such registrations shall be subject to the Bank's Charge and the Bank's Security; and

(d) the proceeds of realization of the Property shall be marshalled so that the burden of payment of the Crown Priorities and any other claims secured by liens having priority over the Bank's Charge and the Bank's Security shall ultimately be satisfied out of the proceeds of the Property.

29. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that, notwithstanding (i) the pendency of these proceedings, (ii) the pendency of any petitions for receiving order hereafter issued pursuant to the BIA in respect of the Applicant and any receiving order issued pursuant to any such petitions, and (iii) the provisions of any federal or provincial statute:

(a) the obligations of the Applicant pursuant to the Term Sheet, the Bank's Charge and the Bank's Security, and all of the documents delivered pursuant thereto, constitute legal, valid and binding obligations of the Applicant enforceable against it in accordance with the terms thereof; and

(b) any payments made by the Applicant pursuant to any such documents, whether made before, on or after the date of this Order, and the granting of the security constituted by the Bank's Charge and the Bank's Security, and the execution, delivery, registration, recording, maintenance and perfection of any security granted or issued by the Applicant to the Bank relating thereto, do not constitute nor shall they be deemed to be settlements, fraudulent preferences, assignments, fraudulent conveyances or other reviewable transactions under the BIA or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, and they do not constitute conduct meriting an oppression remedy.

Further Order Extending Stay Date

30. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant may apply at any time on notice to the Bank and any other Persons as may from time to time be directed by the Court, for an order extending the Initial Stay Termination Date referred to in paragraph 3 of this Order.

Payment of Creditors

31. THIS COURT ORDERS that, except as otherwise provided in this Order, the Applicant is hereby directed, until further order of this Court:

(a) to make no payments, whether of principal, interest thereon or otherwise, on account of amounts owing by the Applicant to any of its creditors as of this date; and

(b) to grant no mortgages, charges or other security upon or in respect of any of the Property.

Plan of Arrangement

32. THIS COURT ORDERS that, subject to further order of this Court, the Applicant is hereby authorized and permitted to file with this Court a plan of compromise or arrangement under the CCAA (the "Plan") on or before the Initial Stay Termination Date.

33. THIS COURT ORDERS that, subject to further order of this Court, the Applicant shall submit, on or before the Initial Stay Termination Date, by way of a motion to this Court, the materials necessary to summon and convene meetings between the Applicant and its respective classes of creditors under the Plan to consider and approve the Plan.

Monitor

34. THIS COURT ORDERS that, until further order of this Court, Ernst & Young Inc. (the "Monitor") be and it is hereby appointed as an officer of this Court to monitor the activities and affairs of the Applicant, with the powers and obligations hereafter set forth, and that the Applicant, its officers, governors, employees, servants, agents and representatives shall cooperate fully with the Monitor in the exercise of its powers and the discharge of its obligations. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the foregoing persons shall provide the Monitor with such access to the Applicant's books, records, assets and premises as the Monitor may, in its sole discretion, require to exercise its powers and perform its obligations under this Order.

35. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor shall, in addition to the duties and functions referred to in Section 11.7 of the CCAA;

(a) assist the Applicant in the development of the Plan and any amendments to and the implementation of the Plan;

(b) assist the Applicant with the holding and administering of any meetings for voting on the Plan (the "Meetings") and shall act as chair at any such Meetings;

(c) inquire into and report to creditors, at or prior to any meetings to consider the Plan, upon the financial condition and prospects of the Applicant;

(d) be at liberty to engage legal counsel, in the event the Monitor requires independent legal advice concerning a specific issue or issues relating to the exercise of its powers and the discharge of its obligations under this Order, and engage such other agents as the Monitor deems necessary respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations under this Order;

(e) report to this Court as the Monitor deems appropriate or as this Court may from time to time direct, in respect of the Plan or the activities or affairs of the Applicant or in respect of such other matters as may be relevant to the proceedings herein;

(f) assist the Applicant in preparing such periodic information for the Bank as may be required from time to time under the Term Sheet; and

(g) perform such other duties as are required by this Order or as may be required by further order of this Court from time to time.

36. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor is authorized but not obligated to provide all interested parties, including but not limited to those creditors which may be affected by these proceedings, with its report or assessment on the Plan. The Monitor shall incur no liability as a result of any report or assessment that it may make pursuant to this provision.

37. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor shall provide the Applicant's creditors with information in response to reasonable requests for information made in writing by any of the creditors addressed to the Monitor. In the case of information which the Monitor has been advised by the Applicant is confidential, the Monitor shall not provide such information to creditors unless otherwise directed by this Court.

38. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor is not empowered to take possession of the Property of the Applicant or to manage any of the Applicant's business or affairs and shall not, by fulfilling its obligations hereunder, be deemed to have taken or maintained possession or control of the Property, or any part thereof, and the Monitor shall not occupy any premises owned, leased or used by the Applicant.

39. THIS COURT ORDERS that the reasonable fees and disbursements of the Monitor (including the reasonable fees and disbursements of any counsel retained by the Monitor) and the reasonable fees and disbursements of Applicant's counsel in these proceedings shall be paid by the Applicant as part of the costs of these proceedings and the Plan, and the Applicant is hereby authorized and directed to pay the accounts of the Monitor, Applicant's counsel and any counsel for the Monitor on a weekly basis. In addition, the Applicant is hereby authorized to pay each of the Monitor and counsel to the Applicant such retainers as may be agreed upon to be held by the Monitor and such counsel as security for payment of their fees and disbursements outstanding from time to time (including with respect to this Application), subject to any final assessment or taxation as may be ordered by this Court, in which case the remuneration of the Monitor shall be taxed on the basis of a chartered accountant and its own client, and the legal costs of the Monitor's and/or Applicant's counsel shall be taxed on the basis of a solicitor and its own client.

40. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor shall not be liable for any act, omission or obligation of the Applicant or any act or omission as a result of the Monitor's appointment or the fulfilment of its duties in the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except for gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part, and that no action, application or other proceeding shall be taken, made or continued against the Monitor without the leave of this Court first being obtained. The appointment of the Monitor shall not disqualify its associate firm, Ernst & Young, from being able to act as auditor of the Applicant, subject to further Order of this Court.

41. THIS COURT ORDERS that the appointment of the Monitor shall not constitute the Monitor to be an employer or a successor employer within the meaning of any legislation governing employment or labour standards or in respect of pensions or benefits or any other statute, regulation or rule of law or equity for any purpose whatsoever and, further, that the Monitor shall not be deemed to be an owner or in possession, control or management of the Property or of the business and affairs of the Applicant whether pursuant to any legislation enacted for the protection of the environment, health and safety or any other statute or regulation of any federal, provincial or other jurisdiction or under any rule of law or equity for any purpose whatsoever.

Transition of National Blood System

42. THIS COURT ORDERS that nothing in this Order shall stay, restrain or otherwise restrict the rights of CBS and H-Q or the obligations of the Applicant pursuant to that certain National Blood Program Acquisition Agreement dated as of July 10, 1998 between the Applicant, as seller, and CBS and H-Q, as buyers (the "Acquisition Agreement"), which Acquisition Agreement remains subject to the approval of this Court, and that such rights and obligations shall be and hereby are declared, subject to further orders of this Court, to be unaffected by the provisions of this Order.

43. THIS COURT ORDERS that, in addition to its other duties hereunder, the Monitor shall provide each of Deloitte & Touche Inc. ("D&T"), as advisor to CBS, and PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. ("PWC"), as advisor to H-Q, with (a) access during normal business hours to the financial books and records of the Applicant relating to the national blood system, (b) such further financial and operational information relating to the national blood system as D&T and/or PWC may from time to time reasonably request, and (c) responses to such reasonable enquiries as either D&T or PWC may make of the Monitor with respect to such financial and operational information regarding the national blood system.

44. THIS COURT ORDERS that, pending a motion for and the granting of an order approving the Acquisition Agreement and the Blood System Transfer, the Applicant and its officers, governors, employees, servants, agents and representatives, together with the Monitor and its employees, servants and agents, are hereby authorized and empowered to take all reasonable steps to co-operate with CBS and H-Q and their respective agents, advisors and representatives to assist in resolving any transitional issues or concerns of CBS and H-Q in contemplation of the Blood System Transfer.

General Items

45. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant be at liberty to:

(a) serve this Order, any other orders in these proceedings, the Plan, any notices of Meetings and all other notices, and to deliver any letters to creditors, information circulars, proofs of claim, proxies and disallowances of claims, by forwarding true copies thereof by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery or electronic transmission to the Applicant's creditors at their addresses as last shown on the records of the Applicant and that any such service or notice by courier, personal delivery or electronic transmission shall be deemed to be received on the next business day following the date of forwarding thereof, or if sent by ordinary mail, on the fourth business day after mailing;

(b) take such proceedings under the BIA or the WURA as the Applicant at any time deems appropriate; and

(c) consent to the appointment of a receiver and/or receiver and manager of any of the Property otherwise protected by this Order, at any time.

46. THIS COURT ORDERS that, notwithstanding subsection 11(5) of the CCAA and any other provision of this Order, the Applicant shall serve this Order only on those creditors and interested parties listed on the service list attached as Schedule "A" hereto and to all parties filing a Notice of Appearance in respect of this Application and, if requested by them, to any creditor or potential creditor of the Applicant.

47. THIS COURT ORDERS that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order, the Applicant may, from time to time, apply to The Honourable Mr. Justice Blair, or to such other Judge as he may designate, to seek directions regarding any of the matters referred to in this Order or to seek any further or other relief, on notice to the Bank and to any other Person likely to be affected by the Order sought or on such other notice, if any, as this Court may from time to time order.

48. THIS COURT ORDERS that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order, any interested Person may, from time to time, apply to The Honourable Mr. Justice Blair, or to such other Judge as he may designate, to seek directions regarding any of the matters referred to in this Order or to vary or rescind this Order or to seek other relief on seven (7) days' notice to the Applicant, the Monitor, the Bank and to any other Person likely to be affected by the Order sought or on such other notice, if any, as this Court may from time to time order.

49. THIS COURT ORDERS that this Order and any other orders in these proceedings shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada and abroad and as against all Persons against whom it may otherwise be enforceable.

50. THIS COURT ORDERS AND REQUESTS the aid and recognition (including, without limitation, the assistance of any court in Canada pursuant to section 17 of the CCAA) of any court or any judicial, regulatory or administrative body in any province or territory of Canada or constituted pursuant to the Parliament of Canada or the legislature of

any province and the Federal Court of Canada, and any court or any judicial, regulatory or administrative body of the United States and the states or other subdivisions of the United States, and of any other nation or state, to act in aid of and to be complementary to this Court in carrying out the terms of this Order.

51. THIS COURT ORDERS that for the purposes of seeking the aid and recognition of any court or any judicial, regulatory or administrative body outside of Canada, the Monitor shall act and be deemed to be the foreign representative of the Applicant.

.....

I. — Schedule "A" Service List

CASSELS, BROCK & BLACKWELL

Scotia Plaza

2100-40 King Street West

Toronto, ON M5H 3C2

A. John Page

E. Bruce Leonard

Tel: (416) 869-5367

Fax: (416) 360-8877

Solicitors for The Canadian Blood Services/Société Canadienne du Sang and the governments of Canada and each of the provinces and territories except Québec

MILLER THOMSON 2500 - 20 Queen Street West Toronto, Ontario M5H 3S1 *Mr. Jeffrey C. Carhart* Tel: (416) 595-8615 Fax: (416) 595-8695 Ontario Solicitors for Héma — Québec and for the government of the province of Québec *FASKEN, CAMPBELL & GODFREY*

TD Bank Tower

P.O. Box 20, Stn. Toronto-Dominion

Toronto, ON M5K 1N6

John A. Levin

Ronald N. Robertson, Q.C.

Edmond Lamek

Tel: (416) 865-4401

Fax: (416) 364-7813

Solicitors for Toronto-Dominion Bank

OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT 1500 - 50 O'Connor Street Ottawa, Ontario K1P 6L2 J. Smellie Tel: (416) 787-1013 Fax: (416) 235-2867 Solicitors for Canadian Blood Agency

II. — Courtesy Copies of Application Record Including Notice of Application and Affidavit of Pierre Duplessis, Sworn July 17, 1998 With Exhibits and Applicant's Factum and Brief of Authorities Sent Via Courier on July 17, 1998

McMILLAN BINCHBarristers and Solicitors200 Bay StreetRoyal Bank PlazaSouth TowerToronto, Ontario M5J 2J7Jeffrey B. GollobTel: (416) 865-7206Fax: (416) 865-7048Solicitors for Bayer Corporation (Requested copies of materials)TEPLITSKY, COLSONBarristers and Solicitors200 - 70 Bond StreetToronto, Ontario

M5B 1X3

Harvin D. Pitch, Q.C.

Tel: (416) 365-9320

Fax: (416) 365-7702

Associated with Harvey Strosberg (Requested copies of materials)

GOODMAN & CARR

Barristers and Solicitors

Suite 2300

200 King Street West

Toronto, Ontario M5H 3W5

A. D. J. Dick

L. Stolz

David Harvey

Tel: (416) 595-2340

Fax: (416) 595-0567

Solicitors in Ontario and National proposed pre-86 and post 90 Hepatitis C Class Action

McCARTHY, TÉTRAULT

Barristers and Solicitors

4700 TD Bank Tower

P.O. Box 48 Stn. Toronto Dominion

Toronto, Ontario M5K 1E6

Mary Thomson

Tel: (416) 601-7418

Fax: (416) 868-0673

Solicitors for Ontario Doctors (co-defendants)

(Requested copies of materials)

KENNETH ARENSEN

Barrister at Law

179 John Street

Suite 401

Toronto, Ontario M5T 1X4

Kenneth Arensen

Tel: (416) 593-4445

Fax: (416) 593-6606

Associated with Harvey Strosberg (Requested copies of materials)

FRASER & BEATTY

Barristers and Solicitors

100 King Street West

1 First Canadian Place

PO Box 100, Stn. 1st Canadian Place

Toronto, Ontario M5X 1B2

Peter Murphy

Tel: (416) 863-0543

Fax: (416) 863-4592

(Bayer Corporation — Requested copies of materials)

SAWERS LISWOOD HICKMAN

BULLIVANT DOLAN

Barristers and Solicitors

2901 - 1 Adelaide Street East

Toronto, Ontario M5C 2Z7

Michael Babcock

Tel: (416) 861-0330

Fax: (416) 861-9886

Solicitors for Hospitals (co-Defendants)

(Requested copies of materials)

Blake, Cassels & Graydon

2800 - 199 Bay Street

Box 25, Commerce Court West

Toronto, Ontario M5L 1A9

Bonnie A. Tough

Tel: (416) 863-2400

Fax: (416) 863-2653

Solicitors in Haemophiliac Hepatitis C Class Action

(Requested copies of materials)

III. — Courtesy Copies of Notice of Application, Affidavit of Pierre Duplessis, Sworn July 17, 1998 (Without Attached Exhibits) and Factum Sent Via Telecopier on July 17, 1998

GÉOFFRION JETTÉ

Barristers and Solicitors

100 rue de la Gauchetière Ouest

Bureau 2800

Montreal, Quebec H3B 4W5

Jean Lesage

Tel: (514) 871-2800

Fax: (514) 871-3933

Québec Solicitors for Héma — Québec

CAMP CHURCH & ASSOCIATES

Barristers

4th Floor, Randall Building

555 West George Street

Vancouver, British Columbia V6B 1Z5

J.J. Camp, Q.C.

Tel: (604) 689-7555

Fax: (604) 689-7554

Solicitors in British Columbia 86 - 90 Hepatitis C Class Action

GIGNAC, SUTTS

Barristers and Solicitors Suite 600 251 Goyeau Street P.O. Box 670 Station A Windsor, Ontario N9A 6V4 Harvey Strosberg, Q,C. Tel: (519) 258-9333 Fax: (519) 258-9527 Solicitors in Ontario 86-90 Hepatitis C Class Action MARCHAND, MAGNAN, MELANÇON, FORGET 600 de la Gauchetière Ouest Suite 1640 Montréal, Québec H3B 3L8 Michel Savonitto Tel: (514) 393-1155 Fax: (514) 861-0727 Solicitors in Québec #1 Class Action Petit Blaquière Dagenais 5929, Transcanadienne, bureau 230 Ville St-Laurent, Québec H4T 1Z6 Jean Blaquière Tel: (514) 744-8001 Fax: (514) 744-8003 Solicitors in Québec #4 Class Action Lapointe, Cayen, Morel 370, boul. Gréber, Bureau 200 Gatineau, Québec J8T 5R6

Claude M. Lapointe
(819) 568 0663
(819) 568-0226
Solicitors in Québec #3 Class Action
Lauzon Bélanger
511, Place D'Armes, Bureau 200
Montréal, Québec H2Y 2W7
Michel Bélanger
Tel: (514) 844-4646
Fax: (514) 844-7009
Solicitors in Quebec #2 Class Action (sent July 20, 1998)
Blake, Cassels & Graydon
Suite 2600
Three Bentall Centre
595 Burrard Street
P. O. Box 49314
Vancouver, British Columbia V7X 1L3
Marvin R. V. Storrow
Tel: (604) 631-3300
Fax: (604) 631-3309
Solicitors in British Columbia #3 Class Action
Klein, Lyons
500 - 805 West Broadway
Vancouver, British Columbia V5Z 1K1
David A. Klein
Tel: (604) 874-7171
Fax: (604) 874-7180
Solicitors in British Columbia #2 Class Action

Lemer Kambas 1550 - 625 Howe Street Vancouver, British Columbia V6C 2T6 Bruce W. Lemer Tel: (604) 669-4005 Fax: (604) 669-4224 Solicitors in British Columbia #1 Class Action

End of Document

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TAB 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE

MR. JUSTICE FARLEY

WEDNESDAY, THE 8th DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2006



IN THE MATTER OF S. 18.6 OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF GRACE CANADA, INC.

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ORDER

THIS MOTION made by Grace Canada, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Applicant"), for an Order, among other things, appointing representative counsel in these proceedings, was read this day at 393 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Consent of the Parties, filed,

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that, notwithstanding the consent of Raven Thundersky, through her counsel, Aikins MacAulay & Thorvaldson LLP ("Aikins") to the appointment of Lauzon Bélanger S.E.N.C.R.L. and Scarfone Hawkins LLP as representative counsel, Ms. Thundersky and/or Aikins reserve the right to apply to this Honourable Court for an order appointing Aikins as representative counsel in respect of aboriginal Canadian claims ("Aboriginal Canadian Claims"), subject to preserving the rights of all parties to raise all objections and arguments as deemed necessary including relating to the conflict of interest issue addressed in the Motion Record of the Applicant in support of the within motion. 2. THIS COURT FURTHER ORDERS that, notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, and for greater certainty, nothing in this order shall preclude Aikins from acting on behalf of Raven Thundersky or any other party(ies) in respect of Canadian claims, and in particular, Aboriginal Canadian Claims, as against any party(ies) other than the Applicant, W. R. Grace & Co. and its subsidiaries, as well as certain other Affiliated Entities (as defined in the order of the United States Bankruptcy Court made on January 22, 2002, as amended).

3. **THIS COURT FURTHER ORDERS** that Raven Thundersky shall in no way be precluded from nor limited in participating in these proceedings in respect of Canadian Claims, including Aboriginal Canadian Claims, as deemed appropriate by this Honourable Court.

JOSEPH P VAN TASSEL REGISTRAR

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO ON / BOOK NO: LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO.:

FFB 0 9 2006

N THE MATTER OF S. 18.6 OF THE <i>COM</i> I <i>CT,</i> R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED Å CANADA, INC	Court File No: 01-CL-4081
	<i>ONTARIO</i> SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
	Proceeding commenced at Toronto
	ORDER
	OGILVY RENAULT LLP Barristers & Solicitors Suite 2800, DO Dev 84
	Suite 3800, PO Box 84 Royal Bank Plaza, South Tower 200 Bay Street Toronto, Ontario M5J 2Z4
	DERRICK C. TAY LSUC #21152A Tel: 416.216.4832 Fax: 416.216.3930
	ORESTES PASPARAKIS LSUC # 36851T Tel: 416.216.4815
	Fax: 416.216.3930 Solicitors for the Applicant

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COMMERCIAL LIST

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THE HONOURABLE

WEDNESDAY, THE 8TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2006

MR. JUSTICE FARLEY

IN THE MATTER OF S. 18.6 OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF GRACE CANADA, INC.

ORDER

THIS MOTION made by Grace Canada, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Applicant"), for an Order:

(a) abridging the time for service of this motion;

(b) appointing Lauzon Bélanger S.E.N.C.R.L. and Scarfone Hawkins LLP (the "Representative Counsel") to act as representative counsel in these proceedings on behalf of all persons who have, or at any time in the future may have a claim, arising out of or in any way connected to damages or loss suffered, directly or in directly, from the manufacture, sale or distribution of Zonolite attic insulation products in Canada ("Canadian Claimants") by the Applicant or any of W.R. Grace & Co. and all of its subsidiaries (the "U.S. Debtors") as well as certain other Affiliated Entities (as defined in the order of the United States Bankruptcy Court (the "U.S. Court") made on January 22, 2002, as amended);

- (c) declaring that the Representative Counsel's powers shall include but not be limited to:
 - (i) representing the interests of Canadian Claimants in these proceedings;
 - (ii) appearing before this Honourable Court in these proceedings and applyingto this Honourable Court for advice and directions from time to time;
 - (iii) seeking to appear or have an agent seek to appear before the U.S. Court in
 the context of the U.S. Debtors' Chapter 11 cases (the "Chapter 11 Cases"); and
 - (iv) negotiating on behalf of the Canadian Claimants with the Applicant, The Attorney General of Canada (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada)
 (the "Crown"), the U.S. Debtors, the Affiliated Entities and any other person or entity;
- (d) declaring that Canadian Claimants shall be responsible for the fees and disbursements of the Representative Counsel subject to further order of this Honourable Court;
- (e) that any person affected by this Order (an "Affected Person") shall be entitled to apply to this Honourable Court for relief from time to time;
- (f) discharging Pierre Le Bourdais as information officer in these proceedings and appointing Richard C. Finke as information officer in these procedures; and
- (g) such further relief as this Honourable Court deems appropriate,

- 2 -

was heard this day at 393 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING, the Applicant's Notice of Motion, the affidavit of Richard Finke sworn January 31, 2006, the affidavit of Raven Thundersky ("Thundersky") sworn February 1, 2006, the affidavit of Yves Lauzon sworn February 3, 2006 and the affidavit of Merv Nordick sworn February 6, 2006, and on hearing the submissions of counsel for: (a) the Applicant; (b) Association Des Consommatuers Pour La Qualité Dans La Construction and Jean-Charles Dextras, Viviane Brosseau and Léotine Roberge-Turgeon; (c) the Crown; (d) Thundersky et. al.; and (e) Merv Nordick and Ernest Spencer et. al., and upon being advised that no other person has appeared on this date or served and filed responding materials on this motion although duly served and on reading the affidavit of service of Monique Massabki sworn February 2, 2006:

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Applicant's Notice of Motion and Motion Record in support of this Motion be and it is hereby abridged such that the Motion is properly returnable today, and, further, that any requirement for service of the Notice of Motion and of the Motion Record upon any interested party, other than the parties herein mentioned, is hereby dispensed with.

2. THIS COURT ORDERS that Lauzon Bélanger S.E.N.C.R.L. and Scarfone Hawkins LLP be appointed as representative counsel, in these proceedings on behalf of all Canadian Claimants.

 THIS COURT ORDERS that the Representative Counsel's power shall include but not be limited to:

(a) representing the interests of Canadian Claimants in these proceedings;

- (b) appearing before this Honourable Court in these proceedings and applying to thisHonourable Court for advice and directions from time to time;
- (c) seeking to appear or have an agent seek to appear before the U.S. Court in the context of the Chapter 11 Cases; and
- (d) negotiating on behalf of the Canadian Claimants with the Applicant, the Crown, the U.S. Debtors, the Affiliated Entities and any other person or entity.

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Canadian Claimants shall be responsible for the fees and disbursements of the Representative Counsel subject to further order of this Honourable Court.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Affected Person shall be entitled to apply to this Honourable Court for relief from time to time.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Pierre Le Bourdais be and is hereby discharged as information officer in these proceedings and Richard C. Finke is hereby appointed information officer in these proceedings.

-2

JOSEPH P VAN TASSEL REGISTRAR ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO ON / BOOK NO: LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO :

FER 0 9 2006

of RIPAS

IN THE MATTER OF S. 18.6 OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF GRACE CANADA, INC

Court File No: 01-CL-4081

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

ORDER

OGILVY RENAULT LLP Barristers & Solicitors Suite 3800, PO Box 84 Royal Bank Plaza, South Tower

200 Bay Street Toronto, Ontario M5J 2Z4

DERRICK C. TAY LSUC #21152A Tel: 416.216.4832 Fax: 416.216.3930

ORESTES PASPARAKIS LSUC # 36851T Tel: 416.216.4815 Fax: 416.216.3930

Solicitors for the Applicant

TAB 4

I.I.C. Ct. Filing 452007047003

Montreal Maine & Atlantic Canada Co. — Court File No. 500-11-045094-139 429. — **Representation Order, April 4, 2014**

Montreal Maine & Atlantic Canada Co., Court File No. 500-11-045094-139 (Quebec Superior Court (Commercial Division))

In the Matter of the Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of: Montreal, Main & Atlantic Canada Co. (Montreal, Maine & Atlantique Canada CIE) Debtor and Richter Advisory Group Inc. (Richter Groupe Conseil Inc.) Monitor and Yannick Gagné, Guy Ouellet, Serge Jacques and Louis-Serges Parent Class Action Plaintifs — Petitioners

SUPERIOR COURT

CANADA

PROVINCE OF QUEBEC

DISTRICT OF SAINT-FRANÇOIS

No. 450-11-000167-134

DATE: April 4, 2014

PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GAETAN DUMAS, J.S.C.

Representation Order

VU le jugement rendu ce jour sur la requête pour désigner les requérants du recours collectif à titre de représentants;

THE COURT:

[1] *GRANTS* the Class Action Petitioners' motion appointing them and their counsel (Daniel Larochelle, Consumer Law Group inc., Rochon Genova LLP and Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP, together, the "Vass Counsel" as representatives in this CCAA Proceeding of the Class Members (as defined in paragraph 2 of this Order) on the terms and conditions set forth in this Order.

[2] *DIRECTS* that any member of the Class who does not wish to be represented by Class Counsel and the Class Action Petitioners may opt-out of such representation by delivering prior to May 30, 2014 written notice of its election to opt-out in the form attached as Appendix "B" hereto (an "*Opt-Out Notice*") to the Debtor, the Monitor and the Class Action Petitioners by mail, registered mail, courier, facsimile transmission or email to the addresses shown on Appendix "C" hereto. Any member of the Class who does not deliver an Opt-Out Notice in accordance with this Order will be considered one of the "Vass Members" for purposes of this Order.

[3] *DIRECTS* that nothing in this Order affects the obligation of each and every Person with a Claim (including each and every member of the Class, and each and every Class Member) to file a Proof of Claim on an individual basis pursuant to the requirements of the Claims Procedure Order.

[4] *DIRECTS* that, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this Order and the requirement of each person with a Claim (including each and every member of the Class and each and every Class Member) to file a Proof of Claim on an individual basis pursuant to the requirements of the Claims Procedure Order, the Class Action Petitioners are authorized to file the Proof of Claim referred to, in paragraph 6 of the Claims Procedure Order.

[5] *DIRECTS* that the Class Action Petitioners, or their counsel on their behalf, are authorized to take all steps and to perform all acts necessary or desirable to carry out the terms of this Order on behalf of the Class Members, including, without limitation, by:

(a) negotiating and approving, on behalf of the Class Members, and binding the Class Members to, any settlements, including the terms of any future court order or Plan, and providing advice to Class Members in respect of same, and for this purpose the Class Action Petitioners shail have access to all individual Proofs of Claims filed by Class Members in the CCAA proceedings;

(b) dealing, on behalf of the Class Members, with stakeholders in these proceedings, the Monitor, any Court, regulatory body and other government ministry, department or agency,

(c) assisting Class Members or their representatives with the completion of their individual Proof of Claim pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order; and

(d) filing the Proof of Claim referred to in paragraph 6 of the Claims Procedure Order, or any other Proof of Claim that may be permitted by further order of the Court.

[6] *DIRECTS* that the reasonable professional fees incurred by Class Counsel on behalf of the Class Action Petitioners, including the costs associated with any legal, accounting or other experts, shall be determined, whether in these proceedings or in the Class Action, in accordance with further order of this Court and/or the Class Action Court, having regard to the usual principles and factors applied to the determination of Class Counsel's fees, including the recovery for Class Members, the risks undertaken, the contribution to the case and any settlements, and any retainer agreements between the Class Action Petitioners and their counsel, provided, however, that during the pendency of the CCAA Proceeding, no order of the Class Action Court shall deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review and consider any such professional costs.

[7] *DIRECTS* that notice of the granting of this Order shall be provided as part of the Newspaper Notice to be issued pursuant to the Claims Procedure Order, in form and substance reasonably satisfactory to the Debtor, the Monitor and the Class Action Petitioners.

[8] *DIRECTS* that nothing in this Order shall prejudice the rights of any party in respect of the Class Action Petitioners' application before the Class Action Court to authorize the bringing of a class action, and shall not have any evidentiary value on such an application or be considered to be either a binding or persuasive decision in respect of the class definition in the Proposed class action Proceedings. In addition, this Order is without Prejudice to the rights of any party to argue that the class definition should be defined differently in the Proposed class action or to argue that the Proposed class action should not be authorized.

[9] *DIRECTS* that the Class Action Petitioners, or their counsel on their behalf, and any other party may apply to this Court for advice and directions in the discharge of the Class Counsel and Class Action Petitioners' powers, responsibilities and duties pursuant to this Order, or for the variation of such powers, responsibilities and duties.

[10] DECLARES that service and notice of this motion was good and sufficient.

[11] ORDERS the provisional execution of this Order notwithstanding appeal.

[12] THE WHOLE without costs.

(S) Gaétan Dumas, j.c.s.

Gaétan Dumas, J.S.C.

Appendix "A" — Definition of Class Members

"All persons and entities residing in, owning or leasing property in, operating a business in, or being employed by a person resident in or a business located in Lac-Mégantic, and/or were physically present in Lac-Mégantic, including their estate, successor, spouse or partner, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent and sibling, who have suffered a loss of any nature or kind relating to or arising directly or indirectly from the train derailment that took place on July 6, 2013 in Lac-Mégantic, or any other group to be determined by the Court, other than the Government of Québec and the City of Lac-Mégantic."

Appendix "B" — Notice to Opt-Out of Representation in CCAA Proceedings

Richter Advisory Group Inc.

1981 McGill College

Montreal, Quebec

H3A 0G6

Attention: Claims Department

Telephone: 1-866-845-8958

Fax: 1-800-246-1125

Email: mmaclaims@richter.ca

Re: Notice to Opt-Out of Representation by the Class Action Petitioners in the Matter of Montreal Maine & Atlantic Canada Co. ("MMA") — CCAA (the "CCAA Proceedings")

I,, am a Class Member, as defined in the Representation Order of Mr. Justice Dumas J.S.C. dated March 28, 2014 (the "*Order*") as including:

All persons and entities residing in, owning or leasing property in, operating a business in, or being employed by a person resident in or a business located in Lac-Mégantic, and/or were physically present in Lac-Mégantic, including their succession, spouse or partner, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent and sibling, who have suffered a loss of any nature or kind relating to or arising directly or indirectly from the train derailment that took place on July 6, 2013 in Lac-Mégantic, or any other group to be determined by the Court, other than the Government of Québec and the City of Lac-Mégantic.

I understand and acknowledge the following:

1) that the Representative Petitioners in the Québec Class Action proceeding have sought and obtained an Order from Justice Dumas in the Québec CCAA proceedings authorizing them to act on behalf of all Class Members, including me, in the CCAA proceedings;

2) the Representation Order directs that Class Members who do not wish to be represented in the bankruptcy proceedings of MMA in the Québec Superior Court in Sherbrooke, Québec ("CCAA Proceedings") by the Class Action Petitioners may opt out, or exclude themselves from that Order, by delivering this form in accordance with the terms of the Order.

3) I further understand that the Class Action Petitioners in the CCAA proceeding are represented by the counsel who are prosecuting the class proceeding on behalf of the Lac-Mégantic residents, and the Class Petitioners are seeking to obtain financial recovery for the Class Members described above through the CCAA proceeding. This financial recovery, if

available in the CCAA proceeding, will be made available to the creditors (including Class Members) who will have filed a valid proof of claim before the Claims Bar Date (June 13, 2014).

4) in signing and delivering this letter on my own behalf I understand and expressly acknowledge that I am terminating the Class Action Petitioners' representation of me in the CCAA Proceedings;

5) further, if I do not deliver a claim in the CCAA Proceedings in accordance with the claims procedure approved by the Québec Court on or before June 13, 2014, then I also recognize that I will be barred from participating in the CCAA Proceedings and I will not receive any part of any monies distributed through the CCAA Proceedings, including, for example, the proceeds of the \$25 million insurance policy held by MMA, or the proceeds of any settlement in the CCAA proceeding with MMA's directors and officers, shareholders, and certain other third parties in connection with the Train Derailment.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF CLASS MEMBER

PRINT NAME OF CLASS MEMBER

Please provide the following contact information for the Class Member:

Address:

Telephone Number:

E-mail address:

If completing this form as an authorized or legal representative, please provide the following contact information:

Name:

Address:

Telephone Number:

E-mail address:

Relationship to Class Member:

Appendix "C" — Addresses for Opt-Out Notices

Monitor:

Richter Advisory Group

Attention: Claims department

Address: 1981 McGill College, 12th Floor, Montréal, Québec, H3A 0G6, Canada

Fax: 1-800-246-1125

Email: mmaclaims@richter.ca

Debtor:

clo Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP

Attention: Patrice Benoit Address: 3700-1 Place Ville Marie, Montréal, Québec, H3B 3P4, Canada Fax: 1-514-878-9641 Email: patrice.benoit@gowlings.com *Class Action Petitioners: clo Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP* Attention: Massimo Starnino Address: 55 Wellington St West, 35th Floor, Toronto, Ontario, M5V 3H1, Canada Fax: 416-646-4301 Email: max.starnino@paliareroland.com

End of Document

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TAB 5

I.I.C. Ct. Filing 200670834002

MuscleTech Research and Development Inc. — Court File No. 06-CL-6241 3. — Endorsement made January 18, 2006, by Farley, J.

Re MuscleTech Research and Development Inc., Court File No. 06-CL-6241 (Superior Court of Justice, Commercial List, Toronto, Ontario)

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO (COMMERCIAL LIST)

<i>RE</i> :	IN THE MATTER OF THE <i>COMPANIES</i> ' <i>CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT</i> , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED
_	AND IN THE MATTER OF MUSCLETECH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INC. AND THOSE ENTITIES LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A" HERETO
BEFORE :	FARLEY J.
COUNSEL:	Jay Carfagnini, for MuscleTech Research and Development Inc. et al.
—	
	Derrick Tay, for Paul Gardiner and Lovate Health Sciences Inc.
	Natasha MacParland, for RSM Richter Inc., proposed Monitor
HEARD :	January 18, 2006

Endorsement

[1] This is a short endorsement which may be elaborated upon.

[2] I am satisfied that the applicants are insolvent given their imbalance of assets to debt (both determined and contingent liability as to product liability suits) and that the debt of the applicant group is over the \$5 million threshold as to the CCAA test.

[3] The product liability situation vis-à-vis the non-applicants appears to be in essence derivative of claims against the applicants and it would neither be logical nor practical/functional to have that product liability litigation not be dealt with on an all encompassing basis: see *Re Lehndorff General Partners Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Re T. Eaton Co.* (1997), 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Campeau v. Olympia & York Development Ltd.* (1993), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.). It is understood that this stay will likely facilitate the entering into of overall *bona fide* resolution meetings/discussions which would form the foundation of a plan of reorganization and compromise.

[4] I further understand that the applicants, all of which are Canadian companies registered in Ontario and with the substantial connections to this jurisdiction as set out a paragraph 67 of the applicants' factum:

67. In addition to the location of each Applicant's registered office, it is respectfully submitted that the following factors further support a finding that each Applicant's COMI is Ontario, Canada:

- (a) each of the Applicants was incorporated in Ontario;
- (b) each Applicant's mailing address is an Ontario address;
- (c) the principals, directors and officers of the Applicants are residents of Ontario;

(d) all decision-making and control in respect of the Applicants, including product development, takes place at the Applicants' premises located in Ontario;

(e) the Applicants' principal banking arrangements have been conducted in Ontario through the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; and

(f) all administrative functions associated with the Applicants and all of the employees that perform such functions, including general accounting, financial reporting, budgeting and cash management, are conducted and situated in Ontario.

will be making an application later today in the Southern District of New York U.S. Bankruptcy Court for recognition, pursuant to Chapter 15 of the US *Bankruptcy Code*, of the Initial Order which I am granting. In that respect, I would observe that as I discussed in *Re Babcock & Wilcox Ltd.* (2000), 18 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. S.C.J.), the courts of Canada and of the US have long enjoyed a firm and ongoing relationship based on comity and commonalities of principles as to, *inter alia*, bankruptcy and insolvency.

[5] As this order today is being requested without notice to persons who may be affected, I would stress that these persons are completely at liberty and encouraged to use the comeback clause found at paragraph 59 of the Initial Order. In that respect, notwithstanding any order having previously been given, the onus rests with the applicants (and the applicants alone) to justify *ab initio* the relief requested and previously granted. Comeback relief, however, cannot prejudicially affect the position of parties who have relied *bona fide* on the previous order in question. This endorsement is to be provided to the creditors and others receiving notice.

[6] Order to issue as per my fiat.

J.M. Farley

DATE: January 18, 2006

End of Document

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TAB 6

2015 ONSC 124 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

4519922 Canada Inc., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 178, 2015 ONSC 124, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 44, 249 A.C.W.S. (3d) 508

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36 as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of 4519922 Canada Inc.

Newbould J.

Heard: December 8, 2014; January 6, 2015 Judgment: January 12, 2015 Docket: CV-1410791-00CL

Counsel: Robert I. Thornton, John T. Porter, Lee M. Nicholson, Asim Iqbal for Applicant Harry M. Fogul for 22, former CLCA partners Orestes Pasparakis, Evan Cobb for Insurers Avram Fishman, Mark Meland for German and Canadian Bank Groups, Widdrington Estate and Trustee of Castor Holdings Limited James H. Grout for 22, former CLCA partners

Chris Reed for 8, former CLCA partners

Andrew Kent for 5, former CLCA partners

Richard B. Jones for one, former CLCA partne

John MacDonald for Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP

James A. Woods, Sylvain Vauclair, Bogdan Catanu, Neil Peden for Chrysler Canada Inc. and CIBC Mellon Trust Company

Jay A. Swartz for proposed Monitor Ernst & Young Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Newbould J.:

Alberta Treasury Branches v. Tallgrass Energy Corp (2013), 8 C.B.R. (6th) 161, 2013 ABQB 432, 2013 CarswellAlta 1496 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Alexis Paragon Limited Partnership, Re (2014), 2014 ABQB 65, 2014 CarswellAlta 165, 9 C.B.R. (6th) 43 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187, 2006 ABQB 153, 2006 CarswellAlta 446 (Alta. Q.B.) — followed

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Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Crystallex International Corp., Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 7701, 2011 CarswellOnt 15034, 89 C.B.R. (5th) 313 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

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Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) —
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List]) — considered
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Statutes considered:
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
s. 2 "insolvent person" — considered
Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44
Generally — referred to
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to
s. 2(1) "debtor company" (a) — considered
s. 3(1) — considered

s. 11 — considered Partnerships Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.5 Generally - referred to

MOTION by creditor of insolvent accounting firm to set aside or vary initial order issued under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act; MOTION by partner of accounting firm to extend stay contained in initial order to include insurers of accounting firm.

Newbould J.:

1 On December 8, 2014 the applicant 4519922 Canada Inc. ("451"), applied for an Initial Order granting it protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA"), extending the protection of the Initial Order to the partnership Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accounts ("CLCA"), of which it is a partner and to CLCA's insurers, and to stay the outstanding litigation in the Quebec Superior Court relating to Castor Holdings Limited ("Castor") during the pendency of these proceedings. The relief was supported by the Canadian and German bank groups who are plaintiffs in the Quebec litigation, by the Widdrington Estate that has a final judgment against CLCA, by the insurers of CLCA and by 22 former CLCA partners who appeared on the application.

2 The material in the application included a term sheet which the applicant wishes to use as a basis of a plan and which provides for an injection of approximately \$220 million in return for a release from any further litigation. The term sheet was supported by all parties who appeared.

3 I granted the order with a stay to January 7, 2015 for reasons to follow, but in light of the fact that Chrysler Canada Inc., with a very large claim against CLCA in the litigation, had not been given notice of the application, ordered that Chrysler be given notice to make any submissions regarding the Initial Order if it wished to do so.

4 Chrysler has now moved to set aside the Initial Order, or in the alternative to vary it to delete the appointment of a creditors' committee and the provision for payment of the committee's legal fees and expenses. On the return of Chrysler's motion, a number of other former CLCA partners and PricewaterhouseCoopers appeared in support of the granting of the Initial Order.

Structure of Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accounts

5 The applicant 451 is a corporation continued pursuant to the provisions of the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, and its registered head office is in Toronto, Ontario. It and 4519931 Canada Inc. ("4519931") are the only partners of CLCA.

6 CLCA is a partnership governed by the *Partnerships Act (Ontario)* with its registered head office located in Toronto, Ontario. It was originally established in 1980 under the name of "Coopers & Lybrand" and was engaged in the accountancy profession. On September 2, 1985, the name "Coopers & Lybrand" was changed to "Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accountants" and the partnership continued in the accountancy profession operating under the new name. Until 1998, CLCA was a national firm of chartered accountants that provided audit and accounting services from offices located across Canada and was a member of a global network of professional firms.

7 In order to comply with the requirements of the various provincial Institutes of Chartered Accountants across Canada, many of which restricted chartered accountants providing audit services from being partners with persons who were not chartered accountants, Coopers & Lybrand Consulting Group ("CLCG") was established under the *Partnerships Act (Ontario)* in September 1985 to provide management consulting services. Concurrent with the formation of CLCG, Coopers & Lybrand ("OpCo") was established as a partnership of CLCA, CLCG and two other parties to develop and manage the CLCA audit and CLCG management consulting practices that had to remain separate. Until 1998, OpCo owned most of the operating assets of CLCA and CLCG. OpCo is governed by the Partnerships Act (Ontario) and its registered head office is in Toronto.

In 1998, the member firms of the global networks of each of Coopers & Lybrand and Price Waterhouse agreed upon a business combination of the two franchises. To effect the transaction in Canada, substantially all of CLCA's and CLCG's business assets were sold to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC"), which entity combined the operations of the Coopers & Lybrand entities and Price Waterhouse entities, and the partners of CLCA and CLCG at that time became partners of PwC. Subsequent to the closing of the PwC transaction, CLCA continued for the purpose of winding up its obligations and CLCA and CLCG retained their partnership interests in OpCo. By 2006, all individual CLCA partners had resigned and been replaced by two corporate partners to ensure CLCA's continued existence to deal with the continuing claims and obligations.

9 Since 1998, OpCo has administered the wind up of CLCA and CLCG's affairs, in addition to its own affairs, including satisfying outstanding legacy obligations, liquidating assets and administering CLCA's defence in the Castor litigation. In conjunction with OpCo, 451 and 4519931 have overseen the continued wind up of CLCA's affairs. The sole shareholders of 451 and 4519931 are two former CLCA partners. 451 and 4519931 have no assets or interests aside from their partnership interests in CLCA.

Castor Holdings litigation

10 Commencing in 1993, 96 plaintiffs commenced negligence actions against CLCA and 311 of its individual partners claiming approximately \$1 billion in damages. The claims arose from financial statements prepared by Castor and audited by CLCA, as well as certain share valuation letters and certificates for "legal for life" opinions. The claims are

for losses relating to investments in or loans made to Castor in the period 1988 to 1991. A critical issue in the Castor litigation was whether CLCA was negligent in doing its work during the period 1988-1991.

11 Fifty-six claims have either been settled or discontinued. Currently, with interest, the plaintiffs in the Castor litigation collectively claim in excess of \$1.5 billion.

12 Due to the commonality of the negligence issues raised in the actions, it was decided that a single case, brought by Peter Widdrington claiming damages in the amount of \$2,672,960, would proceed to trial and all other actions in the Castor litigation would be suspended pending the outcome of the Widdrington trial. All plaintiffs in the Castor litigation were given status in the Widdrington trial on the issues common to the various claims and the determination regarding common issues, including the issues of negligence and applicable law, was to be binding in all other cases.

13 The first trial in the Widdrington action commenced in September 1998, but ultimately was aborted in 2006 due to the presiding judge's illness and subsequent retirement. The new trial commenced in January 2008 before Madam Justice St. Pierre. A decision was rendered in April 2011 in which she held that Castor's audited consolidated financial statements for the period of 1988-1990 were materially misstated and misleading and that CLCA was negligent in performing its services as auditor to Castor during that period. She noted that that the overwhelming majority of CLCA's partners did not have any involvement with Castor or the auditing of the financial statements prepared by Castor.

14 The decision in the Widdrington action was appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal which on the common issues largely upheld the lower court's judgment. The only common issue that was overturned was the nature of the defendant partners' liability. The Quebec Court of Appeal held that under Quebec law, the defendant partners were severally liable. As such, each individual defendant partner is potentially and contingently responsible for his or her several share of the damages suffered by each plaintiff in each action in the Castor litigation for the period that he or she was a partner in the years of the negligence.

15 On January 9, 2014, the defendants' application for leave to appeal the Widdrington decision to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed.

16 The Widdrington action has resulted in a judgment in the amount of \$4,978,897.51, inclusive of interest, a cost award in the amount of \$15,896,297.26 plus interest, a special fee cost award in the amount of \$2.5 million plus interest, and a determination of the common issue that CLCA was negligent in performing its services as auditor to Castor during the relevant period.

17 There remain 26 separate actions representing 40 claims that have not yet been tried. Including interest, the remaining plaintiffs now claim more than \$1.5 billion in damages. Issues of causation, reliance, contributory negligence and damages are involved in them.

18 The Castor Litigation has given rise to additional related litigation:

(a) Castor's trustee in bankruptcy has challenged the transfer in 1998 of substantially all of the assets used in CLCA's business to PwC under the provisions of Quebec's bulk sales legislation. As part of the PwC transaction, CLCA, OpCo and CLCG agreed to indemnify PwC from any losses that it may suffer arising from any failure on the part of CLCA, OpCo or CLCG to comply with the requirements of any bulk sales legislation applicable to the PwC transaction. In the event that PwC suffers any loss arising from the bulk sales action, it has the right to assert an indemnity claim against CLCA, OpCo and CLCG.

(b) Certain of the plaintiffs have brought an action against 51 insurers of CLCA. They seek a declaration that the policies issued by the insurers are subject to Quebec law. The action would determine whether the insurance coverage is costs-inclusive (i.e. defence costs and other expenses are counted towards the total insurance coverage) or costs-in-addition (i.e. amounts paid for the defence of claims do not erode the policy limits). The insurers assert that any insurance coverage is costs-inclusive and has been exhausted. If the insurers succeed,

there will be no more insurance to cover claims. If the insurers do not succeed and the insurance policies are deemed to be costs-in-addition, the insurers may assert claims against CLCA for further premiums resulting from the more extensive coverage.

(c) The claim against the insurers was set to proceed to trial in mid-January 2015 for approximately six months. CLCA is participating in the litigation as a mis-en-cause and it has all the rights of a defendant to contest the action and is bound by the result. As a result of the stay in the Initial Order, the trial has been put off.

(d) There have been eight actions brought in the Quebec Superior Court challenging transactions undertaken by certain partners and parties related to them (typically a spouse) (the "Paulian Actions").

(e) There is a pending appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal involving an order authorizing the examination after judgment in the Widdrington action of Mr. David W. Smith.

19 The next trial to proceed against CLCA and the individual partners will be in respect of claims made by three German banks. It is not expected to start until at the least the fall of 2015 and a final determination is unlikely until 2017 at the earliest, with any appeals taking longer. It is anticipated that the next trial after the three German banks trial will be in respect of Chrysler's claim. Mr. Woods, who acts for Chrysler, anticipates that it will not start until 2017 with a trial decision perhaps being given in 2019 or 2020, with any appeals taking longer. The remaining claims will not proceed until after the Chrysler trial.

20 The fees incurred by OpCo and CLCA in the defence of the Widdrington action are already in excess of \$70 million. The total spent by all parties already amounts to at least \$150 million. There is evidence before me of various judges in Quebec being critical of the way in which the defence of the Widdrington action has been conducted in a "scorched earth" manner.

Individual partner defendants

Of the original 311 defendant partners, twenty-seven are now deceased. Over one hundred and fifty are over sixtyfive years of age, and sixty-five more will reach sixty-five years of age within five years. There is a dispute about the number of defendant partners who were partners of CLCA at the material time. CLCA believes that twenty-six were wrongly named in the Castor litigation (and most have now been removed), a further three were named in actions that were subsequently discontinued, some were partners for only a portion of the 1988-1991 period and some were named in certain actions but not others. Six of the defendant partners have already made assignments in bankruptcy.

Analysis

(i) Applicability of the CCAA

Section 3(1) of the CCAA provides that it applies to a debtor company where the total claims against the debtor company exceed \$5 million. By virtue of section 2(1)(a), a debtor company includes a company that is insolvent. Chrysler contends that the applicant has not established that it is insolvent.

The insolvency of a debtor is assessed at the time of the filing of the CCAA application. While the CCAA does not define "insolvent", the definition of "insolvent person" under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* is commonly referred to for guidance although the BIA definition is given an expanded meaning under the CCAA. See Holden, Morawetz & Sarra, *the 2013-2014 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Carswell) at N§12 and *Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) (per Farley J.); leave to appeal to the C of A refused 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.).

24 The BIA defines "insolvent person" as follows:

"insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and

(a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,

(b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or

(c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due;

25 The applicant submits that it is insolvent under all of these tests.

The applicant 451 is a debtor company. It is a partner of CLCA and is liable as a principal for the partnership's debts incurred while it is a partner.

At present, CLCA's outstanding obligations for which the applicant 451 is liable include: (i) various post-retirement obligations owed to former CLCA partners, the present value of which is approximately \$6.25 million (the "Pre-71 Entitlements"); (ii) \$16,026,189 payable to OpCo on account of a loan advanced by OpCo on October 17, 2011 to allow CLCA to pay certain defence costs relating to the Castor litigation; (iii) the Widdrington costs award in the amount of \$18,783,761.66, inclusive of interest as at December 1, 2014, which became due and payable to the plaintiff's counsel on November 27, 2014; (iv) the special fee in the amount of \$2,675,000, inclusive of interest as at December 1, 2014, awarded to the plaintiff's counsel in the Widdrington action; and (v) contingent liabilities relating to or arising from the Castor litigation, the claims of which with interest that have not yet been decided being approximately \$1.5 billion.

28 The only asset of the applicant 451 on its balance sheet is its investment of \$100 in CLCA. The applicant is a partner in CLCA which in turn is a partner in OpCo. At the time of the granting of the Initial Order, Ernst & Young Inc., the proposed Monitor, stated in its report that the applicant was insolvent based on its review of the financial affairs of the applicant, CLCA and OpCo.

Mr. Peden in argument on behalf of Chrysler analyzed the balance sheets of CLCA and OpCo and concluded that there were some \$39 million in realizable assets against liabilities of some \$21 million, leaving some \$18 million in what he said were liquid assets. Therefore he concluded that these assets of \$18 million are available to take care of the liabilities of 451.

30 I cannot accept this analysis. It was unsupported by any expert accounting evidence and involved assumptions regarding netting out amounts, one of some \$6.5 million owing to pre-1971 retired partners, and one of some \$16 million owing by CLCA to OpCo for defence costs funded by OpCo. He did not consider the contingent claims against the \$6.5 million under the indemnity provided to PWC, nor did he consider that the \$16 million was unlikely to be collectible by OpCo as explained in the notes to the financial statements of 451.

This analysis also ignored the contingent \$1.5 billion liabilities of CLCA in the remaining Castor litigation and the effect that would have on the defence costs and for which the applicant 451 will have liability and a contingent liability for cost awards rendered in that litigation against CLCA. These contingent liabilities must be taken into account in an insolvency analysis under the subsection (c) definition of an insolvent person in the BIA which refers to obligations due and accruing due. In *Stelco Inc., Re, supra*, Farley J. stated that all liabilities, contingent or unliquidated, have to be taken into account. See also *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) (per Farley J.).

32 It is obvious in this case that if the litigation continues, the defence costs for which the applicant 451 will have liability alone will continue and will more than eat up whatever cash OpCo may have. As well, the contingent liabilities of CLCA in the remaining \$1.5 billion in claims cannot be ignored just because CLCA has entered defences in all of them.

The negligence of CLCA has been established for all of these remaining cases in the Widdrington test case. The term sheet provides that the claims of the German and Canadian banks, approximately \$720 million in total, and the claim of the Trustee of CLCA of approximately \$108 million, will be accepted for voting and distribution purposes in a plan of arrangement. While there is no evidence before me at this stage what has led to the decision of CLCA and its former partners to now accept these claims, I can only conclude that in the circumstances it was considered by these defendants that there was exceptional risk in the actions succeeding. I hesitate to say a great deal about this as the agreement in the term sheet to accept these claims for voting and distribution purposes will no doubt be the subject of further debate in these proceedings at the appropriate time.

As stated, the balance sheet of the applicant 451 lists as its sole asset its investment of \$100 in CLCA. The notes to the financial statements state that CLCA was indebted to OpCo at the time, being June 30, 2014, for approximately \$16 million and that its only asset available to satisfy that liability was its investment in OpCo on which it was highly likely that there would be no recovery. As a result 451 would not have assets to support its liabilities to OpCo.

34 For this reason, as well as the contingent risks of liability of CLCA in the remaining claims of \$1.5 billion, it is highly likely that the \$100 investment of the applicant 451 in CLCA is worthless and unable to fund the current and future obligations of the applicant caused by the CLCA litigation.

I accept the conclusion of Ernst & Young Inc. that the applicant 451 is insolvent. I find that the applicant has established its insolvency at the time of the commencement of this CCAA proceeding.

(ii) Should an Initial Order be made and if so should it extend to CLCA?

36 The applicant moved for a stay in its favour and moved as well to extend the stay to CLCA and all of the outstanding Castor litigation. I granted that relief in the Initial Order. Chrysler contends that there should be no stay of any kind. It has not expressly argued that if a stay is granted against the applicant it should not be extended to CLCA, but the tenor of its arguments would encompass that.

I am satisfied that if the stay against the applicant contained in the Initial Order is maintained, it should extend to CLCA and the outstanding Castor litigation. A CCAA court may exercise its jurisdiction to extend protection by way of the stay of proceedings to a partnership related to an applicant where it is just and reasonable or just and convenient to do so. The courts have held that this relief is appropriate where the operations of a debtor company are so intertwined with those of a partner or limited partnership in question that not extending the stay would significantly impair the effectiveness of a stay in respect of the debtor company. See *Priszm Income Fund, Re* (2011), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) per Morawetz J. The stay is not granted under section 11 of the CCAA but rather under the court's inherent jurisdiction. It has its genesis in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) and has been followed in several cases, including *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) per Pepall J. (as she then was) and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.) per Romaine J.

38 The applicant 451's sole asset is its partnership interest in the CLCA partnership and its liabilities are derived solely from that interest. The affairs of the applicant and CLCA are clearly intertwined. Not extending the stay to CLCA and the Castor litigation would significantly impair the effectiveness of the stay in respect of 451. It would in fact denude it of any force at all as the litigation costs would mount and it would in all likelihood destroy any ability to achieve a global settlement of the litigation. CLCA is a necessary party to achieve a resolution of the outstanding litigation, and significant contributions from its interest in OpCo and from its former partners are anticipated under the term sheet in exchange for releases to be provided to them.

39 Chrysler relies on the principle that if the technical requirements for a CCAA application are met, there is discretion in a court to deny the application, and contends that for several reasons the equities in this case require the application

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2015 ONSC 124, 2015 CarswellOnt 178, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 44, 249 A.C.W.S. (3d) 508

to be met. It says that there is no business being carried on by the applicant or by CLCA and that there is no need for a CCAA proceeding to effect a sale of any assets as a going concern. It says there will be no restructuring of a business.

40 Cases under the CCAA have progressed since the earlier cases such as *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.) which expressed the purpose of the CCAA to be to permit insolvent companies to emerge and continue in business. The CCAA is not restricted to companies that are to be kept in business. See *First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 1299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 33 (per Brown J. as he then was). There are numerous cases in which CCAA proceedings were permitted without any business being conducted.

41 To cite a few, in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) the applicants sought relief under the CCAA principally as a means of achieving a global resolution of a large number of product liability and other lawsuits. The applicants had sold all of its operating assets prior to the CCAA application and had no remaining operating business. In *Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Canada Co. (Montreal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Cie), Re*, 2013 QCCS 3777 (Que. Bktcy.) arising out of the Lac-Mégant train disaster, it was acknowledged that the debtor would be sold or dismantled in the course of the CCAA proceedings. The CCAA proceedings were brought to deal with litigation claims against it and others. In *Crystallex International Corp., Re*, 2011 ONSC 7701 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) the CCAA is currently being utilized by a company with no operating business, the only asset of which is an arbitration claim.

42 Chrysler contends, as stated in its factum, that the pith and substance of this case is not about the rescue of a business; it is to shield the former partners of CLCA from their liabilities in a manner that should not be approved by this court. Chrysler refers to several statements by judges beginning in 2006 in the Castor litigation who have been critical of the way in which the Widdrington test case has been defended, using such phrases as "a procedural war of attrition" and "scorched earth" strategies. Chrysler contends that now that the insurance proceeds have run out and the former partners face the prospect of bearing the cost of litigation which that plaintiffs have had to bear throughout the 22-year war of attrition, the former partners have convinced the German and Canadian banks to agree to the compromise set out in the term sheet. To grant them relief now would, it is contended, reward their improper conduct.

43 Chrysler refers to a recent decision in Alberta, *Alexis Paragon Limited Partnership, Re*, 2014 ABQB 65 (Alta. Q.B.) in which a CCAA application was denied and a receiver appointed at the request of its first secured creditor. In that case Justice Thomas referred to a statement of Justice Romaine in *Alberta Treasury Branches v. Tallgrass Energy Corp*, 2013 ABQB 432 (Alta. Q.B.) in which she stated that an applicant had to establish that it has acted and is acting in good faith and with due diligence. Justice Thomas referred to past failures of the applicant to act with due diligence in resolving its financial issues and on that ground denied the CCAA application. Chrysler likens that to the manner in which the Widdrington test case was defended by CLCA.

I am not entirely sure what Justice Romaine precisely had in mind in referring to the need for an applicant to establish that "it has acted and is acting with good faith and with due diligence" but I would think it surprising that a CCAA application should be defeated on the failure of an applicant to have dealt with its affairs in a diligent manner in the past. That could probably said to have been the situation in a majority of cases, or at least arguably so, and in my view the purpose of CCAA protection is to attempt to make the best of a bad situation without great debate whether the business in the past was properly carried out. Did the MM&A railway in Lac-Mégantic act with due diligence in its safety practices? It may well not have, but that could not have been a factor considered in the decision to give it CCAA protection.

I do understand that need for an applicant to act in the CCAA process with due diligence and good faith, but I would be reluctant to lay down any fixed rule as to how an applicant's actions prior to the CCAA application should be considered. I agree with the statement of Farley J. in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) that it is the good faith of an applicant in the CCAA proceedings that is the issue:

Allegations ... of bad faith as to past activities have been made against the CCAA applicants and the Gardiner interests. However, the question of good faith is with respect to how these parties are conducting themselves in these CCAA proceedings.

There is no issue as to the good faith of the applicant in this CCAA proceeding. I would not set aside the Initial Order and dismiss the application on the basis of the defence tactics in the Widdrington test case.

The Castor litigation has embroiled CLCA and the individual partners for over 20 years. If the litigation is not settled, it will take many more years. Chrysler concedes that it likely will take at least until 2020 for the trial process on its claim to play out and then several more years for the appellate process to take its course. Other claims will follow the Chrysler claim. The costs have been enormous and will continue to escalate.

48 OpCo has dedicated all of its resources to the defence of the Castor litigation and it will continue to do so. OpCo has ceased distributions to its partners, including CLCA, in order to preserve funds for the purpose of funding the defence of the litigation. If the Castor litigation continues, further legal and other costs will be incurred by OpCo and judgments may be rendered against CLCA and its partners. If so, those costs and judgments will have to be paid by OpCo through advances from OpCo to CLCA. Since CLCA has no sources of revenue or cash inflow other than OpCo, the liabilities of CLCA, and therefore the applicant, will only increase.

49 If the litigation is not settled, CLCA's only option will be to continue in its defence of the various actions until either it has completely depleted its current assets (thereby exposing the defendant partners to future capital calls), or a satisfactory settlement or judicial determination has been reached. If no such settlement or final determination is achieved, the cost of the defence of the actions could fall to the defendant partners in their personal capacities. If a resolution cannot be reached, the amount that will be available for settlement will continue to decrease due to ongoing legal costs and other factors while at the same time, the damages claimed by the plaintiffs will continue to increase due to accruing interest. With the commencement of further trials, the rate of decrease of assets by funding legal costs will accelerate.

50 After a final determination had been reached on the merits in the Widdrington action, CLCA's board of directors created a committee comprised of certain of its members to consider the next steps in dealing with CLCA's affairs given that, with the passage of time, the defendant partners may ultimately be liable in respect of negligence arising from the Castor audits without a settlement.

51 Over the course of several months, the committee and the defendant partners evaluated many possible settlement structures and alternatives and after conferring with counsel for various plaintiffs in the Castor litigation, the parties agreed to participate in a further mediation. Multiple attempts had earlier been made to mediate a settlement. Most recently, over the course of four weeks in September and October 2014, the parties attended mediation sessions, both plenary and individually. Chrysler participated in the mediation.

52 Although a settlement could not be reached, the applicant and others supporting the applicant believe that significant progress was achieved in the mediation. In light of this momentum, the applicant and CLCA continued settlement discussions with certain plaintiffs willing to engage in negotiations. These discussions culminated with the execution of a term sheet outlining a plan of arrangement under the CCAA that could achieve a global resolution to the outstanding litigation.

53 A CCAA proceeding will permit the applicant and its stakeholders a means of attempting to arrive at a global settlement of all claims. If there is no settlement, the future looks bleak for everyone but the lawyers fighting the litigation.

54 The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It is also intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors

for the benefit of both. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Without a stay, such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan would succeed. See *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) per Farley J.

In this case it would be unfair to one plaintiff who is far down the line on a trial list to have to watch another plaintiff with an earlier trial date win and collect on a judgment from persons who may not have the funds to pay a later judgment. That would be chaos that should be avoided. A recent example of a stay being made to avoid such a possibility is the case of *Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Canada Co. (Montreal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Cie), Re* which stayed litigation arising out of the Lac-Mégant train disaster. See also *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*.

56 In this case, the term sheet that the applicant anticipates will form the basis of a proposed Plan includes, among other elements:

(a) the monetization of all assets of CLCA and its partnership OpCo to maximize the net proceeds available to fund the plan, including all applicable insurance entitlements that are payable or may become payable, which proceeds will be available to satisfy the determined or agreed claims of valid creditors;

(b) contributions from a significant majority of the defendant partners;

(c) contributions from non-defendant partners of CLCA and CLCG exposed under the PwC indemnity;

(d) contributions from CLCA's insurers and other defendants in the outstanding litigation;

(e) the appointment of Ernst & Young Inc. as Monitor to oversee the implementation of the plan, including to assist with the realization and monetization of assets and to oversee (i) the capital calls to be made upon the defendant partners, (ii) a claims process, and (iii) the distribution of the aggregate proceeds in accordance with the plan; and

(f) provision to all parties who contribute amounts under the plan, of a court-approved full and final release from and bar order against any and all claims, both present and future, of any kind or nature arising from or in any way related to Castor.

57 This term sheet is supported by the overwhelming number of creditors, including 13 German banks, 8 Canadian banks, over 100 creditors of Castor represented by the Trustee in bankruptcy of Castor and the Widdrington estate. It is also supported by the insurers. The plaintiffs other than Chrysler, representing approximately 71.2% of the face value of contingent claims asserted in the outstanding litigation against CLCA, either support, do not oppose or take no position in respect of the granting of the Initial Order. Chrysler represents approximately 28.8% of the face value of the claims.

58 Counsel for the German and Canadian banks points out that it has been counsel to them in the Castor claims and was counsel for the Widdrington estate in its successful action. The German and Canadian banks in their factum agree that during the course of the outstanding litigation over the past 20 years, they have been subjected to a "scorched earth", "war of attrition" litigation strategy adopted by CLCA and its former legal counsel. Where they seriously part company with Chrysler is that they vigorously disagree that such historical misconduct should prevent the CLCA group from using the CCAA to try to achieve the proposed global settlement with their creditors in order to finally put an end to this war of attrition and to enable all valid creditors to finally receive some measure of recovery for their losses.

59 It is argued by the banks and others that if Chrysler is successful in defeating the CCAA proceedings, the consequence would be to punish all remaining Castor plaintiffs and to deprive them of the opportunity of arriving at a global settlement, thus exacerbating the prejudice which they have already suffered. Chrysler, as only one creditor of the CLCA group, is seeking to impose its will on all other creditors by attempting to prevent them from voting on the

proposed Plan; essentially, the tyranny of the minority over the majority. I think the banks have a point. The court's primary concern under the CCAA must be for the debtor and all of its creditors. While it is understandable that an individual creditor may seek to obtain as much leverage as possible to enhance its negotiating position, the objectives and purposes of a CCAA should not be frustrated by the self-interest of a single creditor. See *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd.*, *Re*, 2007 ABCA 266 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), at para 38, per O'Brien J.A.

The German and Canadian banks deny that their resolve has finally been broken by the CLCA in its defence of the Castor litigation. On the contrary, they state a belief that due to litigation successes achieved to date, the time is now ripe to seek to resolve the outstanding litigation and to prevent any further dissipation of the assets of those stakeholders funding the global settlement. Their counsel expressed their believe that if the litigation continues as suggested by Chrysler, the former partners will likely end up bankrupt and unable to put in to the plan what is now proposed by them. They see a change in the attitude of CLCA by the appointment of a new committee of partners to oversee this application and the appointment of new CCAA counsel in whom they perceive an attitude to come to a resolution. They see CLCA as now acting in good faith.

61 Whether the banks are correct in their judgments and whether they will succeed in this attempt remains to be seen, but they should not be prevented from trying. I see no prejudice to Chrysler. Chrysler's contingent claim is not scheduled to be tried until 2017 at the earliest, and it will likely still proceed to trial as scheduled if a global resolution cannot be achieved in the course of this CCAA proceeding. Further, since Chrysler has not obtained a judgment or settlement in respect of its contingent claim, the Initial Order has not stayed any immediate right available to Chrysler. The parties next scheduled to proceed to trial in the outstanding litigation who have appeared, the insurers and then the three German banks, which are arguably the most affected by the issuance of a stay of proceedings, have indicated their support for this CCAA proceeding and Initial Order, including the stay of proceedings.

62 What exactly Chrysler seeks in preventing this CCAA application from proceeding is not clear. It is hard to think that it wants another 10 years of hard fought litigation before its claim is finally dealt with. During argument, Mr. Vauclair did say that Chrysler participated in the unsuccessful mediation and that it has been willing to negotiate. That remains to be seen, but this CCAA process will give it that opportunity.

63 Chrysler raises issues with the term sheet, including the provision that the claims of the German and Canadian banks and the Trustee of Castor will be accepted but that the Chrysler claim will be determined in a claims process. Chrysler raises issues regarding the proposed claims process and whether the individual CLCA former partners should be required to disclose all of their assets. These issues are premature and can be dealt with later in the proceedings as required.

Mr. Kent, who represents a number of former CLCA partners, said in argument that the situation cries out for settlement and that there are many victims other than the creditors, namely the vast majority of the former CLCA partners throughout Canada who had nothing to do with the actions of the few who were engaged in the Castor audit. The trial judge noted that the main CLCA partner who was complicit in the Castor Ponzi scheme hid from his partners his relationships with the perpetrators of the scheme.

Mr. Kent's statement that the situation cries out for settlement has support in the language of the trial judge in the Widdrington test case. Madame Justice St. Pierre said in her opening paragraph on her lengthy decision:

1 Time has come to put an end to the longest running judicial saga in the legal history of Quebec and Canada.

66 At the conclusion of her decision, she stated:

3637 Defendants say litigation is far from being finished since debates will continue on individual issues (reliance and damages), on a case by case basis, in the other files. They might be right. They might be wrong. They have to remember that litigating all the other files is only one of multiple options. Now that the litigants have on hand answers to all common issues, resolving the remaining conflicts otherwise is clearly an option (for example, resorting to alternative modes of conflict resolution).

In my view the CCAA is well able to provide the parties with a structure to attempt to resolve the outstanding Castor litigation. The Chrysler motion to set aside the Initial Order and to dismiss the CCAA application is dismissed.

(iii) Should the stay be extended to the insurers?

The applicant 451 moves as well to extend the stay to the insurers of CLCA. This is supported by the insurers. The trial against the insurers was scheduled to commence on January 12, 2015 but after the Initial Order was made, it was adjourned pending the outcome of the motion by Chrysler to set aside the Initial Order. Chrysler has made no argument that if the Initial Order is permitted to stand that it should be amended to remove the stay of the action against the insurers.

69 Under the term sheet intended to form the basis of a plan to be proposed by the applicant, the insurers have agreed to contribute a substantial amount towards a global settlement. It could not be expected that they would be prepared to do so if the litigation were permitted to proceed against them with all of the costs and risks associated with that litigation. Moreover, it could well have an effect on the other stakeholders who are prepared to contribute towards a settlement.

A stay is in the inherent jurisdiction of a court if it is in the interests of justice to do so. While many third party stays have been in favour of partners to applicant corporations, the principle is not limited to that situation. It could not be as the interests of justice will vary depending on the particulars of any case.

In *Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Canada Co. (Montreal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Cie), Re*, Castonguay, J.C.S. stayed litigation against the insurers of the railway. In doing so, he referred to the exceptional circumstances and the multiplicity of proceedings already instituted and concluded it was in the interests of sound administration of justice to stay the proceedings, stating:

En raison des circonstances exceptionnelles de la présente affaire et devant la multiplicité des recours déjà intentés et de ceux qui le seront sous peu, il est dans l'intérêt d'une saine administration de la justice d'accorder cette demande de MMA et d'étendre la suspension des recours à XL.

72 In my view, it is in the interests of justice that the stay of proceedings extend to the action against the insurers.

(iv) Should a creditors' committee be ordered and its fees paid by CLCA?

73 The Initial Order provides for a creditors' committee comprised of one representative of the German bank group, one representative of the Canadian bank group, and the Trustee in bankruptcy of Castor. It also provides that CLCA shall be entitled to pay the reasonable fees and disbursements of legal counsel to the creditors' committee. Chrysler opposes these provisions.

The essential argument of Chrysler is that a creditors' committee is not necessary as the same law firm represents all of the banks and the Trustee of Castor. Counsel for the banks and the Trustee state that the German bank group consists of 13 distinct financial institutions and the Canadian bank group consists of 8 distinct financial institutions and that there is no evidence in the record to the effect that their interests do not diverge on material issues. As for the Castor Trustee, it represents the interests of more than 100 creditors of Castor, including Chrysler, the German and Canadian bank groups, and various other creditors. They says that a creditors' committee brings order and allows for effective communication with all creditors.

75 CCAA courts routinely recognize and accept *ad hoc* creditors' committees. It is common for critical groups of critical creditors to form an *ad hoc* creditors' committee and confer with the debtor prior to a CCAA filing as part of out-of-court restructuring efforts and to continue to function as an *ad hoc* committee during the CCAA proceedings. See Robert J. Chadwick & Derek R. Bulas, "*Ad Hoc Creditors' Committees in CCAA Proceedings: The Result of a Changing and Expanding Restructuring World*", in Janis P. Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2011 (Toronto:Thomson Carswell) 119 at pp 120-121.

Chrysler refers to the fact that it is not to be a member of the creditors' committee. It does not ask to be one. Mr. Meland, counsel for the two bank groups and for the Trustee of Castor said during argument that they have no objection if Chrysler wants to join the committee. If Chrysler wished to join the committee, however, it would need to be considered as to whether antagonism, if any, with other members would rob the committee of any benefit.

Chrysler also takes exception to what it says is a faulty claims process proposed in the term sheet involving the creditors' committee. Whether Chrysler is right or not in its concern, that would not be a reason to deny the existence of the committee but rather would be a matter for discussion when a proposed claims process came before the court for approval.

78 The creditors' committee in this case is the result of an intensely negotiated term sheet that forms the foundation of a plan. The creditors' committee was involved in negotiating the term sheet. Altering the terms of the term sheet by removing the creditors' committee could frustrate the applicant's ability to develop a viable plan and could jeopardize the existing support from the majority of claimants. I would not accede to Chrysler's request to remove the Creditors' committee.

So far as the costs of the committee are concerned, I see this as mainly a final cri de couer from Chrysler. The costs in relation to the amounts at stake will no doubt be relatively minimal. Chrysler says it is galling to see it having to pay 28% (the size of its claim relative to the other claims) to a committee that it thinks will work against its interests. Whether the committee will work against its interests is unknown. I would note that it is not yet Chrysler's money, but CLCA's. If there is no successful outcome to the CCAA process, the costs of the committee will have been borne by CLCA. If the plan is successful on its present terms, there will be \$220 million available to pay claims, none of which will have come from Chrysler. I would not change the Initial Order an deny the right of CLCA to pay the costs of the creditors' committee.

⁸⁰ Finally, Chrysler asks that if the costs are permitted to be paid by CLCA, a special detailed budget should be made and provided to Chrysler along with the amounts actually paid. I see no need for any particular order. The budget for these fees is and will be continued to be contained in the cash flow forecast provided by the Monitor and comparisons of actual to budget will be provided by the Monitor in the future in the normal course.

Conclusion

81 The motion of Chrysler is dismissed. The terms of the Initial Order are continued.

Order accordingly.

End of Document

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TAB 7

1998 CarswellOnt 3346 Ontario Court of Justice, General Division [Commercial List]

Canadian Red Cross Society/Société canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re

1998 CarswellOnt 3346, [1998] O.J. No. 3306, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99, 81 A.C.W.S. (3d) 932

In the matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36

In the matter of a plan of compromise or arrangement of the Canadian Red Cross Society/La Société canadienne de la Croix-Rouge

Blair J.

Judgment: August 19, 1998 * Docket: 98-CL-002970

Proceedings: additional reasons at (August 19, 1998), Doc. 98-CL-002970 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); further additional reasons at (August 19, 1998), Doc. 98-CL-002790 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])

Counsel: B. Zarnett, B. Empey and J. Latham, for Canadian Red Cross. E.B. Leonard, S.J. Page and D.S. Ward, for Provinces except Que. and for the Canadian Blood Services. Jeffrey Carhart, for Héma - Québec and for the Government of Québec. Marlene Thomas and John Spencer, for the Attorney General of Canada. Pierre R. Lavigne and Frank Bennett, for Quebec '86-90 Hepatitis C Claimants. Pamela Huff and Bonnie Tough, for the 1986-1990 Haemophiliac Hepatitis C Claimants. Harvin Pitch and Kenneth Arenson, for the 1986-1990 Hepatitis C Class Action Claimants. Aubrey Kaufman and David Harvey, for the Pre 86/Post 90 Hepatitis C Class Action Claimants. Bruce Lemer, for B.C. 1986-90 Class Action. Donna Ring, for HIV Claimants. David A. Klein, for B.C. Pre-86/Post-90 Hepatitis C Claimants. David Thompson - Agent for Quebec Pre-86/Post 90 Hepatitis C Claimants. Michael Kainer, for Service Employees International Union. I.V.B. Nordheimer, for Bayer Corporation. R.N. Robertson, Q.C., and S.E. Seigel, for T.D. Bank. James H. Smellie, for the Canadian Blood Agency. W.V. Sasso, for the Province of British Columbia. Justin R. Fogarty, for Raytheon Engineers. Nancy Spies, for Central Hospital et al (Co-D). M. Thomson, for various physicians. C. H. Freeman, for Blood Trac System.

Subject: Intellectual Property; Property; Corporate and Commercial; Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Blair J*.:

Dylex Ltd., Re (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — applied *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — applied *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bulk Sales Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.14 Generally — referred to

s. 3 — considered Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

s. 4 — considered

s. 5 — considered

s. 11 — considered

MOTION by Society for approval of sale and transfer of its blood supply assets and operations; CROSS-MOTION by transfusion claimants for order directing holding of meeting of creditors to consider counter-proposal based on Society's continued operation of blood system.

Blair J.:

Background and Genesis of the Proceedings

1 The Canadian Red Cross Society/La Société Canadienne de la Croix Rouge has sought and obtained the insolvency protection and supervision of the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"). It has done so with a view to putting forward a Plan to compromise its obligations to creditors and also as part of a national process in which responsibility for the Canadian blood supply is to be transferred from the Red Cross to two new agencies which are to form a new national blood authority to take control of the Canadian Blood Program.

2 The Red Cross finds itself in this predicament primarily as a result of some \$8 billion of tort claims being asserted against it (and others, including governments and hospitals) by a large number of people who have suffered tragic harm from diseases contacted as a result of a blood contamination problem that has haunted the Canadian blood system since at least the early 1980's. Following upon the revelations forthcoming from the wide-ranging and seminal Krever Commission Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada, and the concern about the safety of that system — and indeed alarm — in the general population as a result of those revelations, the federal, provincial and territorial governments decided to transfer responsibility for the Canadian Blood Supply to a new national authority. This new national authority consists of two agencies, the Canadian Blood Service and Héma-Québec.

The Motions

3 The primary matters for consideration in these Reasons deal with a Motion by the Red Cross for approval of the sale and transfer of its blood supply assets and operations to the two agencies and a cross-Motion on behalf of one of the Groups of Transfusion Claimants for an order dismissing that Motion and directing the holding of a meeting of creditors to consider a counter-proposal which would see the Red Cross continue to operate the blood system for a period of time and attempt to generate sufficient revenues on a fee-for-blood-service basis to create a compensation fund for victims.

4 There are other Motions as well, dealing with such things as the appointment of additional Representative Counsel and their funding, and with certain procedural matters pertaining generally to the CCAA proceedings. I will return to these less central motions at the end of these Reasons.

Operation of the Canadian Blood System and Evolution of the Acquisition Agreement

5 Transfer of responsibility for the operation of the Canadian blood supply system to a new authority will mark the first time that responsibility for a nationally co-ordinated blood system has not been in the hands of the Canadian Red Cross. Its first blood donor clinic was held in January, 1940 - when a national approach to the provision of a blood supply was first developed. Since 1977, the Red Cross has operated the Blood Program furnishing the Canadian health system with a variety of blood and blood products, with funding from the provincial and territorial governments. In 1981, the Canadian Blood Committee, composed of representatives of the governments, was created to oversee the Blood Program on behalf of the Governments. In 1991 this Committee was replaced by the Canadian Blood Agency — whose members are the Ministers of Health for the provinces and territories — as funder and co-ordinator of the Blood Program. The Canadian Blood Agency, together with the federal government's regulatory agency known as BBR (The Bureau of Biologics and Radiopharmaceuticals) and the Red Cross, are the principal components of the organizational structure of the current Blood Supply System.

In the contemplated new regime, The Canadian Blood Service has been designated as the vehicle by which the Governments in Canada will deliver to Canadians (in all provinces and territories except Quebec) a new fully integrated and accountable Blood Supply System. Quebec has established Héma-Québec as its own blood service within its own health care system, but subject to federal standards and regulations. The two agencies have agreed to work together, and are working in a co-ordinated fashion, to ensure all Canadians have access to safe, secure and adequate supplies of blood, blood products and their alternatives. The scheduled date for the transfer of the Canadian blood supply operations from the Red Cross to the new agencies was originally September 1, 1998. Following the adjournment of these proceedings on July 31st to today's date, the closing has been postponed. It is presently contemplated to take place shortly after September 18, 1998 if the transaction is approved by the Court.

The assets owned and controlled by the Red Cross are important to the continued viability of the blood supply operations, and to the seamless transfer of those operations in the interests of public health and safety. They also have value. In fact, they are the source of the principal value in the Red Cross's assets which might be available to satisfy the claims of creditors. Their sale was therefore seen by those involved in attempting to structure a resolution to all of these political, social and personal problems, as providing the main opportunity to develop a pool of funds to go towards satisfying the Red Cross's obligations regarding the claims of what are generally referred to in these proceedings as the "Transfusion Claimants". It appears, through, that the Transfusion Claimants did not have much, if any, involvement in the structuring of the proposed resolution.

8 Everyone recognizes, I think, that the projected pool of funds will not be sufficient to satisfy such claims in full, but it is thought — by the Red Cross and the Governments, in any event — that the proceeds of sale from the transfer of the Society's blood supply assets represent the best hope of maximizing the return on the Society's assets and thus of maximizing the funds available from it to meet its obligations to the Transfusion Claimants.

9 This umbrella approach — namely, that the blood supply operations must be transferred to a new authority, but that the proceeds generated from that transfer should provide the pool of funds from which the Transfusion Claimants can, and should, be satisfied, so that the Red Cross may avoid bankruptcy and continue its other humanitarian operations — is what led to the marriage of these CCAA proceedings and the transfer of responsibility for the Blood System. The Acquisition Agreement which has been carefully and hotly negotiated over the past 9 months, and the sale from the Red Cross to the new agencies is — at the insistence of the Governments — subject to the approval of the Court, and they are as well conditional upon the Red Cross making an application to restructure pursuant to the CCAA.

10 The Initial Order was made in these proceedings under the CCAA on July $20^{\text{ th}}$.

The Sale and Transfer Transaction

11 The Acquisition Agreement provides for the transfer of the operation of the Blood Program from the Red Cross to the Canadian Blood Service and Héma-Québéc, together with employees, donor and patient records and assets relating to the operation of the Program on September 1, 1998. Court approval of the Agreement, together with certain orders to ensure the transfer of clear title to the Purchasers, are conditions of closing. 12 The sale is expected to generate about \$169 million in all, before various deductions. That sum is comprised of a purchase price for the blood supply assets of \$132.9 million plus an estimated \$36 million to be paid for inventory. Significant portions of these funds are to be held in escrow pending the resolution of different issues; but, in the end, after payment of the balance of the outstanding indebtedness to the T-D Bank (which has advanced a secured line of credit to fund the transfer and re-structuring) and the payment of certain creditors, it is anticipated that a pool of funds amounting to between \$70 million and \$100 million may be available to be applied against the Transfusion Claims.

13 In substance, the new agencies are to acquire all fixed assets, inventory, equipment, contracts and leases associated with the Red Cross Blood Program, including intellectual property, information systems, data, software, licences, operating procedures and the very important donor and patient records. There is no doubt that the sale represents the transfer of the bulk of the significant and valuable assets of the Red Cross.

A vesting order is sought as part of the relief to be granted. Such an order, if made, will have the effect of extinguishing realty encumbrances against and security interest in those assets. I am satisfied for these purposes that appropriate notification has been given to registered encumbrancers and other security interest holders to permit such an order to be made. I am also satisfied, for purposes of notification warranting a vesting order, that adequate notification of a direct and public nature has been given to all of those who may have a claim against the assets. The CCAA proceedings themselves, and the general natural of the Plan to be advanced by the Red Cross — including the prior sale of the blood supply assets — has received wide coverage in the media. Specific notification has been published in principal newspapers across the country. A document room containing relevant information regarding the proposed transaction, and relevant financial information, was set up in Toronto and most, if not all, claimants have taken advantage of access to that room. Richter & Partners were appointed by the Court to provide independent financial advice to the Transfusion Claimants, and they have done so. Accordingly, I am satisfied in terms of notification and service that the proper foundation for the granting of the Order sought has been laid.

15 What is proposed, to satisfy the need to protect encumbrancers and holders of personal security interests is,

a) that generally speaking, prior registered interests and encumbrances against the Red Cross's lands and buildings will not be affected-i.e., the transfer and sale will take place subject to those interests, or they will be paid off on closing; and,

b) that registered personal property interests will either be assumed by the Purchasers or paid off from the proceeds of closing in accordance with their legal entitlement.

Whether the Purchase Price is Fair and Reasonable

16 The central question for determination on this Motion is whether the proposed Purchase Price for the Red Cross's blood supply related assets is fair and reasonable in the circumstances, and a price that is as close to the maximum as is reasonably likely to be obtained for such assets. If the answer to this question is "Yes", then there can be little quarrel — it seems to me-with the conversion of those assets into cash and their replacement with that cash as the asset source available to satisfy the claims of creditors, including the Transfusion claimants. It matters not to creditors and Claimants whether the source of their recovery is a pool of cash or a pool of real/personal/intangible assets. Indeed, it may well be advantageous to have the assets already crystallised into a cash fund, readily available and earning interest. What is important is that the value of that recovery pool is as high as possible.

17 On behalf of the 1986-1990 Québec Hepatitis C Claimants Mr. Lavigne and Mr. Bennett argue, however, that the purchase price is *not* high enough. Mr. Lavigne has put forward a counter-proposal which he submits will enhance the value of the Red Cross's blood supply assets by giving greater play to the value of its exclusive licence to be the national supplier of blood, and which will accordingly result in a much greater return for Claimants. This proposal has been referred to as the "Lavigne Proposal" or the "No-Fault Plan of Arrangement". I shall return to it shortly; but first I propose to deal with the submissions of the Red Cross and of those who support its Motion for approval, that the Canadian Red Cross Society/Société canadienne de la..., 1998 CarswellOnt 3346

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proposed price is fair and reasonable. Those parties include the Governments, the proposed Purchasers — the Canadian Blood Service and Héma-Québec — and several (but not all) of the other Transfusion Claimant Groups.

As I have indicated, the gross purchase price under the Acquisition Agreement is \$132.9 million, plus an additional amount to be paid for inventory on closing which will generate a total purchase price of approximately \$169 million. Out of that amount, the Bank indebtedness is to be paid and the claims of certain other creditors defrayed. It is estimated that a fund of between \$70 million and \$100 million will be available to constitute the trust fund to be set aside to satisfy Transfusion Claims.

19 This price is based upon a Valuation prepared jointly by Deloitte & Touche (financial advisor to the Governments) and Ernst & Young (financial advisor to the Red Cross and the present Monitor appointed under the Initial CCAA Order). These two financial advisors retained and relied upon independent appraisal experts to appraise the realty (Royal LePage), the machinery and equipment and intangible assets (American Appraisal Canada Inc.) and the laboratories (Pellemon Inc.). The experience, expertise and qualifications of these various experts to conduct such appraisals cannot be questioned. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that neither Deloitte & Touche nor Ernst & Young are completely "independent" in this exercise, given the source of their retainers. It was at least partly for this reason that the Court was open to the suggestion that Richter & Partners be appointed to advise the 1986-1990 Ontario Class Action Claimants). The evidence and submissions indicate that Richter & Partners have met with the Monitor and with representatives of Deloitte & Touche, and that all enquiries have been responded to.

20 Richter & Partners were appointed at the instance of the 1986-1990 Ontario Hepatitis C Claimants Richter & Partners, with a mandate to share their information and recommendations with the other Groups of Transfusion Claimants. Mr. Pitch advises on behalf of that Group that as a result of their due diligence enquiries his clients are prepared to agree to the approval of the Acquisition Agreement, and, indeed urge that it be approved quickly. A significant number of the other Transfusion Claimant groups — but by no means all — have taken similar positions, although subject in some cases to certain caveats, none of which pertain to the adequacy of the purchase price. On behalf of the 1986-1990 Hemophiliac Claimants, for instance, Ms. Huff does not oppose the transfer approval, although she raises certain concerns about certain terms of the Acquisition Agreement which may impinge upon the amount of monies that will be available to Claimants on closing, and she would like to see these issues addressed in any Order, if approval is granted. Mr. Lemer, on behalf of the British Columbia 1986-1990 Hepatitis C Class Action Claimants, takes the same position as Ms. Huff, but advises that his clients' further due diligence has satisfied them that the price is fair and reasonable. While Mr. Kaufman, on behalf of Pre 86/Post 90 Hepatitis C Claimants, advances a number of jurisdictional arguments against approval, his clients do not otherwise oppose the transfer (but they would like certain caveats applied) and they do not question the price which has been negotiated for the Red Cross's blood supply assets. Mr. Kainer for the Service Employees Union (which represents approximately 1,000 Red Cross employees) also supports the Red Cross Motion, as does, very eloquently, Ms. Donna Ring who is counsel for Ms. Janet Conners and other secondarily infected spouses and children with HIV.

21 Thus, there is broad support amongst a large segment of the Transfusion Claimants for approval of the sale and transfer of the blood supply assets as proposed.

22 Some of these supporting Claimants, at least, have relied upon the due diligence information received through Richter & Partners, in assessing their rights and determining what position to take. This independent source of due diligence therefore provides some comfort as to the adequacy of the purchase price. It does not necessarily carry the day, however, if the Lavigne Proposal offers a solution that may reasonably practically generate a higher value for the blood supply assets in particular and the Red Cross assets in general. I turn to that Proposal now.

The Lavigne Proposal

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23 Mr. Lavigne is Representative Counsel for the 1986-1990 Québec Hepatitis C Claimants. His cross-motion asks for various types of relief, including for the purposes of the main Motion,

a) an order dismissing the Red Cross motion for court approval of the sale of the blood supply assets;

b) an order directing the Monitor to review the feasibility of the Lavigne Proposal's plan of arrangement (the "No-Fault Plan of Arrangement") which has now been filed with the Court of behalf of his group of "creditors"; and,

c) an order scheduling a meeting of creditors within 6 weeks of the end of this month for the purpose of voting on the No-Fault Plan of Arrangement.

This cross-motion is supported by a group of British Columbia Pre 86/Post 90 Hepatitis C Claimants who are formally represented at the moment by Mr. Kaufman but for whom Mr. Klein now seeks to be appointed Representative Counsel. It is also supported by Mr. Lauzon who seeks to be appointed Representative Counsel for a group of Québec Pre 86/Post 90 Hepatitis C Claimants. I shall return to these "Representation" Motions at the end of these Reasons. Suffice it to say at this stage that counsel strongly endorsed the Lavigne Proposal.

25 The Lavigne Proposal can be summarized in essence in the following four principals, namely:

1. Court approval of a no-fault plan of compensation for all Transfusion Claimants, known or unknown;

2. Immediate termination by the Court of the Master Agreement presently governing the relationship between the Red Cross and the Canadian Blood Agency, and the funding of the former, which Agreement requires a one-year notice period for termination;

3. Payment in full of the claims of all creditors of the Red Cross; and,

4. No disruption of the Canadian Blood Supply.

26 The key assumptions and premises underlying these notions are,

• that the Red Cross has a form of monopoly in the sense that it is the only blood supplier licensed by Government in Canada to supply blood to hospitals;

• that, accordingly, this license has "value", which has not been recognized in the Valuation prepared by Deloitte & Touche and by Ernst & Young, and which can be exploited and enhanced by the Red Cross continuing to operate the Blood Supply and charging hospitals directly on a fully funded cost recovery basis for its blood services;

• that Government will not remove this monopoly from the Red Cross for fear of disrupting the Blood Supply in Canada;

• that the Red Cross would be able to charge hospitals sufficient amounts not only to cover its costs of operation (without any public funding such as that now coming from the Canadian Blood Agency under the Master Agreement), but also to pay all of its creditors <u>and</u> to establish a fund which would allow for compensation over time to all of the Transfusion Claimants; and, finally,

• that the no-fault proposal is simply an introduction of the Krever Commission recommendations for a scheme of no-fault compensation for all transfusion claimants, for the funding of the blood supply program as through direct cost recovery from hospitals, and for the inclusion of a component for a compensation fund in the fee for service delivery charge.

27 In his careful argument in support of his proposal Mr. Lavigne was more inclined to couch his rationale for the Nofault Plan in political terms rather than in terms of the potential value created by the Red Cross monopoly licence and arising from the prospect of utilizing that monopoly licence to raise revenue on a fee-for-blood-service basis, thus leading — arguably — to an enhanced "value" of the blood supply operations and assets. He seemed to me to be suggesting, in essence, that because there are significant Transfusion Claims outstanding against the Red Cross, Government as the indirect purchaser of the assets should recognize this and incorporate into the purchase price an element reflecting the value of those claims. It was submitted that because the Red Cross has (or, at least, will have had) a monopoly licence regarding the supply of blood products in Canada, and because it *could* charge a fee-for-blood-service to hospitals for those services and products, and because other regimes in other countries employ such a fee for service system and build in an insurance or compensation element for claims, and because the Red Cross *might* be able to recover such an element in the regime he proposes for it, then the purchase price *must* reflect the value of those outstanding claims in some fashion. I am not able to understand, in market terms, however, why the value of a debtor's assets is necessarily reflective in any way of the value of the claims against those assets. In fact, it is the stuff of the everyday insolvency world that exactly the opposite is the case. In my view, the argument is more appropriately put — for the purposes of the commercial and restructuring considerations which are what govern the Court's decisions in these types of CCAA proceedings — on the basis of the potential increase in value from the revenue generating capacity of the monopoly licence itself. In fairness, that is the way in which Mr. Lavigne's Proposal is developed and justified in the written materials filed.

After careful consideration of it, however, I have concluded that the Lavigne Proposal cannot withstand scrutiny, in the context of these present proceedings.

Farley Cohen — a forensic a principal in the expert forensic investigative and accounting firm of Linquist Avery Macdonald Baskerville Company — has testified that in his opinion the Red Cross operating licence "provides the potential opportunity and ability for the Red Cross to satisfy its current and future liabilities as discussed below". Mr. Cohen then proceeds in his affidavit to set out the basis and underlying assumptions for that opinion in the following paragraphs, which I quote in their entirety:

1. In my opinion, if the Red Cross can continue as a sole and exclusive operator of the Blood Supply Program and can amend its funding arrangements to provide for full cost recovery, including the cost of proven claims of Transfusion Claimants, and whereby the Red Cross would charge hospitals directly for the Blood Safety Program, then there is a substantial value to the Red Cross to satisfy all the claims against it.

2. In my opinion, such value to the Red Cross is not reflected in the Joint Valuation Report.

3. My opinion is based on the following assumptions: (i) the Federal Government, while having the power to issue additional licences to other Blood System operators, would not do so in the interest of public safety; (ii) the Red Cross can terminate the current funding arrangement pursuant to the terms of the Master Agreement; and (iii) the cost of blood charged to the hospitals would not be cost-prohibitive compared to alternative blood suppliers.

(highlighting in original)

30 On his cross-examination, Mr. Cohen acknowledged that he did not know whether his assumptions could come true or not. That difficulty, it seems to me, is an indicia of the central weakness in the Lavigne Proposal. The reality of the present situation is that all 13 Governments in Canada have determined unequivocally that the Red Cross will no longer be responsible for or involved in the operation of the national blood supply in this country. That is the evidentiary bedrock underlying these proceedings. If that is the case, there is simply no realistic likelihood that any of the assumptions made by Mr. Cohen will occur. His opinion is only as sound as the assumptions on which it is based.

Like all counsel — even those for the Transfusion Claimants who do not support his position — I commend Mr. Lavigne for his ingenuity and for his sincerity and perseverence in pursing his clients' general goals in relation to the blood

supply program. However, after giving it careful consideration as I have said, I have come to the conclusion that the Lavigne Proposal — whatever commendation it my deserve in other contexts — does not offer a workable or practical alternative solution in the context of these CCAA proceedings. I question whether it can even be said to constitute a "Plan of Compromise and Arrangement" within the meaning of the CCAA, because it is not something which either the debtor (the Red Cross) or the creditors (the Transfusion Claimants amongst them) have control over to make happen. It is, in reality, a political and social solution which must be effected by Governments. It is not something which can be imposed by the Court in the context of a restructuring. Without deciding that issue, however, I am satisfied that the Proposal is not one which in the circumstances warrants the Court in exercising its discretion under sections 4 and 5 of the CCAA to call a meeting of creditors to vote on it.

Mr. Justice Krever recommended that the Red Cross not continue in the operation of the Blood Supply System and, while he did recommend the introduction of a no-fault scheme to compensate all blood victims, it was not a scheme that would be centred around the continued involvement of the Red Cross. It was a government established statutory no-fault scheme. He said (Final Report, Vol. 3, p. 1045):

The provinces and territories of Canada should devise statutory no-fault schemes that compensate all blood-injured persons promptly and adequately, so they do not suffer impoverishment or illness without treatment. I therefore recommend that, without delay, the provinces and territories devise statutory no-fault schemes for compensating persons who suffer serious adverse consequences as a result of the administration of blood components or blood products.

33 Governments — which are required to make difficult choices — have chosen, for their own particular reasons, not to go down this particular socio-political road. While this may continue to be a very live issue in the social and political arena, it is not one which, as I have said, is a solution that can be imposed by the Court in proceedings such as these.

I am satisfied, as well, that the Lavigne Proposal ought not to impede the present process on the basis that it is unworkable and impractical, in the present circumstances, and given the determined political decision to transfer the blood supply from the Red Cross to the new agencies, might possibly result in a disruption of the supply and raise concerns for the safety of the public if that were the case. The reasons why this is so, from an evidentiary perspective, are well articulated in the affidavit of the Secretary General of the Canadian Red Cross, Pierre Duplessis, in his affidavit sworn on August 17, 1998. I accept that evidence and the reasons articulated therein. In substance Dr. Duplessis states that the assumptions underlying the Lavigne Proposal are "unrealistic, impractical and unachievable for the Red Cross in the current environment" because,

a) the political and factual reality is that Governments have clearly decided — following the recommendation of Mr. Justice Krever — that the Red Cross will not continue to be involved in the National Blood Program, and at least with respect to Québec have indicated that they are prepared to resort to their powers of expropriation if necessary to effect a transfer;

b) the delays and confusion which would result from a postponement to test the Lavigne Proposal could have detrimental effects on the blood system itself and on employees, hospitals, and other health care providers involved in it;

c) the Master Agreement between the Red Cross and the Canadian Blood Agency, under which the Society currently obtains its funding, cannot be cancelled except on one year's notice, and even if it could there would be great risks in denuding the Red Cross of all of its existing funding in exchange for the prospect of replacing that funding with fee for service revenues; and,

d) it is very unlikely that over 900 hospitals across Canada — which have hitherto not paid for their blood supply, which have no budgets contemplating that they will do so, and which are underfunded in event — will be able to pay sufficient sums to enable the Red Cross not only to cover its operating costs and to pay current

bills, but also to repay the present Bank indebtedness of approximately \$35 million in full, <u>and</u> to repay existing unsecured creditors in full, <u>and</u> to generate a compensation fund that will pay existing Transfusion Claimants (it is suggested) in full for their \$8 billion in claims.

35 Dr. Duplessis summarizes the risks inherent in further delays in the following passages from paragraph 17 of his affidavit sworn on August 17, 1998:

The Lavigne Proposal that the purchase price could be renegotiated to a higher price because of Red Cross' ability to operate on the terms the Lavigne Proposal envisions is not realistic, because Red Cross does not have the ability to operate on those terms. Accordingly, there is no reason to expect that CBS and H-Q would pay a higher amount than they have already agreed to pay under the Acquisition Agreement. Indeed, there is a serious risk that delays or attempts to renegotiate would result in lower amounts being paid. Delaying approval of the Acquisition Agreement to permit an experiment with the Lavigne Proposal exposes Red Cross and its stakeholders, including all Transfusion Claimants, to the following risks:

(a) continued losses in operating the National Blood Program which will reduce the amounts ultimately available to all stakeholders;

(b) Red Cross' ability to continue to operate its other activities being jeopardized;

(c) the Bank refusing to continue to support even the current level of funding and demanding repayment, thereby jeopardizing Red Cross and all of Red Cross' activities including the National Blood Program;

(d) CBS and H-Q becoming unprepared to complete an acquisition on the same financial terms given, among other things, the costs which they will incur in adjusting for later transfer dates, raising the risks of exproportation or some other, less favourable taking of Red Cross' assets, or the Governments simply proceeding to set up the means to operate the National Blood Program without paying the Red Cross for its assets.

36 These conclusions, and the evidentiary base underlying them, are in my view irrefutable in the context of these proceedings.

Those supporting the Lavigne Proposal argued vigorously that approval of the proposed sale transaction in advance of a creditors' vote on the Red Cross Plan of Arrangment (which has not yet been filed) would strip the Lavigne Proposal of its underpinnings and, accordingly, would deprive those "creditor" Transfusion Claimants from their statutory right under the Act to put forward a Plan and to have a vote on their proposed Plan. In my opinion, however, Mr. Zarnett's response to that submission is the correct one in law. Sections 4 and 5 of the CCAA do not give the creditors *a right* to a meeting or a right to put forward a Plan and to insist on that Plan being put to a vote; they have *a right to request the Court to order a meeting*, and the Court will do so if it is in the best interests of the debtor company and the stakeholders to do so. In this case I accept the submission that the Court ought not to order a meeting for consideration of the Lavigne Proposal because the reality is that the Proposal is unworkable and unrealistic in the circumstances and I see nothing to be gained by the creditors being called to consider it. In addition, as I have pointed out earlier in these Reasons, a large number of the creditors to apply for an order for the calling of a meeting does not detract from the Court's power to approve a sale of assets, assuming that the Court otherwise has that power in the circumstances.

The only alternative to the sale and transfer, on the one hand, and the Lavigne Proposal, on the other hand, is a liquidation scenario for the Red Cross, and a cessation of its operations altogether. This is not in the interests of anyone, if it can reasonably be avoided. The opinion of the valuation experts is that on a liquidation basis, rather than on a "going concern" basis, as is contemplated in the sale transaction, the value of the Red Cross blood supply operations and assets varies between the mid — \$30 million and about \$74 million. This is quite considerable less than the \$169 million (+/-) which will be generated by the sale transaction. 39 Having rejected the Lavigne Proposal in this context, it follows from what I have earlier said that I conclude the purchase price under the Acquisition Agreement is fair and reasonable, and a price that is as close to the maximum as is reasonably likely to be obtained for the assets.

Jurisdiction Issue

40 The issue of whether the Court has jurisdiction to make an order approving the sale of substantial assets of the debtor company before a Plan has been put forward and placed before the creditors for approval, has been raised by Mr. Bennett. I turn now to a consideration of that question.

41 Mr. Bennett argues that the Court does not have the jurisdiction under the CCAA to make an order approving the sale of substantial assets by the Applicant Company before a Plan has even been filed and the creditors have had an opportunity to consider and vote on it. He submits that section 11 of the Act permits the Court to extend to a debtor the protection of the Court pending a restructuring attempt but only in the form of a stay of proceedings against the debtor or in the form of an order restraining or prohibiting new proceedings. There is no jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in advance he submits, or otherwise than in the context of the sanctioning of a Plan already approved by the creditors.

42 While Mr. Kaufman does not take the same approach to a jurisdictional argument, he submits nonetheless that although he does not oppose the transfer and approval of the sale, the Court cannot grant its approval at this stage if it involves "sanitizing" the transaction. By this, as I understand it, he means that the Court can "permit" the sale to go through — and presumably the purchase price to be paid — but that it cannot shield the assets conveyed from claims that may subsequently arise-such as fraudulent preference claims or oppression remedy claims in relation to the transaction. Apart from the fact that there is no evidence of the existence of any such claims, it seems to me that the argument is not one of "jurisdiction" but rather one of "appropriateness". The submission is that the assets should not be freed up from further claims until at least the Red Cross has filed its Plan and the creditors have had a chance to vote on it. In other words, the approval of the sale transaction and the transfer of the blood supply assets and operations should have been made a part and parcel of the Plan of Arrangement put forward by the debtor, and the question of whether or not it is appropriate and supportable in that context debated and fought out on the voting floor, and not separately before-thefact. These sentiments were echoed by Mr. Klein and by Mr. Thompson as well. In my view, however, the assets either have to be sold free and clear of claims against them-for a fair and reasonable price — or not sold. A purchaser cannot be expected to pay the fair and reasonable purchase price but at the same time leave it open for the assets purchased to be later attacked and, perhaps, taken back. In the context of the transfer of the Canadian blood supply operations, the prospect of such a claw back of assets sold, at a later time, has very troubling implications for the integrity and safety of that system. I do not think, firstly, that the argument is a jurisdictional one, and secondly, that it can prevail in any event.

I cannot accept the submission that the Court has no jurisdiction to make the order sought. The source of the authority is twofold: it is to be found in the power of the Court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under section 11; and it may be grounded upon the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, not to make orders which contradict a statute, but to "fill in the gaps in legislation so as to give effect to the objects of the CCAA, including the survival program of a debtor until it can present a plan": *Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), per Farley J., at p. 110.

As Mr. Zarnett pointed out, paragraph 20 of the Initial Order granted in these proceedings on July 20, 1998, makes it a condition of the protection and stay given to the Red Cross that it not be permitted to sale or dispose of assets valued at more than \$1 million without the approval of the Court. Clearly this is a condition which the Court has the jurisdiction to impose under section 11 of the Act. It is a necessary conjunction to such a condition that the debtor be entitled to come back to the Court and seek approval of a sale of such assets, if it can show it is in the best interests of the Company and its creditors as a whole that such approval be given. That is what it has done. Canadian Red Cross Society/Société canadienne de Ia..., 1998 CarswellOnt 3346 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, [1998] O.J. No. 3306, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99...

It is very common in CCAA restructurings for the Court to approve the sale and disposition of assets during the process and before the Plan if formally tendered and voted upon. There are many examples where this has occurred, the recent Eaton's restructuring being only one of them. The CCAA is designed to be a flexible instrument, and it is that very flexibility which gives it its efficacy. As Farley J said in *Dylex Ltd.* supra (p. 111), "the history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation". It is not infrequently that judges are told, by those opposing a particular initiative at a particular time, that if they make a particular order that is requested it will be the first time in Canadian jurisprudence (sometimes in global jurisprudence, depending upon the level of the rhetoric) that such an order has made! Nonetheless, the orders are made, if the circumstances are appropriate and the orders can be made within the framework and in the spirit of the CCAA legislation. Mr. Justice Farley has well summarized this approach in the following passage from his decision in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at p. 31, which I adopt:

The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course *or otherwise deal with their assets* so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4,5,7,8 and 11 of the CCAA (a lengthy list of authorities cited here is omitted).

The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating *or to otherwise deal with its assets* but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA (citations omitted)

(emphasis added)

In the spirit of that approach, and having regard to the circumstances of this case. I am satisfied not only that the Court has the jurisdiction to make the approval and related orders sought, but also that it should do so. There is no realistic alternative to the sale and transfer that is proposed, and the alternative is a liquidation/bankruptcy scenario which, on the evidence would yield an average of about 44% of the purchase price which the two agencies will pay. To fore go that purchase price — supported as it is by reliable expert evidence — would in the circumstances be folly, not only for the ordinary creditors but also for the Transfusion Claimants, in my view.

47 While the authorities as to exactly what considerations a court should have in mind in approving a transaction such as this are scarce, I agree with Mr. Zarnett that an appropriate analogy may be found in cases dealing with the approval of a sale by a court-appointed receiver. In those circumstances, as the Ontario Court of Appeal has indicated in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 6, the Court's duties are,

(i) to consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;

(ii) to consider the interests of the parties;

- (iii) to consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; and,
- (iv) to consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.
- 48 I am satisfied on all such counts in the circumstances of this case.

49 Some argument was directed towards the matter of an order under the *Bulk Sales Act*. Because of the nature and extent of the Red Cross assets being disposed of, the provisions of that Act must either be complied with, or an exemption from compliance obtained under s. 3 thereof. The circumstances warrant the granting of such an exemption in my view. While there were submissions about whether or not the sale would impair the Society's ability to pay its creditors in full. I do not believe that the sale will *impair* that ability. In fact, it may well enhance it. Even if one accepts the argument that the emphasis should be placed upon the language regarding payment "in full" rather than on "impair", the case qualifies for an exemption. It is conceded that the Transfusion claimants do not qualify as "creditors" as that term is defined under the *Bulk Sales Act*; and if the claims of the Transfusion Claimants are removed from the equation, it seems evident that other creditors could be paid from the proceeds in full.

Conclusion and Treatment of Other Motions

I conclude that the Red Cross is entitled to the relief it seeks at this stage, and orders will go accordingly. In the end, I come to these conclusions having regard in particular to the public interest imperative which requires a Canadian Blood Supply with integrity and a seamless, effective and relatively early transfer of blood supply operations to the new agencies; having regard to the interests in the Red Cross in being able to put forward a Plan that may enable it to avoid bankruptcy and be able to continue on with its non-blood supply humanitarian efforts; and having regard to the interests of the Transfusion Claimants in seeing the value of the blood supply assets maximized.

51 Accordingly an order is granted — subject to the caveat following — approving the sale and authorizing and approving the transactions contemplated in the Acquisition Agreement, granting a vesting order, and declaring that the *Bulk Sales Act* does not apply to the sale, together with the other related relief claimed in paragraphs (a) through (g) of the Red Cross's Notice of Motion herein. The caveat is that the final terms and settlement of the Order are to be negotiated and approved by the Court before the Order is issued. If the parties cannot agree on the manner in which the "Agreement Content" issues raised by Ms. Huff and Mr. Kaufman in their joint memorandum of comments submitted in argument yesterday, I will hear submissions to resolve those issues.

Other Motions

52 The Motions by Mr. Klein and by Mr. Lauzon to be appointed Representative Counsel for the British Columbia and Québec Pre86/Post 90 Hepatitis C Claimants, respectively, are granted. It is true that Mr. Klein had earlier authorized Mr. Kaufman to accept the appointment on behalf of his British Columbia group of clients, but nonetheless it may be — because of differing settlement proposals emanating to differing groups in differing Provinces — that there are differences in interests between these groups, as well as differences in perspectives in the Canadian way. As I commented earlier, in making the original order appointing Representative Counsel, the Court endeavours to conduct a process which is both fair and *perceived* to be fair. Having regard to the nature of the claims, the circumstances in which the injuries and diseases inflicting the Transfusion Claimants have been sustained, and the place in Canadian Society at the moment for those concerns, it seems to me that those particular claimants, in those particular Provinces, are entitled if they wish to have their views put forward by those counsel who are already and normally representing them in their respective class proceedings.

I accept the concerns expressed by Mr. Zarnett on behalf of the Red Cross, and by Mr. Robertson on behalf of the Bank, about the impact of funding on the Society's cash flow and position. In my earlier endorsement dealing with the appointment of Representative Counsel and funding, I alluded to the fact that if additional funding was required to defray these costs those in a position to provide such funding may have to do so. The reference, of course, was to the Governments and the Purchasers. It is the quite legitimate but nonetheless operative concerns of the Governments to ensure the effective and safe transfer of the blood supply operations to the new agencies which are driving much of what is happening here. Since the previous judicial hint was not responded to, I propose to make it a specific term and condition of the approval Order that the Purchasers, or the Governments, establish a fund — not to exceed \$2,000,000 Canadian Red Cross Society/Société canadienne de la..., 1998 CarswellOnt 3346

1998 CarswellOnt 3346, [1998] O.J. No. 3306, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99...

at the present time without further order — to pay the professional costs incurred by Representative Counsel and by Richter & Partners.

54 The other Motions which were pending at the outset of yesterday's Hearing are adjourned to another date to be fixed by the Commercial List Registrar.

55 Orders are to go in accordance with the foregoing.

Motion granted; cross-motion dismissed.

Footnotes

* Additional reasons at (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 319 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); further additional reasons at (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 321 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

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TAB 8

2009 CarswellOnt 6184 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 6184, [2009] O.J. No. 4286, 181 A.C.W.S. (3d) 853, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36. AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"

Pepall J.

Judgment: October 13, 2009 Docket: CV-09-8241-OOCL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Edward Sellers, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants Alan Merskey for Special Committee of the Board of Directors David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. Benjamin Zarnett, Robert Chadwick for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders Edmond Lamek for Asper Family Peter H. Griffin, Peter J. Osborne for Management Directors, Royal Bank of Canada Hilary Clarke for Bank of Nova Scotia Steve Weisz for CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Miscellaneous Debtor companies experienced financial problems due to deteriorating economic environment in Canada — Debtor companies took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets — Economic conditions did not improve nor did financial circumstances of debtor companies — They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees — Application was brought for relief pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application granted — Proposed monitor was appointed — Companies qualified as debtor companies under Act — Debtor companies were in default of their obligations — Required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under s. 11(2) were filed — Stay of proceedings was granted to create stability and allow debtor companies to pursue their restructuring - Partnerships in application carried on operations that were integral and closely interrelated to business of debtor companies — It was just and convenient to grant relief requested with respect to partnerships — Debtor-in-possession financing was approved — Administration charge was granted — Debtor companies' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers was granted — Directors' and officers' charge was granted — Key employee retention plans were approved — Extension of time for calling of annual general meeting was granted. **Table of Authorities**

Cases considered by *Pepall J*.:

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187, 2006 ABQB 153, 2006 CarswellAlta 446 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

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General Publishing Co., Re (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 216, 2003 CarswellOnt 275 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to *Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re* (2004), 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210, 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc., Re (2009), 50 C.B.R. (5th) 71, 2009 CarswellOnt 391 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to *Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

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Generally — referred to
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Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

- Chapter 15 referred to
- Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44

Generally — referred to

s. 106(6) — referred to

s. 133(1) — referred to

s. 133(1)(b) — referred to

s. 133(3) — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — considered

s. 2 "debtor company" --- referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11(2) — referred to

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

- s. 11.2(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] referred to
- s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
- s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] referred to
- s. 11.4(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 23 — considered Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 s. 137(2) — considered **Rules considered:** Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 R. 38.09 — referred to

APPLICATION for relief pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

Pepall J.:

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global"), its principal operating subsidiary, Canwest Media Inc. ("CMI"), and the other applicants listed on Schedule "A" of the Notice of Application apply for relief pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.*¹ The applicants also seek to have the stay of proceedings and other provisions extend to the following partnerships: Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP"), Fox Sports World Canada Partnership and The National Post Company/La Publication National Post ("The National Post Company"). The businesses operated by the applicants and the aforementioned partnerships include (i) Canwest's free-to-air television broadcast business (ie. the Global Television Network stations); (ii) certain subscription-based specialty television channels that are wholly owned and operated by CTLP; and (iii) the National Post.

The Canwest Global enterprise as a whole includes the applicants, the partnerships and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries that are not applicants. The term Canwest will be used to refer to the entire enterprise. The term CMI Entities will be used to refer to the applicants and the three aforementioned partnerships. The following entities are not applicants nor is a stay sought in respect of any of them: the entities in Canwest's newspaper publishing and digital media business in Canada (other than the National Post Company) namely the Canwest Limited Partnership, Canwest Publishing Inc./ Publications Canwest Inc., Canwest Books Inc., and Canwest (Canada) Inc.; the Canadian subscription based specialty television channels acquired from Alliance Atlantis Communications Inc. in August, 2007 which are held jointly with Goldman Sachs Capital Partners and operated by CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries; and subscription-based specialty television channels which are not wholly owned by CTLP.

3 No one appearing opposed the relief requested.

Backround Facts

4 Canwest is a leading Canadian media company with interests in twelve free-to-air television stations comprising the Global Television Network, subscription-based specialty television channels and newspaper publishing and digital media operations.

5 As of October 1, 2009, Canwest employed the full time equivalent of approximately 7,400 employees around the world. Of that number, the full time equivalent of approximately 1,700 are employed by the CMI Entities, the vast majority of whom work in Canada and 850 of whom work in Ontario.

6 Canwest Global owns 100% of CMI. CMI has direct or indirect ownership interests in all of the other CMI Entities. Ontario is the chief place of business of the CMI Entities.

7 Canwest Global is a public company continued under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*². It has authorized capital consisting of an unlimited number of preference shares, multiple voting shares, subordinate voting shares, and non-voting shares. It is a "constrained-share company" which means that at least 66 2/3% of its voting shares must be

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beneficially owned by Canadians. The Asper family built the Canwest enterprise and family members hold various classes of shares. In April and May, 2009, corporate decision making was consolidated and streamlined.

8 The CMI Entities generate the majority of their revenue from the sale of advertising (approximately 77% on a consolidated basis). Fuelled by a deteriorating economic environment in Canada and elsewhere, in 2008 and 2009, they experienced a decline in their advertising revenues. This caused problems with cash flow and circumstances were exacerbated by their high fixed operating costs. In response to these conditions, the CMI Entities took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets. They commenced workforce reductions and cost saving measures, sold certain interests and assets, and engaged in discussions with the CRTC and the Federal government on issues of concern.

9 Economic conditions did not improve nor did the financial circumstances of the CMI Entities. They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, a further reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees.

In February, 2009, CMI breached certain of the financial covenants in its secured credit facility. It subsequently received waivers of the borrowing conditions on six occasions. On March 15, 2009, it failed to make an interest payment of US\$30.4 million due on 8% senior subordinated notes. CMI entered into negotiations with an ad hoc committee of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders holding approximately 72% of the notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee"). An agreement was reached wherein CMI and its subsidiary CTLP agreed to issue US\$105 million in 12% secured notes to members of the Ad Hoc Committee. At the same time, CMI entered into an agreement with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT") in which CIT agreed to provide a senior secured revolving asset based loan facility of up to \$75 million. CMI used the funds generated for operations and to repay amounts owing on the senior credit facility with a syndicate of lenders of which the Bank of Nova Scotia was the administrative agent. These funds were also used to settle related swap obligations.

11 Canwest Global reports its financial results on a consolidated basis. As at May 31, 2009, it had total consolidated assets with a net book value of \$4.855 billion and total consolidated liabilities of \$5.846 billion. The subsidiaries of Canwest Global that are not applicants or partnerships in this proceeding had short and long term debt totalling \$2.742 billion as at May 31, 2009 and the CMI Entities had indebtedness of approximately \$954 million. For the 9 months ended May 31, 2009, Canwest Global's consolidated revenues decreased by \$272 million or 11% compared to the same period in 2008. In addition, operating income before amortization decreased by \$253 million or 47%. It reported a consolidated net loss of \$1.578 billion compared to \$22 million for the same period in 2008. CMI reported that revenues for the Canadian television operations decreased by \$8 million or 4% in the third quarter of 2009 and operating profit was \$21 million compared to \$39 million in the same period in 2008.

12 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of the board ("the Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives in order to maximize value. That committee appointed Thomas Strike, who is the President, Corporate Development and Strategy Implementation of Canwest Global, as Recapitalization Officer and retained Hap Stephen, who is the Chairman and CEO of Stonecrest Capital Inc., as a Restructuring Advisor ("CRA").

13 On September 15, 2009, CMI failed to pay US\$30.4 million in interest payments due on the 8% senior subordinated notes.

14 On September 22, 2009, the board of directors of Canwest Global authorized the sale of all of the shares of Ten Network Holdings Limited (Australia) ("Ten Holdings") held by its subsidiary, Canwest Mediaworks Ireland Holdings ("CMIH"). Prior to the sale, the CMI Entities had consolidated indebtedness totalling US\$939.9 million pursuant to three facilities. CMI had issued 8% unsecured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US\$761,054,211. They were guaranteed by all of the CMI Entities except Canwest Global, and 30109, LLC. CMI had also issued 12% secured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US\$94 million. They were guaranteed by the CMI Entities. Amongst others, Canwest's

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subsidiary, CMIH, was a guarantor of both of these facilities. The 12% notes were secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP and the guarantors. In addition, pursuant to a credit agreement dated May 22, 2009 and subsequently amended, CMI has a senior secured revolving asset-based loan facility in the maximum amount of \$75 million with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT"). Prior to the sale, the debt amounted to \$23.4 million not including certain letters of credit. The facility is guaranteed by CTLP, CMIH and others and secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP, CMIH and other guarantors. Significant terms of the credit agreement are described in paragraph 37 of the proposed Monitor's report. Upon a CCAA filing by CMI and commencement of proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the CIT facility converts into a DIP financing arrangement and increases to a maximum of \$100 million.

15 Consents from a majority of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders were necessary to allow the sale of the Ten Holdings shares. A Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement was entered into by CMI, CMIH, certain consenting noteholders and others wherein CMIH was allowed to lend the proceeds of sale to CMI.

16 The sale of CMIH's interest in Ten Holdings was settled on October 1, 2009. Gross proceeds of approximately \$634 million were realized. The proceeds were applied to fund general liquidity and operating costs of CMI, pay all amounts owing under the 12% secured notes and all amounts outstanding under the CIT facility except for certain letters of credit in an aggregate face amount of \$10.7 million. In addition, a portion of the proceeds was used to reduce the amount outstanding with respect to the 8% senior subordinated notes leaving an outstanding indebtedness thereunder of US\$393.25 million.

17 In consideration for the loan provided by CMIH to CMI, CMI issued a secured intercompany note in favour of CMIH in the principal amount of \$187.3 million and an unsecured promissory note in the principal amount of \$430.6 million. The secured note is subordinated to the CIT facility and is secured by a first ranking charge on the property of CMI and the guarantors. The payment of all amounts owing under the unsecured promissory note are subordinated and postponed in favour of amounts owing under the CIT facility. Canwest Global, CTLP and others have guaranteed the notes. It is contemplated that the debt that is the subject matter of the unsecured note will be compromised.

18 Without the funds advanced under the intercompany notes, the CMI Entities would be unable to meet their liabilities as they come due. The consent of the noteholders to the use of the Ten Holdings proceeds was predicated on the CMI Entities making this application for an Initial Order under the CCAA. Failure to do so and to take certain other steps constitute an event of default under the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement, the CIT facility and other agreements. The CMI Entities have insufficient funds to satisfy their obligations including those under the intercompany notes and the 8% senior subordinated notes.

19 The stay of proceedings under the CCAA is sought so as to allow the CMI Entities to proceed to develop a plan of arrangement or compromise to implement a consensual "pre-packaged" recapitalization transaction. The CMI Entities and the Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders have agreed on the terms of a going concern recapitalization transaction which is intended to form the basis of the plan. The terms are reflected in a support agreement and term sheet. The recapitalization transaction contemplates amongst other things, a significant reduction of debt and a debt for equity restructuring. The applicants anticipate that a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities will continue as going concerns thereby preserving enterprise value for stakeholders and maintaining employment for as many as possible. As mentioned, certain steps designed to implement the recapitalization transaction have already been taken prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

20 CMI has agreed to maintain not more than \$2.5 million as cash collateral in a deposit account with the Bank of Nova Scotia to secure cash management obligations owed to BNS. BNS holds first ranking security against those funds and no court ordered charge attaches to the funds in the account.

21 The CMI Entities maintain eleven defined benefit pension plans and four defined contribution pension plans. There is an aggregate solvency deficiency of \$13.3 million as at the last valuation date and a wind up deficiency of

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\$32.8 million. There are twelve television collective agreements eleven of which are negotiated with the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada. The Canadian Union of Public Employees negotiated the twelfth television collective agreement. It expires on December 31, 2010. The other collective agreements are in expired status. None of the approximately 250 employees of the National Post Company are unionized. The CMI Entities propose to honour their payroll obligations to their employees, including all pre-filing wages and employee benefits outstanding as at the date of the commencement of the CCAA proceedings and payments in connection with their pension obligations.

Proposed Monitor

22 The applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor in these proceedings. It is clearly qualified to act and has provided the Court with its consent to act. Neither FTI nor any of its representatives have served in any of the capacities prohibited by section of the amendments to the CCAA.

Proposed Order

I have reviewed in some detail the history that preceded this application. It culminated in the presentation of the within application and proposed order. Having reviewed the materials and heard submissions, I was satisfied that the relief requested should be granted.

This case involves a consideration of the amendments to the CCAA that were proclaimed in force on September 18, 2009. While these were long awaited, in many instances they reflect practices and principles that have been adopted by insolvency practitioners and developed in the jurisprudence and academic writings on the subject of the CCAA. In no way do the amendments change or detract from the underlying purpose of the CCAA, namely to provide debtor companies with the opportunity to extract themselves from financial difficulties notwithstanding insolvency and to reorganize their affairs for the benefit of stakeholders. In my view, the amendments should be interpreted and applied with that objective in mind.

(a) Threshhold Issues

Firstly, the applicants qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. Their chief place of business is in Ontario. The applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims against them exceeding \$5 million. The CMI Entities are in default of their obligations. CMI does not have the necessary liquidity to make an interest payment in the amount of US\$30.4 million that was due on September 15, 2009 and none of the other CMI Entities who are all guarantors are able to make such a payment either. The assets of the CMI Entities are insufficient to discharge all of the liabilities. The CMI Entities are unable to satisfy their debts as they come due and they are insolvent. They are insolvent both under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*³ definition and under the more expansive definition of insolvency used in *Stelco Inc.,* Re^4 . Absent these CCAA proceedings, the applicants would lack liquidity and would be unable to continue as going concerns. The CMI Entities have acknowledged their insolvency in the affidavit filed in support of the application.

Secondly, the required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under section 11(2) of the CCAA have been filed.

(b) Stay of Proceedings

27 Under section 11 of the CCAA, the Court has broad jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings and to give a debtor company a chance to develop a plan of compromise or arrangement. In my view, given the facts outlined, a stay is necessary to create stability and to allow the CMI Entities to pursue their restructuring.

(b) Partnerships and Foreign Subsidiaries

28 The applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and other relief to the aforementioned partnerships. The partnerships are intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations. They own the National Post daily newspaper and

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Canadian free-to-air television assets and certain of its specialty television channels and some other television assets. These businesses constitute a significant portion of the overall enterprise value of the CMI Entities. The partnerships are also guarantors of the 8% senior subordinated notes.

While the CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or limited partnership, courts have repeatedly exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the scope of CCAA proceedings to encompass them. See for example *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.*, Re^5 ; *Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc.*, Re^6 ; and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd.*, Re^7 . In this case, the partnerships carry on operations that are integral and closely interrelated to the business of the applicants. The operations and obligations of the partnerships are so intertwined with those of the applicants that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted. In my view, it is just and convenient to grant the relief requested with respect to the partnerships.

³⁰ Certain applicants are foreign subsidiaries of CMI. Each is a guarantor under the 8% senior subordinated notes, the CIT credit agreement (and therefore the DIP facility), the intercompany notes and is party to the support agreement and the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement. If the stay of proceedings was not extended to these entities, creditors could seek to enforce their guarantees. I am persuaded that the foreign subsidiary applicants as that term is defined in the affidavit filed are debtor companies within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA and that I have jurisdiction and ought to grant the order requested as it relates to them. In this regard, I note that they are insolvent and each holds assets in Ontario in that they each maintain funds on deposit at the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto. See in this regard *Cadillac*

Fairview Inc., Re⁸ and Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re⁹

(C) DIP Financing

31 Turning to the DIP financing, the premise underlying approval of DIP financing is that it is a benefit to all stakeholders as it allows the debtors to protect going-concern value while they attempt to devise a plan acceptable to creditors. While in the past, courts relied on inherent jurisdiction to approve the terms of a DIP financing charge, the September 18, 2009 amendments to the CCAA now expressly provide jurisdiction to grant a DIP financing charge. Section 11.2 of the Act states:

(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

(3) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over any security or charge arising from a previous order made under subsection (1) only with the consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was made.

(4) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

- (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;
- (b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
- (c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

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(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

In light of the language of section 11.2(1), the first issue to consider is whether notice has been given to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge. Paragraph 57 of the proposed order affords priority to the DIP charge, the administration charge, the Directors' and Officers' charge and the KERP charge with the following exception: "any validly perfected purchase money security interest in favour of a secured creditor or any statutory encumbrance existing on the date of this order in favour of any person which is a "secured creditor" as defined in the CCAA in respect of any of source deductions from wages, employer health tax, workers compensation, GST/QST, PST payables, vacation pay and banked overtime for employees, and amounts under the Wage Earners' Protection Program that are subject to a super priority claim under the BIA". This provision coupled with the notice that was provided satisfied me that secured creditors either were served or are unaffected by the DIP charge. This approach is both consistent with the legislation and practical.

33 Secondly, the Court must determine that the amount of the DIP is appropriate and required having regard to the debtors' cash-flow statement. The DIP charge is for up to \$100 million. Prior to entering into the CIT facility, the CMI Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a credit facility that would convert to a DIP facility should the CMI Entities be required to file for protection under the CCAA. The CIT facility was the best proposal submitted. In this case, it is contemplated that implementation of the plan will occur no later than April 15, 2010. The total amount of cash on hand is expected to be down to approximately \$10 million by late December, 2009 based on the cash flow forecast. The applicants state that this is an insufficient cushion for an enterprise of this magnitude. The cashflow statements project the need for the liquidity provided by the DIP facility for the recapitalization transaction to be finalized. The facility is to accommodate additional liquidity requirements during the CCAA proceedings. It will enable the CMI Entities to operate as going concerns while pursuing the implementation and completion of a viable plan and will provide creditors with assurances of same. I also note that the proposed facility is simply a conversion of the preexisting CIT facility and as such, it is expected that there would be no material prejudice to any of the creditors of the CMI Entities that arises from the granting of the DIP charge. I am persuaded that the amount is appropriate and required.

Thirdly, the DIP charge must not and does not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The only amount outstanding on the CIT facility is \$10.7 in outstanding letters of credit. These letters of credit are secured by existing security and it is proposed that that security rank ahead of the DIP charge.

Lastly, I must consider amongst others, the enumerated factors in paragraph 11.2(4) of the Act. I have already addressed some of them. The Management Directors of the applicants as that term is used in the materials filed will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. It would appear that management has the confidence of its major creditors. The CMI Entities have appointed a CRA and a Restructuring Officer to negotiate and implement the recapitalization transaction and the aforementioned directors will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. The DIP facility will enhance the prospects of a completed restructuring. CIT has stated that it will not convert the CIT facility into a DIP facility if the DIP charge is not approved. In its report, the proposed Monitor observes that the ability to borrow funds from a court approved DIP facility secured by the DIP charge is crucial to retain the confidence of the CMI Entities' creditors, employees and suppliers and would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made. The proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP facility and charge.

36 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and charge.

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(d) Administration Charge

37 While an administration charge was customarily granted by courts to secure the fees and disbursements of the professional advisors who guided a debtor company through the CCAA process, as a result of the amendments to the CCAA, there is now statutory authority to grant such a charge. Section 11.52 of the CCAA states:

(1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

I must therefore be convinced that (1) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; (2) the amount is appropriate; and (3) the charge should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

As with the DIP charge, the issue relating to notice to affected secured creditors has been addressed appropriately by the applicants. The amount requested is up to \$15 million. The beneficiaries of the charge are: the Monitor and its counsel; counsel to the CMI Entities; the financial advisor to the Special Committee and its counsel; counsel to the Management Directors; the CRA; the financial advisor to the Ad Hoc Committee; and RBC Capital Markets and its counsel. The proposed Monitor supports the aforementioned charge and considers it to be required and reasonable in the circumstances in order to preserve the going concern operations of the CMI Entities. The applicants submit that the above-note professionals who have played a necessary and integral role in the restructuring activities to date are necessary to implement the recapitalization transaction.

40 Estimating quantum is an inexact exercise but I am prepared to accept the amount as being appropriate. There has obviously been extensive negotiation by stakeholders and the restructuring is of considerable magnitude and complexity. I was prepared to accept the submissions relating to the administration charge. I have not included any requirement that all of these professionals be required to have their accounts scrutinized and approved by the Court but they should not preclude this possibility.

(e) Critical Suppliers

41 The next issue to consider is the applicants' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers. In recognition that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to permit an insolvent corporation to remain in business, typically courts exercised their inherent jurisdiction to grant such authorization and a charge with respect to the provision of essential goods and services. In the recent amendments, Parliament codified the practice of permitting the payment of pre-filing amounts to critical suppliers and the provision of a charge. Specifically, section 11.4 provides:

(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.

(2) If the court declares a person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.

(3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied under the terms of the order.

(4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

42 Under these provisions, the Court must be satisfied that there has been notice to creditors likely to be affected by the charge, the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company, and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation. While one might interpret section 11.4 (3) as requiring a charge any time a person is declared to be a critical supplier, in my view, this provision only applies when a court is compelling a person to supply. The charge then provides protection to the unwilling supplier.

43 In this case, no charge is requested and no additional notice is therefore required. Indeed, there is an issue as to whether in the absence of a request for a charge, section 11.4 is even applicable and the Court is left to rely on inherent jurisdiction. The section seems to be primarily directed to the conditions surrounding the granting of a charge to secure critical suppliers. That said, even if it is applicable, I am satisfied that the applicants have met the requirements. The CMI Entities seek authorization to make certain payments to third parties that provide goods and services integral to their business. These include television programming suppliers given the need for continuous and undisturbed flow of programming, newsprint suppliers given the dependency of the National Post on a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint to enable it to publish and on newspaper distributors, and the American Express Corporate Card Program and Central Billed Accounts that are required for CMI Entity employees to perform their job functions. No payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. I accept that these suppliers are critical in nature. The CMI Entities also seek more general authorization allowing them to pay other suppliers if in the opinion of the CMI Entities, the supplier is critical. Again, no payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. In addition, again no charge securing any payments is sought. This is not contrary to the language of section 11.4 (1) or to its purpose. The CMI Entities seek the ability to pay other suppliers if in their opinion the supplier is critical to their business and ongoing operations. The order requested is facilitative and practical in nature. The proposed Monitor supports the applicants' request and states that it will work to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized. The Monitor is of course an officer of the Court and is always able to seek direction from the Court if necessary. In addition, it will report on any such additional payments when it files its reports for Court approval. In the circumstances outlined, I am prepared to grant the relief requested in this regard.

(f) Directors' and Officers' Charge

The applicants also seek a directors' and officers' ("D &O") charge in the amount of \$20 million. The proposed charge would rank after the administration charge, the existing CIT security, and the DIP charge. It would rank pari passu with the KERP charge discussed subsequently in this endorsement but postponed in right of payment to the extent of the first \$85 million payable under the secured intercompany note.

45 Again, the recent amendments to the CCAA allow for such a charge. Section 11.51 provides that:

(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company

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(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

(3) The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

(4) The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.

The proposed Monitor reports that the amount of \$20 million was estimated taking into consideration the existing D&O insurance and the potential liabilities which may attach including certain employee related and tax related obligations. The amount was negotiated with the DIP lender and the Ad Hoc Committee. The order proposed speaks of indemnification relating to the failure of any of the CMI Entities, after the date of the order, to make certain payments. It also excludes gross negligence and wilful misconduct. The D&O insurance provides for \$30 million in coverage and \$10 million in excess coverage for a total of \$40 million. It will expire in a matter of weeks and Canwest Global has been unable to obtain additional or replacement coverage. I am advised that it also extends to others in the Canwest enterprise and not just to the CMI Entities. The directors and senior management are described as highly experienced, fully functional and qualified. The directors have indicated that they cannot continue in the restructuring effort unless the order includes the requested directors' charge.

The purpose of such a charge is to keep the directors and officers in place during the restructuring by providing them with protection against liabilities they could incur during the restructuring: *General Publishing Co., Re*¹⁰ Retaining the current directors and officers of the applicants would avoid destabilization and would assist in the restructuring. The proposed charge would enable the applicants to keep the experienced board of directors supported by experienced senior management. The proposed Monitor believes that the charge is required and is reasonable in the circumstances and also observes that it will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in the worst case scenario. In all of these circumstances, I approved the request.

(g) Key Employee Retention Plans

49 Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters of discretion. In this case, the CMI Entities have developed KERPs that are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain of the CMI Entities' senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the CMI Entities through a successful restructuring with a view to preserving enterprise value. There are 20 KERP participants all of whom are described by the applicants as being critical to the successful restructuring of the CMI Entities. Details of the KERPs are outlined in the materials and the proposed Monitor's report. A charge of \$5.9 million is requested. The three Management Directors are seasoned executives with extensive experience in the broadcasting and publishing industries. They have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives taken to date. The applicants state that it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities if the KERPs were not secured by a KERP charge. The other proposed participants are also described as being crucial to the restructuring and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for them

50 Significantly in my view, the Monitor who has scrutinized the proposed KERPs and charge is supportive. Furthermore, they have been approved by the Board, the Special Committee, the Human Resources Committee of

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Canwest Global and the Ad Hoc Committee. The factors enumerated in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*¹¹ have all been met and I am persuaded that the relief in this regard should be granted.

51 The applicants ask that the Confidential Supplement containing unredacted copies of the KERPs that reveal individually identifiable information and compensation information be sealed. Generally speaking, judges are most reluctant to grant sealing orders. An open court and public access are fundamental to our system of justice. Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides authority to grant a sealing order and the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*¹² provides guidance on the appropriate legal principles to be applied. Firstly, the Court must be satisfied that the order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk. Secondly, the salutary effects of the order should outweigh its deleterious effects including the effects on the right to free expression which includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

52 In this case, the unredacted KERPs reveal individually identifiable information including compensation information. Protection of sensitive personal and compensation information the disclosure of which could cause harm to the individuals and to the CMI Entities is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The KERP participants have a reasonable expectation that their personal information would be kept confidential. As to the second branch of the test, the aggregate amount of the KERPs has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. It seems to me that this second branch of the test has been met. The relief requested is granted.

Annual Meeting

The CMI Entities seek an order postponing the annual general meeting of shareholders of Canwest Global. Pursuant to section 133 (1)(b) of the CBCA, a corporation is required to call an annual meeting by no later than February 28, 2010, being six months after the end of its preceding financial year which ended on August 31, 2009. Pursuant to section 133 (3), despite subsection (1), the corporation may apply to the court for an order extending the time for calling an annual meeting.

54 CCAA courts have commonly granted extensions of time for the calling of an annual general meeting. In this case, the CMI Entities including Canwest Global are devoting their time to stabilizing business and implementing a plan. Time and resources would be diverted if the time was not extended as requested and the preparation for and the holding of the annual meeting would likely impede the timely and desirable restructuring of the CMI Entities. Under section 106(6) of the CBCA, if directors of a corporation are not elected, the incumbent directors continue. Financial and other information will be available on the proposed Monitor's website. An extension is properly granted.

Other

55 The applicants request authorization to commence Chapter 15 proceedings in the U.S. Continued timely supply of U.S. network and other programming is necessary to preserve going concern value. Commencement of Chapter 15 proceedings to have the CCAA proceedings recognized as "foreign main proceedings" is a prerequisite to the conversion of the CIT facility into the DIP facility. Authorization is granted.

56 Canwest's various corporate and other entities share certain business services. They are seeking to continue to provide and receive inter-company services in the ordinary course during the CCAA proceedings. This is supported by the proposed Monitor and FTI will monitor and report to the Court on matters pertaining to the provision of inter-company services.

57 Section 23 of the amended CCAA now addresses certain duties and functions of the Monitor including the provision of notice of an Initial Order although the Court may order otherwise. Here the financial threshold for notice to creditors has been increased from \$1000 to \$5000 so as to reduce the burden and cost of such a process. The proceedings will Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re, 2009 CarswellOnt 6184

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be widely published in the media and the Initial Order is to be posted on the Monitor's website. Other meritorious adjustments were also made to the notice provisions.

This is a "pre-packaged" restructuring and as such, stakeholders have negotiated and agreed on the terms of the requested order. That said, not every stakeholder was before me. For this reason, interested parties are reminded that the order includes the usual come back provision. The return date of any motion to vary, rescind or affect the provisions relating to the CIT credit agreement or the CMI DIP must be no later than November 5, 2009.

⁵⁹ I have obviously not addressed every provision in the order but have attempted to address some key provisions. In support of the requested relief, the applicants filed a factum and the proposed Monitor filed a report. These were most helpful. A factum is required under Rule 38.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Both a factum and a proposed Monitor's report should customarily be filed with a request for an Initial Order under the CCAA.

Conclusion

Weak economic conditions and a high debt load do not a happy couple make but clearly many of the stakeholders have been working hard to produce as desirable an outcome as possible in the circumstances. Hopefully the cooperation will persist.

Application granted.

Footnotes

- 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended
- 2 R.S.C. 1985, c.C.44.
- 3 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended.
- 4 (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal refused 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.).
- 5 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
- 6 [2009] O.J. No. 349 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 7 (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.).
- 8 (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
- 9 (2004), 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.).
- 10 (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 216 (Ont. S.C.J.).
- 11 [2009] O.J. No. 3344 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). That said, given the nature of the relationship between a board of directors and senior management, it may not always be appropriate to give undue consideration to the principle of business judgment.
- 12 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).

End of Document

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TAB 9

2010 ONSC 1328 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re

2010 CarswellOnt 1344, 2010 ONSC 1328, [2010] O.J. No. 943, 185 A.C.W.S. (3d) 865, 65 C.B.R. (5th) 152

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST PUBLISHING INC. / PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC. AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC.

Pepall J.

Judgment: March 5, 2010 Docket: CV-10-8533-00CL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb for Canwest LP Entities Maria Konyukhova for Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. Hilary Clarke for Bank of Nova Scotia, Administrative Agent for Senior Secured Lenders' Syndicate Janice Payne, Thomas McRae for Canwest Salaried Employees and Retirees (CSER) Group M.A. Church for Communications, Energy and Paperworkers' Union Anthony F. Dale for CAW-Canada Deborah McPhail for Financial Services Commission of Ontario

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Miscellaneous

In January 2010 LP Entities obtained order pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act staying all proceedings and claims against them — Order permitted, but did not require, payments to employees and pension plans — There were approximately 45 non-unionized employees who were still owed termination and severance payments, as well as accrual of pensionable service - There were further nine employees who were, or would be, entitled pursuant to executive pension plan to pension benefits in excess of those under main pension plan — Moving parties sought order permitting them to represent those employees, for appointment of counsel, and for funding of counsel - Respondents did not object to appointment representatives or counsel, but opposed funding of counsel - Motion granted - All four proposed representatives had claims against LP Entities that were representative of claims that would be advanced by former employees — Individuals at issue were unsecured creditors whose recovery expectations might be non-existent, however they found themselves facing legal proceedings of significant complexity - Evidence was that members of group had little means to pursue representation and were unable to afford proper legal representation at this time — Employees were vulnerable group and there was no other counsel available to represent their interests — Canadian courts did not typically appoint unsecured creditors committees - It would be of considerable benefit to have representatives and representative counsel who could represent interests of salaried employees and retirees — There were three possible sources of funding: LP Entities, Monitors, or senior secured lenders - Court had power to compel senior secured lenders to fund or alternatively to compel LP Administrative Agent to consent to funding - Source of funding other than salaried employees themselves should be identified now - Funding would be prospective in nature and would not extend to investigation of or claims against directors — Counsel were directed to communicate with one another to ascertain how best to structure funding and report back to court by certain date.

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Table of Authorities

Statutes considered: Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) Generally — referred to

MOTION by group of employees for funding for appointment of representatives, appointment of counsel, and funding of counsel.

Pepall J.:

Reasons for Decision

Relief Requested

1 Russell Mills, Blair MacKenzie, Rejean Saumure and Les Bale (the "Representatives") seek to be appointed as representatives on behalf of former salaried employees and retirees of Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Canwest Books Inc., Canwest (Canada) and Canwest Limited Partnership and the Canwest Global Canadian Newspaper Entities (collectively the "LP Entities") or any person claiming an interest under or on behalf of such salaried employees or retirees including beneficiaries and surviving spouses ("the Salaried Employees and Retirees"). They also seek an order that Nelligan O'Brien Payne LLP and Shibley Righton LLP be appointed in these proceedings to represent the Salaried Employees and Retirees for all matters relating to claims against the LP Entities and any issues affecting them in the proceedings. Amongst other things, it is proposed that all reasonable legal, actuarial and financial expert and advisory fees be paid by the LP Entities.

On February 22, 2010, I granted an order on consent of the LP Entities authorizing the Communications, Energy and Paperworker's Union of Canada ("CEP") to continue to represent its current members and to represent former members of bargaining units represented by the union including pensioners, retirees, deferred vested participants and surviving spouses and dependants employed or formerly employed by the LP Entities. That order only extended to unionized members or former members. The within motion focused on non-unionized former employees and retirees although Ms. Payne for the moving parties indicated that the moving parties would be content to include other nonunionized employees as well. There is no overlap between the order granted to CEP and the order requested by the Salaried Employees and Retirees.

Facts

3 On January 8, 2010 the LP Entities obtained an order pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") staying all proceedings and claims against the LP Entities. The order permits but does not require the LP Entities to make payments to employee and retirement benefit plans.

4 There are approximately 66 employees, 45 of whom were non-unionized, whose employment with the LP Entities terminated prior to the Initial Order but who were still owed termination and severance payments. As of the date of the Initial Order, the LP Entities ceased making those payments to those former employees. As many of these former employees were owed termination payments as part of a salary continuance scheme whereby they would continue to accrue pensionable service during a notice period, after the Initial Order, those former employees stopped accruing pensionable service. The Representatives seek an order authorizing them to act for the 45 individuals and for the aforementioned law firms to be appointed as representative counsel.

5 Additionally, seven retirees and two current employees are (or would be) eligible for a pension benefit from Southam Executive Retirement Arrangements ("SERA"). SERA is a non-registered pension plan used to provide supplemental pension benefits to former executives of the LP Entities and their predecessors. These benefits are in excess of those earned

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under the Canwest Southam Publications Inc. Retirement Plan which benefits are capped as a result of certain provisions of the *Income Tax Act*. As of the date of the Initial Order, the SERA payments ceased also. This impacts beneficiaries and spouses who are eligible for a joint survivorship option. The aggregate benefit obligation related to SERA is approximately \$14.4 million. The Representatives also seek to act for these seven retirees and for the aforementioned law firms to be appointed as representative counsel.

6 Since January 8, 2010, the LP Entities have being pursuing the sale and investor solicitation process ("SISP") contemplated by the Initial Order. Throughout the course of the CCAA proceedings, the LP Entities have continued to pay:

- (a) salaries, commissions, bonuses and outstanding employee expenses;
- (b) current services and special payments in respect of the active registered pension plan; and

(c) post-employment and post-retirement benefits to former employees who were represented by a union when they were employed by the LP Entities.

7 The LP Entities intend to continue to pay these employee related obligations throughout the course of the CCAA proceedings. Pursuant to the Support Agreement with the LP Secured Lenders, AcquireCo. will assume all of the employee related obligations including existing pension plans (other than supplemental pension plans such as SERA), existing post-retirement and post-employment benefit plans and unpaid severance obligations stayed during the CCAA proceeding. This assumption by AcquireCo. is subject to the LP Secured Lenders' right, acting commercially reasonably and after consultation with the operational management of the LP Entities, to exclude certain specified liabilities.

8 All four proposed Representatives have claims against the LP Entities that are representative of the claims that would be advanced by former employees, namely pension benefits and compensation for involuntary terminations. In addition to the claims against the LP Entities, the proposed Representatives may have claims against the directors of the LP Entities that are currently impacted by the CCAA proceedings.

9 No issue is taken with the proposed Representatives nor with the experience and competence of the proposed law firms, namely Nelligan O'Brien Payne LLP and Shibley Righton LLP, both of whom have jointly acted as court appointed representatives for continuing employees in the Nortel Networks Limited case.

10 Funding by the LP Entities in respect of the representation requested would violate the Support Agreement dated January 8, 2010 between the LP Entities and the LP Administrative Agent. Specifically, section 5.1(j) of the Support Agreement states:

The LP Entities shall not pay any of the legal, financial or other advisors to any other Person, except as expressly contemplated by the Initial Order or with the consent in writing from the Administrative Agent acting in consultation with the Steering Committee.

11 The LP Administrative Agent does not consent to the funding request at this time.

12 On October 6, 2009, the CMI Entities applied for protection pursuant to the provisions of the CCAA. In that restructuring, the CMI Entities themselves moved to appoint and fund a law firm as representative counsel for former employees and retirees. That order was granted.

13 Counsel were urged by me to ascertain whether there was any possibility of resolving this issue. Some time was spent attempting to do so, however, I was subsequently advised that those efforts were unsuccessful.

Issues

14 The issues on this motion are as follows:

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- (1) Should the Representatives be appointed?
- (2) Should Nelligan O'Brien Payne LLP and Shibley Righton LLP be appointed as representative counsel?
- (3) If so, should the request for funding be granted?

Positions of Parties

15 In brief, the moving parties submit that representative counsel should be appointed where vulnerable creditors have little means to pursue a claim in a complex CCAA proceeding; there is a social benefit to be derived from assisting vulnerable creditors; and a benefit would be provided to the overall CCAA process by introducing efficiency for all parties involved. The moving parties submit that all of these principles have been met in this case.

16 The LP Entities oppose the relief requested on the grounds that it is premature. The amounts outstanding to the representative group are prefiling unsecured obligations. Unless a superior offer is received in the SISP that is currently underway, the LP Entities will implement a support transaction with the LP Secured Lenders that does not contemplate any recoveries for unsecured creditors. As such, there is no current need to carry out a claims process. Although a superior offer may materialize in the SISP, the outcome of the SISP is currently unknown.

17 Furthermore, the LP Entities oppose the funding request. The fees will deplete the resources of the Estate without any possible corresponding benefit and the Support Agreement with the LP Secured Lenders does not authorize any such payment.

18 The LP Senior Lenders support the position of the LP Entities.

19 In its third report, the Monitor noted that pursuant to the Support Agreement, the LP Entities are not permitted to pay any of the legal, financial or other advisors absent consent in writing from the LP Administrative Agent which has not been forthcoming. Accordingly, funding of the fees requested would be in contravention of the Support Agreement with the LP Secured Lenders. For those reasons, the Monitor supported the LP Entities refusal to fund.

Discussion

20 No one challenged the court's jurisdiction to make a representation order and such orders have been granted in large CCAA proceedings. Examples include Nortel Networks Corp., Fraser Papers Inc., and Canwest Global Communications Corp. (with respect to the television side of the enterprise). Indeed, a human resources manager at the Ottawa Citizen advised one of the Representatives, Mr. Saumure, that as part of the CCAA process, it was normal practice for the court to appoint a law firm to represent former employees as a group.

- 21 Factors that have been considered by courts in granting these orders include:
 - the vulnerability and resources of the group sought to be represented;
 - any benefit to the companies under CCAA protection;
 - any social benefit to be derived from representation of the group;
 - the facilitation of the administration of the proceedings and efficiency;
 - the avoidance of a multiplicity of legal retainers;
 - the balance of convenience and whether it is fair and just including to the creditors of the Estate;

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• whether representative counsel has already been appointed for those who have similar interests to the group seeking representation and who is also prepared to act for the group seeking the order; and

• the position of other stakeholders and the Monitor.

22 The evidence before me consists of affidavits from three of the four proposed Representatives and a partner with the Nelligan O'Brien Payne LLP law firm, the Monitor's Third Report, and a compendium containing an affidavit of an investment manager for noteholders filed on an earlier occasion in these CCAA proceedings. This evidence addresses most of the aforementioned factors.

The primary objection to the relief requested is prematurity. This is reflected in correspondence sent by counsel for the LP Entities to counsel for the Senior Lenders' Administrative Agent. Those opposing the relief requested submit that the moving parties can keep an eye on the Monitor's website and depend on notice to be given by the Monitor in the event that unsecured creditors have any entitlement. Counsel for the LP Entities submitted that counsel for the proposed representatives should reapply to court at the appropriate time and that I should dismiss the motion without prejudice to the moving parties to bring it back on.

24 In my view, this watch and wait suggestion is unhelpful to the needs of the Salaried Employees and Retirees and to the interests of the Applicants. I accept that the individuals in issue may be unsecured creditors whose recovery expectation may prove to be non-existent and that ultimately there may be no claims process for them. I also accept that some of them were in the executive ranks of the LP Entities and continue to benefit from payment of some pension benefits. That said, these are all individuals who find themselves in uncertain times facing legal proceedings of significant complexity. The evidence is also to the effect that members of the group have little means to pursue representation and are unable to afford proper legal representation at this time. The Monitor already has very extensive responsibilities as reflected in paragraph 30 and following of the Initial Order and the CCAA itself and it is unrealistic to expect that it can be fully responsive to the needs and demands of all of these many individuals and do so in an efficient and timely manner. Desirably in my view, Canadian courts have not typically appointed an Unsecured Creditors Committee to address the needs of unsecured creditors in large restructurings. It would be of considerable benefit to both the Applicants and the Salaried Employees and Retirees to have Representatives and representative counsel who could interact with the Applicants and represent the interests of the Salaried Employees and Retirees. In that regard, I accept their evidence that they are a vulnerable group and there is no other counsel available to represent their interests. Furthermore, a multiplicity of legal retainers is to be discouraged. In my view, it is a false economy to watch and wait. Indeed the time taken by counsel preparing for and arguing this motion is just one such example. The appointment of the Representatives and representative counsel would facilitate the administration of the proceedings and information flow and provide for efficiency.

The second basis for objection is that the LP Entities are not permitted to pay any of the legal, financial or other advisors to any other person except as expressly contemplated by the Initial Order or with consent in writing from the LP Administrative Agent acting in consultation with the Steering Committee. Funding by the LP Entities would be in contravention of the Support Agreement entered into by the LP Entities and the LP Senior Secured Lenders. It was for this reason that the Monitor stated in its Report that it supported the LP Entities' refusal to fund.

I accept the evidence before me on the inability of the Salaried Employees and Retirees to afford legal counsel at this time. There are in these circumstances three possible sources of funding: the LP Entities; the Monitor pursuant to paragraph 31 (i) of the Initial Order although quere whether this is in keeping with the intention underlying that provision; or the LP Senior Secured Lenders. It seems to me that having exercised the degree of control that they have, it is certainly arguable that relying on inherent jurisdiction, the court has the power to compel the Senior Secured Lenders to fund or alternatively compel the LP Administrative Agent to consent to funding. By executing agreements such as the Support Agreement, parties cannot oust the jurisdiction of the court. Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re, 2010 ONSC 1328, 2010...

2010 ONSC 1328, 2010 CarswellOnt 1344, [2010] O.J. No. 943, 185 A.C.W.S. (3d) 865...

27 In my view, a source of funding other than the Salaried Employees and Retirees themselves should be identified now. In the CMI Entities' CCAA proceeding, funding was made available for Representative Counsel although I acknowledge that the circumstances here are somewhat different. Staged payments commencing with the sum of \$25,000 may be more appropriate. Funding would be prospective in nature and would not extend to investigation of or claims against directors.

28 Counsel are to communicate with one another to ascertain how best to structure the funding and report to me if necessary at a 9:30 appointment on March 22, 2010. If everything is resolved, only the Monitor need report at that time and may do so by e-mail. If not resolved, I propose to make the structuring order on March 22, 2010 on a nunc pro tunc basis. Ottawa counsel may participate by telephone but should alert the Commercial List Office of their proposed mode of participation.

Motion granted.

End of Document

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TAB 10

2010 ONSC 222 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re

2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222, [2010] O.J. No. 188, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 684, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST PUBLISHING INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC. AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC.

Pepall J.

Judgment: January 18, 2010 Docket: CV-10-8533-00CL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb, Duncan Ault for Applicant, LP Entities Mario Forte for Special Committee of the Board of Directors Andrew Kent, Hilary Clarke for Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders' Syndicate Peter Griffin for Management Directors Robin B. Schwill, Natalie Renner for Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J*.:

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Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to s. 4 — considered

s. 5 — considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

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s. 137(2) — considered

APPLICATION by entity of company already protected under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for similar protection.

Pepall J.:

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global") is a leading Canadian media company with interests in (i) newspaper publishing and digital media; and (ii) free-to-air television stations and subscription based specialty television channels. Canwest Global, the entities in its Canadian television business (excluding CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries) and the National Post Company (which prior to October 30, 2009 owned and published the National Post) (collectively, the "CMI Entities"), obtained protection from their creditors in a *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*¹ ("CCAA") proceeding on October 6, 2009.² Now, the Canwest Global Canadian newspaper entities with the exception of National Post Inc. seek similar protection. Specifically, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc. ("CPI"), Canwest Books Inc. ("CBI"), and Canwest (Canada) Inc. ("CCI") apply for an order pursuant to the CCAA. They also seek to have the stay of proceedings and the other benefits of the order extend to Canwest Limited Partnership/ Canwest Société en Commandite (the "Limited Partnership"). The Applicants and the Limited Partnership are referred to as the "LP Entities" throughout these reasons. The term "Canwest" will be used to refer to the Canwest enterprise as a whole. It includes the LP Entities and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries which are not applicants in this proceeding.

2 All appearing on this application supported the relief requested with the exception of the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders. That Committee represents certain unsecured creditors whom I will discuss more fully later.

3 I granted the order requested with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

I start with three observations. Firstly, Canwest Global, through its ownership interests in the LP Entities, is the largest publisher of daily English language newspapers in Canada. The LP Entities own and operate 12 daily newspapers across Canada. These newspapers are part of the Canadian heritage and landscape. The oldest, The Gazette, was established in Montreal in 1778. The others are the Vancouver Sun, The Province, the Ottawa Citizen, the Edmonton Journal, the Calgary Herald, The Windsor Star, the Times Colonist, The Star Phoenix, the Leader-Post, the Nanaimo Daily News and the Alberni Valley Times. These newspapers have an estimated average weekly readership that exceeds 4 million. The LP Entities also publish 23 non-daily newspapers and own and operate a number of digital media and online operations. The community served by the LP Entities is huge. In addition, based on August 31, 2009 figures, the LP Entities employ approximately 5,300 employees in Canada with approximately 1,300 of those employees working in Ontario. The granting of the order requested is premised on an anticipated going concern sale of the newspaper business of the LP Entities. This serves not just the interests of the LP Entities and their stakeholders but the Canadian community at large.

5 Secondly, the order requested may contain some shortcomings; it may not be perfect. That said, insolvency proceedings typically involve what is feasible, not what is flawless.

6 Lastly, although the builders of this insolvent business are no doubt unhappy with its fate, gratitude is not misplaced by acknowledging their role in its construction.

Background Facts

(i) Financial Difficulties

7 The LP Entities generate the majority of their revenues through the sale of advertising. In the fiscal year ended August 31, 2009, approximately 72% of the LP Entities' consolidated revenue derived from advertising. The LP Entities have been seriously affected by the economic downturn in Canada and their consolidated advertising revenues declined substantially in the latter half of 2008 and in 2009. In addition, they experienced increases in certain of their operating costs.

8 On May 29, 2009 the Limited Partnership failed, for the first time, to make certain interest and principal reduction payments and related interest and cross currency swap payments totaling approximately \$10 million in respect of its senior secured credit facilities. On the same day, the Limited Partnership announced that, as of May 31, 2009, it would be in breach of certain financial covenants set out in the credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007 between its predecessor, Canwest Media Works Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent, a syndicate of secured lenders ("the LP Secured Lenders"), and the predecessors of CCI, CPI and CBI as guarantors. The Limited Partnership also failed to make principal, interest and fee payments due pursuant to this credit agreement on June 21, June 22, July 21, July 22 and August 21, 2009.

9 The May 29, 2009, defaults under the senior secured credit facilities triggered defaults in respect of related foreign currency and interest rate swaps. The swap counterparties (the "Hedging Secured Creditors") demanded payment of \$68.9 million. These unpaid amounts rank pari passu with amounts owing under the LP Secured Lenders' credit facilities.

On or around August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership and certain of the LP Secured Lenders entered into a forbearance agreement in order to allow the LP Entities and the LP Secured Lenders the opportunity to negotiate a pre-packaged restructuring or reorganization of the affairs of the LP Entities. On November 9, 2009, the forbearance agreement expired and since then, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to demand payment of approximately \$953.4 million, the amount outstanding as at August 31, 2009. Nonetheless, they continued negotiations with the LP Entities. The culmination of this process is that the LP Entities are now seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to provide them with the necessary "breathing space" to restructure and reorganize their businesses and to preserve their enterprise value for the ultimate benefit of their broader stakeholder community.

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11 The Limited Partnership released its annual consolidated financial statements for the twelve months ended August 31, 2009 and 2008 on November 26, 2009. As at August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated assets with a net book value of approximately \$644.9 million. This included consolidated current assets of \$182.7 million and consolidated non-current assets of approximately \$462.2 million. As at that date, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated liabilities of approximately \$1.719 billion (increased from \$1.656 billion as at August 31, 2008). These liabilities consisted of consolidated current liabilities of \$1.612 billion and consolidated non-current liabilities of \$107 million.

12 The Limited Partnership had been experiencing deteriorating financial results over the past year. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership's consolidated revenues decreased by \$181.7 million or 15% to \$1.021 billion as compared to \$1.203 billion for the year ended August 31, 2008. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership reported a consolidated net loss of \$66 million compared to consolidated net earnings of \$143.5 million for fiscal 2008.

(ii) Indebtedness under the Credit Facilities

13 The indebtedness under the credit facilities of the LP Entities consists of the following.

(a) The LP senior secured credit facilities are the subject matter of the July 10, 2007 credit agreement already mentioned. They are guaranteed by CCI, CPI and CBI. The security held by the LP Secured Lenders has been reviewed by the solicitors for the proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. and considered to be valid and enforceable. ³ As at August 31, 2009, the amounts owing by the LP Entities totaled \$953.4 million exclusive of interest. ⁴

(b) The Limited Partnership is a party to the aforementioned foreign currency and interest rate swaps with the Hedging Secured Creditors. Defaults under the LP senior secured credit facilities have triggered defaults in respect of these swap arrangements. Demand for repayment of amounts totaling \$68.9 million (exclusive of unpaid interest) has been made. These obligations are secured.

(c) Pursuant to a senior subordinated credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007, between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders, and others, certain subordinated lenders agreed to provide the Limited Partnership with access to a term credit facility of up to \$75 million. CCI, CPI, and CBI are guarantors. This facility is unsecured, guaranteed on an unsecured basis and currently fully drawn. On June 20, 2009, the Limited Partnership failed to make an interest payment resulting in an event of default under the credit agreement. In addition, the defaults under the senior secured credit facilities resulted in a default under this facility. The senior subordinated lenders are in a position to take steps to demand payment.

(d) Pursuant to a note indenture between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of New York Trust Company of Canada as trustee, and others, the Limited Partnership issued 9.5% per annum senior subordinated unsecured notes due 2015 in the aggregate principal amount of US \$400 million. CPI and CBI are guarantors. The notes are unsecured and guaranteed on an unsecured basis. The noteholders are in a position to take steps to demand immediate payment of all amounts outstanding under the notes as a result of events of default.

14 The LP Entities use a centralized cash management system at the Bank of Nova Scotia which they propose to continue. Obligations owed pursuant to the existing cash management arrangements are secured (the "Cash Management Creditor").

(iii) LP Entities' Response to Financial Difficulties

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15 The LP Entities took a number of steps to address their circumstances with a view to improving cash flow and strengthening their balance sheet. Nonetheless, they began to experience significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and other trade creditors. The LP Entities' debt totals approximately \$1.45 billion and they do not have the liquidity required to make payment in respect of this indebtedness. They are clearly insolvent.

16 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of directors (the "Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives. The Special Committee has appointed Thomas Strike, the President, Corporate Development & Strategy Implementation, as Recapitalization Officer and has retained Gary Colter of CRS Inc. as Restructuring Advisor for the LP Entities (the "CRA"). The President of CPI, Dennis Skulsky, will report directly to the Special Committee.

17 Given their problems, throughout the summer and fall of 2009, the LP Entities have participated in difficult and complex negotiations with their lenders and other stakeholders to obtain forbearance and to work towards a consensual restructuring or recapitalization.

An ad hoc committee of the holders of the senior subordinated unsecured notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee") was formed in July, 2009 and retained Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg as counsel. Among other things, the Limited Partnership agreed to pay the Committee's legal fees up to a maximum of \$250,000. Representatives of the Limited Partnership and their advisors have had ongoing discussions with representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee and their counsel was granted access to certain confidential information following execution of a confidentiality agreement. The Ad Hoc Committee has also engaged a financial advisor who has been granted access to the LP Entities' virtual data room which contains confidential information regarding the business and affairs of the LP Entities. There is no evidence of any satisfactory proposal having been made by the noteholders. They have been in a position to demand payment since August, 2009, but they have not done so.

19 In the meantime and in order to permit the businesses of the LP Entities to continue to operate as going concerns and in an effort to preserve the greatest number of jobs and maximize value for the stakeholders of the LP Entities, the LP Entities have been engaged in negotiations with the LP Senior Lenders, the result of which is this CCAA application.

(iv) The Support Agreement, the Secured Creditors' Plan and the Solicitation Process

20 Since August 31, 2009, the LP Entities and the LP administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders have worked together to negotiate terms for a consensual, prearranged restructuring, recapitalization or reorganization of the business and affairs of the LP Entities as a going concern. This is referred to by the parties as the Support Transaction.

As part of this Support Transaction, the LP Entities are seeking approval of a Support Agreement entered into by them and the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders. 48% of the LP Secured Lenders, the Hedging Secured Creditors, and the Cash Management Creditor (the "Secured Creditors") are party to the Support Agreement.

22 Three interrelated elements are contemplated by the Support Agreement and the Support Transaction: the credit acquisition, the Secured Creditors' plan (the "Plan"), and the sale and investor solicitation process which the parties refer to as SISP.

23 The Support Agreement contains various milestones with which the LP Entities are to comply and, subject to a successful bid arising from the solicitation process (an important caveat in my view), commits them to support a credit acquisition. The credit acquisition involves an acquisition by an entity capitalized by the Secured Creditors and described as AcquireCo. AcquireCo. would acquire substantially all of the assets of the LP Entities (including the shares in National Post Inc.) and assume certain of the liabilities of the LP Entities. It is contemplated that AcquireCo. would offer employment to all or substantially all of the employees of the LP Entities and would assume all of the LP Entities' existing pension plans and existing post-retirement and post-employment benefit plans subject to a right by AcquireCo., acting commercially reasonably and after consultation with the operational management of the LP Entities, to exclude Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re, 2010 ONSC 222, 2010...

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certain specified liabilities. The credit acquisition would be the subject matter of a Plan to be voted on by the Secured Creditors on or before January 31, 2010. There would only be one class. The Plan would only compromise the LP Entities' secured claims and would not affect or compromise any other claims against any of the LP Entities ("unaffected claims"). No holders of the unaffected claims would be entitled to vote on or receive any distributions of their claims. The Secured Creditors would exchange their outstanding secured claims against the LP Entities under the LP credit agreement and the swap obligations respectively for their *pro rata* shares of the debt and equity to be issued by AcquireCo. All of the LP Entities' obligations under the LP secured claims calculated as of the date of closing less \$25 million would be deemed to be satisfied following the closing of the Acquisition Agreement. LP secured claims in the amount of \$25 million would continue to be held by AcquireCo. and constitute an outstanding unsecured claim against the LP Entities.

The Support Agreement contemplates that the Financial Advisor, namely RBC Dominion Securities Inc., under the supervision of the Monitor, will conduct the solicitation process. Completion of the credit acquisition process is subject to a successful bid arising from the solicitation process. In general terms, the objective of the solicitation process is to obtain a better offer (with some limitations described below) than that reflected in the credit acquisition. If none is obtained in that process, the LP Entities intend for the credit acquisition to proceed assuming approval of the Plan. Court sanction would also be required.

In more detailed terms, Phase I of the solicitation process is expected to last approximately 7 weeks and qualified interested parties may submit non-binding proposals to the Financial Advisor on or before February 26, 2010. Thereafter, the Monitor will assess the proposals to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining a Superior Offer. This is in essence a cash offer that is equal to or higher than that represented by the credit acquisition. If there is such a prospect, the Monitor will recommend that the process continue into Phase II. If there is no such prospect, the Monitor will then determine whether there is a Superior Alternative Offer, that is, an offer that is not a Superior Offer but which might nonetheless receive approval from the Secured Creditors. If so, to proceed into Phase II, the Superior Alternative Offer must be supported by Secured Creditors holding more than at least 33.3% of the secured claims. If it is not so supported, the process would be terminated and the LP Entities would then apply for court sanction of the Plan.

26 Phase II is expected to last approximately 7 weeks as well. This period allows for due diligence and the submission of final binding proposals. The Monitor will then conduct an assessment akin to the Phase 1 process with somewhat similar attendant outcomes if there are no Superior Offers and no acceptable Alternative Superior Offers. If there were a Superior Offer or an acceptable Alternative Superior Offer, an agreement would be negotiated and the requisite approvals sought.

The solicitation process is designed to allow the LP Entities to test the market. One concern is that a Superior Offer that benefits the secured lenders might operate to preclude a Superior Alternative Offer that could provide a better result for the unsecured creditors. That said, the LP Entities are of the view that the solicitation process and the support transaction present the best opportunity for the businesses of the LP Entities to continue as going concerns, thereby preserving jobs as well as the economic and social benefits of their continued operation. At this stage, the alternative is a bankruptcy or liquidation which would result in significant detriment not only to the creditors and employees of the LP Entities but to the broader community that benefits from the continued operation of the LP Entities' business. I also take some comfort from the position of the Monitor which is best captured in an excerpt from its preliminary Report:

The terms of the Support Agreement and SISP were the subject of lengthy and intense arm's length negotiations between the LP Entities and the LP Administrative Agent. The Proposed Monitor supports approval of the process contemplated therein and of the approval of those documents, but without in any way fettering the various powers and discretions of the Monitor.

It goes without saying that the Monitor, being a court appointed officer, may apply to the court for advice and directions and also owes reporting obligations to the court.

As to the objection of the Ad Hoc Committee, I make the following observations. Firstly, they represent unsecured subordinated debt. They have been in a position to take action since August, 2009. Furthermore, the LP Entities have

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provided up to \$250,000 for them to retain legal counsel. Meanwhile, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to enforce their rights through a non-consensual court proceeding and have advised the LP Entities of their abilities in that regard in the event that the LP Entities did not move forward as contemplated by the Support Agreement. With the Support Agreement and the solicitation process, there is an enhanced likelihood of the continuation of going concern operations, the preservation of jobs and the maximization of value for stakeholders of the LP Entities. It seemed to me that in the face of these facts and given that the Support Agreement expired on January 8, 2010, adjourning the proceeding was not merited in the circumstances. The Committee did receive very short notice. Without being taken as encouraging or discouraging the use of the comeback clause in the order, I disagree with the submission of counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee to the effect that it is very difficult if not impossible to stop a process relying on that provision. That

provision in the order is a meaningful one as is clear from the decision in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re^5*. On a come back motion, although the positions of parties who have relied bona fide on an Initial Order should not be prejudiced, the onus is on the applicants for an Initial Order to satisfy the court that the existing terms should be upheld.

Proposed Monitor

30 The Applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor. It currently serves as the Monitor in the CMI Entities' CCAA proceeding. It is desirable for FTI to act; it is qualified to act; and it has consented to act. It has not served in any of the incompatible capacities described in section 11.7(2) of the CCAA. The proposed Monitor has an enhanced role that is reflected in the order and which is acceptable.

Proposed Order

31 As mentioned, I granted the order requested. It is clear that the LP Entities need protection under the CCAA. The order requested will provide stability and enable the LP Entities to pursue their restructuring and preserve enterprise value for their stakeholders. Without the benefit of a stay, the LP Entities would be required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would be unable to continue operating their businesses.

(a) Threshold Issues

32 The chief place of business of the Applicants is Ontario. They qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. They are affiliated companies with total claims against them that far exceed \$5 million. Demand for payment of the swap indebtedness has been made and the Applicants are in default under all of the other facilities outlined in these reasons. They do not have sufficient liquidity to satisfy their obligations. They are clearly insolvent.

(b) Limited Partnership

The Applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and the other relief requested to the Limited Partnership. The CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or a limited partnership but courts have exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the protections of an Initial CCAA Order to partnerships when it was just and convenient to do so. The relief has been held to be appropriate where the operations of the partnership are so intertwined with those of the debtor companies that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted: *Canwest Global Communications Corp.*, Re^{6} and *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.*, Re^{7} .

In this case, the Limited Partnership is the administrative backbone of the LP Entities and is integral to and intertwined with the Applicants' ongoing operations. It owns all shared information technology assets; it provides hosting services for all Canwest properties; it holds all software licences used by the LP Entities; it is party to many of the shared services agreements involving other Canwest entities; and employs approximately 390 full-time equivalent employees who work in Canwest's shared services area. The Applicants state that failure to extend the stay to the Limited Partnership would have a profoundly negative impact on the value of the Applicants, the Limited Partnership and the Canwest Global enterprise as a whole. In addition, exposing the assets of the Limited Partnership to the demands of creditors Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re, 2010 ONSC 222, 2010...

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would make it impossible for the LP Entities to successfully restructure. I am persuaded that under these circumstances it is just and convenient to grant the request.

(c) Filing of the Secured Creditors' Plan

The LP Entities propose to present the Plan only to the Secured Creditors. Claims of unsecured creditors will not be addressed.

36 The CCAA seems to contemplate a single creditor-class plan. Sections 4 and 5 state:

s.4 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, it the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

s.5 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

37 Case law has interpreted these provisions as authorizing a single creditor-class plan. For instance, Blair J. (as he then was) stated in *Philip Services Corp., Re^8* : " There is no doubt that a debtor is at liberty, under the terms of sections 4 and 5 of the CCAA, to make a proposal to secured creditors or to unsecured creditors or to both groups."⁹ Similarly, in *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re^{10}*, the Court of Appeal stated: "It may also be noted that s. 5 of the CCAA contemplates a plan which is a compromise between a debtor company and its secured creditors and that by the terms of s. 6 of the Act, applied to the facts of this case, the plan is binding only on the secured creditors and the company and not on the unsecured creditors."¹¹

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a debtor has the statutory authority to present a plan to a single class of creditors. In *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re*, the issue was raised in the context of the plan's sanction by the court and a consideration of whether the plan was fair and reasonable as it eliminated the opportunity for unsecured creditors to realize anything. The basis of the argument was that the motions judge had erred in not requiring a more complete and in depth valuation of the company's assets relative to the claims of the secured creditors.

In this case, I am not being asked to sanction the Plan at this stage. Furthermore, the Monitor will supervise a vigorous and lengthy solicitation process to thoroughly canvass the market for alternative transactions. The solicitation should provide a good indication of market value. In addition, as counsel for the LP Entities observed, the noteholders and the LP Entities never had any forbearance agreement. The noteholders have been in a position to take action since last summer but chose not to do so. One would expect some action on their part if they themselves believed that they "were in the money". While the process is not perfect, it is subject to the supervision of the court and the Monitor is obliged to report on its results to the court.

40 In my view it is appropriate in the circumstances to authorize the LP Entities to file and present a Plan only to the Secured Creditors.

(D) DIP Financing

41 The Applicants seek approval of a DIP facility in the amount of \$25 million which would be secured by a charge over all of the assets of the LP Entities and rank ahead of all other charges except the Administration Charge, and ahead of all other existing security interests except validly perfected purchase money security interests and certain specific statutory encumbrances. 42 Section 11.2 of the CCAA provides the statutory jurisdiction to grant a DIP charge. In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*¹², I addressed this provision. Firstly, an applicant should address the requirements contained in section 11.2 (1) and then address the enumerated factors found in section 11.2(4) of the CCAA. As that list is not exhaustive, it may be appropriate to consider other factors as well.

43 Applying these principles to this case and dealing firstly with section 11.2(1) of the CCAA, notice either has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the security or charge or alternatively they are not affected by the DIP charge. While funds are not anticipated to be immediately necessary, the cash flow statements project a good likelihood that the LP Entities will require the additional liquidity afforded by the \$25 million. The ability to borrow funds that are secured by a charge will help retain the confidence of the LP Entities' trade creditors, employees and suppliers. It is expected that the DIP facility will permit the LP Entities to conduct the solicitation process and consummate a recapitalization transaction of a sale of all or some of its assets. The charge does not secure any amounts that were owing prior to the filing. As such, there has been compliance with the provisions of section 11.2 (1).

Turning then to a consideration of the factors found in section 11.2(4) of the Act, the LP Entities are expected to be subject to these CCAA proceedings until July 31, 2010. Their business and financial affairs will be amply managed during the proceedings. This is a consensual filing which is reflective of the confidence of the major creditors in the current management configuration. All of these factors favour the granting of the charge. The DIP loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement and would ensure the necessary stability during the CCAA process. I have already touched upon the issue of value. That said, in relative terms, the quantum of the DIP financing is not large and there is no readily apparent material prejudice to any creditor arising from the granting of the charge and approval of the financing. I also note that it is endorsed by the proposed Monitor in its report.

45 Other factors to consider in assessing whether to approve a DIP charge include the reasonableness of the financing terms and more particularly the associated fees. Ideally there should be some evidence on this issue. Prior to entering into the forbearance agreement, the LP Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a DIP facility. In this case, some but not all of the Secured Creditors are participating in the financing of the DIP loan. Therefore, only some would benefit from the DIP while others could bear the burden of it. While they may have opted not to participate in the DIP financing for various reasons, the concurrence of the non participating Secured Creditors is some market indicator of the appropriateness of the terms of the DIP financing.

Lastly, I note that the DIP lenders have indicated that they would not provide a DIP facility if the charge was not approved. In all of these circumstances, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and grant the DIP charge.

(e) Critical Suppliers

47 The LP Entities ask that they be authorized but not required to pay pre-filing amounts owing in arrears to certain suppliers if the supplier is critical to the business and ongoing operations of the LP Entities or the potential future benefit of the payments is considerable and of value to the LP Entities as a whole. Such payments could only be made with the consent of the proposed Monitor. At present, it is contemplated that such suppliers would consist of certain newspaper suppliers, newspaper distributors, logistic suppliers and the Amex Bank of Canada. The LP Entities do not seek a charge to secure payments to any of its critical suppliers.

48 Section 11.4 of the CCAA addresses critical suppliers. It states:

11.4(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods and services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.

(2) If the court declares the person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.

(3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied upon the terms of the order.

(4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

49 Mr. Byers, who is counsel for the Monitor, submits that the court has always had discretion to authorize the payment of critical suppliers and that section 11.4 is not intended to address that issue. Rather, it is intended to respond to a post-filing situation where a debtor company wishes to compel a supplier to supply. In those circumstances, the court may declare a person to be a critical supplier and require the person to supply. If the court chooses to compel a person to supply, it must authorize a charge as security for the supplier. Mr. Barnes, who is counsel for the LP Entities, submits that section 11.4 is not so limited. Section 11.4 (1) gives the court general jurisdiction to declare a supplier to be a "critical supplier" where the supplier provides goods or services that are essential to the ongoing business of the debtor company. The permissive as opposed to mandatory language of section 11.4 (2) supports this interpretation.

Section 11.4 is not very clear. As a matter of principle, one would expect the purpose of section 11.4 to be twofold: (i) to codify the authority to permit suppliers who are critical to the continued operation of the company to be paid and (ii) to require the granting of a charge in circumstances where the court is compelling a person to supply. If no charge is proposed to be granted, there is no need to give notice to the secured creditors. I am not certain that the distinction between Mr. Byers and Mr. Barnes' interpretation is of any real significance for the purposes of this case. Either section 11.4(1) does not oust the court's inherent jurisdiction to make provision for the payment of critical suppliers where no charge is requested or it provides authority to the court to declare persons to be critical suppliers. Section 11.4(1) requires the person to be a supplier of goods and services that are critical to the companies' operation but does not impose any additional conditions or limitations.

51 The LP Entities do not seek a charge but ask that they be authorized but not required to make payments for the prefiling provision of goods and services to certain third parties who are critical and integral to their businesses. This includes newsprint and ink suppliers. The LP Entities are dependent upon a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint and ink and they have insufficient inventory on hand to meet their needs. It also includes newspaper distributors who are required to distribute the newspapers of the LP Entities; American Express whose corporate card programme and accounts are used by LP Entities employees for business related expenses; and royalty fees accrued and owing to content providers for the subscription-based online service provided by FPinfomart.ca, one of the businesses of the LP Entities. The LP Entities believe that it would be damaging to both their ongoing operations and their ability to restructure if they are unable to pay their critical suppliers. I am satisfied that the LP Entities may treat these parties and those described in Mr. Strike's affidavit as critical suppliers but none will be paid without the consent of the Monitor.

(f) Administration Charge and Financial Advisor Charge

52 The Applicants also seek a charge in the amount of \$3 million to secure the fees of the Monitor, its counsel, the LP Entities' counsel, the Special Committee's financial advisor and counsel to the Special Committee, the CRA and counsel to the CRA. These are professionals whose services are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities' business. This charge is to rank in priority to all other security interests in the LP Entities' assets, with the exception of purchase money security interests and specific statutory encumbrances as provided for in the proposed order. ¹³ The LP Entities also request a \$10 million charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, RBC Dominion Securities Inc. The

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Financial Advisor is providing investment banking services to the LP Entities and is essential to the solicitation process. This charge would rank in third place, subsequent to the administration charge and the DIP charge.

⁵³ In the past, an administration charge was granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Section 11.52 of the amended CCAA now provides statutory jurisdiction to grant an administration charge. Section 11.52 states:

On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the debtor company is subject to a security or charge - in an amount that the court considers appropriate - in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

I am satisfied that the issue of notice has been appropriately addressed by the LP Entities. As to whether the amounts are appropriate and whether the charges should extend to the proposed beneficiaries, the section does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in its assessment. It seems to me that factors that might be considered would include:

(a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured;

- (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;
- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- (f) the position of the Monitor.

This is not an exhaustive list and no doubt other relevant factors will be developed in the jurisprudence.

There is no question that the restructuring of the LP Entities is large and highly complex and it is reasonable to expect extensive involvement by professional advisors. Each of the professionals whose fees are to be secured has played a critical role in the LP Entities restructuring activities to date and each will continue to be integral to the solicitation and restructuring process. Furthermore, there is no unwarranted duplication of roles. As to quantum of both proposed charges, I accept the Applicants' submissions that the business of the LP Entities and the tasks associated with their restructuring are of a magnitude and complexity that justify the amounts. I also take some comfort from the fact that the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders has agreed to them. In addition, the Monitor supports the charges requested. The quantum of the administration charge appears to be fair and reasonable. As to the quantum of the charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, it is more unusual as it involves an incentive payment but I note that the Monitor conducted its own due diligence and, as mentioned, is supportive of the request. The quantum reflects an appropriate incentive to secure a desirable alternative offer. Based on all of these factors, I concluded that the two charges should be approved.

(g) Directors and Officers

56 The Applicants also seek a directors and officers charge ("D & O charge") in the amount of \$35 million as security for their indemnification obligations for liabilities imposed upon the Applicants' directors and officers. The D & O charge will rank after the Financial Advisor charge and will rank pari passu with the MIP charge discussed subsequently. Section 11.51 of the CCAA addresses a D & O charge. I have already discussed section 11.51 in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*¹⁴ as it related to the request by the CMI Entities for a D & O charge. Firstly, the charge is essential to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. The continued participation of the experienced Boards of Directors, management and employees of the LP Entities is critical to the restructuring. Retaining the current officers and directors will also avoid destabilization. Furthermore, a CCAA restructuring creates new risks and potential liabilities for the directors and officers. The amount of the charge appears to be appropriate in light of the obligations and liabilities in a worse case scenario. While Canwest Global maintains D & O liability insurance, it has only been extended to February 28, 2009 and further extensions are unavailable. As of the date of the Initial Order, Canwest Global had been unable to obtain additional or replacement insurance coverage.

57 Understandably in my view, the directors have indicated that due to the potential for significant personal liability, they cannot continue their service and involvement in the restructuring absent a D & O charge. The charge also provides assurances to the employees of the LP Entities that obligations for accrued wages and termination and severance pay will be satisfied. All secured creditors have either been given notice or are unaffected by the D & O charge. Lastly, the Monitor supports the charge and I was satisfied that the charge should be granted as requested.

(h) Management Incentive Plan and Special Arrangements

The LP Entities have made amendments to employment agreements with 2 key employees and have developed certain Management Incentive Plans for 24 participants (collectively the "MIPs"). They seek a charge in the amount of \$3 million to secure these obligations. It would be subsequent to the D & O charge.

59 The CCAA is silent on charges in support of Key Employee Retention Plans ("KERPs") but they have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings. Most recently, in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*¹⁵, I approved the KERP requested on the basis of the factors enumerated in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*¹⁶ and given that the Monitor had carefully reviewed the charge and was supportive of the request as were the Board of Directors, the Special Committee of the Board of Directors, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the Adhoc Committee of Noteholders.

60 The MIPs in this case are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the LP Entities through a successful restructuring. The participants are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. They are experienced executives and have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives to date. They are integral to the continued operation of the business during the restructuring and the successful completion of a plan of restructuring, reorganization, compromise or arrangement.

In addition, it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities in the absence of a charge securing their payments. The departure of senior management would distract from and undermine the restructuring process that is underway and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for these employees. The MIPs provide appropriate incentives for the participants to remain in their current positions and ensures that they are properly compensated for their assistance in the reorganization process.

In this case, the MIPs and the MIP charge have been approved in form and substance by the Board of Directors and the Special Committee of Canwest Global. The proposed Monitor has also expressed its support for the MIPs and the MIP charge in its pre-filing report. In my view, the charge should be granted as requested. Canwest Publishing Inc. / Publications Canwest Inc., Re, 2010 ONSC 222, 2010... 2010 ONSC 222, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, [2010] O.J. No. 188, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 684...

(i) Confidential Information

The LP Entities request that the court seal the confidential supplement which contains individually identifiable information and compensation information including sensitive salary information about the individuals who are covered by the MIPs. It also contains an unredacted copy of the Financial Advisor's agreement. I have discretion pursuant to Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act*¹⁷ to order that any document filed in a civil proceeding be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record. That said, public access in an important tenet of our system of justice.

64 The threshold test for sealing orders is found in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*¹⁸. In that case, Iacobucci J. stated that an order should only be granted when: (i) it is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (ii) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

In Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re¹⁹ I applied the Sierra Club test and approved a similar request by 65 the Applicants for the sealing of a confidential supplement containing unredacted copies of KERPs for the employees of the CMI Entities. Here, with respect to the first branch of the Sierra Club test, the confidential supplement contains unredacted copies of the MIPs. Protecting the disclosure of sensitive personal and compensation information of this nature, the disclosure of which would cause harm to both the LP Entities and the MIP participants, is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The information would be of obvious strategic advantage to competitors. Moreover, there are legitimate personal privacy concerns in issue. The MIP participants have a reasonable expectation that their names and their salary information will be kept confidential. With respect to the second branch of the Sierra Club test, keeping the information confidential will not have any deleterious effects. As in the Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re case, the aggregate amount of the MIP charge has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. The salutary effects of sealing the confidential supplement outweigh any conceivable deleterious effects. In the normal course, outside of the context of a CCAA proceeding, confidential personal and salary information would be kept confidential by an employer and would not find its way into the public domain. With respect to the unredacted Financial Advisor agreement, it contains commercially sensitive information the disclosure of which could be harmful to the solicitation process and the salutary effects of sealing it outweigh any deleterious effects. The confidential supplements should be sealed and not form part of the public record at least at this stage of the proceedings.

Conclusion

66 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to grant the order requested.

Application granted.

Footnotes

- 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended.
- 2 On October 30, 2009, substantially all of the assets and business of the National Post Company were transferred to the company now known as National Post Inc.
- 3 Subject to certain assumptions and qualifications.
- 4 Although not formally in evidence before the court, counsel for the LP Secured Lenders advised the court that currently \$382,889,000 in principal in Canadian dollars is outstanding along with \$458,042,000 in principal in American dollars.

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2010 ONSC 222, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, [2010] O.J. No. 188, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 684...

- 5 2006 CarswellOnt 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 6 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 29.
- 7 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
- 8 1999 CarswellOnt 4673 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 9 Ibid at para. 16.
- 10 (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (March 6,2003) [2003 CarswellOnt 730 (S.C.C.)].
- 11 Ibid at para. 34.
- 12 Supra, note 7 at paras. 31-35.
- 13 This exception also applies to the other charges granted.
- 14 Supra note 7 at paras. 44-48.
- 15 Supra note 7.
- 16 [2009] O.J. No. 3344 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 17 R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as amended.
- 18 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).
- 19 Supra, note 7 at para. 52.

End of Document

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TAB 11

2012 ONSC 3767 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Cinram International Inc., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 8413, 2012 ONSC 3767, 217 A.C.W.S. (3d) 11, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Cinram International Inc., Cinram International Income Fund, CII Trust and The Companies Listed in Schedule "A" (Applicants)

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 25, 2012 Judgment: June 26, 2012 Docket: CV-12-9767-00CL

Counsel: Robert J. Chadwick, Melaney Wagner, Caroline Descours for Applicants

Steven Golick for Warner Electra-Atlantic Corp.

Steven Weisz for Pre-Petition First Lien Agent, Pre-Petition Second Lien Agent and DIP Agent

Tracy Sandler for Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation

David Byers for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

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Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Fraser Papers Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3658, 56 C.B.R. (5th) 194 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re (2004), 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210, 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - considered

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 1990 CarswellBC 394, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, (sub nom. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada) [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

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Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to *Priszm Income Fund, Re* (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — considered

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Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 Generally — referred to

s. 2 "insolvent person" — considered

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1982

Chapter 15 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "company" — considered

s. 2(1) "debtor company" - considered

s. 3(1) — considered

- s. 3(2) considered
- s. 11 considered
- s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.2(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.2(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

APPLICATION by group of debtor companies for initial order and other relief under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

Morawetz J.:

1 Cinram International Inc. ("CII"), Cinram International Income Fund ("Cinram Fund"), CII Trust and the Companies listed in Schedule "A" (collectively, the "Applicants") brought this application seeking an initial order (the "Initial Order") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"). The Applicants also request that the court exercise its jurisdiction to extend a stay of proceedings and other benefits under the Initial Order to Cinram International Limited Partnership ("Cinram LP", collectively with the Applicants, the "CCAA Parties").

2 Cinram Fund, together with its direct and indirect subsidiaries (collectively, "Cinram" or the "Cinram Group") is a replicator and distributor of CDs and DVDs. Cinram has a diversified operational footprint across North America and Europe that enables it to meet the replication and logistics demands of its customers.

3 The evidentiary record establishes that Cinram has experienced significant declines in revenue and EBITDA, which, according to Cinram, are a result of the economic downturn in Cinram's primary markets of North America and Europe, which impacted consumers' discretionary spending and adversely affected the entire industry.

4 Cinram advises that over the past several years it has continued to evaluate its strategic alternatives and rationalize its operating footprint in order to attempt to balance its ongoing operations and financial challenges with its existing debt levels. However, despite cost reductions and recapitalized initiatives and the implementation of a variety of restructuring alternatives, the Cinram Group has experienced a number of challenges that has led to it seeking protection under the CCAA.

5 Counsel to Cinram outlined the principal objectives of these CCAA proceedings as:

(i) to ensure the ongoing operations of the Cinram Group;

(ii) to ensure the CCAA Parties have the necessary availability of working capital funds to maximize the ongoing business of the Cinram Group for the benefit of its stakeholders; and

(iii) to complete the sale and transfer of substantially all of the Cinram Group's business as a going concern (the "Proposed Transaction").

6 Cinram contemplates that these CCAA proceedings will be the primary court supervised restructuring of the CCAA Parties. Cinram has operations in the United States and certain of the Applicants are incorporated under the laws of the United States. Cinram, however, takes the position that Canada is the nerve centre of the Cinram Group.

7 The Applicants also seek authorization for Cinram International ULC ("Cinram ULC") to act as "foreign representative" in the within proceedings to seek a recognition order under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code ("Chapter 15"). Cinram advises that the proceedings under Chapter 15 are intended to ensure that the CCAA Parties are protected from creditor actions in the United States and to assist with the global implementation of the Proposed Transaction to be undertaken pursuant to these CCAA proceedings.

8 Counsel to the Applicants submits that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business in Canada, the United States and Europe that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects. Cinram is one of the world's largest providers of pre-recorded multi-media products and related logistics services. It has facilities in North America and Europe, and it: (i) manufactures DVDs, blue ray disks and CDs, and provides distribution services for motion picture studios, music labels, video game publishers, computer software companies, telecommunication companies and retailers around the world;

(ii) provides various digital media services through One K Studios, LLC; and

(iii) provides retail inventory control and forecasting services through Cinram Retail Services LLC (collectively, the "Cinram Business").

9 Cinram contemplates that the Proposed Transaction could allow it to restore itself as a market leader in the industry. Cinram takes the position that it requires CCAA protection to provide stability to its operations and to complete the Proposed Transaction.

10 The Proposed Transaction has the support of the lenders forming the steering committee with respect to Cinram's First Lien Credit Facilities (the "Steering Committee"), the members of which have been subject to confidentiality agreements and represent 40% of the loans under Cinram's First Lien Credit Facilities (the "Initial Consenting Lenders"). Cinram also anticipates further support of the Proposed Transaction from additional lenders under its credit facilities following the public announcement of the Proposed Transaction.

11 Cinram Fund is the direct or indirect parent and sole shareholder of all of the subsidiaries in Cinram's corporate structure. A simplified corporate structure of the Cinram Group showing all of the CCAA Parties, including the designation of the CCAA Parties' business segments and certain non-filing entities, is set out in the Pre-Filing Report of FTI Consulting Inc. (the "Monitor") at paragraph 13. A copy is attached as Schedule "B".

12 Cinram Fund, CII, Cinram International General Partner Inc. ("Cinram GP"), CII Trust, Cinram ULC and 1362806 Ontario Limited are the Canadian entities in the Cinram Group that are Applicants in these proceedings (collectively, the "Canadian Applicants"). Cinram Fund and CII Trust are both open-ended limited purpose trusts, established under the laws of Ontario, and each of the remaining Canadian Applicants is incorporated pursuant to Federal or Provincial legislation.

13 Cinram (US) Holdings Inc. ("CUSH"), Cinram Inc., IHC Corporation ("IHC"), Cinram Manufacturing, LLC ("Cinram Manufacturing"), Cinram Distribution, LLC ("Cinram Distribution"), Cinram Wireless, LLC ("Cinram Wireless"), Cinram Retail Services, LLC ("Cinram Retail") and One K Studios, LLC ("One K") are the U.S. entities in the Cinram Group that are Applicants in these proceedings (collectively, the "U.S. Applicants"). Each of the U.S. Applicants is incorporated under the laws of Delaware, with the exception of One K, which is incorporated under the laws of California. On May 25, 2012, each of the U.S. Applicants opened a new Canadian-based bank account with J.P. Morgan.

14 Cinram LP is not an Applicant in these proceedings. However, the Applicants seek to have a stay of proceedings and other relief under the CCAA extended to Cinram LP as it forms part of Cinram's income trust structure with Cinram Fund, the ultimate parent of the Cinram Group.

15 Cinram's European entities are not part of these proceedings and it is not intended that any insolvency proceedings will be commenced with respect to Cinram's European entities, except for Cinram Optical Discs SAC, which has commenced insolvency proceedings in France.

16 The Cinram Group's principal source of long-term debt is the senior secured credit facilities provided under credit agreements known as the "First-Lien Credit Agreement" and the "Second-Lien Credit Agreement" (together with the First-Lien Credit Agreement, the "Credit Agreements").

17 All of the CCAA Parties, with the exception of Cinram Fund, Cinram GP, CII Trust and Cinram LP (collectively, the "Fund Entities"), are borrowers and/or guarantors under the Credit Agreements. The obligations under the Credit Agreements are secured by substantially all of the assets of the Applicants and certain of their European subsidiaries.

As at March 31, 2012, there was approximately \$233 million outstanding under the First-Lien Term Loan Facility; \$19 million outstanding under the First-Lien Revolving Credit Facilities; approximately \$12 million of letter of credit exposure under the First-Lien Credit Agreement; and approximately \$12 million outstanding under the Second-Lien Credit Agreement.

19 Cinram advises that in light of the financial circumstances of the Cinram Group, it is not possible to obtain additional financing that could be used to repay the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements.

Mr. John Bell, Chief Financial Officer of CII, stated in his affidavit that in connection with certain defaults under the Credit Agreements, a series of waivers was extended from December 2011 to June 30, 2012 and that upon expiry of the waivers, the lenders have the ability to demand immediate repayment of the outstanding amounts under the Credit Agreements and the borrowers and the other Applicants that are guarantors under the Credit Agreements would be unable to meet their debt obligations. Mr. Bell further stated that there is no reasonable expectation that Cinram would be able to service its debt load in the short to medium term given forecasted net revenues and EBITDA for the remainder of fiscal 2012, fiscal 2013, and fiscal 2014. The cash flow forecast attached to his affidavit indicates that, without additional funding, the Applicants will exhaust their available cash resources and will thus be unable to meet their obligations as they become due.

21 The Applicants request a stay of proceedings. They take the position that in light of their financial circumstances, there could be a vast and significant erosion of value to the detriment of all stakeholders. In particular, the Applicants are concerned about the following risks, which, because of the integration of the Cinram business, also apply to the Applicants' subsidiaries, including Cinram LP:

- (a) the lenders demanding payment in full for money owing under the Credit Agreements;
- (b) potential termination of contracts by key suppliers; and
- (c) potential termination of contracts by customers.

As indicated in the cash flow forecast, the Applicants do not have sufficient funds available to meet their immediate cash requirements as a result of their current liquidity challenges. Mr. Bell states in his affidavit that the Applicants require access to Debtor-In-Possession ("DIP") Financing in the amount of \$15 millions to continue operations while they implement their restructuring, including the Proposed Transaction. Cinram has negotiated a DIP Credit Agreement with the lenders forming the Steering Committee (the "DIP Lenders") through J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA as Administrative Agent (the "DIP Agent") whereby the DIP Lenders agree to provide the DIP Financing in the form of a term loan in the amount of \$15 million.

23 The Applicants also indicate that during the course of the CCAA proceedings, the CCAA Parties intend to generally make payments to ensure their ongoing business operations for the benefit of their stakeholders, including obligations incurred prior to, on, or after the commencement of these proceedings relating to:

(a) the active employment of employees in the ordinary course;

(b) suppliers and service providers the CCAA Parties and the Monitor have determined to be critical to the continued operation of the Cinram business;

(c) certain customer programs in place pursuant to existing contracts or arrangements with customers; and

(d) inter-company payments among the CCAA Parties in respect of, among other things, shared services.

Mr. Bell states that the ability to make these payments relating to critical suppliers and customer programs is subject to a consultation and approval process agreed to among the Monitor, the DIP Agent and the CCAA Parties.

The Applicants also request an Administration Charge for the benefit of the Monitor and Moelis and Company, LLC ("Moelis"), an investment bank engaged to assist Cinram in a comprehensive and thorough review of its strategic alternatives.

In addition, the directors (and in the case of Cinram Fund and CII Trust, the Trustees, referred to collectively with the directors as the "Directors/Trustees") requested a Director's Charge to provide certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities. Mr. Bell states that in order to complete a successful restructuring, including the Proposed Transaction, the Applicants require the active and committed involvement of their Directors/Trustees and officers. Further, Cinram's insurers have advised that if Cinram was to file for CCAA protection, and the insurers agreed to renew the existing D&O policies, there would be a significant increase in the premium for that insurance.

27 Cinram has also developed a key employee retention program (the "KERP") with the principal purpose of providing an incentive for eligible employees, including eligible officers, to remain with the Cinram Group despite its financial difficulties. The KERP has been reviewed and approved by the Board of Trustees of the Cinram Fund. The KERP includes retention payments (the "KERP Retention Payments") to certain existing employees, including certain officers employed at Canadian and U.S. Entities, who are critical to the preservation of Cinram's enterprise value.

28 Cinram also advises that on June 22, 2012, Cinram Fund, the borrowers under the Credit Agreements, and the Initial Consenting Lenders entered into a support agreement pursuant to which the Initial Consenting Lenders agreed to support the Proposed Transaction to be pursued through these CCAA proceedings (the "Support Agreement").

29 Pursuant to the Support Agreement, lenders under the First-Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement or Consent Agreement prior to July 10, 2012 (the "Consent Date") are entitled to receive consent consideration (the "Early Consent Consideration") equal to 4% of the principal amount of loans under the First-Lien Credit Agreement held by such consenting lenders as of the Consent Date, payable in cash from the net sale proceeds of the Proposed Transaction upon distribution of such proceeds in the CCAA proceedings.

30 Mr. Bell states that it is contemplated that the CCAA proceedings will be the primary court-supervised restructuring of the CCAA Parties. He states that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business in Canada, the United States and Europe that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects. Mr. Bell further states that although Cinram has operations in the United States, and certain of the Applicants are incorporated under the laws of the United States, it is Ontario that is Cinram's home jurisdiction and the nerve centre of the CCAA Parties' management, business and operations.

The CCAA Parties have advised that they will be seeking a recognition order under Chapter 15 to ensure that they are protected from creditor actions in the United States and to assist with the global implementation of the Proposed Transaction. Thus, the Applicants seek authorization in the Proposed Initial Order for:

Cinram ULC to seek recognition of these proceedings as "foreign main proceedings" and to seek such additional relief required in connection with the prosecution of any sale transaction, including the Proposed Transaction, as well as authorization for the Monitor, as a court-appointed officer, to assist the CCAA Parties with any matters relating to any of the CCAA Parties' subsidiaries and any foreign proceedings commenced in relation thereto.

32 Mr. Bell further states that the Monitor will be actively involved in assisting Cinram ULC as the foreign representative of the Applicants in the Chapter 15 proceedings and will assist in keeping this court informed of developments in the Chapter 15 proceedings.

The facts relating to the CCAA Parties, the Cinram business, and the requested relief are fully set out in Mr. Bell's affidavit.

34 Counsel to the Applicants filed a comprehensive factum in support of the requested relief in the Initial Order. Part III of the factum sets out the issues and the law.

The relief requested in the form of the Initial Order is extensive. It goes beyond what this court usually considers on an initial hearing. However, in the circumstances of this case, I have been persuaded that the requested relief is appropriate.

In making this determination, I have taken into account that the Applicants have spent a considerable period of time reviewing their alternatives and have done so in a consultative manner with their senior secured lenders. The senior secured lenders support this application, notwithstanding that it is clear that they will suffer a significant shortfall on their positions. It is also noted that the Early Consent Consideration will be available to lenders under the First-Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement prior to July 10, 2012. Thus, all of these lenders will have the opportunity to participate in this arrangement.

As previously indicated, the Applicants' factum is comprehensive. The submissions on the law are extensive and cover all of the outstanding issues. It provides a fulsome review of the jurisprudence in the area, which for purposes of this application, I accept. For this reason, paragraphs 41-96 of the factum are attached as Schedule "C" for reference purposes.

38 The Applicants have also requested that the confidential supplement — which contains the KERP summary listing the individual KERP Payments and certain DIP Schedules — be sealed. I am satisfied that the KERP summary contains individually identifiable information and compensation information, including sensitive salary information, about the individuals who are covered by the KERP and that the DIP schedules contain sensitive competitive information of the CCAA Parties which should also be treated as being confidential. Having considered the principals of *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), I accept the Applicants' submission on this issue and grant the requested sealing order in respect of the confidential supplement.

³⁹ Finally, the Applicants have advised that they intend to proceed with a Chapter 15 application on June 26, 2012 before the United States Bankruptcy Court in the District of Delaware. I am given to understand that Cinram ULC, as proposed foreign representative, will be seeking recognition of the CCAA proceedings as "foreign main proceedings" on the basis that Ontario, Canada is the Centre of Main Interest or "COMI" of the CCAA Applicants.

40 In his affidavit at paragraph 195, Mr. Bell states that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects and that, as a result of the following factors, the Applicants submit the COMI of the CCAA Parties is Ontario, Canada:

(a) the Cinram Group is managed on a consolidated basis out of the corporate headquarters in Toronto, Ontario, where corporate-level decision-making and corporate administrative functions are centralized;

(b) key contracts, including, among others, major customer service agreements, are negotiated at the corporate level and created in Canada;

(c) the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of CII, who are also directors, trustees and/or officers of other entities in the Cinram Group, are based in Canada;

(d) meetings of the board of trustees and board of directors typically take place in Canada;

(e) pricing decisions for entities in the Cinram Group are ultimately made by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer in Toronto, Ontario;

(f) cash management functions for Cinram's North American entities, including the administration of Cinram's accounts receivable and accounts payable, are managed from Cinram's head office in Toronto, Ontario;

(g) although certain bookkeeping, invoicing and accounting functions are performed locally, corporate accounting, treasury, financial reporting, financial planning, tax planning and compliance, insurance procurement services and internal audits are managed at a consolidated level in Toronto, Ontario;

(h) information technology, marketing, and real estate services are provided by CII at the head office in Toronto, Ontario;

(i) with the exception of routine maintenance expenditures, all capital expenditure decisions affecting the Cinram Group are managed in Toronto, Ontario;

(j) new business development initiatives are centralized and managed from Toronto, Ontario; and

(k) research and development functions for the Cinram Group are corporate-level activities centralized at Toronto, Ontario, including the Cinram Group's corporate-level research and development budget and strategy.

41 Counsel submits that the CCAA Parties are highly dependent upon the critical business functions performed on their behalf from Cinram's head office in Toronto and would not be able to function independently without significant disruptions to their operations.

42 The above comments with respect to the COMI are provided for informational purposes only. This court clearly recognizes that it is the function of the receiving court — in this case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware — to make the determination on the location of the COMI and to determine whether this CCAA proceeding is a "foreign main proceeding" for the purposes of Chapter 15.

43 In the result, I am satisfied that the Applicants meet all of the qualifications established for relief under the CCAA and I have signed the Initial Order in the form submitted, which includes approvals of the Charges referenced in the Initial Order.

Schedule "A"

Additional Applicants

Cinram International General Partner Inc.

Cinram International ULC

1362806 Ontario Limited

Cinram (U.S.) Holdings Inc.

Cinram, Inc.

IHC Corporation


Cinram Manufacturing LLC

Cinram Distribution LLC

Cinram Wireless LLC

Cinram Retail Services, LLC

One K Studios, LLC







A. The Applicants Are "Debtor Companies" to Which the CCAA Applies

41. The CCAA applies in respect of a "debtor company" (including a foreign company having assets or doing business in Canada) or "affiliated debtor companies" where the total of claims against such company or companies exceeds \$5 million.

CCAA, Section 3(1).

42. The Applicants are eligible for protection under the CCAA because each is a "debtor company" and the total of the claims against the Applicants exceeds \$5 million.

(1) The Applicants are Debtor Companies

43. The terms "company" and "debtor company" are defined in Section 2 of the CCAA as follows:

"company" means any company, corporation or legal person incorporated by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province and any incorporated company having assets or doing business in Canada, wherever incorporated, and any income trust, but does not include banks, authorized foreign banks within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bank Act*, railway or telegraph companies, insurance companies and companies to which the *Trust and Loan Companies Act* applies.

"debtor company" means any company that:

(a) is bankrupt or insolvent;

(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;

(c) has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or

(d) is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act* because the company is insolvent.

CCAA, Section 2 ("company" and "debtor company").

44. The Applicants are debtor companies within the meaning of these definitions.

(2) The Applicants are "companies"

45. The Applicants are "companies" because:

a. with respect to the Canadian Applicants, each is incorporated pursuant to federal or provincial legislation or, in the case of Cinram Fund and CII Trust, is an income trust; and

b. with respect to the U.S. Applicants, each is an incorporated company with certain funds in bank accounts in Canada opened in May 2012 and therefore each is a company having assets or doing business in Canada.

Bell Affidavit at paras. 4, 80, 84, 86, 91, 94, 98, 102, 105, 108, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123, 212; Application Record, Tab 2.

46. The test for "having assets or doing business in Canada" is disjunctive, such that either "having assets" in Canada or "doing business in Canada" is sufficient to qualify an incorporated company as a "company" within the meaning of the CCAA.

47. Having only nominal assets in Canada, such as funds on deposit in a Canadian bank account, brings a foreign corporation within the definition of "company". In order to meet the threshold statutory requirements of the CCAA, an applicant need only be in technical compliance with the plain words of the CCAA.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 30 [*Canwest Global*]; Book of Authorities of the Applicants ("*Book of Authorities*"), Tab 1.

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 17 [Global Light]; Book of Authorities, Tab 2.

48. The Courts do not engage in a quantitative or qualitative analysis of the assets or the circumstances in which the assets were created. Accordingly, the use of "instant" transactions immediately preceding a CCAA application, such as

the creation of "instant debts" or "instant assets" for the purposes of bringing an entity within the scope of the CCAA, has received judicial approval as a legitimate device to bring a debtor within technical requirements of the CCAA.

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re, supra at para. 17; Book of Authorities, Tab 2.

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at paras. 5-6; Book of Authorities, Tab 3.

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 74, 83; Book of Authorities, Tab 4.

(3) The Applicants are insolvent

49. The Applicants are "debtor companies" as defined in the CCAA because they are companies (as set out above) and they are insolvent.

50. The insolvency of the debtor is assessed as of the time of filing the CCAA application. The CCAA does not define insolvency. Accordingly, in interpreting the meaning of "insolvent", courts have taken guidance from the definition of "insolvent person" in Section 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA"), which defines an "insolvent person" as a person (i) who is not bankrupt; and (ii) who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada; (iii) whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims under the BIA amount to one thousand dollars; and (iv) who is "insolvent" under one of the following tests:

a. is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due;

b. has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due; or

c. the aggregate of his property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

BIA, Section 2 ("insolvent person").

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal to C.A. refused [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.), at para.4 [Stelco]; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

51. These tests for insolvency are disjunctive. A company satisfying any one of these tests is considered insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA.

Stelco Inc., Re, supra at paras. 26 and 28; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

52. A company is also insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA if, at the time of filing, there is a reasonably foreseeable expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis that would result in the company being unable to pay its debts as they generally become due if a stay of proceedings and ancillary protection are not granted by the court.

Stelco Inc., Re, supra at para. 40; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

53. The Applicants meet both the traditional test for insolvency under the BIA and the expanded test for insolvency based on a looming liquidity condition as a result of the following:

a. The Applicants are unable to comply with certain financial covenants under the Credit Agreements and have entered into a series of waivers with their lenders from December 2011 to June 30, 2012.

b. Were the Lenders to accelerate the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements, the Borrowers and the other Applicants that are Guarantors under the Credit Agreements would be unable to meet their debt obligations. Cinram Fund would be the ultimate parent of an insolvent business.

d. The Applicants have been unable to repay or refinance the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements or find an out-of-court transaction for the sale of the Cinram Business with proceeds that equal or exceed the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements.

e. Reduced revenues and EBITDA and increased borrowing costs have significantly impaired Cinram's ability to service its debt obligations. There is no reasonable expectation that Cinram will be able to service its debt load in the short to medium term given forecasted net revenues and EBITDA for the remainder of fiscal 2012 and for fiscal 2013 and 2014.

f. The decline in revenues and EBITDA generated by the Cinram Business has caused the value of the Cinram Business to decline. As a result, the aggregate value of the Property, taken at fair value, is not sufficient to allow for payment of all of the Applicants' obligations due and accruing due.

g. The Cash Flow Forecast indicates that without additional funding the Applicants will exhaust their available cash resources and will thus be unable to meet their obligations as they become due.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 23, 179-181, 183, 197-199; Application Record, Tab 2.

(4) The Applicants are affiliated companies with claims outstanding in excess of \$5 million

54. The Applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims exceeding 5 million dollars. Therefore, the CCAA applies to the Applicants in accordance with Section 3(1).

55. Affiliated companies are defined in Section 3(2) of the CCAA as follows:

a. companies are affiliated companies if one of them is the subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of the same company or each is controlled by the same person; and

b. two companies are affiliated with the same company at the same time are deemed to be affiliated with each other.

CCAA, Section 3(2).

56. CII, CII Trust and all of the entities listed in Schedule "A" hereto are indirect, wholly owned subsidiaries of Cinram Fund; thus, the Applicants are "affiliated companies" for the purpose of the CCAA.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 3, 71; Application Record, Tab 2.

57. All of the CCAA Parties (except for the Fund Entities) are each a Borrower and/or Guarantor under the Credit Agreements. As at March 31, 2012 there was approximately \$252 million of aggregate principal amount outstanding under the First Lien Credit Agreement (plus approximately \$12 million in letter of credit exposure) and approximately \$12 million of aggregate principal amount outstanding under the Second Lien Credit Agreement. The total claims against the Applicants far exceed \$5 million.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 75; Application Record, Tab 2.

B. The Relief is Available under The CCAA and Consistent with the Purpose and Policy of the CCAA

(1) The CCAA is Flexible, Remedial Legislation

58. The CCAA is remedial legislation, intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy. In particular during periods of financial hardship, debtors turn to the Court so that the Court may apply the CCAA in a flexible manner in order to accomplish the statute's goals. The Court should give the CCAA a broad and liberal interpretation so as to encourage and facilitate successful restructurings whenever possible.

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of), supra at paras. 22 and 56-60; Book of Authorities, Tab 4. *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 5; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 4 and 7; Book of Authorities, Tab 7.

59. On numerous occasions, courts have held that Section 11 of the CCAA provides the courts with a broad and liberal power, which is at their disposal in order to achieve the overall objective of the CCAA. Accordingly, an interpretation of the CCAA that facilitates restructurings accords with its purpose.

Sulphur Corp. of Canada Ltd., Re (2002), 35 C.B.R. (4th) 304 (Alta. Q.B.) ("Sulphur") at para. 26; Book of Authorities, Tab 8.

60. Given the nature and purpose of the CCAA, this Honourable Court has the authority and jurisdiction to depart from the Model Order as is reasonable and necessary in order to achieve a successful restructuring.

(2) The Stay of Proceedings Against Non-Applicants is Appropriate

61. The relief sought in this application includes a stay of proceedings in favour of Cinram LP and the Applicants' direct and indirect subsidiaries that are also party to an agreement with an Applicant (whether as surety, guarantor or otherwise) (each, a "Subsidiary Counterparty"), including any contract or credit agreement. It is just and reasonable to grant the requested stay of proceedings because:

a. the Cinram Business is integrated among the Applicants, Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties;

b. if any proceedings were commenced against Cinram LP, or if any of the third parties to such agreements were to commence proceedings or exercise rights and remedies against the Subsidiary Counterparties, this would have a detrimental effect on the Applicants' ability to restructure and implement the Proposed Transaction and would lead to an erosion of value of the Cinram Business; and

c. a stay of proceedings that extends to Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties is necessary in order to maintain stability with respect to the Cinram Business and maintain value for the benefit of the Applicants' stakeholders.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 185-186; Application Record, Tab 2.

62. The purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the *status quo* to enable a plan of compromise to be prepared, filed and considered by the creditors:

In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors.

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re, supra at para. 5; Book of Authorities, Tab 6. Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re, supra at para. 27; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

CCAA, Section 11.

63. The Court has broad inherent jurisdiction to impose stays of proceedings that supplement the statutory provisions of Section 11 of the CCAA, providing the Court with the power to grant a stay of proceedings where it is just and reasonable to do so, including with respect to non-applicant parties.

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re, supra at paras. 5 and 16; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.

T. Eaton Co., Re (1997), 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 6; Book of Authorities, Tab 9.

64. The Courts have found it just and reasonable to grant a stay of proceedings against third party non-applicants in a number of circumstances, including:

a. where it is important to the reorganization process;

b. where the business operations of the Applicants and the third party non-applicants are intertwined and the third parties are not subject to the jurisdiction of the CCAA, such as partnerships that do not qualify as "companies" within the meaning of the CCAA;

c. against non-applicant subsidiaries of a debtor company where such subsidiaries were guarantors under the note indentures issued by the debtor company; and

d. against non-applicant subsidiaries relating to any guarantee, contribution or indemnity obligation, liability or claim in respect of obligations and claims against the debtor companies.

Woodward's Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 10. Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re, supra at para. 21; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re, supra at paras. 28 and 29; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Sino-Forest Corp., Re, 2012 ONSC 2063 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 5, 18, and 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 11.

Re MAAX Corp, Initial Order granted June 12, 2008, Montreal 500-11-033561-081, (Que. Sup. Ct. [Commercial Division]) at para. 7; Book of Authorities, Tab 12.

65. The Applicants submit the balance of convenience favours extending the relief in the proposed Initial Order to Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties. The business operations of the Applicants, Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties are intertwined and the stay of proceedings is necessary to maintain stability and value for the benefit of the Applicants' stakeholders, as well as allow an orderly, going-concern sale of the Cinram Business as an important component of its reorganization process.

(3) Entitlement to Make Pre-Filing Payments

66. To ensure the continued operation of the CCAA Parties' business and maximization of value in the interests of Cinram's stakeholders, the Applicants seek authorization (but not a requirement) for the CCAA Parties to make certain pre-filing payments, including: (a) payments to employees in respect of wages, benefits, and related amounts; (b) payments to suppliers and service providers critical to the ongoing operation of the business; (c) payments and the application of credits in connection with certain existing customer programs; and (d) intercompany payments among the Applicants related to intercompany loans and shared services. Payments will be made with the consent of the Monitor and, in certain circumstances, with the consent of the Agent.

67. There is ample authority supporting the Court's general jurisdiction to permit payment of pre-filing obligations to persons whose services are critical to the ongoing operations of the debtor companies. This jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted by Section 11.4 of the CCAA, which became effective as part of the 2009 amendments to the CCAA and codified the Court's practice of declaring a person to be a critical supplier and granting a charge on the debtor's property in favour of such critical supplier. As noted by Pepall J. in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, the recent amendments, including Section 11.4, do not detract from the inherently flexible nature of the CCAA or the Court's broad and inherent jurisdiction to make such orders that will facilitate the debtor's restructuring of its business as a going concern.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re supra, at paras. 41 and 43; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

68. There are many cases since the 2009 amendments where the Courts have authorized the applicants to pay certain prefiling amounts where the applicants were not seeking a charge in respect of critical suppliers. In granting this authority, the Courts considered a number of factors, including:

a. whether the goods and services were integral to the business of the applicants;

b. the applicants' dependency on the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;

c. the fact that no payments would be made without the consent of the Monitor;

d. the Monitor's support and willingness to work with the applicants to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized;

e. whether the applicants had sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet their needs; and

f. the effect on the debtors' ongoing operations and ability to restructure if they were unable to make pre-filing payments to their critical suppliers.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re supra, at para. 43; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Brainhunter Inc., Re, [2009] O.J. No. 5207 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 21 [Brainhunter]; Book of Authorities, Tab 13.

Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 29-34; Book of Authorities, Tab 14.

69. The CCAA Parties rely on the efficient and expedited supply of products and services from their suppliers and service providers in order to ensure that their operations continue in an efficient manner so that they can satisfy customer requirements. The CCAA Parties operate in a highly competitive environment where the timely provision of their products and services is essential in order for the company to remain a successful player in the industry and to ensure the continuance of the Cinram Business. The CCAA Parties require flexibility to ensure adequate and timely supply of required products and to attempt to obtain and negotiate credit terms with its suppliers and service providers. In order to accomplish this, the CCAA Parties require the ability to pay certain pre-filing amounts and post-filing payables to those suppliers they consider essential to the Cinram Business, as approved by the Monitor. The Monitor, in determining whether to approve pre-filing payments as critical to the ongoing business operations, will consider various factors, including the above factors derived from the caselaw.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 226, 228, 230; Application Record, Tab 2.

70. In addition, the CCAA Parties' continued compliance with their existing customer programs, as described in the Bell Affidavit, including the payment of certain pre-filing amounts owing under certain customer programs and the application of certain credits granted to customers pre-filing to post-filing receivables, is essential in order for the CCAA Parties to maintain their customer relationships as part of the CCAA Parties' going concern business.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 234; Application Record, Tab 2.

71. Further, due to the operational integration of the businesses of the CCAA Parties, as described above, there is a significant volume of financial transactions between and among the Applicants, including, among others, charges by an Applicant providing shared services to another Applicant of intercompany accounts due from the recipients of those services, and charges by a Applicant that manufactures and furnishes products to another Applicant of inter-company accounts due from the receiving entity.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 225; Application Record, Tab 2.

72. Accordingly, the Applicants submit that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the CCAA Parties the authority to make the pre-filing payments described in the proposed Initial Order subject to the terms therein.

(4) The Charges Are Appropriate

73. The Applicants seek approval of certain Court-ordered charges over their assets relating to their DIP Financing (defined below), administrative costs, indemnification of their trustees, directors and officers, KERP and Support Agreement. The Lenders and the Administrative Agent under the Credit Agreements, the senior secured facilities that will be primed by the charges, have been provided with notice of the within Application. The proposed Initial Order does not purport to give the Court-ordered charges priority over any other validly perfected security interests.

(A) DIP Lenders' Charge

74. In the proposed Initial Order, the Applicants seek approval of the DIP Credit Agreement providing a debtor-inpossession term facility in the principal amount of \$15 million (the "DIP Financing"), to be secured by a charge over all of the assets and property of the Applicants that are Borrowers and/or Guarantors under the Credit Agreements (the "Charged Property") ranking ahead of all other charges except the Administration Charge.

75. Section 11.2 of the CCAA expressly provides the Court the statutory jurisdiction to grant a debtor-in-possession ("DIP") financing charge:

11.2(1) *Interim financing* - On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

11.2(2) *Priority* — secured creditors — The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

Timminco Ltd., Re, 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 881 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [2012 CarswellOnt 1466] at para. 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 15. CCAA, Section 11.2(1) and (2).

76. Section 11.2 of the CCAA sets out the following factors to be considered by the Court in deciding whether to grant a DIP financing charge:

11.2(4) Factors to be considered — In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

CCAA, Section 11.2(4).

77. The above list of factors is not exhaustive, and it may be appropriate for the Court to consider additional factors in determining whether to grant a DIP financing charge. For example, in circumstances where funds to be borrowed pursuant to a DIP facility were not expected to be immediately necessary, but applicants' cash flow statements projected the need for additional liquidity, the Court in granting the requested DIP charge considered the fact that the applicants' ability to borrows funds that would be secured by a charge would help retain the confidence of their trade creditors, employees and suppliers.

Canwest Publishing Inc./*Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 42-43 [*Canwest Publishing*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

78. Courts in recent cross-border cases have exercised their broad power to grant charges to DIP lenders over the assets of foreign applicants. In many of these cases, the debtors have commenced recognition proceedings under Chapter 15.

Re Catalyst Paper Corporation, Initial Order granted on January 31, 2012, Court File No. S-120712 (B.C.S.C.) [*Catalyst Paper*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 17.

Angiotech, supra, Initial Order granted on January 28, 2011, Court File No. S-110587; Book of Authorities, Tab 18

Fraser Papers Inc., Re [2009 CarswellOnt 3658 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])], Initial Order granted on June 18, 2009, Court File No. CV-09-8241-00CL; Book of Authorities, Tab 19.

79. As noted above, pursuant to Section 11.2(1) of the CCAA, a DIP financing charge may not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The requested DIP Lenders' Charge will not secure any pre-filing obligations.

80. The following factors support the granting of the DIP Lenders' Charge, many of which incorporate the considerations enumerated in Section 11.2(4) listed above:

a. the Cash Flow Forecast indicates the Applicants will need additional liquidity afforded by the DIP Financing in order to continue operations through the duration of these proposed CCAA Proceedings;

b. the Cinram Business is intended to continue to operate on a going concern basis during these CCAA Proceedings under the direction of the current management with the assistance of the Applicants' advisors and the Monitor;

c. the DIP Financing is expected to provide the Applicants with sufficient liquidity to implement the Proposed Transaction through these CCAA Proceedingsand implement certain operational restructuring initiatives, which will materially enhance the likelihood of a going concern outcome for the Cinram Business;

d. the nature and the value of the Applicants' assets as set out in their consolidated financial statements can support the requested DIP Lenders' Charge;

e. members of the Steering Committee under the First Lien Credit Agreement, who are senior secured creditors of the Applicants, have agreed to provide the DIP Financing;

f. the proposed DIP Lenders have indicated that they will not provide the DIP Financing if the DIP Lenders' Charge is not approved;

g. the DIP Lenders' Charge will not secure any pre-filing obligations;

h. the senior secured lenders under the Credit Agreements affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA Proceedings;and

i. the proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP Facility, including the DIP Lenders' Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 199-202, 205-208; Application Record, Tab 2.

(B) Administration Charge

81. The Applicants seek a charge over the Charged Property in the amount of CAD\$3.5 million to secure the fees of the Monitor and its counsel, the Applicants' Canadian and U.S. counsel, the Applicants' Investment Banker, the Canadian and U.S. Counsel to the DIP Agent, the DIP Lenders, the Administrative Agent and the Lenders under the Credit Agreements, and the financial advisor to the DIP Lenders and the Lenders under the Credit Agreements (the "Administration Charge"). This charge is to rank in priority to all of the other charges set out in the proposed Initial Order.

82. Prior to the 2009 amendments, administration charges were granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Section 11.52 of the CCAA now expressly provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant an administration charge:

11.52(1) Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs

On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

11.52(2) Priority

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

CCAA, Section 11.52(1) and (2).

82. Administration charges were granted pursuant to Section 11.52 in, among other cases, *Timminco Ltd., Re, Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re* and *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re.*

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re, supra; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Canwest Publishing, supra; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Timminco Ltd., Re, 2012 ONSC 106 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [Timminco]; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

84. In *Canwest Publishing*, the Court noted Section 11.52 does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in granting an administration charge and provided a list of non-exhaustive factors to consider in making such an assessment. These factors were also considered by the Court in *Timminco*. The list of factors to consider in approving an administration charge include:

a. the size and complexity of the business being restructured;

b. the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

- c. whether there is unwarranted duplication of roles;
- d. whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

e. the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and

f. the position of the Monitor.

Canwest Publishing supra, at para. 54; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Timminco, supra, at paras. 26-29; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

85. The Applicants submit that the Administration Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the Administration Charge, given:

a. the proposed restructuring of the Cinram Business is large and complex, spanning several jurisdictions across North America and Europe, and will require the extensive involvement of professional advisors;

b. the professionals that are to be beneficiaries of the Administration Charge have each played a critical role in the CCAA Parties' restructuring efforts to date and will continue to be pivotal to the CCAA Parties' ability to pursue a successful restructuring going forward, including the Investment Banker's involvement in the completion of the Proposed Transaction;

c. there is no unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA Proceedings; and

e. the Monitor is in support of the proposed Administration Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 188, 190; Application Record, Tab 2.

(C) Directors' Charge

86. The Applicants seek a Directors' Charge in an amount of CAD\$13 over the Charged Property to secure their respective indemnification obligations for liabilities imposed on the Applicants' trustees, directors and officers (the

"Directors and Officers"). The Directors' Charge is to be subordinate to the Administration Charge and the DIP Lenders' Charge but in priority to the KERP Charge and the Consent Consideration Charge.

87. Section 11.51 of the CCAA affords the Court the jurisdiction to grant a charge relating to directors' and officers' indemnification on a priority basis:

11.51(1) Security or charge relating to director's indemnification

On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company after the commencement of proceedings under this Act.

11.51(2) Priority

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditors of the company

11.51(3) Restriction — indemnification insurance

The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

11.51(4) Negligence, misconduct or fault

The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

CCAA, Section 11.51.

88. The Court has granted director and officer charges pursuant to Section 11.51 in a number of cases. In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, the Court outlined the test for granting such a charge:

I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re, supra at paras 46-48; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Canwest Publishing, supra at paras. 56-57; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Timminco, supra at paras. 30-36; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

89. The Applicants submit that the D&O Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the D&O Charge in the amount of CAD \$13 million, given:

a. the Directors and Officers of the Applicants may be subject to potential liabilities in connection with these CCAA proceedings with respect to which the Directors and Officers have expressed their desire for certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities;

b. renewal of coverage to protect the Directors and Officers is at a significantly increased cost due to the imminent commencement of these CCAA proceedings;

c. the Directors' Charge would cover obligations and liabilities that the Directors and Officers, as applicable, may incur after the commencement of these CCAA Proceedings and is not intended to cover wilful misconduct or gross negligence;

d. the Applicants require the continued support and involvement of their Directors and Officers who have been instrumental in the restructuring efforts of the CCAA Parties to date;

e. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA proceedings; and

f. the Monitor is in support of the proposed Directors' Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 249, 250, 254-257; Application Record, Tab 2.

(D) KERP Charge

90. The Applicants seek a KERP Charge in an amount of CAD\$3 million over the Charged Property to secure the KERP Retention Payments, KERP Transaction Payments and Aurora KERP Payments payable to certain key employees of the CCAA Parties crucial for the CCAA Parties' successful restructuring.

91. The CCAA is silent with respect to the granting of KERP charges. Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters within the discretion of the Court. The Court in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re* [2009 CarswellOnt 4699 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])] considered a number of factors in determining whether to grant a KERP and a KERP charge, including:

a. whether the Monitor supports the KERP agreement and charge (to which great weight was attributed);

b. whether the employees to which the KERP applies would consider other employment options if the KERP agreement were not secured by the KERP charge;

c. whether the continued employment of the employees to which the KERP applies is important for the stability of the business and to enhance the effectiveness of the marketing process;

d. the employees' history with and knowledge of the debtor;

e. the difficulty in finding a replacement to fulfill the responsibilities of the employees to which the KERP applies;

f. whether the KERP agreement and charge were approved by the board of directors, including the independent directors, as the business judgment of the board should not be ignored;

g. whether the KERP agreement and charge are supported or consented to by secured creditors of the debtor; and

h. whether the payments under the KERP are payable upon the completion of the restructuring process.

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 8-24 [*Grant Forest*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 21.

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re supra, at paras 59; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re supra, at para. 49; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 95 C.C.P.B. 48 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 72-75; Book of Authorities, Tab 22.

92. The purpose of a KERP arrangement is to retain key personnel for the duration of the debtor's restructuring process and it is logical for compensation under a KERP arrangement to be deferred until after the restructuring process has been completed, with "staged bonuses" being acceptable. KERP arrangements that do not defer retention payments to completion of the restructuring may also be just and fair in the circumstances.

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re, supra at para. 22-23; Book of Authorities, Tab 21.

93. The Applicants submit that the KERP Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the KERP Charge in the amount of CAD \$3 million, given:

a. the KERP was developed by Cinram with the principal purpose of providing an incentive to the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers, and the Aurora Employees to remain with the Cinram Group while the company pursued its restructuring efforts;

b. the Eligible Employees and the Eligible Officers are essential for a restructuring of the Cinram Group and the preservation of Cinram's value during the restructuring process;

c. the Aurora Employees are essential for an orderly transition of Cinram Distribution's business operations from the Aurora facility to its Nashville facility;

d. it would be detrimental to the restructuring process if Cinram were required to find replacements for the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers and/or the Aurora Employees during this critical period;

e. the KERP, including the KERP Retention Payments, the KERP Transaction Payments and the Aurora KERP Payments payable thereunder, not only provides appropriate incentives for the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers and the Aurora Employees to remain in their current positions, but also ensures that they are properly compensated for their assistance in Cinram's restructuring process;

f. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA proceedings; and

g. the KERP has been reviewed and approved by the board of trustees of Cinram Fund and is supported by the Monitor.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 236-239, 245-247; Application Record, Tab 2.

(E) Consent Consideration Charge

94. The Applicants request the Consent Consideration Charge over the Charged Property to secure the Early Consent Consideration. The Consent Consideration Charge is to be subordinate in priority to the Administration Charge, the DIP Lenders' Charge, the Directors' Charge and the KERP Charge.

95. The Courts have permitted the opportunity to receive consideration for early consent to a restructuring transaction in the context of CCAA proceedings payable upon implementation of such restructuring transaction. In *Sino-Forest Corp., Re*, the Court ordered that any noteholder wishing to become a consenting noteholder under the support agreement and entitled to early consent consideration was required to execute a joinder agreement to the support agreement prior to the applicable consent deadline. Similarly, in these proceedings, lenders under the First Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement (or a joinder thereto) and thereby agree to support the Proposed Transaction on or before July

10, 2012, are entitled to Early Consent Consideration earned on consummation of the Proposed Transaction to be paid from the net sale proceeds.

Sino-Forest Corp., Re, supra, Initial Order granted on March 30, 2012, Court File No. CV-12-9667-00CL at para. 15; Book of Authorities, Tab 23. Bell Affidavit, para. 176; Application Record, Tab 2.

96. The Applicants submit it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the Consent Consideration Charge, given:

a. the Proposed Transaction will enable the Cinram Business to continue as a going concern and return to a market leader in the industry;

b. Consenting Lenders are only entitled to the Early Consent Consideration if the Proposed Transaction is consummated; and

c. the Early Consent Consideration is to be paid from the net sale proceeds upon distribution of same in these proceedings.

Bell Affidavit, para. 176; Application Record, Tab 2.

Application granted.

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TAB 12

2012 ONSC 1299 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 2559, 2012 ONSC 1299, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 266

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of First Leaside Wealth Management Inc., First Leaside Finance Inc., First Leaside Securities Inc., FL Securities Inc., First Leaside Management Inc., First Leaside Accounting and Tax Services Inc., First Leaside Holdings Inc., 2086056 Ontario Inc., First Leaside Realty Inc., First Leaside Capital Inc., First Leaside Realty II Inc., First Leaside Investments Inc., 965010 Ontario Inc., 1045517 Ontario Inc., 1024919 Ontario Inc., 1031628 Ontario Inc., 1056971 Ontario Inc., 1376095 Ontario Inc., 1437290 Ontario Ltd., 1244428 Ontario Ltd., PrestonOne Development (Canada) Inc., PrestonTwo Development (Canada) Inc., PrestonThree Development (Canada) Inc., PrestonFour Development (Canada) Inc., 2088543 Ontario Inc., 2088544 Ontario Inc., 2088545 Ontario Inc., 1331607 Ontario Inc., Queenston Manor General Partner Inc., 1408927 Ontario Ltd., 2107738 Ontario Inc., 1418361 Ontario Ltd., 2128054 Ontario Inc., 2069212 Ontario Inc., 1132413 Ontario Inc., 2067171 Ontario Inc., 2085306 Ontario Inc., 2059035 Ontario Inc., 2086218 Ontario Inc., 2085438 Ontario Inc., First Leaside Visions Management Inc., 1049015 Ontario Inc., 1049016 Ontario Inc., 2007804 Ontario Inc., 2019418 Ontario Inc., FL Research Management Inc., 970877 Ontario Inc., 1031628 Ontario Inc., 1045516 Ontario Inc., 2004516 Ontario Inc., 2192341 Ontario Inc., and First Leaside Fund Management Inc., Applicants

D.M. Brown J.

Heard: February 23, 2012 Judgment: February 26, 2012 Docket: CV-12-9617-00CL

Counsel: J. Birch, D. Ward, for Applicants

- P. Huff, C. Burr, for Proposed Monitor, Grant Thornton Limited
- D. Bish, for Independent Directors
- B. Empey, for Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada
- J. Grout, for Ontario Securities Commission
- R. Oliver, for Kenaidan Contracting Limited
- J. Dietrich Proposed Representative Counsel, for the investors
- E. Garbe, for Structform International Limited
- N. Richter, for Gilbert Steel Limited
- M. Sanford, for Janick Electrick Limited
- M. Konyukhova, for Midland Loan Services Inc.
- C. Prophet, for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial Table of Authorities Cases considered by *D.M. Brown J.*:

2012 ONSC 1299, 2012 CarswellOnt 2559, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 266

Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re (1987), 1987 CarswellAlta 330, 56 Alta. L.R. (2d) 259, [1988] 2 W.W.R. 211, 38 B.L.R. 148, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237, (sub nom. First Investors Corp., Re) 46 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Brake Pro Ltd., Re (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 3195 (Ont. S.C.J.) - considered

Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta (2007), [2007] I.L.R. I-4622, 281 D.L.R. (4th) 125, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, 409 A.R. 207, 402 W.A.C. 207, 49 C.C.L.I. (4th) 1, 2007 SCC 22, 2007 CarswellAlta 702, 2007 CarswellAlta 703, 362 N.R. 111, 75 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, [2007] 8 W.W.R. 1 (S.C.C.) — considered

Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. 360networks Corp. (2007), 2007 BCCA 14, 2007 CarswellBC 29, 61 B.C.L.R. (4th) 334, 28 E.T.R. (3d) 186, 27 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 10 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 311, 235 B.C.A.C. 95, 388 W.A.C. 95, 279 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

Indalex Ltd., Re (2011), 2011 CarswellOnt 2458, 2011 ONCA 265, 2011 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8433, 104 O.R. (3d) 641, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 19, 17 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 194, 331 D.L.R. (4th) 352, 276 O.A.C. 347, 89 C.C.P.B. 39 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 256 O.A.C. 131, 2009 CarswellOnt 7383, 2009 ONCA 833, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 23, 77 C.C.P.B. 161, (sub nom. *Sproule v. Nortel Networks Corp.*) 2010 C.L.L.C. 210-005, (sub nom. *Sproule v. Nortel Networks Corp.*, *Re*) 99 O.R. (3d) 708 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Priszm Income Fund, Re (2011), 2011 ONSC 2061, 2011 CarswellOnt 2258, 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan (2005), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188, 2005 SCC 13, 2005 CarswellSask 162, 2005 CarswellSask 163, 250 D.L.R. (4th) 411, [2005] 9 W.W.R. 403 (S.C.C.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re* (2010), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. Canada* (*A.G.*)) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada*) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 503 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re*) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. *Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re*) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — considered

Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 506, 95 C.C.P.B. 48, 2012 CarswellOnt 1263, 85 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 Generally — referred to

s. 2 "insolvent person" — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally - referred to

- s. 2 considered
- s. 2 "secured creditor" considered
- s. 3(1) considered
- s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
- s. 11.51(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
- s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered

s. 11.52(1) [en. 2007, c. 36, s. 66] — considered *Constitution Act, 1867*, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 Generally — referred to

s. 91 ¶ 21 — considered

s. 92 ¶ 13 — considered

APPLICATION by members of insolvent group of companies for initial order under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

D.M. Brown J.:

I. Overview: CCAA Initial Order

1 On Thursday, February 23, 2012, I granted an Initial Order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, in respect of the Applicants. These are my Reasons for that decision.

II. The applicant corporations

2 The Applicants are members of the First Leaside group of companies. They are described in detail in the affidavit of Gregory MacLeod, the Chief Restructuring Officer of First Leaside Wealth Management ("FLWM"), so I intend only refer in these Reasons to the key entities in the group. The parent corporation, FLWM, owns several subsidiaries, including the applicant, First Leaside Securities Inc. ("FLSI"). According to Mr. MacLeod, the Group's operations centre on FLWM and FLSI.

3 FLSI is an Ontario investment dealer that manages clients' investment portfolios which, broadly speaking, consist of non-proprietary Marketable Securities as well as proprietary equity and debt securities issued by First Leaside (the socalled "FL Products"). All segregated Marketable Securities are held in segregated client accounts with Penson Financial Services Canada Inc.

4 First Leaside designed its FL Products to provide investors with consistent monthly distributions. First Leaside acts as a real estate syndicate, purchasing real estate through limited partnerships with a view to rehabilitating the properties for lease at higher rates or eventual resale. First Leaside incorporated special-purpose corporations to act as general partners in the various LPs it set up. The general partners of First Leaside's Canadian LPs — i.e. those which own property in Canada — are applicants in this proceeding. First Leaside also seeks to extend the benefits of the Initial Order to the corresponding LPs.

5 First Leaside has two types of LPs: individual LPs that acquire and operate a single property or development, and aggregator LPs that hold units of multiple LPs. Investors have invested in both kinds of LPs. In paragraph 49 of his affidavit Mr. MacLeod detailed the LPs within First Leaside. While most First Leaside LPs hold interests in identifiable properties, for a few, called "Blind Pool LPs", clients invest funds without knowing where the funds likely were to be invested. Those LPs are described in paragraph 51 of Mr. MacLeod's affidavit.

6 The applicant, First Leaside Finance Inc. ("FL Finance"), acted as a "central bank" for the First Leaside group of entities.

III. The material events leading to this application

7 In the fall of 2009 the Ontario Securities Commission began investigating First Leaside. In March, 2011, First Leaside retained the proposed Monitor, Grant Thornton Limited, to review and make recommendations about First Leaside's businesses. Around the same time First Leaside arranged for appraisals to be performed of various properties.

8 Grant Thornton released its report on August 19, 2011. For purposes of this application Grant Thornton made several material findings:

(i) There exist significant interrelationships between the entities in the FL Group which result in a complex corporate structure;

(ii) Certain LPs have been a drain on the resources of the Group as a result of recurring operating losses and property rehabilitation costs; and,

(iii) The future viability of the FL Group was contingent on its ability to raise new capital:

If the FL Group was restricted from raising new capital, it would likely be unable to continue its operations in the ordinary course, as it would have insufficient revenue to support its infrastructure, staffing costs, distributions, and to meet their funding requirements for existing projects.

9 As a result of the report First Leaside hired additional staff to improve accounting resources and financial planning. Last November the Board appointed an Independent Committee to assume all decision-making authority in respect of First Leaside; the Group's founder, David Phillips, was no longer in charge of its management.

10 FLSI is regulated by both the OSC and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada ("IIROC"). In October, 2011, IIROC issued FLSI a discretionary early warning level 2 letter prohibiting the company from reducing capital and placing other restrictions on its activities. At the same time the OSC told First Leaside that unless satisfactory arrangements were made to deal with its situation, the OSC almost certainly would take regulatory action, including seeking a cease trade order.

11 First Leaside agreed to a voluntary cease trade, retained Grant Thornton to act as an independent monitor, informed investors about those developments, and made available the August Grant Thornton report.

12 Because the cease trade restricted First Leaside's ability to raise capital, the Independent Committee decided in late November to cease distributions to clients, including distributions to LP unit holders, interest payments on client notes/debts, and dividends on common or preferred shares.

13 In December the Independent Committee decided to retain Mr. MacLeod as CRO for First Leaside and asked him to develop a workout plan, which he finalized in late January, 2012. Mr. MacLeod deposed that the downturn in the economy has resulted in First Leaside realizing lower operating income while incurring higher operational costs. In his affidavit Mr. MacLeod set out his conclusion about a workout plan:

After carefully analyzing the situation, my ultimate conclusion was that it was too risky and uncertain for First Leaside to pursue a resumption of previous operations, including the raising of capital. My recommendation to the Independent Committee was that First Leaside instead undertake an orderly wind-down of operations, involving:

(a) Completing any ongoing property development activity which would create value for investors;

(b) Realizing upon assets when it is feasible to do so (even where optimal realization might occur over the next 12 to 36 months);

(c) Dealing with the significant inter-company debts; and,

(d) Distributing proceeds to investors.

Mr. MacLeod further deposed:

[T]he best way to promote this wind-down is through a filing under the CCAA so that all issues — especially the numerous investor and creditor claims and inter-company claims — can be dealt with in one forum under the supervision of the court.

The Independent Committee approved Mr. MacLeod's recommendations. This application resulted.

IV. Availability of CCAA

A. The financial condition of the applicants

According to Mr. MacLeod, First Leaside has over \$370 million in assets under management. Some of those, however, are Marketable Securities. First Leaside is proposing that clients holding Marketable Securities (which are held in segregated accounts) be free to transfer them to another investment dealer during the *CCAA* process. As to the value of FL Products, Mr. MacLeod deposed that "it remains to be determined specifically how much value will be realized for investors on the LP units, debt instruments, and shares issued by the various First Leaside entities."

First Leaside's debt totals approximately \$308 million: \$176 million to secured creditors (mostly mortgagees) and \$132 million to unsecured creditors, including investors holding notes or other debt instruments.

16 Mr. MacLeod summarized his assessment of the financial status of the First Leaside Group as follows:

[S]ince GTL reported that the aggregate value of properties in the First Leaside exceeded the value of the properties, there will be net proceeds remaining to provide at least some return to subordinate creditors or equity holders (i.e., LP unit holders and corporation shareholders) in many of the First Leaside entities. The recovery will, of course, vary depending on the entity. At this stage, however, it is fair to conclude that there is a material equity deficit both in individual First Leaside entities and in the overall First Leaside group.

17 In his affidavit Mr. MacLeod also deposed, with respect to the financial situation of First Leaside, that:

(i) The cease trade placed severe financial constraints on First Leaside as almost every business unit depended on the ability of FLWM and its subsidiaries to raise capital from investors;

(ii) There are immediate cash flow crises at FLWM and most LPs;

(iii) FLWM's cash reserves had fallen from \$2.8 million in November, 2011 to \$1.6 million at the end of this January;

(iv) Absent new cash from asset disposals, current cash reserves would be exhausted in April;

(v) At the end of December, 2011 Ventures defaulted by failing to make a principal mortgage payment of \$4.25 million owing to KingSett;

(vi) Absent cash flow from FLWM a default is imminent for Investor's Harmony property;

(vii) First Leaside lacks the liquidity or refinancing options to rehabilitate a number of the properties and execute on its business plan; and,

(viii) First Leaside generally has been able to make mortgage payments to its creditors, but in the future it will be difficult to do so given the need to expend monies on property development and upgrading activities

¹⁸ In his description of the status of the employees of the Applicants, Mr. MacLeod did not identify any issue concerning a pension funding deficiency. ¹ The internally-prepared 2010 FLWM financial statements did not record any such liability. Grant Thornton did not identify any such issue in its Pre-filing Report.

¹⁹ First Leaside is not proposing to place all of its operations under court-supervised insolvency proceedings. It does not plan to seek Chapter 11 protection for its Texas properties since it believes they may be able to continue operations over the anticipated wind-up period using cash flows they generate and pay their liabilities as they become due. Nor does First Leaside seek to include in this *CCAA* proceeding the First Leaside Venture LP ("Ventures") which owns and operates several properties in Ontario and British Columbia. On February 15, 2012 Ventures and Bridge Gap Konsult Inc. signed a non-binding term sheet to provide some bridge financing for Ventures. First Leaside decided not to include certain Ventures-related limited partnerships in the *CCAA* application at this stage,² while reserving the right to later

certain Ventures-related limited partnerships in the *CCAA* application at this stage,² while reserving the right to later bring a motion to extend the Initial Order and stay to these Excluded LPs. The Initial Order which I signed reflected that reservation.

As noted above, over the better part of the past year the proposed Monitor, Grant Thornton, has become familiar with the affairs of the First Leaside Group as a result of the review it conducted for its August, 2011 report. Last November First Leaside retained Grant Thornton as an independent monitor of its business.

In its Pre-filing Report Grant Thornton noted that the last available financial statements for FLWM were internally prepared ones for the year ended December 31, 2010. They showed a net loss of about \$2.863 million. The Pre-filing Report contained a 10-week cash flow projection (ending April 27, 2012) prepared by the First Leaside Group. The Cash Flow Projection does not contemplate servicing interest and principal payments during the projection period. On that basis the Cash Flow Projection showed the Group's combined closing bank balance declining from \$6.97 million to \$4.144 million by the end of the projection period. Grant Thornton reviewed the Cash Flow Projection and stated that it reflected the probable and hypothetical assumptions on which it was prepared and that the assumptions were suitably supported and consistent with the plans of the First Leaside Group and provided a reasonable basis for the Cash Flow Projection.

22 Grant Thornton reported that certain creditors, specifically construction lien claimants, had commenced enforcement proceedings and it concluded:

Given creditors' actions to date and due to the complicated nature of the FL Group's business, the complex corporate structure and the number of competing stakeholders, it is unlikely that the FL Group will be able to conduct an orderly wind-up or continue to rehabilitate properties without the stability provided by a formal Court supervised restructuring process.

• • •

As the various stakeholder interests are in many cases intertwined, including intercompany claims, the granting of the relief requested would provide a single forum for the numerous stakeholders of the FL Group to be heard and to deal with such parties' claims in an orderly manner, under the supervision of the Court, a CRO and a Court-appointed Monitor. In particular, a simple or forced divestiture of the properties of the FL Group would not only erode potential investor value, but would not provide the structure necessary to reconcile investor interests on an equitable and ratable basis.

A stay of proceedings for both the Applicants and the LPs is necessary if it is deemed appropriate by this Honourable Court to allow the FL Group to maintain its business and to allow the FL Group the opportunity to develop, refine and implement their restructuring/wind-up plan(s) in a stabilized environment.

B. Findings

I am satisfied that the Applicants are "companies" within the meaning of the *CCAA* and that the total claims against the Applicants, as an affiliated group of companies, is greater than \$5 million.

Are the Applicant companies "debtor companies" in the sense that they are insolvent? For the purposes of the *CCAA* a company may be insolvent if it falls within the definition of an insolvent person in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or if its financial circumstances fall within the meaning of insolvent as described in *Stelco Inc., Re* which include a financially troubled corporation that is "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring". ³

When looked at as a group the Applicants fall within the extended meaning of "insolvent": as a result of the cease trade their ability to raise capital has been severely restricted; cash reserves fell significantly from November until the time of filing, and the Cash Flow Projection indicates that cash reserves will continue to decline even with the cessation of payments on mortgages and other debt; Mr. MacLeod estimated that cash reserves would run out in April; distributions to unit holders were suspended last November; and, some formal mortgage defaults have occurred.

²⁶ However, a secured creditor mortgagee, Midland Loan Services Inc., submitted that to qualify for *CCAA* protection each individual applicant must be a "debtor company" and that in the case of one applicant, Queenston Manor General Partner Inc., that company was not insolvent. In his affidavit Mr. MacLeod deposed that the Queenston Manor LP is owned by the First Leaside Expansion Limited Partnership ("FLEX"). Queenston owns and operates a 77-unit retirement complex in St. Catherines, has been profitable since 2008 and is expected to remain profitable through 2013. Queenston has been listed for sale, and management currently is considering an offer to purchase the property. Midland Loan submitted that in light of that financial situation, no finding could be made that the applicant, Queenston Manor General Partner Inc., was a "debtor company".

Following that submission I asked Applicants' counsel where in the record one could find evidence about the insolvency of each individual Applicant. That prompted a break in the hearing, at the end of which the Applicants filed a supplementary affidavit from Mr. MacLeod. Indicating that one of the biggest problems facing the Applicants was the lack of complete and up-to-date records, in consultation with the Applicants' CFO Mr. MacLeod submitted a chart providing, to the extent possible, further information about the financial status of each Applicant. That chart broke down the financial status of each of the 52 Applicants as follows:

Insolvent	28
Dormant	15
Little or no realizable assets	5
More information to be made available to the court	3
Other: management revenue stopped in 2010; \$70,000 cash; \$270,000 in related-company receivables	1

Queenston Manor General Partner Inc. was one of the applicants for which "more information would be made available to the court".

As I have found, when looked at as a group, the Applicants fall within the extended meaning of "insolvent". When one descends a few levels and looks at the financial situation of some of the aggregator LPs, such as FLEX, Mr. MacLeod deposed that FLEX is one of the largest net debtors — i.e. it is unable to repay inter-company balances from operating cash flows and lacks sufficient net asset value to settle the intercompany balances through the immediate liquidation of assets. The evidence therefore supports a finding that the corporate general partner of FLEX is insolvent. Queenston Manor is one of several assets owned by FLEX, albeit an asset which uses the form of a limited partnership.

If an insolvent company owns a healthy asset in the form of a limited partnership does the health of that asset preclude it from being joined as an applicant in a *CCAA* proceeding? In the circumstances of this case it does not. The jurisprudence under the *CCAA* provides that the protection of the Act may be extended not only to a "debtor company", but also to entities who, in a very practical sense, are "necessary parties" to ensure that that stay order works. Morawetz J. put the matter the following way in *Priszm Income Fund, Re*: The *CCAA* definition of an eligible company does not expressly include partnerships. However, *CCAA* courts have exercised jurisdiction to stay proceedings with respect to partnerships and limited partnerships where it is just and convenient to do so. See *Lehndorff*, *supra*, and *Re Canwest Global Communications Corp.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (S.C.J.).

The courts have held that this relief is appropriate where the operations of the debtor companies are so intertwined with those of the partnerships or limited partnerships in question, that not extending the stay would significantly impair the effectiveness of a stay in respect of the debtor companies.⁴

30 Although section 3(1) of the *CCAA* requires a court on an initial application to inquire into the solvency of any applicant, the jurisprudence also requires a court to take into account the relationship between any particular company and the larger group of which it is a member, as well as the need to place that company within the protection of the Initial Order so that the order will work effectively. On the evidence filed I had no hesitation in concluding that given the insolvency of the overall First Leaside Group and the high degree of inter-connectedness amongst the members of that group, the protection of the *CCAA* needed to extend both to the Applicants and the limited partnerships listed in Schedule "A" to the Initial Order. The presence of all those entities within the ambit of the Initial Order is necessary to effect an orderly winding-up of the insolvent group as a whole. Consequently, whether Queenston Manor General Partner Inc. falls under the Initial Order by virtue of being a "debtor company", or by virtue of being a necessary party as part of an intertwined whole, is, in the circumstances of this case, a distinction without a practical difference.

In sum, I am satisfied that those Applicants identified as "insolvent" on the chart attached to Mr. MacLeod's supplementary affidavit are "debtor companies" within the meaning of the *CCAA* and that the other Applicants, as well as the limited partnerships listed on Schedule "A" of the Initial Order, are entities to which it is necessary and appropriate to extend *CCAA* protection.

C. "Liquidation" CCAA

While in most circumstances resort is made to the *CCAA* to "permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets" and to create "conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all", the reality is that "reorganizations of differing complexity require different legal mechanisms." ⁵ That reality has led courts to recognize that the *CCAA* may be used to sell substantially all of the assets of a debtor company to preserve it as a going concern under new ownership, ⁶ or to wind-up or liquidate it. In *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.*, *Re*⁷ Farley J. observed:

It appears to me that the purpose of the *CCAA* is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Assoc. Investors, supra*, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Co.* (1951), 32 C.B.R. 1986, (1951) 5 D.L.R. 203 (N.S.S.C.) at pp. 187-8 (C.B.R.).

33 In the decision of *Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re* referred to by Farley J., the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench stated:

The realities of the modern marketplace dictate that courts of law respond to commercial problems in innovative ways without sacrificing legal principle. In my opinion, the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act is not restricted in its application to companies which are to be kept in business. Moreover, the Court is not without the ability to address within its jurisdiction the concerns expressed in the Ontario cases. The Act may be invoked as a means of liquidating a company and winding-up its affairs but only if certain conditions precedent are met:

1. It must be demonstrated that benefits would likely flow to Creditors that would not otherwise be available if liquidation were effected pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act or the Winding-Up Act.

2. The Court must concurrently provide directions pursuant to compatible legislation that ensures judicial control over the liquidation process and an effective means whereby the affairs of the company may be investigated and the results of that investigation made available to the Court.

3. A Plan of Arrangement should not receive judicial sanction until the Court has in its possession, all of the evidence necessary to allow the Court to properly exercise its discretion according to standards of fairness and reasonableness, absent any findings of illegality.⁸

The editors of *The 2012 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* take some issue with the extent of those conditions:

With respect, these conditions may be too rigorous. If the court finds that the plan is fair and reasonable and in the best interests of creditors, and there are cogent reasons for using the statute rather than the *BIA* or *WURA*, there seems no reason why an orderly liquidation could not be carried out under the *CCAA*.⁹

Mr. MacLeod, the CRO, deposed that no viable plan exists to continue First Leaside as a going concern and that the most appropriate course of action is to effect an orderly wind-down of First Leaside's operations over a period of time and in a manner which will create the opportunity to realize improved net asset value. In his professional judgment the *CCAA* offered the most appropriate mechanism by which to conduct such an orderly liquidation:

[T]he best way to promote this wind-down is through a filing under the CCAA so that all issues — especially the numerous investor and creditor claims and the inter-company claims — can be dealt with in one forum under the supervision of the court.

In its Pre-filing Report the Monitor also supported using the *CCAA* to implement the "restructuring/wind-up plan(s) in a stabilized environment".

Both the CRO and the proposed Monitor possess extensive knowledge about the workings of the Applicants. Both support a process conducted under the *CCAA* as the most practical and effective way in which to deal with the affairs of this insolvent group of companies. No party contested the availability of the *CCAA* to conduct an orderly winding-up of the affairs of the Applicants (although, as noted, some parties questioned whether certain entities should be included within the scope of the Initial Order). Given that state of affairs, I saw no reason not to accept the professional judgment of the CRO and the proposed Monitor that a liquidation under the *CCAA* was the most appropriate route to take.

36 Moreover, I saw no prejudice to claimant creditors by permitting the winding-up of the First Leaside Group to proceed under the *CCAA* instead of under the *BIA* in view of the convergence which exists between the *CCAA* and *BIA* on the issue of priorities. As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in *Century Services*:

Because the CCAA is silent about what happens if reorganization fails, the *BIA* scheme of liquidation and distribution necessarily supplies the backdrop for what will happen if a *CCAA* reorganization is ultimately unsuccessful.¹⁰

As the British Columbia Court of Appeal observed in *Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. 360networks Corp.* interested parties also use that priorities backdrop to negotiate successful *CCAA* reorganizations:

While it might be suggested that *CCAA* proceedings may require those with a financial stake in the company, including shareholders and creditors, to compromise some of their rights in order to sustain the business, it cannot be said that the priorities between those with a financial stake are meaningless. The right of creditors to realize on any

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security may be suspended pending the final approval of the court, but this does not render their potential priority nugatory. Priorities are always in the background and influence the decisions of those who vote on the plan.¹¹

37 I therefore concluded that the CCAA was available to the Applicants in the circumstances, and I so ordered.

V. Representative Counsel, CRO and Monitor

38 The Applicants sought the appointment of Fraser Milner Casgrain ("FMC") as Representative Counsel to represent the interests of the some 1,200 clients of FLSI in this proceeding, subject to the right of any client to opt-out of such representation. The proposed Monitor expressed the view that it would be in the best interests of the FL Group and its investors to appoint Representative Counsel. No party objected to such an appointment. I reviewed the qualifications and experience of proposed Representative Counsel and its proposed fees, and I was satisfied that it would be appropriate to appoint FMC as Representative Counsel on the terms set out in the Initial Order.

39 The Applicants sought the appointment of G.S. MacLeod & Associates Inc. as CRO of First Leaside. No party objected to that appointment. The Applicants included a copy of the CRO's December 21, 2011 Retention Agreement in their materials. The proposed Monitor stated that the appointment of a CRO was important to ensure an adequate level of senior corporate governance leadership. I agree, especially in light of the withdrawal of Mr. Phillips last November from the management of the Group. The proposed Monitor reported that the terms and conditions of the Retention Agreement were consistent with similar arrangements approved by other courts in *CCAA* proceedings and the remuneration payable was reasonable in the circumstances. As a result, I confirmed the appointment of G.S. MacLeod & Associates Inc. as CRO of First Leaside.

40 Finally, I appointed Grant Thornton as Monitor. No party objected, and Grant Thornton has extensive knowledge of the affairs of the First Leaside Group.

VI. Administration and D&O Charges and their priorities

A. Charges sought

41 The Applicants sought approval, pursuant to section 11.52 of the *CCAA*, of an Administration Charge in the amount of \$1 million to secure amounts owed to the Estate Professionals — First Leaside's legal advisors, the CRO, the Monitor, and the Monitor's counsel.

42 They also sought an order indemnifying the Applicants' directors and officers against any post-filing liabilities, together with approval, pursuant to section 11.51 of the *CCAA*, of a Director and Officer's Charge in the amount of \$250,000 as security for such an indemnity. Historically the First Leaside Group did not maintain D&O insurance, and the Independent Committee was not able to secure such insurance at reasonable rates and terms when it tried to do so in 2011.

43 The Monitor stated that the amount of the Administration Charge was established based on the Estate Professionals' previous history and experience with restructurings of similar magnitude and complexity. The Monitor regarded the amount of the D&O Charge as reasonable under the circumstances. The Monitor commented that the combined amount of both charges (\$1.25 million) was reasonable in comparison with the amount owing to mortgagees (\$176 million).

In its Pre-filing Report the Monitor did note that shortly before commencing this application the Applicants paid \$250,000 to counsel for the Independent Committee of the Board. The Monitor stated that the payment might "be subject to review by the Monitor, if/when it is appointed, in accordance with s. 36.1(1) of the *CCAA*". No party requested an adjudication of this issue, so I refer to the matter simply to record the Monitor's expression of concern.

Based on the evidence filed, I concluded that it was necessary to grant the charges sought in order to secure the services of the Estate Professionals and to ensure the continuation of the directors in their offices and that the amounts of the charges were reasonable in the circumstances.

B. Priority of charges

46 The Applicants sought super-priority for the Administration and D&O Charges, with the Administration Charge enjoying first priority and the D&O Charge second, with some modification with respect to the property of FLSI which the Applicants had negotiated with IIROC.

47 In its Pre-filing Report the proposed Monitor stated that the mortgages appeared to be well collateralized, and the mortgagees would not be materially prejudiced by the granting of the proposed priority charges. The proposed Monitor reported that it planned to work with the Applicants to develop a methodology which would allocate the priority charges fairly amongst the Applicants and the included LPs, and the allocation methodology developed would be submitted to the Court for review and approval.

48 In *Indalex Ltd., Re*¹² the Court of Appeal reversed the super-priority initially given to a DIP Charge by the motions judge in an initial order and, instead, following the sale of the debtor company's assets, granted priority to deemed trusts for pension deficiencies. In reaching that decision Court of Appeal observed that affected persons — the pensioners — had not been provided at the beginning of the *CCAA* proceeding with an appropriate opportunity to participate in the issue of the priority of the DIP Charge.¹³ Specifically, the Court of Appeal held:

In this case, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the issue of paramountcy was invoked on April 8, 2009, when Morawetz J. amended the Initial Order to include the super-priority charge. The documents before the court at that time did not alert the court to the issue or suggest that the *PBA* deemed trust would have to be overridden in order for Indalex to proceed with its DIP financing efforts while under *CCAA* protection. To the contrary, the affidavit of Timothy Stubbs, the then CEO of Indalex, sworn April 3, 2009, was the primary source of information before the court. In para. 74 of his affidavit, Mr. Stubbs deposes that Indalex intended to comply with all applicable laws including "regulatory deemed trust requirements".

While the super-priority charge provides that it ranks in priority over trusts, "statutory or otherwise", I do not read it as taking priority over the deemed trust in this case because the deemed trust was not identified by the court at the time the charge was granted and the affidavit evidence suggested such a priority was unnecessary. As no finding of paramountcy was made, valid provincial laws continue to operate: the super-priority charge does not override the *PBA* deemed trust. The two operate sequentially, with the deemed trust being satisfied first from the Reserve Fund.¹⁴

49 In his recent decision in *Timminco Ltd., Re*¹⁵ ("Timminco I") Morawetz J. described the commercial reality underpinning requests for Administration and D&O Charges in *CCAA* proceedings:

In my view, in the absence of the court granting the requested super priority and protection, the objectives of the CCAA would be frustrated. It is not reasonable to expect that professionals will take the risk of not being paid for their services, and that directors and officers will remain if placed in a compromised position should the Timminco Entities continue CCAA proceedings without the requested protection. The outcome of the failure to provide these respective groups with the requested protection would, in my view, result in the overwhelming likelihood that the

CCAA proceedings would come to an abrupt halt, followed, in all likelihood, by bankruptcy proceedings.¹⁶

50 In its Pre-filing Report the proposed Monitor expressed the view that if the priority charges were not granted, the First Leaside Group likely would not be able to proceed under the *CCAA*.

51 In my view, absent an express order to the contrary by the initial order applications judge, the issue of the priorities enjoyed by administration, D&O and DIP lending charges should be finalized at the commencement of a *CCAA* proceeding. Professional services are provided, and DIP funding is advanced, in reliance on super-priorities contained in initial orders. To ensure the integrity, predictability and fairness of the *CCAA* process, certainty must accompany the granting of such super-priority charges. When those important objectives of the *CCAA* process are coupled with the Court of Appeal's holding that parties affected by such priority orders be given an opportunity to raise any paramountcy issue, it strikes me that a judge hearing an initial order application should directly raise with the parties the issue of the priority of the charges sought, including any possible issue of paramountcy in respect of competing claims on the debtor's property based on provincial legislation.

Accordingly I raised that issue at the commencement of the hearing last Thursday and requested submissions on the issues of priority and paramountcy from any interested party. Several parties made submissions on those points: (i) the Applicants, proposed Monitor and proposed Representative Counsel submitted that the Court should address any priority or paramountcy issues raised; (ii) IIROC advised that it did not see any paramountcy issue in respect of its interests; (iii) counsel for Midland Loan submitted that a paramountcy issue existed with respect to its client, a secured mortgagee, because it enjoyed certain property rights under provincial mortgage law; she also argued that the less than full day's notice of the hearing given by the Applicants was inadequate to permit the mortgagee to consider its position, and her client should be given seven days to do so; and, (iv) counsel for a construction lien claimant, Structform International, who spoke on behalf of a number of such lien claimants, made a similar submission, contending that the construction lien claimants required 10 days to determine whether they should make submissions on the relationship between their lien claims and any super-priority charge granted under the *CCAA*.

I did not grant the adjournment requested by the mortgagee and construction lien claimants for the following reasons. First, the facts in *Indalex* were quite different from those in the present case, involving as they did considerations of what fiduciary duty a debtor company owed to pensioners in respect of underfunded pension liabilities. I think caution must be exercised before extending the holding of *Indalex* concerning *CCAA*-authorized priority charges to other situations, such as the one before me, which do not involve claims involving pension deficiencies, but claims by more "ordinary" secured creditors, such as mortgagees and construction lien claimants.

Second, I have some difficulty seeing how constitutional issues of paramountcy arise in in a *CCAA* proceeding as between claims to the debtor's property by secured creditors, such as mortgagees and construction lien claimants, and persons granted a super-priority charge by court order under sections 11.51 and 11.52 of the *CCAA*. At the risk of gross over-simplification, Canadian constitutional law places the issue of priorities of secured creditors in different legislative balliwicks depending on the health of the debtor company. When a company is healthy, secured creditor priorities usually are determined under provincial laws, such as personal property security legislation and related statutes, which result from provincial legislatures exercising their powers with respect to "property and civil rights in the province". ¹⁷ However, when a company gets sick — becomes insolvent — our *Constitution* vests in Parliament the power to craft the legislative regimes which will govern in those circumstances. Exercising its power in respect of "bankruptcy and insolvency", ¹⁸ Parliament has established legal frameworks under the *BIA* and *CCAA* to administer sick companies. Priority determinations under the *CCAA* draw on those set out in the *BIA*, as well as the provisions of the *CCAA* dealing with specific claims such as Crown trusts and other claims.

As it has evolved over the years the constitutional doctrine of paramountcy polices the overlapping effects of valid federal and provincial legislation: "The doctrine applies not only to cases in which the provincial legislature has legislated pursuant to its ancillary power to trench on an area of federal jurisdiction, but also to situations in which the provincial legislature acts within its primary powers, and Parliament pursuant to its ancillary powers." ¹⁹ Since 1960 the Supreme Court of Canada has travelled a "path of judicial restraint in questions of paramountcy". ²⁰ That Court has not been prepared to presume that, by legislating in respect of a matter, Parliament intended to rule out any possible provincial action in respect of that subject, ²¹ unless (and it is a big "unless"), Parliament used very clear statutory language to that effect. ²²

I have found that the Applicants have entered the world of the sick, or the insolvent, and are eligible for the protection of the federal *CCAA*. The federal legislation *expressly* brings mortgagees and construction lien claimants within its regime — the definition of "secured creditor" contained in section 2 of the *CCAA* specifically includes "a holder of a mortgage" and "a holder of a ...lien...on or against...all or any of the property of a debtor company as security for indebtedness of the debtor company". The federal legislation also *expressly* authorizes a court to grant priority to administration and D&O charges over the claims of such secured creditors of the debtor. ²³ In light of those express provisions in sections 2, 11.51 and 11.52 of the *CCAA*, and my finding that the Applicants are eligible for the protection offered by the *CCAA*, I had great difficulty understanding what argument could be advanced by the mortgagees and construction lien claimants about the concurrent operation of provincial and federal law which would relieve them from the priority charge provisions of the *CCAA*. I therefore did not see any practical need for an adjournment.

57 Finally, sections 11.51(1) and 11.52(1) of the *CCAA* both require that notice be given to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by an administration or D&O charge before a court grants such charges. In the present case I was satisfied that such notice had been given. Was the notice adequate in the circumstances? I concluded that it was. To repeat, making due allowance for the unlimited creativity of lawyers, I have difficulty seeing what concurrent operation argument could be advanced by mortgagee and construction lien claims against court-ordered super-priority charges under sections 11.51 and 11.52 of the *CCAA*. Second, as reported by the proposed Monitor, the quantum of the priority charges (\$1.25 million) is reasonable in comparison with the amount owing to mortgagees (\$176 million) and the mortgages appeared to be well collateralized based on available information. Third, the Applicant and Monitor will develop an allocation methodology for the priority charges for later consideration by this Court. The proposed Monitor reported:

It is the Proposed Monitor's view that the allocation of the proposed Priority Charges should be carried out on an equitable and proportionate basis which recognizes the separate interests of the stakeholders of each of the entities.

The secured creditors will be able to make submissions on any proposed allocation of the priority charges. Finally, while I understand why the secured creditors are focusing on their specific interests, it must be recalled that the work secured by the priority charges will be performed for the benefit of all creditors of the Applicants, including the mortgagees and construction lien claimants. All creditors will benefit from an orderly winding-up of the affairs of the Applicants.

In the event that I am incorrect that no paramountcy issue arises in this case in respect of the priority charges, I echo the statements made by Morawetz J. in *Timminco* which I reproduced in paragraph 49 above. In *Indalex* the Court of Appeal accepted that "the CCAA judge can make an order granting a super-priority charge that has the effect of overriding provincial legislation". ²⁴ I find that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant super priority to both the Administration and D&O Charges in order to ensure that the objectives of the *CCAA* are not frustrated.

59 For those reasons I did not grant the adjournment requested by Midland Loan and the construction lien claimants, concluding that they had been given adequate notice in the circumstances, and I granted the requested Administration and D&O Charges.

VII. Other matters

At the hearing counsel for one of the construction lien claimants sought confirmation that by granting the Initial Order a construction lien claimant who had issued, but not served, a statement of claim prior to the granting of the order would not be prevented from serving the statement of claim on the Applicants. Counsel for the Applicants confirmed that such statements of claim could be served on it.

61 At the hearing the Applicants submitted a modified form of the model Initial Order. Certain amendments were proposed during the hearing; the parties had an opportunity to make submissions on the proposed amendments.

VIII. Summary

For the foregoing reasons I was satisfied that it was appropriate to grant the *CCAA* Initial Order in the form requested. I signed the Initial Order at 4:08 p.m. EST on Thursday, February 23, 2012.

Application granted.

Footnotes

- 1 MacLeod Affidavit, paras. 104 to 106.
- 2 The Excluded LPs were identified in paragraph 134 of Mr. MacLeod's affidavit.
- 3 (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 4 2011 ONSC 2061 (Ont. S.C.J.), paras. 26-27.
- 5 Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.), paras. 15, 77 and 78.
- 6 Nortel Networks Corp., Re, 2009 ONCA 833 (Ont. C.A.), para. 46; see Kevin P. McElcheran, Commercial Insolvency in Canada, Second Edition (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2011), pp. 284 et seq.
- [1993] O.J. No. 14 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). In *Brake Pro Ltd., Re*, [2008] O.J. No. 2180 (Ont. S.C.J.), Wilton-Siegel J. stated, at paragraph 10: "While reservations are expressed from time to time regarding the appropriateness of a "liquidating" *CCAA* proceeding, such proceedings are permissible under the *CCAA*."
- 8 Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re (1987), 46 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Alta. Q.B.), para. 36.
- 9 Houlden, Morawetz & Sarra, The 2012 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, N§1, p. 1099.
- 10 Century Services, supra., para. 23.
- 11 (2007), 279 D.L.R. (4th) 701 (B.C. C.A.), para. 42.
- 12 2011 ONCA 265 (Ont. C.A.).
- 13 *Ibid.*, para. 155.
- 14 *Ibid.*, paras. 178 and 179.
- 15 2012 ONSC 506 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 16 *Ibid.*, para. 66.
- 17 *Constitution Act, 1867, s.* 92 ¶13.
- 18 *Ibid.*, s. 91 ¶21.
- 19 Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), para. 69.
- 20 Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188 (S.C.C.), para. 21
- 21 Canadian Western Bank, supra., para. 74.
- 22 *Rothmans*, *supra*., para. 21.

23 *CCAA* ss. 11.51(2) and 11.52(2).

24 *Indalex*, *supra*., para. 176.

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TAB 13

2008 CarswellOnt 6284 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Grace Canada Inc., Re

2008 CarswellOnt 6284, [2008] O.J. No. 4208, 170 A.C.W.S. (3d) 692, 50 C.B.R. (5th) 25

IN THE MATTER OF S. 18.6 OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

AND IN THE MATTER OF GRACE CANADA, INC.

Morawetz J.

Heard: September 30, 2008 Judgment: October 23, 2008 Docket: 01-CL-4081

Counsel: Derrick C. Tay, Orestes Pasparakis, Jennifer Stam for Grace Canada Inc. Keith J. Ferbers for Raven Thundersky Alexander Rose for Sealed Air (Canada) Michel Bélanger, David Thompson, Matthew G. Moloci for CDN ZAI Claimants Jacqueline Dais-Visca, Carmela Maiorino for Attorney General of Canada

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act --- Miscellaneous issues

Faced with product liability suits U.S. parent of applicant G Inc. filed for Chapter 11 re-organization — G Inc. spun off subsidiary SA and provided SA with indemnities relating to asbestos liabilities arising from attic insulation — G Inc commenced proceedings under Act seeking ancillary relief to facilitate and coordinate U.S. proceedings in Canada - Several proposed class actions were commenced in Canada and by court order were enjoined and brought within restructuring process — Representative counsel were appointed to represent claimants in restructuring — Minutes of settlement were reached settling all Canadian claims — Minutes contained provisions for relief in favour of SA and Crown — Crown objected to language of release removing claim over for contribution and indemnity — Minutes were submitted for court approval — The minutes were approved — Representative counsel had been given broad powers by court order to negotiate on behalf of Canadian claimants so had authority to enter the minutes of settlement — Court had power to approve material agreements including settlement agreements before filing of any plan of compromise or arrangement — SA had contributed to settlement funds — Release not only necessary and essential but fair — Crown's release also necessary otherwise G Inc. could become indirectly liable through contribution and indemnity claims — Minutes released any claims for which Crown had right of contribution or indemnity — Since company released from claims Crown had no need to claim over — Minutes were to be approved or rejected as whole — Approval of minutes fair and reasonable especially given that company could have defended on limitation period and that U.S. bankruptcy court had determined that attic insulation did not pose unreasonable risk — Court awarded compensation to representative counsel, claims administrator and qualified expert in amount of \$3,250,000.

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Cases considered by Morawetz J.:

Association des consommateurs pour la qualité dans la construction v. Canada (Attorney General) (2005), 2005 CarswellQue 10587 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

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ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to
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Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 27, 410 W.A.C. 25, 417 A.R. 25, 2007 ABCA 266, 2007 CarswellAlta 1097, 80 Alta. L.R. (4th) 60, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 94 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to
Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered
Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2007), 30 C.B.R. (5th) 59, 2007 CarswellOnt 1029 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1982

Chapter 11 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

s. 18.6(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] — considered

s. 18.6(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 125] - considered

MOTION to seek approval of minutes of settlement.

Morawetz J.:

1 Grace Canada Inc. ("Grace Canada" and with the U.S. debtors, "Grace") bring this motion to seek approval of the Minutes of Settlement ("the Minutes") in respect of claims against Grace relating to the manufacture and sale of Zonolite Attic Insulation ("ZAI") in Canada (the "CDN ZAI Claims").

2 Under the Minutes, Grace agrees to:

(a) fund a broad multimedia notice programme across Canada;

(b) establish a trust with \$6.5 million for the payment of Canada ZAI property damage claims; and

(c) channel any Canadian ZAI personal injury claims to a U.S. asbestos trust which will have in excess of US \$1.5 billion in funding.

3 In consideration, Grace would be discharged of any liability in connection with CDN ZAI Claims.

4 Although there was no direct opposition to the terms of the Minutes as being fair and reasonable, certain parties proposed amendments to the form of order sought by Grace.

5 Grace submits that the Minutes ought to be approved in the form submitted. Counsel submitted that Grace's significant settlement contribution is manifestly fair and reasonable, given Grace's defences to CDN ZAI Claims and, in particular, the judicial determination by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court (the "U.S. Court") that ZAI does not pose an unreasonable risk of harm.

6 Further, counsel to Grace submits that the Minutes are an important step towards the successful reorganization of Grace and with this settlement, these insolvency proceedings, which were filed in April 2001, are nearing completion.

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7 W. R. Grace & Co. and its 61 subsidiaries (the "U.S. Debtors") have filed a joint Chapter 11 plan of reorganization (the "Plan") with the U.S. Court and expect to commence a confirmation hearing for the Plan in early 2009. The Plan incorporates the terms of the settlement before this Court and if confirmed, sees Grace emerging from Chapter 11 protection in 2009.

8 The chain of events that resulted in the Minutes began in 1963 with Grace's purchase of the assets of the Zonolite Company ("Zonolite"). Zonolite mined and processed vermiculite from a mine near Libby, Montana (the "Libby Mine"). Vermiculite is an insulator which apparently has no known toxic properties. However, the vermiculite ore from the Libby Mine contained impurities, including asbestiform minerals.

9 One of the products made from the U.S. Debtors' vermiculite was ZAI. ZAI was installed in attics of homes. Some ZAI contained trace amounts of asbestos.

10 In addition, 40 years ago the U.S. Debtors manufactured a product known as monokote-3 ("MK-3") which had chrysotile asbestos added during the manufacturing process.

11 Grace stopped manufacturing MK-3 in Canada by 1975 and ceased production of ZAI in 1984 and closed the Libby Mine in 1990.

By the 1970s, the U.S. Debtors began to be named in asbestos-related lawsuits. These included both asbestosrelated personal injury claims ("PI Claims") and property damage claims relating to ZAI.

13 Due to a rise in the number of PI Claims in 2000 and 2001, the U.S. Debtors filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the *United States Bankruptcy Code* on April 2, 2001.

14 Grace Canada was incorporated in 1997. According to the affidavit of Mr. Finke, it had no direct involvement in any historic use of asbestos.

15 Rather, Grace's historic business operations in Canada were undertaken by a company now known as Sealed Air (Canada) Co./CIE ("Sealed Air Canada"). Sealed Air Canada is the successor to the Canadian companies with past involvement in the sale and distribution of ZAI and asbestos containing products such as MK-3.

16 Sealed Air Canada was spun-off from Grace in 1998 and as part of the transaction, Grace Canada and the U.S. Debtors provided certain indemnities to Sealed Air Canada and its parent, Sealed Air Corporation, relating to historic asbestos liabilities.

17 On April 4, 2001, two days after the Chapter 11 proceedings had been commenced, Grace Canada commenced these proceedings. The Canadian CCAA proceedings were commenced seeking ancillary relief to facilitate and coordinate the U.S. proceedings in Canada. An initial order was granted by this Court pursuant to s.18.6(4) of the CCAA (the "Initial Order").

18 By 2005, despite the Initial Order, 10 proposed class actions (the "Proposed Class Actions") were commenced across Canada in relation to the manufacture, distribution and sale of ZAI. Grace Canada, some of the U.S. Debtors and Sealed Air Canada were named as defendants, as was the Attorney General of Canada (the "Crown").

19 The allegations in the Proposed Class Actions include both ZAI PI Claims as well as damages for the cost of removing ZAI from homes across Canada ("CDN ZAI PD Claims").

20 On November 14, 2005, an order was issued (the "November 14th Order") enjoining the Proposed Class Actions against the U.S. Debtors, Sealed Air Canada and the Crown.

21 As a result, the Proposed Class Actions were brought within the overall restructuring process.

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By order of February 8, 2006 (the "Representation Order"), Lauzon Bélanger S.E.N.C. ("Lauzon") and Scarfone Hawkins LLP ("Scarfone") (jointly, "Representative Counsel") were appointed to act as the single representative on behalf of all of the holders of Canadian ZAI Claims ("CDN ZAI Claimants") to advocate their interests in the restructuring process.

23 No one has taken issue with the authority of the Representative Counsel to represent all CDN ZAI Claimants in the U.S. Court, this Court or at any of the mediations. The Representation Order provided that Representative Counsel would, among other things, have authority to negotiate a settlement with Grace.

After a long history of negotiations, on June 2, 2008, Grace, Representative Counsel and the Crown announced to the U.S. Court that they had reached an agreement in principle that remained subject to the Crown's acceptance. The Crown was not able to obtain firm instructions on whether to participate in the settlement.

25 On September 2, 2008, Grace and Representative Counsel signed the Minutes resolving all CDN ZAI Claims against Grace and Sealed Air Canada.

On April 7, 2008, the U.S. Debtors reached an agreement effectively settling all present and future PI Claims (the "PI Settlement") and under this agreement, the U.S. Debtors agreed to pay into trust various assets, including US \$250 million, warrants to acquire common stock, proceeds of insurance, certain litigation and deferred payments and it estimates that the total value of the settlement is in excess of US\$1.5 billion. Sealed Air Canada is making a contribution to the settlement in excess of \$500 million, plus 18 million shares of stock.

27 On September 21, 2008, the U.S. Debtors filed their draft Plan with the U.S. Court and confirmation hearings are scheduled for early in 2009.

28 The Minutes contemplate a settlement of all CDN ZAI Claims, both personal injury ("CDN ZAI PI Claims") and property damage, on the following terms:

(a) Grace agrees to provide in its Plan for the creation of a separate class of CDN ZAI PD Claims and to establish the CDN ZAI PD Claims Fund, which shall make payments in respect of CDN ZAI Claims;

(b) on the effective date of Grace's Plan, Grace will contribute \$6,500,000 through a U.S. PD Trust to the CDN ZAI PD Claims Fund;

(c) Grace's Plan provides that any holder of a CDN ZAI PI Claim ("CDN ZAI PI Claimant") shall be entitled to file his or her claim with the Asbestos Personal Injury Trust to be created for all PI Claims and funded in accordance with the US\$1.5 billion PI Settlement;

(d) Representative Counsel shall vote, on behalf of CDN ZAI Claimants, in favour of the Plan incorporating the settlement; and

(e) Representative Counsel shall be entitled to bring a fee application within the U.S. proceedings and any such payments received would reduce the amount otherwise payable to Representative Counsel under the Settlement.

In addition, Grace has agreed to fund a broad based media notice programme across Canada and an extended claims bar procedure for CDN ZAI PD Claims and Grace has also agreed to give direct notice to any known claimant.

29 Under the Minutes, the bar date for CDN ZAI PD Claims is not less than 180 days from substantial completion of the CDN ZAI Claims Notice Program. The period for filing ZAI PD Claims in the U.S. is considerably shorter and Grace has scheduled a motion with the U.S. Court on October 20, 2008 to approve the CDN ZAI PD Claims bar date.

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Grace has indicated that if granted, recognition of the U.S. order will be sought from this Court. There will be no bar date for CDN ZAI PI Claims.

30 Grace has indicated that it has contemplated that monies will be distributed out of the CDN ZAI PD Claims Fund based on a claimant's ability to prove that his or her property contained ZAI and that monies were expended to contain or remove ZAI from the property. Based on proof of ZAI in the home and the remediation measures taken by a claimant, that claimant may recover \$300 or \$600 per property.

31 The issues for consideration were stated by counsel to Grace as follows:

(a) Does Representative Counsel have the authority to enter into the Minutes on behalf of all CDN ZAI Claimants?

(b) Does the CCAA Court have the jurisdiction to approve the Minutes, including the relief in favour of Sealed Air Canada and the Crown?

(c) Are the Minutes fair and reasonable? In particular, is their prejudice to the key constituencies?

32 The Representation Order is clear. It gives Representative Counsel broad powers, including the ability to negotiate on behalf of CDN ZAI Claimants. No party has objected to or taken issue with the Representation Order or with the authority of Representative Counsel to represent all CDN ZAI Claims.

I am satisfied that Lauzon and Scarfone have the authority, as Representative Counsel, to enter the Minutes of Settlement on behalf of all CDN ZAI Claimants.

I am also satisfied that the CCAA Court may approve material agreements, including settlement agreements, before the filing of any plan of compromise or arrangement. See *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal denied (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 27 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]).

35 It is noted that, in this case, the Plan will be voted on by creditors in the U.S. proceedings.

36 With respect to relief in favour of Sealed Air, Grace has agreed to indemnify Sealed Air Canada for certain liabilities in connection with ZAI. As part of the settlement, Grace seeks to ensure that the release of the CDN ZAI Claims includes a release for the benefit of Sealed Air Canada.

37 Counsel submits that such release is not only necessary and essential, but also fair given Sealed Air Canada's contribution to the PI Settlement under the Plan in excess of \$500 million. I am satisfied that, in these circumstances, the release for the benefit of Sealed Air Canada is fair and reasonable.

The Minutes also provide a limited release in favour of the Crown. Pursuant to the Minutes, the Crown's claims for contribution and indemnity against Grace (being CDN ZAI Claims) are released. Counsel submits that the corollary is that the Crown is relieved of any joint liability it shares with Grace for CDN ZAI Claims.

39 Counsel to Grace again submits that such a release of the Crown is necessary. Otherwise, Grace could become indirectly liable through contribution and indemnity claims.

40 Counsel for Grace submits that, in certain circumstances, this Court has ordered third party releases where they are necessary and connected to a resolution of the debtor's claims, will benefit creditors generally, and are not overly broad or offensive to public policy. (See: *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2007), 30 C.B.R. (5th) 59 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), aff'd. 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.) ("Metcalfe"), leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied. [2008 CarswellOnt 5432 (S.C.C.)])

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41 Subsections 18.6(3) and (4) of the CCAA, allow the Ontario Court to make orders with respect to foreign insolvency proceedings, on such terms and conditions as the Court considers appropriate.

42 In assessing whether to grant its approval, the Court has to consider whether the Minutes are fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances.

43 It is the submission of Grace that the Minutes are fair and reasonable, and that resolutions of the CDN ZAI Claims in particular do not prejudice the Crown, CDN ZAI PD Claimants or, CDN ZAI PI Claimants.

44 Grace also submits that, given the strong defences which it believes are available, the Minutes provide a substantial compromise by Grace, considering the circumstances in which it believes it has no liability for CDN ZAI Claims.

45 Early in the insolvency proceedings, the U.S. Court held a hearing to determine, as a threshold scientific issue, whether the presence of ZAI in a home created an unreasonable risk of harm. The opinion of the U.S. Court was filed as part of the record. Grace states that the U.S. Court came to the conclusion that ZAI did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm. The background and conclusions of the U.S. Court have been summarized at paragraphs 72 to 85 of the Grace factum.

46 I have been persuaded by and accept these submissions.

47 In addition, even if ZAI had been found to pose an unreasonable risk of harm, Grace submits that it still has a complete defence to any claims under Canadian law for the reasons set out at paragraphs 86 to 97 of the factum.

Further, the passage of time is such that Grace submits that many cases would be dismissed outright based on the expiry of the limitation period.

49 With respect to the issue of prejudice to the Crown, on the one hand, the Crown has asserted claims against Grace. The Crown has estimated that over 2,000 homes located on military bases have been remediated to contain vermiculite attic insulation or ZAI from homes built by the Canadian military. Under the Settlement, the Crown, as a CDN ZAI Claimant, would receive \$300 per unit for the sealing of ZAI. Based on the Crown's records, the Crown would potentially have a claim against the Fund for up to \$660,000 and if it chose to pursue this claim, the Crown would receive approximately 50% of its remediation expenditures.

50 On the other hand, the Crown is also a defendant in the Proposed Class Actions. Through the Minutes, the Crown will release its CDN ZAI Claims against Grace, but at the same time, counsel to Grace submits that the Crown is effectively released from any joint liability it may share with Grace. Grace submits that the Crown will be relieved from all CDN ZAI Claims except those for which it is severally responsible.

51 It is with respect to the release language that the Crown takes exception.

52 The Crown acknowledges that Representative Counsel has the authority to negotiate on behalf of ZAI Claimants. However, the Crown disputes the authority of Representative Counsel to purport to negotiate away the Crown's Chapter 11 "claim over" for contribution and indemnity.

53 The Crown supports the approval of the Settlement insofar as it purports to resolve all of Grace's liability with respect to CDN ZAI PD and PI Claims, provided that the approval order expressly recognizes that the Crown's protective "claim over" for contribution and indemnity against Grace is unimpaired by the Settlement and provided that the Approval Order expressly allows the Crown to third party Grace in ZAI related actions where the Crown is sued on a several basis.

54 Counsel to the Crown submits that to interpret the authority of Representative Counsel to have the power to release the Crown's "claim over" against Grace while they simultaneously reserve the right to pursue the claims against

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the Crown would conflict with the clear direction in the Representation Order. They submit that CCAA Representative Counsel does not represent the Crown's interest with respect to the contribution and indemnity claim, and would be in conflict of interest with respect to the members of the group it represents if it attempted to do so. They further submit that it has always been the position of the Crown that all ZAI related damages give rise to a contribution and indemnity claims against Grace and that no independent claim lies against the Crown; hence, the Crown has and will continue to assert a contribution and indemnity claim against Grace for the totality of the damages.

55 At the hearing, the argument of the Crown was presented without the benefit of a factum. I requested and received a factum from the Crown which was then responded to by counsel to Grace and by Representative Counsel.

⁵⁶ In my view, the response of Grace is a complete answer to the Crown's submissions. Counsel to Grace notes that the Crown purports to support the Order sought on the proviso that its contribution and indemnity claims against Grace are unimpaired. However, the Minutes do impair the Crown's contribution claims, and with the Order, the Crown will have no claims for contribution and indemnity against Grace.

57 It is Grace's position that Representative Counsel has the authority to resolve and release all CDN ZAI Claims, including Crown claims for contribution and indemnity. Further, in any event, there is no prejudice to the Crown as pursuant to the Minutes, CDN ZAI Claimants have agreed that they cannot pursue the Crown for claims for which Grace is ultimately responsible. Consequently, the Crown has no contribution claims to assert against Grace. Simply put, as submitted by counsel to Grace, there is nothing left.

58 The Representation Order applies to all claims "arising out of or in any way connected to damages or loss suffered, directly or indirectly, from the manufacture, sale or distribution of Zonolite attic insulation products in Canada".

59 It seems to me that the wording of the Representation Order is clear. Representative Counsel have the authority to resolve and release all CDN ZAI Claims, including Crown claims for contribution and indemnity.

With respect to the Release itself, the Minutes release any claims or causes of action for which the Crown has a right of contribution and indemnity. As submitted by counsel to Grace, Representative Counsel may not pursue the Crown in respect of claims for which Grace is ultimately liable.

61 Paragraph 13(b)(iii) of the Minutes provides for a release of:

...any claims or causes of action asserted against the Grace Parties as a result of the Canadian ZAI Claims advanced by CCAA Representative Counsel against the Crown as a result of which the Crown is or may become entitled to contribution or indemnity from the Grace Parties.

I accept the submission of counsel to Grace that the purpose of this provision is to protect Grace from indirect claims through the Crown. Since any claim for which Grace is ultimately liable cannot be pursued, the Crown has no need nor any ability to "claim over" against Grace.

63 The Crown also relied on an order of November 7, 2005 of Chaput J. of the Québec Superior Court in the [*Association des consommateurs pour la qualité dans la construction v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2005 CarswellQue 10587 (C.S. Que.)] case which was one of the Proposed Class Actions. The Crown relied on the order of Chaput J. to argue that all claims against the Crown flow through Grace and that Grace is therefore ultimately responsible for any Crown liability.

I agree with the position being taken by Grace to the effect that this argument is misplaced. It was made quite clear at this hearing that the scope of any remaining Crown liability will need to be addressed at a future hearing.

65 Submissions were also made by counsel on behalf of Ms. Thundersky.

66 Counsel pointed out certain concerns and suggested that it was appropriate to alter the proposed form of order.

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The first concern raised related to the issue of preservation of claims against the Crown and counsel submitted that paragraph 13(b)(iv) creates some ambiguity in this area. In my view, paragraph 13(b)(iv) of the Minutes is clear. The concluding words read as follows:

For greater certainty, nothing contained in these Minutes shall serve to discharge, extinguish or release Canadian ZAI Claims asserted against the Crown and which claims seek to establish and apportion independent and/or several liability against the Crown.

I do not share counsel's concern. The issue does not require clarification. In my view, this paragraph is not ambiguous.

69 Counsel to Ms. Thundersky also raises concern that the draft order provides that all of the legal actions in Canada be "permanently stayed" until all of the actions have formally removed the Grace Parties as defendants which would not occur until the Effective Date of any approved Plan of Reorganization. In my view, this is not a significant concern. This Court retains jurisdiction over the matters before it in these proceedings and to the extent that further direction is required, the appropriate motion can be brought before me.

The third concern raised by counsel to Ms. Thundersky was with respect to the Asbestos PI Fund to be established in the U.S. process. Concerns were raised with respect to the uncertainty surrounding when and in what manner the eligibility criteria for the fund would be established. Counsel to Grace advised that Mr. Ferbers would have the opportunity to provide comment during the Plan process on this issue. I expect that this should be sufficient to alleviate any concerns but, if not, further direction can be sought from this Court.

Finally, concern was also raised with respect to the absence of a personal injury notice program. Counsel to Grace advised that this issue would be communicated to those involved in the U.S. Plan. In the circumstances, this would appear to be a pragmatic response to the concern raised by counsel to Ms. Thundersky.

72 Counsel to Ms. Thundersky acknowledged that it was difficult to propose a resolution which stayed within the four corners of the Minutes, but that Ms. Thundersky did wish to bring the foregoing concerns to the attention of the parties and the Court in the hopes that they could be taken into account.

73 Counsel to Grace and Representative Counsel are aware of these issues and will take them into account.

⁷⁴ I indicated at the hearing that I was inclined to either approve the Minutes or to reject them. The Minutes are the product of extensive negotiation between the Representative Counsel and the Grace Parties. I am of the view that it is not appropriate for me to examine and evaluate the Minutes on a line-by-line basis, nor to amend or alter the agreement as reached between Representative Counsel and the Grace Parties.

In my view, to accept the submissions of the Crown and Ms. Thundersky would leave the Court in the position of having to reject the Minutes and refuse to approve the Settlement. Having considered all of the circumstances, I do not consider this to be an appropriate outcome.

I have been satisfied that the Minutes are fair and reasonable. The Minutes have been agreed to by Representative Counsel. In my view, the Minutes do not prejudice the interests of the Crown. I am also of the view that there is no prejudice to the ZAI PD Claimants who will have access to a significant fund to assist with their remediation costs. Their alternative is more litigation which, at the end of the day, would have a very uncertain outcome. I am also of the view that there is no prejudice to the ZAI PI Claimants who will have the opportunity to make a claim to the asbestos trust in the U.S. I am satisfied that the ZAI PI Claimants will be receiving treatment that is fair and equal with other PI Claimants. Further, it is noted that counsel to Grace advised that the Thundersky family are the only known ZAI PI Claimants. Their alternative is the continuation of a claim that on its face, would appear to have been statute barred in 1994.

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⁷⁷ I also accept the conclusions as put forth by counsel to Grace. This Settlement provides CDN ZAI PD Claimants with clear recourse to the CDN ZAI PD Claims Fund and CDN ZAI PI Claimants with recourse to the Asbestos Personal Injury Trust in situations where it is Grace's view that the Canadian claims have little or no value.

⁷⁸ I am also satisfied that third party releases are, in the circumstances of this case, directly connected to the resolution of the debtor's claims and are necessary. The third party releases are not, in my view, overly broad nor offensive to public policy.

79 Counsel to Grace also submitted that Representative Counsel have been continuously active and diligent in both the U.S. and Canadian proceedings and Grace is of the view that it is appropriate that a portion of the funds paid under the settlement go towards compensation of Representative Counsel's fees. I accept this submission and specifically note that the Minutes provide for specified payments to Representative Counsel, a Claims Administrator and a qualified expert to assist in the claims process, in a total amount of approximately CDN\$3,250,000.

80 In conclusion, the Minutes, in my view, represent an important component of the Plan. They provide a mechanism for the resolution of CDN ZAI Claims without the uncertainty and delay associated with ongoing litigation.

81 The Minutes are approved and an order shall issue in the form requested, as amended.

Order accordingly.

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TAB 14

2005 CarswellOnt 6648 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Grace Canada Inc., Re

2005 CarswellOnt 6648, [2005] O.J. No. 4868, 17 C.B.R. (5th) 275

IN THE MATTER OF S. 18.6 OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF GRACE CANADA INC.

Farley J.

Heard: November 14, 2005 Judgment: November 14, 2005 Docket: 01-CL-4081

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Michel Bélanger, Jean-Philippe Lincourt, Matt Moloci for Association Des Consommatuers Pour La Qualité Dans La Construction, Jean-Charles Dextras, Viviane Brosseau, Léotine Roberge-Turgeon

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings

Quebec plaintiffs in their putative class proceedings worked out arrangement with federal Crown — As result, Quebec plaintiffs were not proceeding with their request to lift stay and other ancillary relief — Saskatchewan plaintiffs were not opposed to Grace relief — Stay was extended to April 1, 2006, and included proceedings against federal Crown related to Grace proceedings in class actions — Modified preliminary injunction granted on January 22, 2002, by US Bankruptcy Court was recognized pending further order of Canadian court — There had been recognition in US Bankruptcy Court that Canadian proceedings would be governed by Canadian substantive law.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Farley J.:

Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 704, 5 B.L.R. (3d) 75, 18 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

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Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287, 1982 CarswellOnt 461 (Ont. H.C.) — referred to

Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 135, 33 C.P.C. 210, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 266, 1983 CarswellOnt 397 (Ont. Div. Ct.) — referred to

Eagle River International Ltd., Re (2001), (sub nom. *Sam Lévy & Associés Inc. v. Azco Mining Inc.*) 2001 SCC 92, 2001 CarswellQue 2725, 2001 CarswellQue 2726, 30 C.B.R. (4th) 105, (sub nom. *Sam Lévy & Associates Inc. v. Azco Mining Inc.*) 207 D.L.R. (4th) 385, (sub nom. *Lévy (Sam) & Associés Inc. v. Azco Mining Inc.*) 280 N.R. 155, (sub nom. *Sam Lévy & Associés Inc. v. Azco Mining Inc.*) 280 N.R. 155, (sub nom. *Sam Lévy & Associés Inc. v. Azco Mining Inc.*) 280 N.R. 155, (sub nom. *Sam Lévy & Associés Inc. v. Azco Mining Inc.*) 280 N.R. 155, (sub nom. *Sam Lévy & Associés Inc. v. Azco Mining Inc.*) [2001] 3 S.C.R. 978 (S.C.C.) — considered

2005 CarswellOnt 6648, [2005] O.J. No. 4868, 17 C.B.R. (5th) 275

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to Noma Co., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 5033 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered by *Farley J*.:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

DETERMINATION of motions regarding stay of proceedings and related matters.

Farley J.:

1 This endorsement applies to the 3 motions of Grace, the Quebec class proceeding and the Manitoba class proceeding.

2 The Quebec plaintiffs in their putative class proceedings have worked out an arrangement with the Federal Government. As a result they are not proceeding with their request to lift the stay and other ancillary relief, but without prejudice to it or similar relief being sought if the insolvency/CCAA recognition proceedings get bogged down. The Grace relief was then supported by the Quebec plaintiffs.

3 The "Sask" plaintiffs (represented by the Merchant firm were not opposed to the Grace relief.

4 The Manitoba plaintiffs represented by the Atkins firm took the position that the Grace relief was all right so long as it did not apply to their proceedings except that judgment would not be enforced without leave of this court.

5 It would seem to me that the various class proceedings would benefit from cooperation and coordination — using the 3Cs of the Commercial List (communication, cooperation and common sense). Otherwise they will be faced with the practical problem of fighting amongst themselves as to a turf war and running the risk of being divided and therefore susceptible to being conquered.

6 The stay is extended to April 1, 2006 and includes proceedings against the Federal Crown related to the Grace proceedings in these class actions. As well the Modified Preliminary Injunction granted on January 22, 2002 by the US Bankruptcy Court is recognized pending further order of this Court.

7 The foregoing does not prevent any of the parties entering into consensual resolutions with the Federal Crown.

8 I note that the Grace interests represented before me today indicated that it was their goal to emerge from their insolvency proceedings as soon as reasonably possible but under the guidelines that there be justice for all affected persons.

9 I also note that there has been recognition in the US Bankruptcy Court that Canadian proceedings will be governed by Canadian substantive law.

10 The foregoing relief granted is pursuant to the principles set out in *Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd., Re* (2000), 18 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and is in furtherance of the long standing respect for comity extended by the courts of this country for the courts of the US and vice versa.

11 It would seem to me that the insolvency adjudicative proceedings would, at least under presently anticipated circumstances, result in a more effective efficient process than would a full-blown class action proceeding.

12 I concur with the views of the US court in Maryland Casualty re respect to the necessity/desirability of a stay against

the Federal Crown as a "3rd party" given the interrelated aspects of the claims against the Crown and Grace. There would in my mind be a considerable risk of record taint if the action against the Crown were allowed to proceed on its own without direct Grace evidence and counsel. See also *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 137 D.L.R.

2005 CarswellOnt 6648, [2005] O.J. No. 4868, 17 C.B.R. (5th) 275

(3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.), aff'd (1983), 145 D.L.R. (3d) 266 (Ont. Div. Ct.); *Noma Co., Re*, [2004] O.J. No. 4914(Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

13 The stay does not affect the ability of the plaintiffs from coming back to court if they feel that there is foot dragging or other elements of prejudice.

14 I note that the Federal Crown may accept service of the Sask claim without that being an infringement of the stay now imposed (and previously requested). This is without prejudice to the Crown moving for relief on, say, a limitations point.

15 What the Manitoba plaintiffs are in essence requesting is that they obtain a leg up on all other Canadian plaintiffs (and US plaintiffs) and that there be by this court somewhat of a quasi-certification, although indicating that the actual certification would be dealt with by the Manitoba court.

16 This would result in a lack of single control in insolvency proceedings which was cautioned against in *Eagle River International Ltd., Re*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 978 (S.C.C.). It would also fragment and possibly destabilize the other proceedings by other affected persons (including those claiming for personal injury including serious personal injury). In saying that I in no way wish to or intend to be taken as minimizing the terrible tragedy which has befallen the Thundersky/Bruce family.

17 I look forward to seeing that continued timely progress is being made with respect to this insolvency proceeding including the effective efficient way of dealing with personal injury and property damage claims. The information officer should ensure that this court and affected parties including these class action plaintiffs are kept abreast of proposed material developments and their outcome. That is the report on the regular time period basis should be the minimum.

18 The motion of the Manitoba plaintiffs is dismissed, but without prejudice to similar or other relief being sought in the future based on a change in circumstances.

Order accordingly.

End of Document

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TAB 15

2013 QCCS 4039 Cour supérieure du Québec

Montréal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Co., Re

2013 CarswellQue 11253, 2013 CarswellQue 8264, 2013 QCCS 4039, [2013] R.J.Q. 1440, 245 A.C.W.S. (3d) 513, EYB 2013-225915

Dans l'affaire de la proposition ou plan d'arrangement de : Montréal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Co., Débitrice, c. Richter Groupe conseil inc., Syndic

Castonguay J.C.S.

Heard: 7 août 2013 - 8 août 2013 Judgment: 8 août 2013 Written reasons: 21 août 2013 Docket: C.S. Qué. Montréal 500-11-045094-139

Counsel: *Me Sylvain Vauclair*, pour le syndic *Me Denis St-Onge, Me Patrice Benoit, Me Louise Lalonde*, pour la requérante *Me Louis Coallier*, pour la Municipalité de Lac-Mégantic *Me Louise Comtois, Me Catherine Miron*, pour le Procureur général du Québec *Me Dominique Naud, Me Brendan D. O'Neill*, pour XL Insurance & Group *Me Louis-P. Bélanger*, pour World Fuel Services *Me Roger Simard, Me Laurent Nahmiash*, pour certains administrateurs et officiers de la requérante

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial; Public

Castonguay J.C.S.:

[UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

EDITED REASONS OF THE JUDGMENT RENDERED FROM THE BENCH ON AUGUST 8, 2013

1 Montreal, Maine & Atlantique Canada Company (hereinafter « MMA ») is seeking an initial order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*¹ (hereinafter the « *Act* »).

2 In addition to the usual conclusions sought in such circumstances, MMA seeks a stay of the creditors' lawsuit against its civil liability insurer, XL Insurance Company Ltd. and XL Group PLC (hereinafter collectively referred to as « XL »), which arose from the tragedy that occurred in Lac-Mégantic this past July 6.

3 The evidence submitted to the Court is minimal in that it is based on exhibits and the short testimony of the monitor suggested by MMA, the whole to establish that MMA meets the financial prerequisites for the *Act* to apply.

4 From the outset, MMA has informed the Court that it believes that the events that took place in Lac-Mégantic are a matter of judicial notice.

POSITION OF MMA

5 Supported by the municipality of Lac-Mégantic and the Government of Quebec, MMA argues that it is in its interest and that of its creditors to continue operating its business to maximize the value of its patrimony.

2013 QCCS 4039, 2013 CarswellQue 11253, 2013 CarswellQue 8264...

6 It also asserts that because it clearly will not be in a position to honour all of the claims that are rolling in and will continue to roll in, it is in the interest of all parties to channel most of these claims through an arrangement that it intends to propose to its creditors.

ANALYSIS

7 Before making an initial order, the Court must ensure that the criteria established in the *Act*, other than financial ones, have been met. To do so, the Court will consider this file under the following headings:

a) Because MMA is a railway company within the meaning of the *Canada Transportation Act*² (hereinafter the *« Transportation Act »*), is it a debtor company within the meaning of the *Act*?

b) Can the highly questionable viability of MMA and its conduct defeat the application of the Act?

c) Can the Court order a stay of proceedings regarding third parties who are not parties to these proceedings?

7 (A) BECAUSE MMA IS A RAILWAY COMPANY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CANADA TRANSPORTATION ACT, IS IT A DEBTOR COMPANY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACT?

8 Section 2 of the *Act* gives the following definitions for « company » and « debtor company »:

company

company" means any company, corporation or legal person incorporated by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province, any incorporated company having assets or doing business in Canada, wherever incorporated, and any income trust, but does not include banks, authorized foreign banks within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bank Act*, railway or telegraph companies, insurance companies and companies to which the *Trust and Loan Companies Act* applies;

debtor company

debtor company" means any company that:

(a) is bankrupt or insolvent,

(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those *Acts*,

(c) has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, or

(d) is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act* because the company is insolvent;

9 Those who may avail themselves of the provisions in the *Act* are identified in section 3 thereof:

3. (1) This *Act* applies in respect of a debtor company or affiliated debtor companies if the total of claims against the debtor company or affiliated debtor companies, determined in accordance with section 20, is more than \$5,000,000 or any other amount that is prescribed.

•••

2013 QCCS 4039, 2013 CarswellQue 11253, 2013 CarswellQue 8264...

10 In its proceedings, MMA admits to being a railway company within the meaning of the federal transportation statute but argues that including « railway company » in section 2 of the *Act*, thereby rendering the *Act* unavailable to MMA, reveals an anachronism.

11 Railway companies are also excluded from the application of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*³ (hereinafter the $\ll BIA \gg$).

12 Thus, because of this double exclusion, railway companies can neither file for bankruptcy under the *BIA* nor propose an arrangement with their creditors under the *Act*.

13 This legal vacuum can be explained.

14 Until the *Transportation Act* came into effect in 1996, railway transportation was subject to the *Railway Act*.⁴

15 This statute had a chapter that addressed the situation of insolvent railway companies 5 and had done so since 1901, when Parliament enacted the *Act to amend the Railway Act*.⁶

16 The Quebec *Railway Act*, which was enacted in 1964, applied to railway companies formed in Quebec and also had provisions addressing insolvency.⁷

17 The *Transportation Act*, although it repeats some of the old provisions from the *Railway Act* regarding insolvency, states that only shareholders and guaranteed creditors may file a plan of arrangement. Moreover, this statute is mute on the rights of ordinary creditors, including employees.⁸

18 Faced with this legal vacuum affecting certain categories of creditors, what can and should the Court do?

19 The solution to this problem is found in the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction of the courts.

20 This is how the author Janis Sarra defines this doctrine:⁹

Inherent jurisdiction has its origins in the separation of legislative and judicial power, where the courts have taken jurisdiction to deal with matters not otherwise codified by parliaments and legislatures. The notion of equity in the exercise of that jurisdiction dates back to the 12th and 13th centuries, arising from a notion of conscience, protection of the vulnerable from the more powerful, and enforcement of relations of trust and confidence. In the context of both common law and statutory interpretation, balancing equities and prejudice was part of the move toward purposive legal reasoning that has become today's hallmark or statutory interpretation. The practice of reconciling conflicting doctrines, interests and statutes also dates back to this period.

[Emphasis added.]

21 As for applying this doctrine within the framework of the Act, she states: ¹⁰

The exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction is a more sparingly used tool. Inherent jurisdiction is the exercising of the general powers of the court as the superior court of the province or territory. It has been used more generally by the court to control its process, or to fill in the gaps where legislation has not specified what is to occur in particular circumstances. In the context of its supervisory role under the *CCAA*, the court has defined inherent jurisdiction as a "residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in particular, to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them". Inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised in a manner that conflicts with a statute and, because it is and extraordinary power, should be exercised only sparingly

2013 QCCS 4039, 2013 CarswellQue 11253, 2013 CarswellQue 8264...

and in a clear case where there is cogent evidence that the benefits to all clearly outweighs the potential prejudice to a particular creditor.

[Emphasis added.]

22 In *Stelco*, ¹¹ the Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed the issue of a legal vacuum as follows:

[35] In spite of the expansive nature of this power, inherent jurisdiction does not operate where Parliament or the legislature has acted. As Farley J. noted in *Royal Oak Mines, supra*, inherent jurisdiction is "not limitless; if the legislative body has not left a functional gap or vacuum, then inherent jurisdiction should not be brought into play" (para. 4). See also, *Baxter Student Housing Ltd.* v. *College Housing Co-operative Ltd.*, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 1, at p. 480 S.C.R.; Richtree Inc. (Re) (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 174, [2005] O.J. No. 251 (S.C.J.).

Thus, in this case and contrary to the situation described above, there is no existing codification of the rights of ordinary creditors of insolvent railway companies.

To apply the *Act* blindly and deny MMA the right to avail itself of the said *Act* would be grossly unfair with respect to the rights of ordinary creditors - including the victims in Lac-Mégantic - and absolutely unacceptable in a society governed by the rule of law.

Furthermore, attempting to manage insolvency by applying one statute to some creditors and another to other creditors runs the risk of causing inconsistencies, if not outright injustices.

The Court concludes that it is necessary to fill the legal vacuum created during the last reform of Canadian transportation statutes and allow MMA to avail itself of the provisions of the *Act*, for all of its creditors.

26 B) CAN THE HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE VIABILITY OF MMA AND ITS CONDUCT DEFEAT THE APPLICATION OF THE ACT?

27 MMA adds that it will not be able to fulfil all of its obligations to all of its creditors and that resorting to the *Act* will allow it to maximize the value of its patrimony, for the benefit of all its creditors.

It also argues that the lack of this protection will result in legal chaos that could harm a certain number of its creditors, including the victims of the events that took place on July 6, 2013, in Lac-Mégantic.

29 MMA's insurer, while confirming that it will honour its insurance contract, supports MMA's position, also raising the risk of legal chaos.

30 The main objective sought by Parliament in enacting the *Act* was the survival of companies so as to benefit everyone: employees, creditors, and the company in general.

31 What can be done if the evidence proffered before the Court clearly shows unrecoverable insolvency, as in this case?

32 On a few occasions, the courts have agreed to apply the *Act* even though, in the end, it was expected that the company would be wound up or dismantled.

In this case, it is too soon to determine which path MMA will choose to maximize the value of its patrimony, that is, whether it will be sold or dismantled.

34 Allowing MMA to continue its operations to maximize the value of its patrimony is to every creditor's advantage.

Thus, when the company clearly announces that it will not be viable in its present form, whatever the plan of arrangement, the Court must take a step back from the twin purposes of the *Act* - the company's survival and the protection of its creditors - to focus entirely on the second of the two.

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36 The Court will then consider all the claims made at the original order stage, giving priority to the rights of creditors.

37 In such a situation, some of the possible claims under the *Act*, such as temporary financing, carry a priority charge or a charge in favour of directors, which would not be admissible.

In this case, channelling all the claims toward an arrangement context is certainly to every creditor's advantage, be they guaranteed or ordinary. It should be noted that the latter category includes the victims of the events of July 6, whom the Court will characterize as [TRANSLATION] « extraordinary » creditors.

39 In this case, these extraordinary creditors will benefit from the insurance coverage and may, as the case may be, additionally benefit from a part of MMA's patrimony other than its insurance coverage.

40 In this context, applying the *Act* to allow MMA to continue its operations and maximize the value of its patrimony will certainly benefit MMA's creditors.

41 We must now consider some of the applications made by MMA and decide whether they would benefit the creditors, examining the whole through the prism of « good faith » as set out under the *Act*. ¹²

In addition to a stay of the proceedings resulting from the derailment, MMA seeks the creation of a \$150,000 priority charge in favour of its directors.

60. The Petitioner seeks a \$150.000 Directors' Charge, the whole as set forth ore fully at paragraph 22 and following o the conclusions of this Petition. The amount of the Directors' Charge was established by the Petitioner and reviewed by the Monitor, taking into account direct and indirect payroll obligations, commissions, vacation pay, deductions at source and sales taxes remittances;

43 Even though in light of the wording of the insurance policy it would be appropriate to stay the proceedings arising from the derailment as far as they concern the directors, a general stay of proceedings or even the creation of a directors' charge is not in the interest of creditors in general or of MMA's employees in particular.

44 Have MMA and/or its directors acted in good faith since the events of July 6?

45 MMA asserts that all of the events that took place post-derailment are known in law.

46 Authors Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant have very competently summarized the notion of judicial notice, also known as « judicial knowledge »:

19.13. Judicial notice is the acceptance by a court or judicial tribunal, in a civil or criminal proceeding, without the requirement of proof, of the truth of a particular fact or state of affairs. Facts which are (a) so notorious as not to be the subject of dispute among reasonable persons; or (b) capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resorting to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy, may be noticed by the court without proof of them by any party.

47 The Court accepts this theory and, basing itself on well-known facts, does not hesitate to characterize the postderailment conduct of MMA and its directors as lamentable.

48 What can be said of Edward Burkhardt's silence in the hours, days even, following the tragedy.

49 What of the fact that Mr. Burkhardt only broke his silence to blame various parties involved in the disaster, before the investigation had even begun.

50 What of the fact that MMA retained the services of various clean-up and decontamination firms but did not pay them, resulting in a work stoppage.

2013 QCCS 4039, 2013 CarswellQue 11253, 2013 CarswellQue 8264...

51 What can be said of the fact that MMA failed to inform the competent authorities that it would not or could not pay the firms it had hired so that these same competent authorities could take over in an orderly fashion.

52 What of the testimony of Robert Grindrod, president of MMA, at the hearing of this case, when he stated that MMA was unable to pay its recently laid-off employees the vacation pay owing, whereas the exhibits filed in support of the motion show that its parent corporation, Montreal Maine and Atlantic Railway Ltd., which regularly provides it with funds, has enough cash to make these payments.

53 What more can be said of the testimony of Mr. Grindrod, president of MMA, when he asserted that this vacation pay would be paid when the Director of Finance for the parent corporation decided that it would be.

54 In light of these facts, the Court finds that the directors of MMA have not shown the good faith that would justify granting them a stay of proceedings or a priority charge protecting them from the claims of their employees.

55 That being the case, once again to avoid legal chaos, the Court will grant the stay of proceedings with respect to the directors but only as to liability arising from the derailment. The Court does so for the sole reason that the directors are also insureds within the meaning of the civil liability insurance policy.

55 (C) CAN THE COURT ORDER A STAY OF PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THIRD PARTIES WHO ARE NOT PARTIES TO THESE PROCEEDINGS?

56 MMA seeks a stay of the proceedings with respect to its civil liability insurer, XL.

57 MMA's petition is supported by the Municipality of Lac-Mégantic and, obviously, by XL.

58 This petition is the logical extension of MMA's wish to channel the various claims and/or debts into an arrangement it will submit to its creditors.

59 Such an arrangement proposal can include various categories of creditors and even subgroups of creditors.

60 While it is trite law that XL's insurance coverage will benefit only the victims of the derailment, whether these victims are land owners, the municipality of Lac-Mégantic or even the Government of Quebec for decontamination costs, the chaos that will result from a first-come, first-served approach should be avoided.

61 XL has already announced that it will deposit the amount of the insurance coverage.

A plan of arrangement may surely provide for a proposal to distribute this amount among the victims, hence MMA's application to extend the stay of proceedings to a third party, XL in this case.

63 Since the early nineties, Canadian courts have been considering the possibility of extending stays of proceedings to third parties. Farley J. of the Superior Court for Ontario had the following to say on the subject in *Lehndorff General Partners Ltd.*: ¹³

14 I am not persuaded that the words of s.11 which are quite specific as relating as to a company can be enlarged to encompass something other than that. However it appears to me that Blair J. was clearly in the right channel in his analysis in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd*, unreported [1992] O.J. No. 1946 9now reported at 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at pp. 4-7 9at pp. 308-310 C.B.R.0.

The Power to Stay

The court has always had in inherent jurisdiction ot grant a stay of proceedings whenever it is just and convenient to do so, in order to control its process or prevent an abuse of that process: see *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1983), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.), and cases referred to therein.

2013 QCCS 4039, 2013 CarswellQue 11253, 2013 CarswellQue 8264...

In the civil context, this general power is also embodied in the very broad terms of s.106 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.46, which provides as follows:

106. A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.

Recently, Mr. Justice O'Connell has observed that this discretionary power is "highly dependent on the facts of each particular case" *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim* (unreported) [June 25, 1992], Doc. 24127/88 (Ont. Gen. Div.), [1992] O.J. No. 1330.

Apart from this inherent and general jurisdiction to stay proceedings, there are many instances where the court is specifically granted the power to stay in a particular context, by virtue of statute or under the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. The authority to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in the same court, under r. 6.01(1), is an example of the latter. The power to stay judicial and extra-judicial proceedings under s.11 of the C.C.A.A., is an example of the former. Section 11 of the C.C.A.A. provides as follows.

64 Since that case, other judgments have endorsed the possibility of extending stays of proceedings to third parties.¹⁴

The Court gathers from these judgments that every case turns on its own merits and that in the end it is a decision based on the fair administration of justice.

66 Because of the exceptional circumstances of this case and faced with the multiple lawsuits that have already been instituted and those that will be instituted shortly, it is in the interests of the fair administration of justice to grant MMA's application and extend the stay of proceedings to XL.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:

67 *GRANTS* the application in part, in accordance with the disposition signed on August 8, 2013.

Footnotes

- 1 R.S.C. (1985), c. C-36.
- 2 S.C. 1996, c. 10.
- 3 R.S.C. (1985) c. B-3.
- 4 R.S.C. (1985) c. R-3.
- 5 Sections 99-103.
- 6 *Act to amend the Railway Act* (1901) IE.VIIc.31.
- 7 Sections 11-16.
- 8 Sections 106-110.
- 9 Janis Sarra, *Rescue! The Compagnies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Thomson Carswell) at 63.
- 10 *Ibid.* at 61-62.
- 11 Re Stelco Inc., 2005 Carswell Ont. 1188.
- 12 Subsection 11.02(3).

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13 1993 Carswell Ont. 183.

14 See *Muscletech Research and Development inc.*, 2006 Carswell Ont. 264, *Metcalfe and Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp et al.* (17 March 2008), 88CL7440 (Ont. Sup, Ct), *Papiers Gaspesia inc.*, EYB2004-71992.

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TAB 16

2006 CarswellOnt 720 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re

2006 CarswellOnt 720, [2006] O.J. No. 462, 19 C.B.R. (5th) 57

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF MUSCLETECH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INC. AND THOSE ENTITIES LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A" HERETO

Farley J.

Heard: February 6, 2006 Judgment: February 6, 2006 Docket: 06-CL-6241

Counsel: J.A. Carfagnini, Caterina Costa, Tom Ringe for Applicants Derrick Tay for Iovate Companies, DIP Lender, Gardiner personally Jay Swartz, Natasha MacParland for Monitor Steven Golick for Zurich Insurance Company Jeffrey Carhart, A. Sambasivan, Bill Baldiga, Stephen Smith for Ad Hoc Committee of the Muscletech Tort Claimants

Jeffrey Carhart, A. Sambasivan, Bill Baldiga, Stephen Smith for Ad Hoc Committee of the Muscletech Tort Clai David Rothwell, Jere Smith for Plaintiffs, Jaramillo

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Farley J.:

Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 14 C.P.C. (3d) 339, 1992 CarswellOnt 185 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — followed

Grace Canada Inc., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6648 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* (2002), 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 287 N.R. 203, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada)* 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

Statutes considered by Farley J.:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — considered

MOTION by creditors to extend stay of proceedings.

Farley J.:

1 This endorsement should be read in conjunction with my endorsement of January 18, 2006.

The essential aspects of the motion before me today were for an extension of the stay of proceedings to March 15, 2006, the sealing of the unredacted version of the Monitor's Second Report and recognition the U.S. Protective Orders. Allow me to deal with the two non-contentious aspects. Firstly, I note that there has been minimal redaction of the Monitor's Second Repot as to sensitive commercial financial information, all in accordance with the principles *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* (2002), 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.). The draft order contemplates a

2006 CarswellOnt 720, [2006] O.J. No. 462, 19 C.B.R. (5th) 57

sealing of the unredacted version pending further order of the court; thus any interested person could apply to the court for an unsealing on proper grounds. The unredacted version may be made available to any party which executes a suitable confidentiality/non-disclosure agreement. Similarly, with respect to the recognition of the U.S. Protective Orders, this makes common sense and is in general accord with the principles of *Sierra Club of Canada*.

That leaves the question of the extension of the protective stay to March 15, 2006. Let me observe that all the parties 3 represented before me today, except for counsel for the Jaramillos, were supportive of this request. Those supportive indicated that very significant progress had been made since the January 18, 2006 Initial Order with respect to the mechanics concerning a global resolution and as to initial discussions concerning substance; in contrast, the Jaramillos were concerned that this CCAA filing was designed to derail their trial scheduled for April 3, 2006 in New Mexico. In defence of the attitude of the Jaramillos in this regard, I would observe that I can understand their frustration and suspicion that, vis-à-vis them, the CCAA filing was a ploy and/or a stall designed to defeat a looming trial date. If that were shown to be the case, then this (Canadian) court would not tolerate such tactical game playing. However, I am satisfied on the evidence before me (and as supported by the other parties represented here today, including the Monitor, being an officer of the court — appointed by the court, with special responsibilities to the court, including neutrality as to all stakeholders (including the Jaramillos)) that the CCAA applicants have been proceeding in good faith with due diligence towards a CCAA resolution (and with the timetable addressed in the material having to be met demonstrating that they are presently proceeding in good faith and with due diligence) that it would be appropriate in these circumstances to extend the stay to March 15, 2006. I pause to note that at any time and from time to time any interested person may employ the comeback clause provision of the Initial Order and in this regard the Jaramillos (or others) are perfectly at liberty to request that the stay be terminated even before the March 15, 2006 date. One would ordinarily assume that that use of the comeback clause would be triggered by some adverse happening or negative result; however, the comeback clause is not so restricted.

4 Allegations by the Jaramillos of bad faith as to *past activities* have been made against the CCAA applicants and the Gardiner interests. However, the question of good faith is with respect to how these parties are conducting themselves in *these CCAA proceedings*.

5 It was suggested by U.S. counsel for the Jaramillos (I would observe that US counsel were variously present in the courtroom as shown in the list of counsel) that the CCAA applicants were attempting to pit this (Canadian) court off against the U.S. court (this would include Judge Rakoff's court and the court in New Mexico). I would observe that this court has a long tradition of comity and cooperation with the courts of the U.S. and it will not engage in such an activity. As discussed in Judge Rakoff's hearing transcript of January 25, 2006, he would be calling me and I would confirm that he and I had a very pleasant and productive discussion as to coordination and cooperation — and we will continue with that liaison and endeavour. I know that he is waiting to see how this hearing in Canada goes, before dealing with the matter in New York on February 9.

6 In that regard, and as I pointed out, I have absolutely no difficulty with the element of Judge Rakoff having to be satisfied as to the appropriateness of how to deal with the Jaramillo litigation in New Mexico. It will be up to him to assess whether that litigation should be carved out, as to which see his previous consideration in this regard. I advised counsel (and Mr. Ringe specifically acknowledged) that they would have to be up to speed re the New Mexico case if Judge Rakoff did not find favour with the process as presently contemplated.

In that regard, I would also advise that I impressed upon all parties/counsel that they would have to continue with the lightning (choice of that word being that of one supportive counsel) progress that had been made to date. I found it very helpful to have the Monitor's interim report as to transactions affecting the CCAA applicants with related parties. That report will have to be finalized forthwith, including all aspects of "reviewable transactions". I was advised by the Monitor that the CCAA applicants and the other Gardiner entities plus Mr. Gardiner personally recognized the importance of this and that the Monitor was receiving full cooperation and candour in this respect. I am certain that the Supplemental Objection to Motion For Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (headed up with the style of proceedings in the CCAA matter, but clearly addressed to the U.S. court) of the Jaramillos will be of assistance

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in allowing the Monitor to give special attention to the concerns addressed there. Originally, it was thought that the final report could be completed by February 15, 2006, but with the additional workload forthcoming, it was suggested that February 22, 2006 would be a more manageable date. I would therefore expect a draft interim report by February 15, 2006 to demonstrate that real progress is being made in this regard. Given the future dates in question, it would be better to consider February 22, 2006 as an outside date and better to provide same earlier.

8 I understand that later this week the Ad Hoc Committee will be requesting a representation and ancillary order incorporating a joint funding agreement. [Note: as this is being typed up February 8th, I would note that I have just granted such an order.]

9 I would reiterate my observations in *Grace Canada Inc., Re*, [2005] O.J. No. 4868 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraph 5 and 11:

5. It would seem to me that the various class proceedings would benefit from cooperation and coordination — using the 3 Cs of the Commercial List (communication, cooperation and common sense). Otherwise, they will be faced with the practical problem of fighting amongst themselves as to a turf war and running the risk of being divided and therefore susceptible to being conquered.

11. It would seem to me that the insolvency adjudicative proceedings would, at least under presently anticipated circumstances, result in a more effective efficient process than would a full-blown class action proceeding.

10 As well, it is helpful to recall what Blair J. (as he then was) said concerning CCAA stays of proceedings against third parties in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at paragraphs 13, 17, 20, 24 and 25:

13. The second motion is by National Bank, which of course opposes the first motion, and which seeks an order staying the Campeau action as against it as well, pending the disposition of the C.C.A.A. proceedings. Counsel submits that the factual substratum of the claim against the bank is dependent entirely on the success of the allegations against the Olympia & York defendants, and that the claim against those defendants is better addressed within the parameters of the C.C.A.A. proceedings. He points out also that if the action were to be taken against the bank alone, his client would be obliged to bring Olympia & York back into the action as third parties in any event.

17. By its formal title the C.C.A.A. is known as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangement between companies and their creditors". To ensure the effective nature of such a "facilitative" process it is essential that the debtor company be afforded a respite from the litigious and other rights being exercised by creditors, while it attempts to carry on as a going concern and to negotiate an acceptable corporate restructuring arrangements with such creditors.

20. I agree with those sentiments and would simply add that, in my view, the restraining power extends as well to conduct which could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement.

24. In making these orders, I see no prejudice to the Campeau plaintiffs. The processing of their action is not being precluded, but merely postponed. Their claims may, indeed, be addressed more expeditiously than might have otherwise been the case, as they may be dealt with — at least for the purposes of that proceeding — in the C.C.A.A. proceeding itself. On the other hand, there might be great prejudice to Olympia & York if its attention is diverted from the corporate restructuring process and it is required to expend time and energy in defending an action of the complexity and dimension of this one. While there may not be a great deal of prejudice to National Bank in allowing the action to proceed against it, I am satisfied that there is little likelihood of the action proceeding very far or very effectively unless and until Olympia & York — whose alleged misdeeds are the real focal point of the attack on both sets of defendants — is able to participate.

25. In addition to the foregoing, I have considered the following factors in the exercise of my discretion:

1. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the Campeau claim must be dealt with, either in the action or in the C.C.A.A. proceedings and that it cannot simply be ignored. I agree. However, in my view, it is more appropriate, and in fact is essential, that the claim be addressed within the parameters of the C.C.A.A. proceedings rather than outside, in order to maintain the integrity of those proceedings. Were it otherwise, the numerous creditors in that mammoth proceeding would have no effective way of assessing the weight to be given to the Campeau claim in determining their approach to the acceptance or rejection of the Olympia & York plan filed under the Act.

2. In this sense, the Campeau claim — like other secured, undersecured, unsecured, and contingent claims — must be dealt with as part of a "controlled stream" of claims that are being negotiated with a view to facilitating a compromise and arrangement between Olympia & York and its creditors. In weighing "the good management" of the two sets of proceedings — i.e., the action and the C.C.A.A. proceeding — the scales tip in favour of dealing with the Campeau claim in the context of the latter: see *Attorney General v. Arthur Andersen & Co.* (1988), [1989] E.C.C. 224 (C.A.), cited in *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim*, supra.

I am aware, when saying this, that in the initial plan of compromise and arrangement filed by the applicants with the court on August 21, 1992, the applicants have chosen to include the Campeau plaintiffs amongst those described as "Persons not Affected by the Plan". This treatment does not change the issues, in my view, as it is up to the applicants to decide how they wish to deal with that group of "creditors" in presenting their plan, and up to the other creditors to decide whether they will accept such treatment. In either case, the matter is being dealt with, as it should be, within the context of the C.C.A.A. proceedings.

3. Pre-judgment interest will compensate the plaintiffs for any delay caused by the imposition of the stays, should the action subsequently proceed and the plaintiffs ultimately be successful.

4. While there may not be great prejudice to National Bank if the action were to continue against it alone and the causes of action asserted against the two groups of defendants are different, the complex factual situation is common to both claims and the damages are the same. The potential of two different inquiries at two different times into those same facts and damages is not something that should be encouraged. Such multiplicity of inquiries should in fact be discouraged, particularly where — as is the case here — the delay occasioned by the stay is relatively short (at least in terms of the speed with which an action like this Campeau action is likely to progress).

11 I am satisfied on a balancing of interests, weighing the benefits and the detriments, that it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to extend the stay. Order is to issue as per my fiat.

12 This endorsement was written over the lunch hour. I directed counsel to have their lunch together usefully discussing how this matter may productively proceed. I then returned to court to give them this endorsement and read it to them. I was advised that counsel (including those for the Jaramillos) had had an open and frank discussion.

Motion granted.

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TAB 17

1999 CarswellBC 1916 British Columbia Supreme Court

New Home Warranty of British Columbia Inc., Re

1999 CarswellBC 1916, 13 C.B.R. (4th) 118, 178 D.L.R. (4th) 381, 21 B.C.T.C. 118, 90 A.C.W.S. (3d) 676

In the Matter of the Proposal of New Home Warranty of British Columbia Inc.

Satanove J.

Heard: September 2, 1999 Judgment: September 3, 1999 Docket: Vancouver 190882VA99

Counsel: *Margaret R. Sims*, for New Home Warranty. John A. McLean, for IBNR Claimants. Timothy W. Pearkes, for The Owners: Strata Corporation NES122. Mary I. Buttery, for KPMG Inc., Trustee. William E. Skelly, for Great West Development Group of Companies and others. J. Cameron McKechnie, for C & J Restorations.

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Satanove J*.:

Hardy v. Fothergill (1888), 13 App. Cas. 351, [1886-90] All E.R. Rep. 597, 58 L.J.Q.B. 44, 54 L.T. 273 (U.K. H.L.) — referred to *Wiebe, Re* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 109 (Ont. Bktcy.) — referred to

Woodward's Ltd., Re (1993), 20 C.B.R. (3d) 74, 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206 (B.C. S.C.) — distinguished

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 Generally — considered

s. 2 "creditor" — referred to

s. 54 — considered

s. 135(1.1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 89(1)] — considered Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by group of creditors for declaration of entitlement to vote on proposal.

Satanove J.:

1 New Home Warranty of British Columbia Inc. ("New Home") has made a proposal in bankruptcy under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. An issue has arisen as to who has legal status to vote on the proposal.

2 The applicants who seek a court declaration that they are entitled to vote are all those persons who are covered by New Home warranties and are presently unaware of any defect in construction of their buildings which would entitle New Home Warranty of British Columbia Inc., Re, 1999 CarswellBC 1916

1999 CarswellBC 1916, 13 C.B.R. (4th) 118, 178 D.L.R. (4th) 381, 21 B.C.T.C. 118...

them to make a claim, but who may be entitled to make a claim in the future under the warranties. They have been referred to throughout the proceedings as the "IBNRs".

3 On April 20, 1999, Madam Justice Allan appointed Mr. McLean, an officer of the court, as counsel to protect the interest of the IBNRs. Mr. McLean obtained an actuarial report which estimated New Home's outstanding claim liabilities at about \$4.1 million dollars, of which about \$20.4 million dollars represented IBNR claims. Mr. McLean has asked the court to declare that the IBNR claimants consist of 362 creditors with provable claims under the Act to be valued for voting purposes as totalling \$20,411,842. He intends to vote on their behalf in approval of the proposal.

4 There is an understandable concern on the part of non-IBNR creditors that if the relief sought were granted, the IBNRs who represent 50% of the claims would control the process because it would be impossible to obtain the majority in number and two-thirds majority in value required to approve any proposal to which the IBNRs, through Mr. McLean, did not agree. Further, the non-IBNRs say they have little or no chance of voting down the proposal because it is unlikely they could get sufficient creditors to participate to create the negative vote they would need. They say their vote will be rendered meaningless and the whole process will be undemocratic.

5 It has been suggested by some of these latter claimants that the proposal should separate the unsecured creditors into two classes so that a majority in number and two-thirds in value vote of approval would have to be obtained from both classes, thereby providing IBNRs and non-IBNRs alike with a veto power.

6 Counsel referred me to the decision of Tysoe, J. in *Re Woodward's Ltd.* (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206 (B.C. S.C.) wherein he approved the creation of a separate class under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 for those creditors holding the guarantee of Woodward's holding company. He found that the holders of the guarantees had such different legal rights that they could not vote on the Reorganization Plan with a common interest.

7 In the case before me, the legal rights underlying the nature of the claims of the IBNRs and other unsecured creditors should be the same. They are all privy to the same contractual terms with New Home and they all have a claim for breach of warranty although the extent of each of their damage may not yet be known. I do not see the basis for the creation of two classes of unsecured creditors.

8 In any event, all counsel acknowledge that I have no jurisdiction to order that a separate claim of unsecured creditors be created under the proposal.

9 The only issue before me is whether the IBNRs are entitled to vote and to what extent. Section 54 of the *Bankruptcy* and *Insolvency Act* allows "creditors" with "proven claims" to vote on a proposal. Section 2(1) of the Act defines "creditor" as a person having a claim "provable as a claim under the Act". The law has long held that contingent claims may be provable claims in bankruptcy. This principle is in keeping with the policy of the Act to allow as many claims, actual or potential, against the bankrupt to be brought forward so that the bankrupt's slate can be wiped clean and all creditors, even contingent ones, can have the opportunity to try and prove their claim and share in the assets of the estate (*Re Wiebe* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 109 (Ont. Bktcy.); *Hardy v. Fothergill* (1888), 13 App. Cas. 351 (U.K. H.L.)).

10 The test whether a claim is "provable in bankruptcy" is whether it is capable of being fairly estimated. If it is too remote or speculative to be measured by actuarial computation or otherwise, then it is not capable of fair estimation and is not provable in bankruptcy. However, if claims can be actuarially measured, such as in the case before me, then they are capable of estimation and the trustee, or the court, should proceed to evaluate them.

11 Section 54 of the Act refers to creditors with "proven" claims, but the effect of s. 135(1.1) of the Act is to deem contingent claims to be "proven" when they have been determined by the trustee to be provable claims and to have a certain value. If the trustee sets the value of these IBNR claims, then notwithstanding their contingent nature they will become "proven claims" for the purposes of voting on the proposal.

12 I see no reason why the trustee should not rely on the actuarial evidence to set the value of these claims for voting purposes. Although I received some objections to admitting into evidence the KPMG Actuarial Report, these were of a general nature only. No specific observations were made as to any flaws in the report. The Report qualifies itself a number of times that it represents a rough prediction only but at this stage of the proceedings it is the only evidence before me and I have no reason to find it unreliable.

13 The IBNRs, as creditors with provable claims in bankruptcy, should be entitled to participate in any decisions about New Home's estate. Mr. McLean is authorized to file a single proof of claim in the amount of \$20,411,842 on behalf of 362 separate creditors and the trustee is authorized to accept the proof of claim for voting purposes only. Mr. McLean is authorized to vote without proxies on behalf of those IBNRs who are not present at the meeting.

14 The other relief sought in the notice of motion is adjourned generally.

Application granted.

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TAB 18

2009 CarswellOnt 4806 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Nortel Networks Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 4806, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 801, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 232, 76 C.C.P.B. 307

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF NORTEL NETWORKS CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION (Applicants)

> APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

> > Morawetz J.

Heard: June 16, 2009 Judgment: August 18, 2009 Docket: 09-CL-7950

Counsel: Alan Merskey for Nortel Networks Corp. et al

Lyndon Barnes, Adam Hirsh for Board of Directors of Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited

Leanne Williams for Flextronics Inc.

J. Pasquariello for Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.

B. Wadsworth for CAW-Canada

Thomas McRae for Recently Severed Calgary Employees

A. McKinnon for Former Employees

Mary Arzoymanidis for Bell Canada

Alex MacFarlane for Unsecured Creditors' Committee

Gavin Finlayson for Noteholders

Tina Lie for Superintendent of Financial Services of Ontario

Steven Graff, Ian Aversa for Current and Former Employees

Subject: Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Morawetz J.:

Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 14 C.P.C. (3d) 339, 1992 CarswellOnt 185 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Morneau Sobeco Ltd. Partnership v. Aon Consulting Inc. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 1427, (sub nom. Morneau Sobeco Ltd. Partnership v. AON Consulting Inc.) 237 O.A.C. 267, 65 C.C.L.I. (4th) 159, 2008 ONCA 196, 40 C.B.R. (5th) 172, 65 C.C.P.B. 293, (sub nom. Slater Steel Inc. (Re)) 2008 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8285, 291 D.L.R. (4th) 314 (Ont. C.A.) — distinguished

SNV Group Ltd., Re (2001), 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 116, 2001 BCSC 1644, 2001 CarswellBC 2662 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to *Woodward's Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236, 79 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257, 1993 CarswellBC 530 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to to

Statutes considered:

Nortel Networks Corp., Re, 2009 CarswellOnt 4806

2009 CarswellOnt 4806, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 801, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 232, 76 C.C.P.B. 307

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

s. 11.5 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.5(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - considered

s. 11.5(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to *Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 1974*, 29 U.S.C.

Generally — referred to

Rules considered:

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 R. 21 — referred to

MOTION by applicants for order extending stay in action; MOTION by moving parties for order lifting stay of proceedings.

Morawetz J.:

1 This endorsement relates to two motions.

The first is brought by the Applicants for an order extending the stay contained at paragraphs 14 - 15 and 19 of the Amended and Restated Initial Order (the "Initial Order") to the individual defendants (the "Named Defendants") in the action commenced in the United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville District (the "ERISA Litigation").

3 The second is brought by the current and former employees of Nortel Networks Inc. ("NNI") who are or were participants in the long-term investment plan sponsored by NNI (the "Moving Parties") for an order, if necessary, lifting the stay of proceedings provided for in the Initial Order for the purpose of allowing the Moving Parties to continue with the ERISA Litigation.

4 For the following reasons, the motion of the Applicants is granted and the motion of the Moving Parties is dismissed.

Background

5 The motion of the Applicants is supported by the Board of Directors of Nortel Networks Corp. ("NNC") and Nortel Networks Ltd. ("NNL"), the Monitor, the Unsecured Creditors' Committee and the Bondholders.

6 The ERISA Litigation involves the alleged breach by the Named Defendants of their statutory duties under the *Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 1974* ("ERISA") regarding the management of NNI's defined contribution retirement plan (the "Plan"). It is alleged that, among others, the Named Defendants breached their duty by imprudently offering NNC stock for investment in the Plan.

7 The ERISA Litigation is currently at the discovery stage, which entails a review and production of millions of pages of electronic documents and numerous depositions. The ERISA Litigation plaintiffs are entitled to conduct up to 60 depositions.

8 Counsel to the Moving Parties explained that the defendants in ERISA cases are typically the individuals who managed the plan, being the "fiduciaries" in the language of ERISA. The fiduciaries may include the corporate entity itself, senior management employees, human resources employees and/or other personnel, entities or persons outside the company, or any combination of same. Counsel submits that under ERISA, the status of an individual as a fiduciary depends on the plan documents and the actual management and practice relating to the plan, not an individual's official corporate status as an officer and/or director of the plan's sponsor.

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9 Although the intent of the ERISA action may be aimed at the individuals in their capacity as independent ERISA fiduciaries, it seems to me that the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") as filed in the action has a much broader impact.

10 At paragraph 15 of his factum, Mr. Barnes makes the following submission:

It is simply untenable to suggest that the D&O Defendants [referred to herein as the "Named Defendants"] are only being sued in their capacity as independent ERISA fiduciaries. This claim is belied by the Plaintiff's own pleadings. The Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint ("SAC") repeatedly asserts claims against the Named Defendants that specifically relate to the obligations of the company, where the defendants are alleged to be liable in their capacities as directors or officers. For example, the Plaintiff's allege that Nortel "necessarily acts through its Board of Directors, officers and employees", and assert that the "directors-fiduciaries act on behalf of [Nortel]". The SAC further claims that the Named Defendants are liable as "co-fiduciaries" alongside the company. It is inescapable that some of the claims for which the plaintiff's seek to recover against the individual Named Defendants relate to obligations of Nortel, because, as is evident from multiple allegations in the SAC, Nortel can only act derivatively through its directors and officers.

11 Mr. Barnes cites references to the SAC at page 5, paragraph 14; page 6, paragraph 19; pages 24, 52, 54 and paragraphs 50 - 109, 114; and pages 26 and 35 and paragraphs 58 and 66.

12 Mr. Barnes goes on to submit that as a result, the allegations in the ERISA Litigation against the Named Defendants and the allegations against the corporate defendants are invariably intertwined, raising several identical questions of fact and law.

13 Mr. Barnes also made reference to paragraph 147 of the SAC which sets out the additional theory of liability against some of the Defendants and alleges in the alternative that the said defendants are liable as non-fiduciaries who knowingly participated in the fiduciary breaches of the other Plan fiduciaries described herein, for which said Defendants are liable pursuant to ERISA.

14 Although the ERISA Litigation may be aimed at the Named Defendants in their capacities as "fiduciaries" it seems to me that this distinction is somewhat blurred such that it is arguable that the Named Defendants only have fiduciary status under ERISA as a consequence of their position as directors or officers of the company.

15 The Moving Parties concede that the ERISA Litigation against NNI, NNC and NNL is stayed as a result of the Chapter 11 proceeding, the Initial Order, and the Chapter 15 proceedings. The Moving Parties seek to continue the action as against the Named Defendants and carry on with the discovery process.

16 The Moving Parties stated intention in continuing with the ERISA Litigation is to pursue insurance proceeds. The Moving Parties have filed evidence of an offer to settle made within the limits of the applicable policies but the offer has not been accepted.

17 The Moving Parties take the position that the ERISA Litigation is not stayed as against the Named Defendants pursuant to the stay because the Named Defendants are "not being sued in their capacity as officers and directors of the two Canadian corporations, but in their capacities as fiduciaries of an American 401(k) Plan". The Applicants take the position that it is, however, as a result of their employment by the Applicants that the Named Defendants had any capacity as fiduciaries for an American 401(k) Plan.

18 The Moving Parties take the position that a continuation of the ERISA Litigation will have a minimal effect on the Applicants because, among other things:

(a) the documentary discovery can be managed by the lawyers without the extensive involvement of any Nortel personnel;

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(b) the bulk of documentary discovery issues have been worked out;

(c) they will accommodate individual defendants involved in the restructuring efforts by scheduling the remaining steps in the ERISA Litigation so that they are not distracted from the restructuring efforts; and

(d) they will agree that any determination or adjudication shall be without prejudice to the Canadian applicants in the claims process.

19 The Applicants take the position that they do not wish to be drawn into the conflict over the insurance proceeds as this would result in prejudice to their restructuring efforts. At this time, the Applicants are at a critical stage of their restructuring and submit that their efforts should be directed towards the restructuring.

Mr. Barnes submits that, if the ERISA Litigation is allowed to continue, it will detract significant attention and resources from Nortel's restructuring. The Moving Parties are seeking continued discovery of millions of pages of electronic documents in the company's possession and are expected to conduct dozens depositions. Mr. Barnes further submits it is simply not the case that continued litigation has a minimal effect on the company as negotiating a discovery agreement and collecting and providing the documents in question requires considerable time and resources in preparing past and current directors and officers for the depositions which will necessitate significant attention and focus for management and the board. In addition, he submits that addressing the strategic issues raised by the litigation, including the prospect of settlement, requires the attention of management and the board. Further, as the questions of fact and law at issue in the ERISA Litigation are practically identical as between the corporate defendants and the D&O Defendants, he submits there is a serious risk of the record being tainted if the action proceeds without the Applicants' participation, which could have corresponding effects on any claims process.

21 It is also necessary to take into account the effect of a stay of the ERISA Litigation on the Moving Parties.

As counsel to the Applicants points out, the Moving Parties have also stated that their primary interest in continuing the ERISA Litigation is to pursue an insurance policy issued by Chubb. The Moving Parties have noted that the insurance proceeds are a "wasting policy", starting at U.S. \$30 million and declining for defence costs.

23 Counsel to the Applicants submits that in the event that the stay continues, few defence costs will be incurred against the insurance proceeds and the Moving Parties will maintain the value of their within limits offer.

Further, as Mr. Barnes points out, staying the entire ERISA Litigation would not significantly harm the Moving Parties as it does not preclude their action, but merely postpones it.

Analysis

25 Section 11.5 of the CCAA authorizes the court to make an order under the CCAA to provide for a stay of proceedings against directors. Section 11.5(1) states:

11.5(1) An order made under section 11 may provide that no person may commence or continue any action against a director of the debtor company on any claim against directors that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relates to obligations of the company where directors are under any law liable within their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations, unless a compromise or arrangement in respect of the company, if one is filed, is sanctioned by the court or is refused by the creditors or the court.

26 Section 19 of the Initial Order provides as follows:

THIS COURT ORDERS that during the Stay Period, and except as permitted by subsection 11.5(2) of the CCAA, no Proceeding may be commenced or continued against any of the former, current or future directors or officers of the Applicants with respect to any claim against the directors or officers that arose before the date hereof and that

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relates to any obligations of the Applicants whereby the directors or officers are alleged under any law to be liable in their capacity as directors or officers for the payment or performance of such obligations, unless a compromise or arrangement in respect of the Applicants, if one is filed, is sanctioned by this Court or is refused by the creditors of the applicant or this Court (the "D&O" stay).

It is also argued by both counsel to the Applicants and the Board that this statutory power is augmented by the court's inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay in appropriate circumstances. (See: *SNV Group Ltd., Re*, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2497 (B.C. S.C.).) Counsel to the Applicants and the Board also submit that the CCAA is remedial legislation to be construed liberally and in these circumstances, it should be recognized that the purpose of the stay is to provide a debtor with its opportunity to negotiate with its creditors without having to devote time and scarce resources to defending legal actions against it. It is further submitted that given that a company can only act through its management and board, by extension, the purpose of the stay provision is to provide management and the board with the opportunity to negotiate with out having to devote precious time, resources and energy to defending against legal actions.

28 Mr. Barnes submits that the ERISA Litigation falls squarely within the terms of the D&O Stay as it is a claim against former and current directors and officers under a U.S. statute that arose prior to the date of filing. Further, the Named Defendants are only exposed to this liability as a consequence of their position with the company.

It is on this last point that Mr. Graff, on behalf of the Moving Parties, takes issue. He submits that the litigation is not stayed against the individual defendants because they are not being sued in their capacities as officers and directors of two Canadian corporations, but in their capacities as fiduciaries of an American 401(k) Plan. As such, he submits that the stay ought not to extend to the ERISA Litigation. He submits that the named defendants' liability is not a derivative of the Applicants' liability, if any, as a fiduciary. He further submits that the corporate defendants have claimed in the ERISA Litigation that the corporate entities are not fiduciaries at all and need not even have been named in the ERISA Litigation.

Mr. Graff further submits that the Applicants' submission and the Board's submission is flawed and that following the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in *Morneau Sobeco Ltd. Partnership v. Aon Consulting Inc.* (2008), 40 C.B.R. (5th) 172 (Ont. C.A.), the fact that the management of the Plan has always been performed by the Applicants' employees, officers and directors is moot. Mr. Graff submits that the *Morneau* case is on "all fours" with this case.

31 With respect, I do not find that the *Morneau* case is on "all fours" with this case. Mr. Graff submits that in *Morneau*, the Court of Appeal opined on the applicable legal questions: When are directors and officers not directors and officers?

32 In my view, while the Court of Appeal may have commented on the issue referenced by Mr. Graff, it was not in a context which is similar to that being faced on this motion. In *Morneau*, the Court of Appeal was faced with an interpretation issue arising out of the scope and terms of a release. The consequences of an interpretation against Morneau would have resulted in a bar of the claim. This distinction between *Morneau* and the case at bar is, in my view, significant.

33 The *Morneau* case can also be distinguished on the basis that Gillese J.A. was examining a release and, in particular, how far that release went. That is not an issue that is before me. There is no determination that is being made on this motion that will affect the ultimate outcome of the ERISA Litigation. There is no issue that a denial of the stay will result in the action being barred. Rather, the effect of the stay would be merely to postpone the ERISA Litigation.

This is not a Rule 21 motion and accordingly, the pleadings do not have to be reviewed on the basis as to whether it is "plain, obvious and beyond doubt" that the claim could not succeed. In this case, there is no "bright line" in the pleadings. As I have noted above, the allegations against the Named Defendants are not restricted to the defendants acting in their capacity as fiduciaries. In expanding the scope of the litigation to include broad allegations as against the directors, the Moving Parties have brought the ERISA Litigation, in my view, within the terms of the D&O Stay. Nortel Networks Corp., Re, 2009 CarswellOnt 4806

2009 CarswellOnt 4806, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 801, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 232, 76 C.C.P.B. 307

35 Having determined that the ERISA Litigation falls within the terms of the D&O Stay, the second issue to consider is whether the stay should be lifted so as to permit the ERISA Litigation to continue at this time.

In my view, the Nortel restructuring is at a critical stage and the energies and activities of the Board should be directed towards the restructuring. I accept the argument of Mr. Barnes on this point. To permit the ERISA Litigation to continue at that time would, in my view, result in a significant distraction and diversion of resources at a time when that can be least afforded. It is necessary in considering whether to lift the stay, to weigh the interests of the Applicants against the interests of those who will be affected by the stay. Where the benefits to be achieved by the applicant outweighs the prejudice to affected parties, a stay will be granted. (See: *Woodward's Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236 (B.C. S.C.).)

37 I also note the comments of Blair J. (as he then was) in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at paragraph 24 where he stated:

In making these orders, I see no prejudice to the Campeau plaintiffs. The processing of their action is not being precluded, but merely postponed. Their claims may, indeed, be addressed more expeditiously than might have otherwise been the case, as they may be dealt with - at least for the purposes of that proceeding in the CCAA proceeding itself.

38 The prejudice to be suffered by the Moving Parties in the ERISA Litigation is a postponement of the claim. In view of the fact that the ERISA Litigation was commenced in 2001, I have not been persuaded that a further postponement for a relatively short period of time will be unduly prejudicial to the Moving Parties.

Disposition

39 Under the circumstances, I have concluded that the D&O Stay under the Initial Order does cover the D&O Defendants in the ERISA Litigation and that it is not appropriate to lift the stay at this time.

40 It is recognized that the ERISA Litigation will proceed at some point. The plaintiffs in the ERISA Litigation are at liberty to have this matter reviewed in 120 days.

41 To the extend that I have erred in determining that the ERISA Litigation is not the type of action directly contemplated by the D&O Stay, I would exercise this Court's inherent power to stay the proceedings against non-parties to achieve the same result.

Motion by applicants granted; motion by moving parties dismissed.

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TAB 19

2002 SKQB 161 Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench

Oblats de Marie Immaculee du Manitoba, Re

2002 CarswellSask 287, 2002 SKQB 161, 113 A.C.W.S. (3d) 566, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 76

In the Matter of an Application by Les Oblats de Marie Immaculee du Manitoba, Pursuant to the Companies' Creditor Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

Zarzeczny J.

Judgment: April 18, 2002 Docket: Regina Q.B.G. 865/02

Counsel: James S. Ehmann, for Applicant, Les Oblats de Marie Immaculee du Manitoba

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Zarzeczny J.:

Prince Edward Island Development Agency v. Perfection Foods Ltd., 29 C.B.R. (3d) 137, 124 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 142, 384 A.P.R. 142, 1994 CarswellPEI 9 (P.E.I. C.A.) — referred to

Royal Bank v. Perfection Foods Ltd., 90 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 302, 280 A.P.R. 302, 1991 CarswellPEI 116 (P.E.I. T.D.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

s. 9 — considered

s. 9(1) — considered

s. 11(1) — pursuant to

s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — referred to

Les Oblats de Marie Immaculée du Manitoba Incorporation Act, R.S.M. 1990, c. 131

Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) — considered

s. 2(4) — considered

s. 2(6) — considered

APPLICATION by religious order pursuant to s. 11 of *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* for order granting stay of proceedings against it and authorizing it to file formal plan of compromise or arrangement.

Zarzeczny J.:

1 The Applicant, Les Oblats De Marie Immaculee Du Manitoba ("LOMI"), apply *ex parte* pursuant to s. 11(1) of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as am. (the "*CCAA*") for an order granting a stay of

Oblats de Marie Immaculee du Manitoba, Re, 2002 SKQB 161, 2002 CarswellSask 287 2002 SKQB 161, 2002 CarswellSask 287, 113 A.C.W.S. (3d) 566, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 76

any and all proceedings against or in respect of the Applicant and authorizing the Applicant to file with this Court a formal plan of compromise or arrangement. A draft order has been filed indicating that the relief and orders applied for are intended to subsist for an interim period of thirty days only, after which it is intended that a notice of motion for further orders will be presented for the Court's consideration. The motion is intended to be served upon identified interested parties and their solicitors.

2 The material in support of the application consists only of two affidavits, one filed by Father James Fiori of Winnipeg, Manitoba, the Provincial Superior of LOMI and the affidavit of Clark Sullivan, a chartered accountant of Edmonton, Alberta, representing the firm of Sullivan & Associates Inc. proposed as Monitor of the property and assets of LOMI pursuant to s. 11.7(1) of the *CCAA*.

3 The affidavit of Father Fiori deposes that LOMI was initially constituted a body corporate by an Act of the Manitoba legislature in 1873. Most recently, the Manitoba legislature enacted *Les Oblats de Marie Immaculée du Manitoba Incorporation Act*, R.S.M. 1990, c. 131, to replace the 1873 legislation. The "business" of LOMI is set out in s. 2 which recognizes the objects and powers of LOMI in part as follows:

2(1) The corporation shall have power to act as manager of the temporal affairs of the Roman Catholic Church in any parish in the Province of Manitoba; the establishing and carrying on of missions; the erection, maintenance and conduct of schools, colleges, churches, orphanages and hospitals; the promotion of the spiritual education and other interests of the Roman Catholic Church; the conducting, taking charge of, holding and managing property, both real, personal and mixed, which may at any time or in any manner come to or vest in or which may heretofore have vested in the said corporation for any purpose whatever, by purchase, gift, grant, devise or otherwise, to take, buy, hold, purchase and receive by gift, grant, devise or otherwise any property, either real, personal or mixed, and to mortgage, pledge, sell or dispose of the same or any part thereof.

4 Section 2(4) of that Act provides as follows:

2(4) The head office of the corporation shall be at the City of Winnipeg, or such other place in the Province of Manitoba as may from time to time be determined by the by-laws of the corporation.

[Emphasis added]

5 Subsection 2(6) provides that persons of Roman Catholic faith who are members of the religious order known as La Congrégation des Missionnaires Oblats de Marie Immaculée and by decision of the supreme authority of the Order, are associated to Les Révérends Péres Oblats in the Province of Manitoba, constitute the members of LOMI.

6 Father Fiori's affidavit deposes that LOMI has been extra-provincially registered in Saskatchewan although no further information or particulars are provided with respect to this registration nor with respect to any registered, functional or operating office in Saskatchewan. The affidavit does not depose to any activity presently being carried out by LOMI or any of its members in Saskatchewan, nor is there any indication that any members of LOMI are actively involved in this province.

7 LOMI is either a defendant or third party to hundreds, perhaps soon to be thousands, of law suits which have been initiated in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Northern Ontario respecting the activity of certain members of LOMI acting in various capacities at residential schools in these provinces. By far, the largest number of claims initiated (presently 1,742) are in Saskatchewan, although there are 479 plaintiffs in Manitoba and 167 in Northern Ontario. Paragraph 13 of Father Fiori's affidavit deposes in part:

... I do verily believe that there may be a significant number of further IRS lawsuits commenced in Manitoba.

These circumstances prompt Father Fiori to depose in paragraph 8 of his affidavit:

Over the course of the last two years, the chief business of LOMI has been the management and defence of IRS [Indian Residential School] claims in Saskatchewan.

8 The members of LOMI are missionary Catholic priests and brothers. The current membership, for which LOMI has financial responsibility, stands at 58 men, 39 of whom are more than 70 years of age and most of whom reside at a retirement home owned and operated by LOMI in Winnipeg, Manitoba. (Father Fiori affidavit, para. 5).

9 An examination of the financial statements and analysis tendered as exhibits "E" and "F" to Father Fiori's affidavit establish that the principal assets of LOMI consist of financial investments as well as capital assets. The latter includes real property with a realizable estimated value slightly in excess of \$2,000,000.00. Although Father Fiori's affidavit does not further particularize the nature and location of either the investment or capital assets, it is fair to assume, in respect of the latter, that they would include the retirement home known as Casa Bonita owned and operated by LOMI (see para. 5 of the affidavit), and located in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Additionally, although Father Fiori's affidavit does not specify it, it is a clear inference to be drawn that the head office of LOMI (as its incorporating legislation mandates) is in Manitoba as appear to be LOMI's administrative offices.

10 This analysis of the materials and information supplied upon and in support of this *ex parte* application is set out with a view to the provisions and application of s. 9 of the *CCAA* dealing, as it does, with the subject headed "Jurisdiction of court to receive applications".

11 Section 9(1) of the CCAA provides:

9.(1) Any application under this Act may be made to the court that has jurisdiction in the province within which the head office or chief place of business of the company in Canada is situated, or, if the company has no place of business in Canada, in any province within which any assets of the company are situated. [Emphasis added]

12 The material makes it abundantly clear that the head office of LOMI is in Winnipeg, Manitoba as mandated by its incorporating legislation. Nothing in the affidavit materials filed suggests otherwise. It is also clear that most of the assets (if not all of the assets) tangible and intangible of LOMI are located in Winnipeg or administered out of the offices of LOMI in Winnipeg, Manitoba. It is equally clear that the existing members of LOMI, including retired members who have a very real interest in and will be very much affected by this application (and for whose benefit it may well be taken) all, or for the most part, reside in Manitoba. The materials filed depose to no assets being located in Saskatchewan, no members presently being or operating in Saskatchewan, nor to any of LOMI's members being actively engaged in the pursuit of its "business" as broadly defined by s. 2(1) of the *Les Oblats De Marie Immaculée Du Manitoba Incorporation Act* in this province. If it is otherwise, the materials do not reveal it.

13 The proper interpretation and application of s. 9 of the *CCAA* was considered in the case of *Royal Bank v. Perfection Foods Ltd.* (1991), 90 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 302 (P.E.I. T.D.). At p. 311 MacDonald C.J.T.D. observes in part as follows at para. 44:

[44] In my opinion, the "head office" of the companies means its registered head office. The situation here is identical to the facts in *Re Smith Transportation Co. Ltd.*, [1928] 2 D.L.R. 508, 10 C.B.R. 48, 62 O.L.R. 203. As to a company's "chief place of business", I was not cited any cases where this term has been explored. Determining a chief place of business is a question of fact and those facts concerning the companies and the businesses they conduct must be considered. The number of employees, the goods being sold, the length of time each aspect of the business has been carried on and the location where that has been done, the income and expenses of the company and its allocation between different aspects of the company are, I am sure, a few of the considerations to be dealt with.

At paras. 45 and 46 he observes and concludes as follows:

[45] The respondents have stated that because the C. C.A.A. is a federal statue weight must be given to making orders applicable on a wider basis than that of a single province. I do not give weight to that submission for the reason that s. 9 of the *Act* makes it clear that provincial jurisdiction is of prime importance.

[46] It is for the respondents to establish that the sought after order under the *C.C.A.A.* is within jurisdiction. I do not believe that they have laid before me sufficient facts to establish that the affected companies come within the jurisdiction of this province....

14 The judgment of Macdonald C.J.T.D. was appealed (1994), 29 C.B.R. (3d) 137 (P.E.I. C.A.). for circumstances and upon grounds unrelated to the present issue before the Court.

Accordingly, in view of the plain and ordinary meaning and interpretation of s. 9 of the *CCAA*, I have concluded that this Court in Saskatchewan is without jurisdiction to issue the orders applied for. Based upon the materials presently before this Court, it appears clear that this application, or any other made under the *CCAA*, must appropriately be made to the Court of Queen's Bench in Manitoba. The application must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Application dismissed.

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TAB 20

2012 ONSC 2063 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Sino-Forest Corp., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 4117, 2012 ONSC 2063, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 831

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Sino-Forest Corporation, Applicant

Morawetz J.

Heard: March 30, 2012 Judgment: April 2, 2012 Docket: CV-12-9667-00CL

Counsel: Robert W. Staley, Kevin Zych, Derek J. Bell, Jonathan Bell, for Applicant E.A. Sellers, for Sino Forest Corporation Board of Directors Derrick Tay, Jennifer Stam, for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. R. J. Chadwick, B. O'Neill, C. Descours, for Ad Hoc Noteholders M. Starnino, for Counsel in the Ontario Class Action P. Griffin, for Ernst & Young Jim Grout, Hugh Craig, for Ontario Securities Commission Scott Bomhof, for Credit Suisse, TD and the Underwriter Defendants in the Canadian Class Action Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial **Table of Authorities** Cases considered by Morawetz J.: ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 45 B.L.R. (4th) 201, 2008 CarswellOnt 2652, 42 C.B.R. (5th) 90 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) referred to Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - referred to Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) - referred to Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 338 N.R. 196 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201 (S.C.C.) - referred to **Statutes considered:** Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1982 Chapter 15 — referred to Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16 Generally - referred to Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 Generally — referred to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to s. 2(1) "debtor company" — referred to

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

2012 ONSC 2063, 2012 CarswellOnt 4117, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 831

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered

Morawetz J.:

Overview

1 The Applicant, Sino-Forest Corporation ("SFC"), moves for an Initial Order and Sale Process Order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA").

2 The factual basis for the application is set out in the affidavit of Mr. W. Judson Martin, sworn March 30, 2012. Additional detail has been provided in a pre-filing report provided by the proposed monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. ("FTI").

3 Counsel to SFC advise that, after extensive arm's-length negotiations, SFC has entered into a Support Agreement with a substantial number of its Noteholders, which requires SFC to pursue a CCAA plan as well as a Sale Process.

4 Counsel to SFC advises that the restructuring transactions contemplated by this proceeding are intended to:

(a) separate Sino-Forest's business operations from the problems facing SFC outside the People's Republic of China ("PRC") by transferring the intermediate holding companies that own the "business" and SFC's inter-company claims against its subsidiaries to a newly formed company owned primarily by the Noteholders in compromise of their claims;

(b) effect a Sale Process to determine whether anyone will purchase SFC's business operations for an amount of consideration acceptable to SFC and its Noteholders, with potential excess being made available to Junior Constituents;

(c) create a structure that will enable litigation claims to be pursued for the benefit of SFC's stakeholders; and

(d) allow Junior Constituents some "upside" in the form of a profit participation if Sino-Forest's business operations acquired by the Noteholders are monetized at a profit within seven years from Plan implementation.

5 The relief sought by SFC in this application includes:

(i) a stay of proceedings against SFC, its current or former directors or officers, any of SFC's property, and in respect of certain of SFC's subsidiaries with respect to the note indentures issued by SFC;

(ii) the granting of a Directors' Charge and Administration Charge on certain of SFC's property;

(iii) the approval of the engagement letter of SFC's financial advisor, Houlihan Lokey;

(iv) the relieving of SFC of any obligation to call and hold an annual meeting of shareholders until further order of this court; and

(v) the approval of sales process procedures.

Facts

6 SFC was formed under the *Business Corporations Act (Ontario)*, R.S.O. 1990, c. B-16, and in 2002 filed articles of continuance under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44 ("CBCA").

7 Since 1995, SFC has been a publicly-listed company on the TSX. SFC's registered office is in Mississauga, Ontario, and its principal executive office is in Hong Kong.

8 A total of 137 entities make up the Sino-Forest Companies: 67 PRC incorporated entities (with 12 branch companies), 58 BVI incorporated entities, 7 Hong Kong incorporated entities, 2 Canadian entities and 3 entities incorporated in other jurisdictions.

9 SFC currently has three employees. Collectively, the Sino-Forest Companies employ a total of approximately 3,553 employees, with approximately 3,460 located in the PRC and approximately 90 located in Hong Kong.

10 Sino-Forest is a publicly-listed major integrated forest plantation operator and forest productions company, with assets predominantly in the PRC. Its principal businesses include the sale of standing timber and wood logs, the ownership and management of forest plantation trees, and the complementary manufacturing of downstream engineered-wood products.

11 Substantially all of Sino-Forest's sales are generated in the PRC.

12 On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters LLC published a report (the "MW Report") which, according to submissions made by SFC, alleged, among other things, that SFC is a "near total fraud" and a "ponzi scheme".

13 On the same day that the MW Report was released, the board of directors of SFC appointed an independent committee to investigate the allegations set out in the MW Report.

14 In addition, investigations have been launched by the Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC"), the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commissions ("HKSFC") and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("RCMP").

15 On August 26, 2011, the OSC issued a cease trade order with respect to the securities of SFC and with respect to certain senior management personnel. With the consent of SFC, the cease trade order was extended by subsequent orders of the OSC.

16 SFC and certain of its officers, directors and employees, along with SFC's current and former auditors, technical consultants and various underwriters involved in prior equity and debt offerings, have been named as defendants in eight class action lawsuits in Canada. Additionally, a class action was commenced against SFC and other defendants in the State of New York.

17 The affidavit of Mr. Martin also points out that circumstances are such that SFC has not been able to release Q3 2011 results and these circumstances could also impact SFC's historical financial statements and its ability to obtain an audit for its 2011 fiscal year. On January 10, 2012, SFC cautioned that its historic financial statements and related audit reports should not be relied upon.

18 SFC has issued four series of notes (two senior notes and two convertible notes), with a combined principal amount of approximately \$1.8 billion, which remain outstanding and mature at various times between 2013 and 2017. The notes are supported by various guarantees from subsidiaries of SFC, and some are also supported by share pledges from certain of SFC's subsidiaries.

19 Mr. Martin has acknowledged that SFC's failure to file the Q3 results constitutes a default under the note indentures.

20 On January 12, 2012, SFC announced that holders of a majority in principal amount of SFC's senior notes due 2014 and its senior notes due 2017 agreed to waive the default arising from SFC's failure to release the Q3 results on a timely basis.

21 The waiver agreements expire on the earlier of April 30, 2012 and any earlier termination of the waiver agreements in accordance with their terms. In addition, should SFC fail to file its audited financial statements for its fiscal year ended December 31, 2011 by March 30, 2012, the indenture trustees would be in a position to accelerate and enforce the approximately \$1.8 billion in notes. 22 The audited financial statements for the fiscal year that ended on December 31, 2011 have not yet been filed.

23 Mr. Martin also deposes that, although the allegations in the MW Report have not been substantiated, the allegations have had a catastrophic negative impact on Sino-Forest's business activities and there has been a material decline in the market value of SFC's common shares and notes. Further, credit ratings were lowered and ultimately withdrawn.

Mr. Martin contends that the various investigations and class action lawsuits have required, and will continue to require, that significant resources be expended by directors, officers and employees of Sino-Forest. This has also affected Sino-Forest's ability to conduct its operations in the normal course of business and the business has effectively been frozen and ground to a halt. In addition, SFC has been unable to secure or renew certain existing onshore banking facilities and has been unable to obtain offshore letters of credit to facilitate its trading business. Further, relationships with the PRC government, local government, and suppliers have become strained, making it increasingly difficult to conduct any business operations.

As noted above, following arm's-length negotiations between SFC and the Ad Hoc Noteholders, the parties entered into a Support Agreement which provides that SFC will pursue a CCAA plan on the terms set out in the Support Agreement in order to implement the agreed upon restructuring transaction.

Application of the CCAA

26 SFC is a corporation continued under the CBCA and is a "company" as defined in the CCAA.

27 SFC also takes the position that it is a "debtor company" within the meaning of the CCAA. A "debtor company" includes a company that is insolvent.

The issued and outstanding convertible and senior notes of SFC total approximately \$1.8 billion. The waiver agreements with respect to SFC's defaults under the senior notes expire on April 30, 2012. Mr. Martin contends that, but for the Support Agreement, which requires SFC to pursue a CCAA plan, the indenture trustees under the notes would be entitled to accelerate and enforce the rights of the Noteholders as soon as April 30, 2012. As such, SFC contends that it is insolvent as it is "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within a reasonable proximity of time" and would be unable to meet its obligations as they come due or continue as a going concern. See *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 26; leave to appeal to C.A. refused [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.); and *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, [2008] O.J. No. 1818 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 12 and 32.

29 For the purposes of this application, I accept that SFC is a "debtor company" within the meaning of the CCAA and is insolvent; and, as a CBCA company that is insolvent with debts in excess of \$5 million, SFC meets the statutory requirements for relief under the CCAA.

30 The required financial information, including cash-flow information, has been filed.

31 I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant SFC relief under the CCAA and to provide for a stay of proceedings. FTI Consulting Canada, Inc., having filed its Consent to act, is appointed Monitor.

The Administration Charge

32 SFC has also requested an Administration Charge. Section 11.52 of the CCAA provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant an Administration Charge in respect of the fees and expenses of FTI and other professionals.

I am satisfied that, in the circumstances of this case, an Administration Charge in the requested amount is appropriate. In making this determination I have taken into account the complexity of the business, the proposed role

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of the beneficiaries of the charge, whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable, the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge and the position of FTI.

In this case, FTI supports the Administration Charge. Further, it is noted that the Administration Charge does not seek a super priority charge ranking ahead of the secured creditors.

The Directors' Charge

35 SFC also requests a Directors' Charge. Section 11.51 of the CCAA provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant a charge in favour of any director to indemnify the director against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director of the company after commencement of the CCAA proceedings.

³⁶ Having reviewed the record, I am satisfied that the Directors' Charge in the requested amount is appropriate and necessary. In making this determination, I have taken into account that the continued participation of directors is desirable and, in this particular case, absent the Directors' Charge, the directors have indicated they will not continue in their participation in the restructuring of SFC. I am also satisfied that the insurance policies currently in place contain exclusions and limitations of coverage which could leave SFC's directors without coverage in certain circumstances.

In addition, the Directors' Charge is intended to rank behind the Administration Charge. Further, FTI supports the Directors' Charge and the Directors' Charge does not seek a super priority charge ranking ahead of secured creditors.

38 Based on the above, I am satisfied that the Directors' Charge is fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

The Sale Process

39 SFC has also requested approval for the Sale Process.

40 The CCAA is to be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and to facilitate the restructuring of an insolvent company. It has been held that a sale by a debtor, which preserves its businesses as a going concern, is consistent with these objectives, and the court has the jurisdiction to authorize such a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan. See *Nortel Networks Corp.*, *Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 47-48.

41 The following questions may be considered when determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan (See *Nortel Networks Corp., Re, supra* at para. 49):

- (i) Is the sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (ii) Will the sale benefit the "whole economic community"?
- (iii) Do any of the debtors' creditors have a bone fide reason to object to the sale of the business?
- (iv) Is there a better alternative?

42 Counsel submits that as a result of the uncertainty surrounding SFC, it is impossible to know what an interested third party might be willing to pay for the underlying business operations of SFC once they are separated from the problems facing SFC outside the PRC. Counsel further contends that it is only by running the Sale Process that SFC and the court can determine whether there is an interested party that would be willing to purchase SFC's business operations for an amount of consideration that is acceptable to SFC and its Noteholders while also making excess funds available to Junior Constituents.

43 Based on a review of the record, the comments of FTI, and the support levels being provided by the Ad Hoc Noteholders Committee, I am satisfied that the aforementioned factors, when considered in the circumstances of this case, justify the approval of the Sale Process at this point in time.

Ancillary Relief

I am also of the view that it is impractical for SFC to call and hold its annual general meeting at this time and, therefore, I am of the view that it is appropriate to grant an order relieving SFC of this obligation.

45 SFC seeks to have FTI authorized, as a formal representative of SFC, to apply for recognition of these proceedings, as necessary, in any jurisdiction outside of Canada, including as "foreign main proceedings" in the United States pursuant to Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Counsel contends that such an order is necessary to facilitate the restructuring as, among other things, SFC faces class action lawsuits in New York, the notes are governed by New York law, the indenture trustees are located in New York and certain of the SFC subsidiaries may face proceedings in foreign jurisdictions in respect of certain notes issued by SFC. In my view, this relief is appropriate and is granted.

46 SFC also requests an order approving:

- (i) the Financial Advisor Agreement; and
- (ii) Houlihan Lokey's retention by SFC under the terms of the agreement.

47 Both SFC and FTI believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration provided for in the Financial Advisor Agreement is fair and reasonable and that an order approving the Financial Advisor Agreement is appropriate and essential to a successful restructuring of SFC. This request has the support of parties appearing today and, in my view, is appropriate in the circumstances and is therefore granted.

Disposition

48 Accordingly, the relief requested by SFC is granted and orders shall issue substantially in the form of the Initial Order and the Sale Process Order included the Application Record.

Miscellaneous

49 SFC has confirmed that it is bound by the Support Agreement and intends to comply with it.

50 The come-back hearing is scheduled for Friday, April 13, 2012. The orders granted today contain a come-back clause. The orders were made on extremely short notice and for all practical purposes are to be treated as being made *ex parte*.

51 The scheduling of future hearings in this matter shall be coordinated through counsel to the Monitor and the Commercial List Office.

52 Finally, it would be helpful if counsel could also file materials on a USB key in addition to a paper record.

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TAB 21

2004 CarswellOnt 1211 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Stelco Inc., Re

2004 CarswellOnt 1211, [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [2004] O.T.C. 284, 129 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1065, 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO STELCO INC. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Farley J.

Heard: March 5, 2004 Judgment: March 22, 2004 Docket: 04-CL-5306

Counsel: Michael E. Barrack, James D. Gage, Geoff R. Hall for Applicants David Jacobs, Michael McCreary for Locals, 1005, 5328, 8782 of the United Steel Workers of America Ken Rosenberg, Lily Harmer, Rob Centa for United Steelworkers of America Bob Thornton, Kyla Mahar for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor of the Applicants Kevin J. Zych for Informal Committee of Stelco Bondholders David R. Byers for CIT Kevin McElcheran for GE Murray Gold, Andrew Hatnay for Retired Salaried Beneficiaries Lewis Gottheil for CAW Canada and its Local 523 Virginie Gauthier for Fleet H. Whiteley for CIBC Gail Rubenstein for FSCO Kenneth D. Kraft for EDS Canada Inc. Subject: Insolvency **Table of Authorities** Cases considered by Farley J.: A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), Re (1993), [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) — considered Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2254, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) - considered Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd. (1996), [1997] 1 W.W.R. 209, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 33, 148 Sask. R. 135, 134 W.A.C. 135, 6 C.P.C. (4th) 90, 1996 CarswellSask 581 (Sask. C.A.) - considered Barsi v. Farcas (1923), [1924] 1 W.W.R. 707, 2 C.B.R. 299, 18 Sask. L.R. 158, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154, 1923 CarswellSask 227 (Sask. C.A.) - referred to Bell Express Vu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex (2002), 2002 SCC 42, 2002 CarswellBC 851, 2002 CarswellBC 852, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 5 W.W.R. 1, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 287 N.R. 248, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 289, 166 B.C.A.C. 1, 271 W.A.C. 1, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) — considered Challmie, Re (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78, 1976 CarswellBC 63 (B.C. S.C.) - considered Clarkson v. Sterling (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Ont. C.P.) — considered

Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re (1986), 69 B.C.L.R. 273, 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156, 1986 CarswellBC 481 (B.C. S.C.) -- considered

Cumberland Trading Inc., Re (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225, 1994 CarswellOnt 255 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Davidson v. Douglas (1868), 15 Gr. 347, 1868 CarswellOnt 167 (Ont. Ch.) - considered

Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of) (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133, 1991 CarswellOnt 168 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp. (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 2213, 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Gagnier, Re (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74, 1950 CarswellOnt 101 (Ont. S.C.) - considered

Gardner v. Newton (1916), 10 W.W.R. 51, 26 Man. R. 251, 29 D.L.R. 276, 1916 CarswellMan 83 (Man. K.B.) — considered

Inducon Development Corp., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306, 1991 CarswellOnt 219 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered Kenwood Hills Development Inc., Re (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44, 1995 CarswellOnt 38 (Ont. Bktcy.) — considered King Petroleum Ltd., Re (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76, 1978 CarswellOnt 197 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Provisioners Maritimes Ltd. (1989), 92 N.S.R. (2d) 283, 75 C.B.R. (N.S.) 317, 45 B.L.R. 14, 237 A.P.R. 283, 1989 CarswellNS 27 (N.S. T.D.) — considered

Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd. (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14, (sub nom. Timber Lodge Ltd. v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada (No. 1)) 101 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 73, (sub nom. Timber Lodge Ltd. v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada (No. 1)) 321 A.P.R. 73, 1992 CarswellPEI 13 (P.E.I. C.A.) — referred to

MTM Electric Co., Re (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29, 1982 CarswellOnt 170 (Ont. Bktcy.) — considered

New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 93, 1993 CarswellOnt 173 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1990 CarswellOnt 139 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp. (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 2954, 16 B.L.R. (3d) 74, 28 C.B.R. (4th) 294 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

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Optical Recording Laboratories Inc., Re (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 64, 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747, 42 O.A.C. 321, (sub nom. *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc. v. Digital Recording Corp.*) 1 O.R. (3d) 131, 1990 CarswellOnt 143 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Pacific Mobile Corp., Re (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209, 1979 CarswellQue 76 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc. (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 49 C.P.R. (3d) 456, 64 O.A.C. 274, 15 O.R. (3d) 730, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 109, 1993 CarswellOnt 149 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc. (1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) ix, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 244 (note), 104 D.L.R. (4th) vii, 68 O.A.C. 21 (note), 164 N.R. 78 (note), 16 O.R. (3d) xvi (S.C.C.) — referred to

R. v. Proulx (2000), [2000] 4 W.W.R. 21, 2000 SCC 5, 2000 CarswellMan 32, 2000 CarswellMan 33, 140 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 30 C.R. (5th) 1, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 249 N.R. 201, 49 M.V.R. (3d) 163, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, 142 Man. R. (2d) 161, 212 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 1991 CarswellOnt 220 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co. (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7, 21 C.B.R. (3d) 25, 1993 CarswellOnt 219 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

TDM Software Systems Inc., Re (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92, 1986 CarswellOnt 203 (Ont. S.C.) — referred to *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157, 1986 CarswellBC 499 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

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Webb v. Stenton (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 (Eng. C.A.) - referred to
    633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72, 73 O.R. (2d) 774, 1990 CarswellOnt 181
    (Ont. S.C.) - considered
Statutes considered:
Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-3
    Generally - referred to
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
    Generally - referred to
    s. 2(1) "insolvent person" — referred to
    s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (a) — considered
    s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (b) — considered
    s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (c) — considered
    s. 43(7) — referred to
    s. 121(1) — referred to
    s. 121(2) — referred to
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
    Generally - referred to
    s. 2 "debtor company" --- referred to
    s. 2 "debtor company" (a) - considered
    s. 2 "debtor company" (b) — considered
    s. 2 "debtor company" (c) - considered
    s. 2 "debtor company" (d) — considered
    s. 12 - referred to
    s. 12(1) "claim" — referred to
Winding-up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11
    Generally - referred to
Words and phrases considered:
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debtor company

It seems to me that the [Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36] test of insolvency ... which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the [Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3] definition of [s. 2(1)] (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring.

MOTION by union that steel company was not "debtor company" as defined in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

Farley J.:

1 As argued this motion by Locals 1005, 5328 and 8782 United Steel Workers of America (collectively "Union") to rescind the initial order and dismiss the application of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") and various of its subsidiaries (collectively "Sub Applicants") for access to the protection and process of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") was that this access should be denied on the basis that Stelco was not a "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA because it was not insolvent.

2 Allow me to observe that there was a great deal of debate in the materials and submissions as to the reason(s) that Stelco found itself in with respect to what Michael Locker (indicating he was "an expert in the area of corporate restructuring and a leading steel industry analyst") swore to at paragraph 12 of his affidavit was the "current crisis":

12. Contending with weak operating results and resulting tight cash flow, management has deliberately chosen not to fund its employee benefits. By contrast, Dofasco and certain other steel companies have consistently funded both their employee benefit obligations as well as debt service. If Stelco's management had chosen to fund pension obligations, presumably with borrowed money, *the current crisis* and related restructuring plans would focus on debt restructuring as opposed to the reduction of employee benefits and related liabilities. [Emphasis added.]

3 For the purpose of determining whether Stelco is insolvent and therefore could be considered to be a debtor company, it matters not what the cause or who caused the financial difficulty that Stelco is in as admitted by Locker on behalf of the Union. The management of a corporation could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the corporation could be in the grip of ruthless, hard hearted and hard nosed outside financiers; the corporation could be the innocent victim of uncaring policy of a level of government; the employees (unionized or non-unionized) could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the relationship of labour and management could be absolutely poisonous; the corporation could be the victim of unforeseen events affecting its viability such a as a fire destroying an essential area of its plant and equipment or of rampaging dumping. One or more or all of these factors (without being exhaustive), whether or not of varying degree and whether or not in combination of some may well have been the cause of a corporation's difficulty. The point here is that Stelco's difficulty exists; the only question is whether Stelco is insolvent within the meaning of that in the "debtor company" definition of the CCAA. However, I would point out, as I did in closing, that no matter how this motion turns out, Stelco does have a problem which has to be addressed addressed within the CCAA process if Stelco is insolvent or addressed outside that process if Stelco is determined not to be insolvent. The status quo will lead to ruination of Stelco (and its Sub Applicants) and as a result will very badly affect its stakeholder, including pensioners, employees (unionized and non-unionized), management, creditors, suppliers, customers, local and other governments and the local communities. In such situations, time is a precious commodity; it cannot be wasted; no matter how much some would like to take time outs, the clock cannot be stopped. The watchwords of the Commercial List are equally applicable in such circumstances. They are communication, cooperation and common sense. I appreciate that these cases frequently invoke emotions running high and wild; that is understandable on a human basis but it is the considered, rational approach which will solve the problem.

4 The time to determine whether a corporation is insolvent for the purpose of it being a "debtor company" and thus able to make an application to proceed under the CCAA is the date of filing, in this case January 29, 2004.

5 The Monitor did not file a report as to this question of insolvency as it properly advised that it wished to take a neutral role. I understand however, that it did provide some assistance in the preparation of Exhibit C to Hap Steven's affidavit.

6 If I determine in this motion that Stelco is not insolvent, then the initial order would be set aside. See *Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14 (P.E.I. C.A.). The onus is on Stelco as I indicated in my January 29, 2004 endorsement.

7 S. 2 of the CCAA defines "debtor company" as:

"debtor company" means any company that:

(a) is bankrupt or insolvent;

(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ["BIA"] or deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;

(c) has made an authorized assignment against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or

(d) is in the course of being wound-up under the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act* because the company is insolvent.

8 Counsel for the Existing Stelco Lenders and the DIP Lenders posited that Stelco would be able to qualify under (b) in light of the fact that as of January 29, 2004 whether or not it was entitled to receive the CCAA protection under (a) as being insolvent, it had ceased to pay its pre-filing debts. I would merely observe as I did at the time of the hearing that I do not find this argument attractive in the least. The most that could be said for that is that such game playing would be ill advised and in my view would not be rewarded by the exercise of judicial discretion to allow such an applicant the benefit of a CCAA stay and other advantages of the procedure for if it were capriciously done where there is not reasonable need, then such ought not to be granted. However, I would point out that if a corporation did capriciously do so, then one might well expect a creditor-initiated application so as to take control of the process (including likely the ouster of management including directors who authorized such unnecessary stoppage); in such a case, while the corporation would not likely be successful in a corporation application, it is likely that a creditor application would find favour of judicial discretion.

9 This judicial discretion would be exercised in the same way generally as is the case where s. 43(7) of the BIA comes into play whereby a bankruptcy receiving order which otherwise meets the test may be refused. See *Kenwood Hills Development Inc., Re* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44 (Ont. Bktcy.) where at p. 45 I observed:

The discretion must be exercised judicially based on credible evidence; it should be used according to common sense and justice and in a manner which does not result in an injustice: See *Re Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd.* (1971), 16 C.B.R. (NS) 158 (Man. Q.B.).

10 Anderson J. in *MTM Electric Co., Re* (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29 (Ont. Bktcy.) at p. 30 declined to grant a bankruptcy receiving order for the eminently good sense reason that it would be counterproductive: "Having regard for the value of the enterprise and having regard to the evidence before me, I think it far from clear that a receiving order would confer a benefit on anyone." This common sense approach to the judicial exercise of discretion may be contrasted by the rather more puzzling approach in *TDM Software Systems Inc., Re* (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92 (Ont. S.C.).

11 The Union, supported by the International United Steel Workers of America ("International"), indicated that if certain of the obligations of Stelco were taken into account in the determination of insolvency, then a very good number of large Canadian corporations would be able to make an application under the CCAA. I am of the view that this concern can be addressed as follows. The test of insolvency is to be determined on its own merits, not on the basis that an otherwise technically insolvent corporation should not be allowed to apply. However, if a technically insolvent corporation were to apply and there was no material advantage to the corporation and its stakeholders (in other words, a pressing need to restructure), then one would expect that the court's discretion would be judicially exercised against granting CCAA protection and ancillary relief. In the case of Stelco, it is recognized, as discussed above, that it is in crisis and in need of restructuring - which restructuring, if it is insolvent, would be best accomplished within a CCAA proceeding. Further, I am of the view that the track record of CCAA proceedings in this country demonstrates a healthy respect for the fundamental concerns of interested parties and stakeholders. I have consistently observed that much more can be achieved by negotiations outside the courtroom where there is a reasonable exchange of information, views and the exploration of possible solutions and negotiations held on a without prejudice basis than likely can be achieved by

resorting to the legal combative atmosphere of the courtroom. A mutual problem requires a mutual solution. The basic interest of the CCAA is to rehabilitate insolvent corporations for the benefit of all stakeholders. To do this, the cause(s) of the insolvency must be fixed on a long term viable basis so that the corporation may be turned around. It is not achieved by positional bargaining in a tug of war between two parties, each trying for a larger slice of a defined size pie; it may be achieved by taking steps involving shorter term equitable sacrifices and implementing sensible approaches to improve productivity to ensure that the pie grows sufficiently for the long term to accommodate the reasonable needs of the parties.

12 It appears that it is a given that the Sub Applicants are in fact insolvent. The question then is whether Stelco is insolvent.

13 There was a question as to whether Stelco should be restricted to the material in its application as presented to the Court on January 29, 2004. I would observe that CCAA proceedings are not in the nature of the traditional adversarial lawsuit usually found in our courtrooms. It seems to me that it would be doing a disservice to the interest of the CCAA to artificially keep the Court in the dark on such a question. Presumably an otherwise deserving "debtor company" would not be allowed access to a continuing CCAA proceeding that it would be entitled to merely because some potential evidence were excluded for traditional adversarial technical reasons. I would point out that in such a case, there would be no prohibition against such a corporation reapplying (with the additional material) subsequently. In such a case, what would be the advantage for anyone of a "pause" before being able to proceed under the rehabilitative process under the CCAA. On a practical basis, I would note that all too often corporations will wait too long before applying, at least this was a significant problem in the early 1990s. In *Inducon Development Corp., Re* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.), I observed:

Secondly, CCAA is designed to be remedial; it is not, however, designed to be preventative. CCAA should not be the *last* gasp of a dying company; it should be implemented, if it is to be implemented, at a stage prior to the death throe.

14 It seems to me that the phrase "death throe" could be reasonably replaced with "death spiral". In *Cumberland Trading Inc., Re* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), I went on to expand on this at p. 228:

I would also observe that all too frequently debtors wait until virtually the last moment, the last moment, or in some cases, beyond the last moment before even beginning to think about reorganizational (and the attendant support that any successful reorganization requires from the creditors). I noted the lamentable tendency of debtors to deal with these situations as "last gasp" desperation moves in *Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 308 (Ont. Gen. Div.). To deal with matters on this basis minimizes the chances of success, even if "success" may have been available with earlier spade work.

I have not been able to find in the CCAA reported cases any instance where there has been an objection to a corporation availing itself of the facilities of the CCAA on the basis of whether the corporation was insolvent. Indeed, as indicated above, the major concern here has been that an applicant leaves it so late that the timetable of necessary steps may get impossibly compressed. That is not to say that there have not been objections by parties opposing the application on various other grounds. Prior to the 1992 amendments, there had to be debentures (plural) issued pursuant to a trust deed; I recall that in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), the initial application was rejected in the morning because there had only been one debenture issued but another one was issued prior to the return to court that afternoon. This case stands for the general proposition that the CCAA should be given a large and liberal interpretation. I should note that there was in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp.* (1999), 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) a determination that in a creditor application, the corporation was found not to be insolvent, but see below as to BIA test (c) my views as to the correctness of this decision.

16 In Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) I observed at p. 32:

One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors.

17 In Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), the court stated to the same effect:

The second submission is that the plan is contrary to the purposes of the CCAA. Courts have recognized that the purpose of the CCAA is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and the company and to keep the company alive and out of the hands of liquidators.

18 Encompassed in this is the concept of saving employment if a restructuring will result in a viable enterprise. See *Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of)* (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133 (Ont. Gen. Div.). This concept has been a continuing thread in CCAA cases in this jurisdiction stretching back for at least the past 15 years, if not before.

19 I would also note that the jurisprudence and practical application of the bankruptcy and insolvency regime in place in Canada has been constantly evolving. The early jails of what became Canada were populated to the extent of almost half their capacity by bankrupts. Rehabilitation and a fresh start for the honest but unfortunate debtor came afterwards. Most recently, the Bankruptcy Act was revised to the BIA in 1992 to better facilitate the rehabilitative aspect of making a proposal to creditors. At the same time, the CCAA was amended to eliminate the threshold criterion of there having to be debentures issued under a trust deed (this concept was embodied in the CCAA upon its enactment in 1933 with a view that it would only be large companies with public issues of debt securities which could apply). The size restriction was continued as there was now a threshold criterion of at least \$5 million of claims against the applicant. While this restriction may appear discriminatory, it does have the practical advantage of taking into account that the costs (administrative costs including professional fees to the applicant, and indeed to the other parties who retain professionals) is a significant amount, even when viewed from the perspective of \$5 million. These costs would be prohibitive in a smaller situation. Parliament was mindful of the time horizons involved in proposals under BIA where the maximum length of a proceeding including a stay is six months (including all possible extensions) whereas under CCAA, the length is in the discretion of the court judicially exercised in accordance with the facts and the circumstances of the case. Certainly sooner is better than later. However, it is fair to observe that virtually all CCAA cases which proceed go on for over six months and those with complexity frequently exceed a year.

20 Restructurings are not now limited in practical terms to corporations merely compromising their debts with their creditors in a balance sheet exercise. Rather there has been quite an emphasis recently on operational restructuring as well so that the emerging company will have the benefit of a long term viable fix, all for the benefit of stakeholders. See *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 314 where Borins J. states:

The proposed plan exemplifies the policy and objectives of the Act as it proposes a regime for the court-supervised reorganization for the Applicant company intended to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a creditorinitiated termination of its ongoing business operations and enabling the company to carry on its business in a manner in which it is intended to cause the least possible harm to the company, its creditors, its employees and former employees and the communities in which its carries on and carried on its business operations.

21 The CCAA does not define "insolvent" or "insolvency". Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2004 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto, Carswell; 2003) at p. 1107 (N5) states:

In interpreting "debtor company", reference must be had to the definition of "insolvent person" in s. 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*...

To be able to use the Act, a company must be bankrupt or insolvent: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75. The company must, in its application, admit its insolvency.

It appears to have become fairly common practice for applicants and others when reference is made to insolvency in the context of the CCAA to refer to the definition of "insolvent person" in the BIA. That definition is as follows:

s. 2(1) . . .

"insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, and whose liability to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and

(a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,

(b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or

(c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

23 Stelco acknowledges that it does not meet the test of (b); however, it does assert that it meets the test of both (a) and (c). In addition, however, Stelco also indicates that since the CCAA does not have a reference over to the BIA in relation to the (a) definition of "debtor company" as being a company that is "(a) bankrupt or insolvent", then this term of "insolvent" should be given the meaning that the overall context of the CCAA requires. See the modern rule of statutory interpretation which directs the court to take a contextual and purposive approach to the language of the provision at issue as illustrated by *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) at p. 580:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

I note in particular that the (b), (c) and (d) aspects of the definition of "debtor company" all refer to other statutes, 24 including the BIA; (a) does not. S. 12 of the CCAA defines "claims" with reference over to the BIA (and otherwise refers to the BIA and the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act). It seems to me that there is merit in considering that the test for insolvency under the CCAA may differ somewhat from that under the BIA, so as to meet the special circumstances of the CCAA and those corporations which would apply under it. In that respect, I am mindful of the above discussion regarding the time that is usually and necessarily (in the circumstances) taken in a CCAA reorganization restructuring which is engaged in coming up with a plan of compromise and arrangement. The BIA definition would appear to have been historically focussed on the question of bankruptcy - and not reorganization of a corporation under a proposal since before 1992, secured creditors could not be forced to compromise their claims, so that in practice there were no reorganizations under the former *Bankruptcy Act* unless all secured creditors voluntarily agreed to have their secured claims compromised. The BIA definition then was essentially useful for being a pre-condition to the "end" situation of a bankruptcy petition or voluntary receiving order where the upshot would be a realization on the bankrupt's assets (not likely involving the business carried on - and certainly not by the bankrupt). Insolvency under the BIA is also important as to the Paulian action events (eg., fraudulent preferences, settlements) as to the conduct of the debtor prior to the bankruptcy; similarly as to the question of provincial preference legislation. Reorganization under a plan or proposal, on the contrary, is with a general objective of the applicant continuing to exist, albeit that the CCAA may also be used to have an orderly disposition of the assets and undertaking in whole or in part.

It seems to me that given the time and steps involved in a reorganization, and the condition of insolvency perforce requires an expanded meaning under the CCAA. Query whether the definition under the BIA is now sufficient in that light for the allowance of sufficient time to carry through with a realistically viable proposal within the maximum of six months allowed under the BIA? I think it sufficient to note that there would not be much sense in providing for a rehabilitation program of restructuring/reorganization under either statute if the entry test was that the applicant

could not apply until a rather late stage of its financial difficulties with the rather automatic result that in situations of complexity of any material degree, the applicant would not have the financial resources sufficient to carry through to hopefully a successful end. This would indeed be contrary to the renewed emphasis of Parliament on "rescues" as exhibited by the 1992 and 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA.

Allow me now to examine whether Stelco has been successful in meeting the onus of demonstrating with credible evidence on a common sense basis that it is insolvent within the meaning required by the CCAA in regard to the interpretation of "debtor company" in the context and within the purpose of that legislation. To a similar effect, see *PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc.* (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [(1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) ix (S.C.C.)] wherein it was determined that the trial judge was correct in holding that a party was not insolvent and that the statutory definition of insolvency pursuant to the BIA definition was irrelevant to determine that issue, since the agreement in question effectively provided its own definition by implication. It seems to me that the CCAA test of insolvency advocated by Stelco and which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the BIA definition of (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring. That is, there should be a reasonable cushion, which cushion may be adjusted and indeed become in effect an encroachment depending upon reasonable access to DIP between financing. In the present case, Stelco accepts the view of the Union's affiant, Michael Mackey of Deloitte and Touche that it will otherwise run out of funding by November 2004.

On that basis, allow me to determine whether Stelco is insolvent on the basis of (i) what I would refer to as the CCAA test as described immediately above, (ii) BIA test (a) or (iii) BIA test (c). In doing so, I will have to take into account the fact that Stephen, albeit a very experienced and skilled person in the field of restructurings under the CCAA, unfortunately did not appreciate that the material which was given to him in Exhibit E to his affidavit was modified by the caveats in the source material that in effect indicated that based on appraisals, the fair value of the real assets acquired was in excess of the purchase price for two of the U.S. comparators. Therefore the evidence as to these comparators is significantly weakened. In addition at Q. 175-177 in his cross examination, Stephen acknowledged that it was reasonable to assume that a purchaser would "take over some liabilities, some pension liabilities and OPEB liabilities, for workers who remain with the plant." The extent of that assumption was not explored; however, I do note that there was acknowledgement on the part of the Union that such an assumption would also have a reciprocal negative effect on the purchase price.

The BIA tests are disjunctive so that anyone meeting any of these tests is determined to be insolvent: see *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc., Re* (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 756; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 161. Thus, if I determine that Stelco is insolvent on *any one* of these tests, then it would be a "debtor company" entitled to apply for protection under the CCAA.

In my view, the Union's position that Stelco is not insolvent under BIA (a) because it has not entirely used up its cash and cash facilities (including its credit line), that is, it is not yet as of January 29, 2004 run out of liquidity conflates inappropriately the (a) test with the (b) test. The Union's view would render the (a) test necessarily as being redundant. See *R. v. Proulx*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.) at p. 85 for the principle that no legislative provision ought to be interpreted in a manner which would "render it mere surplusage." Indeed the plain meaning of the phrase "unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due" requires a construction of test (a) which permits the court to take a purposive assessment of a debtor's ability to meet his future obligations. See *King Petroleum Ltd., Re* (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76 (Ont. S.C.) where Steele J. stated at p. 80:

With respect to cl. (a), it was argued that at the time the disputed payments were made the company was able to meet its obligations as they generally became due because no major debts were in fact due at that time. This was premised on the fact that the moneys owed to Imperial Oil were not due until 10 days after the receipt of the statements and that the statements had not then been received. I am of the opinion that this is not a proper interpretation of cl. (a). *Clause (a) speaks in the present and future tenses and not in the past*. I am of the opinion that the company was an

"insolvent person" within the meaning of cl. (a) because by the very payment-out of the money in question it placed itself in a position that it was unable to meet its obligations as they would generally become due. In other words, it had placed itself in a position that it would not be able to pay the obligations that it knew it had incurred and which it knew would become due in the immediate future. [Emphasis added.]

30 *King Petroleum Ltd.* was a case involving the question in a bankruptcy scenario of whether there was a fraudulent preference during a period when the corporation was insolvent. Under those circumstances, the "immediate future" does not have the same expansive meaning that one would attribute to a time period in a restructuring forward looking situation.

31 Stephen at paragraphs 40-49 addressed the restructuring question in general and its applicability to the Stelco situation. At paragraph 41, he outlined the significant stages as follows:

The process of restructuring under the CCAA entails a number of different stages, the most significant of which are as follows:

- (a) identification of the debtor's stakeholders and their interests;
- (b) arranging for a process of meaningful communication;
- (c) dealing with immediate relationship issues arising from a CCAA filing;
- (d) sharing information about the issues giving rise to the debtor's need to restructure;
- (e) developing restructuring alternatives; and
- (f) building a consensus around a plan of restructuring.

32 I note that January 29, 2004 is just 9-10 months away from November 2004. I accept as correct his conclusion based on his experience (and this is in accord with my own objective experience in large and complicated CCAA proceedings) that Stelco would have the liquidity problem within the time horizon indicated. In that regard, I also think it fair to observe that Stelco realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access further outside funding. To bridge the gap it must rely upon the stay to give it the uplift as to prefiling liabilities (which the Union misinterpreted as a general turnaround in its cash position without taking into account this uplift). As well, the Union was of the view that recent price increases would relieve Stelco's liquidity problems; however, the answers to undertaking in this respect indicated:

With respect to the Business Plan, the average spot market sales price per ton was \$514, and the average contract business sales price per ton was \$599. The Forecast reflects an average spot market sales price per ton of \$575, and average contract business sales price per ton of \$611. The average spot price used in the forecast considers further announced price increases, recognizing, among other things, the timing and the extent such increases are expected to become effective. The benefit of the increase in sales prices from the Business Plan is essentially offset by the substantial increase in production costs, and in particular in raw material costs, primarily scrap and coke, as well as higher working capital levels and a higher loan balance outstanding on the CIT credit facility as of January 2004.

I accept that this is generally a cancel out or wash in all material respects.

I note that \$145 million of cash resources had been used from January 1, 2003 to the date of filing. Use of the credit facility of \$350 million had increased from \$241 million on November 30, 2003 to \$293 million on the date of filing. There must be a reasonable reserve of liquidity to take into account day to day, week to week or month to month variances and also provide for unforeseen circumstances such as the breakdown of a piece of vital equipment which would significantly affect production until remedied. Trade credit had been contracting as a result of appreciation by suppliers of Stelco's financial difficulties. The DIP financing of \$75 million is only available if Stelco is under CCAA protection. I also note

that a shut down as a result of running out of liquidity would be complicated in the case of Stelco and that even if conditions turned around more than reasonably expected, start-up costs would be heavy and quite importantly, there would be a significant erosion of the customer base (reference should be had to the Slater Hamilton plant in this regard). One does not liquidate assets which one would not sell in the ordinary course of business to thereby artificially salvage some liquidity for the purpose of the test: see *Pacific Mobile Corp., Re* (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209 (C.S. Que.) at p. 220. As a rough test, I note that Stelco (albeit on a consolidated basis with all subsidiaries) running significantly behind plan in 2003 from its budget of a profit of \$80 million now to a projected loss of \$192 million and cash has gone from a positive \$209 million to a negative \$114 million.

34 Locker made the observation at paragraph 8 of his affidavit that:

8. Stelco has performed poorly for the past few years primarily due to an inadequate business strategy, poor utilization of assets, inefficient operations and generally weak management leadership and decision-making. This point is best supported by the fact that Stelco's local competitor, Dofasco, has generated outstanding results in the same period.

Table 1 to his affidavit would demonstrate that Dofasco has had superior profitability and cashflow performance than its "neighbour" Stelco. He went on to observe at paragraphs 36-37:

36. Stelco can achieve significant cost reductions through means other than cutting wages, pensions and benefits for employees and retirees. Stelco could bring its cost levels down to those of restructured U.S. mills, with the potential for lowering them below those of many U.S. mills.

37. Stelco could achieve substantial savings through productivity improvements within the mechanisms of the current collective agreements. More importantly, a major portion of this cost reduction could be achieved through constructive negotiations with the USWA in an out-of-court restructuring that does not require intervention of the courts through the vehicle of CCAA protection.

I accept his constructive comments that there is room for cost reductions and that there are substantial savings to be achieved through productivity improvements. However, I do not see anything detrimental to these discussions and negotiations by having them conducted within the umbrella of a CCAA proceeding. See my comments above regarding the CCAA in practice.

But I would observe and I am mystified by Locker's observations at paragraph 12 (quoted above), that Stelco should have borrowed to fund pension obligations to avoid its current financial crisis. This presumes that the borrowed funds would not constitute an obligation to be paid back as to principal and interest, but rather that it would assume the character of a cost-free "gift".

I note that Mackey, without the "laundry list" he indicates at paragraph 17 of his second affidavit, is unable to determine at paragraph 19 (for himself) whether Stelco was insolvent. Mackey was unable to avail himself of all available information in light of the Union's refusal to enter into a confidentiality agreement. He does not closely adhere to the BIA tests as they are defined. In the face of positive evidence about an applicant's financial position by an experienced person with expertise, it is not sufficient to displace this evidence by filing evidence which goes no further than raising questions: see *Anvil Range Mining Corp.*, *supra* at p. 162.

The Union referred me to one of my decisions *Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co.* (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7 (Ont. Gen. Div.) where I stated as to the MacGirr affidavit:

The Trustee's cause of action is premised on MacGirr's opinion that STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 and therefore the STC common shares and promissory note received by Trustco in return for the Injection had no value at the time the Injection was made. Further, MacGirr ascribed no value to the opportunity which the Injection

gave to Trustco to restore STC and salvage its thought to be existing \$74 million investment. In stating his opinion MacGirr defined solvency as:

- (a) the ability to meet liabilities as they fall due; and
- (b) that assets exceed liabilities.

On cross-examination MacGirr testified that in his opinion on either test STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 since as to (a) STC was experiencing then a negative cash flow and as to (b) the STC financial statements incorrectly reflected values. As far as (a) is concerned, I would comment that while I concur with MacGirr that at some time in the long run a company that is experiencing a negative cash flow will eventually not be able to meet liabilities as they fall due but that is not the test (which is a "present exercise"). On that current basis STC was meeting its liabilities on a timely basis.

As will be seen from that expanded quote, MacGirr gave his own definitions of insolvency which are not the same as the s. 2 BIA tests (a), (b) and (c) but only a very loose paraphrase of (a) and (c) and an omission of (b). Nor was I referred to the *King Petroleum Ltd.* or *Proulx* cases *supra*. Further, it is obvious from the context that "*sometime in the long run*... *eventually*" is not a finite time in the foreseeable future.

39 I have not given any benefit to the \$313 - \$363 million of improvements referred to in the affidavit of William Vaughan at paragraph 115 as those appear to be capital expenditures which will have to be accommodated within a plan of arrangement or after emergence.

It seems to me that if the BIA (a) test is restrictively dealt with (as per my question to Union counsel as to how far in the future should one look on a prospective basis being answered "24 hours") then Stelco would not be insolvent under that test. However, I am of the view that that would be unduly restrictive and a proper contextual and purposive interpretation to be given when it is being used for a restructuring purpose even under BIA would be to see whether there is a reasonably foreseeable (at the time of filing) expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis which will result in the applicant running out of "cash" to pay its debts as they generally become due in the future without the benefit of the say and ancillary protection and procedure by court authorization pursuant to an order. I think this is the more appropriate interpretation of BIA (a) test in the context of a reorganization or "rescue" as opposed to a threshold to bankruptcy consideration or a fraudulent preferences proceeding. On that basis, I would find Stelco insolvent from the date of filing. Even if one were not to give the latter interpretation to the BIA (a) test, clearly for the above reasons and analysis, if one looks at the meaning of "insolvent" within the context of a CCAA reorganization or rescue solely, then of necessity, the time horizon must be such that the liquidity crisis would occur in the sense of running out of "cash" but for the grant of the CCAA order. On that basis Stelco is certainly insolvent given its limited cash resources unused, its need for a cushion, its rate of cash burn recently experienced and anticipated.

41 What about the BIA (c) test which may be roughly referred to as an assets compared with obligations test. See *New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen*, [1993] O.J. No. 727 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) as to fair value and fair market valuation. The Union observed that there was no intention by Stelco to wind itself up or proceed with a sale of some or all of its assets and undertaking and therefore some of the liabilities which Stelco and Stephen took into account would not crystallize. However, as I discussed at the time of the hearing, the (c) test is what one might reasonably call or describe as an "artificial" or notional/hypothetical test. It presumes certain things which are in fact not necessarily contemplated to take place or to be involved. In that respect, I appreciate that it may be difficult to get one's mind around that concept and down the right avenue of that (c) test. See my views at trial in *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.*, [2001] O.J. No. 3394 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraphs 13, 21 and 33; affirmed [2003] O.J. No. 5242 (Ont. C.A.). At paragraph 33, I observed in closing:

33 . . . They (and their expert witnesses) all had to contend with dealing with rambling and complicated facts and, in Section 100 BIA, a section which is difficult to administer when fmv [fair market value] in a notational or

hypothetical market involves ignoring what would often be regarded as self evidence truths but at the same time appreciating that this notational or hypothetical market requires that the objects being sold have to have realistic true to life attributes recognized.

42 The Court of Appeal stated at paragraphs 24-25 as follows:

24. Nor are the appellants correct to argue that the trial judge also assumed an imprudent vendor in arriving at his conclusion about the fair market value of the OYSF note would have to know that in order to realize value from the note any purchaser would immediately put OYSF and thus OYDL itself into bankruptcy to pre-empt a subsequent triggering event in favour of EIB. While this was so, and the trial judge clearly understood it, the error in this submission is that it seeks to inject into the analysis factors subjected to the circumstances of OYDL as vendor and not intrinsic to the value of the OYSF note. The calculation of fair market value does not permit this but rather must assume an unconstrained vendor.

25. The Applicants further argue that the trial judge eroded in determining the fair market value of the OYSF note by reference to a transaction which was entirely speculative because it was never considered by OYDL nor would have it been since it would have resulted in OYDL's own bankruptcy. I disagree. The transaction hypothesized by the trial judge was one between a notational, willing, prudent and informed vendor and purchaser based on factors relevant to the OYSF note itself rather than the particular circumstances of OYDL as the seller of the note. This is an entirely appropriate way to determine the fair market value of the OYSF note.

43 Test (c) deems a person to be insolvent if "the aggregate of [its] property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or of disposed at a fairly conducted sale under legal process would not be sufficient to enable payment of all [its] obligations, due and accruing due." The origins of this legislative test appear to be the decision of Spragge V-C in *Davidson v. Douglas* (1868), 15 Gr. 347 (Ont. Ch.) at p. 351 where he stated with respect to the solvency or insolvency of a debtor, the proper course is:

to see and examine whether all his property, real and personal, be sufficient if presently realized for the payment of his debts, and in this view we must estimate his land, as well as his chattel property, not at what his neighbours or others may consider to be its value, but at what it would bring in the market at a forced sale, or a sale where the seller cannot await his opportunities, but must sell.

44 In *Clarkson v. Sterling* (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Ont. C.P.) at p. 463, Rose J. indicted that the sale must be fair and reasonable, but that the determination of fairness and reasonableness would depend on the facts of each case.

The Union essentially relied on garnishment cases. Because of the provisions relating as to which debts may or may not be garnished, these authorities are of somewhat limited value when dealing with the test (c) question. However I would refer to one of the Union's cases *Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd.*, [1996] S.J. No. 655 (Sask. C.A.) where it is stated at paragraph 11:

11. Few phrases have been as problematic to define as "debt due or accruing due". The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. defines "accruing" as "arising in due course", but an examination of English and Canadian authority reveals that not all debts "arising in due course" are permitted to be garnisheed. (See Professor Dunlop's extensive research for his British Columbia Law Reform Commission's Report on Attachment of Debts Act, 1978 at 17 to 29 and is text Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada, 2nd ed. at 374 to 385.)

46 In *Barsi v. Farcas* (1923), [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154 (Sask. C.A.), Lamont J.A. was cited for his statement at p. 522 of *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 (Eng. C.A.) that: "an accruing debt, therefore, is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation."

47 Saunders J. noted in *633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72 (Ont. S.C.) at p. 81 that a sale out of the ordinary course of business would have an adverse effect on that actually realized.

48 There was no suggestion by any of the parties that any of the assets and undertaking would have any enhanced value from that shown on the financial statements prepared according to GAAP.

49 In *King Petroleum Ltd.*, *supra* at p. 81 Steele J. observed:

To consider the question of insolvency under cl. (c) I must look to the aggregate property of the company and come to a conclusion as to whether or not it would be sufficient to enable payment of all obligations due and accruing due. There are two tests to be applied: First, its fair value and, secondly, its value if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process. The balance sheet is a starting point, but the evidence relating to the fair value of the assets and what they might realize if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process must be reviewed in interpreting it. In this case, I find no difficulty in accepting the obligations shown as liabilities because they are known. I have more difficulty with respect to the assets.

50 To my view the preferable interpretation to be given to "sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due" is to be determined in the context of this test as a whole. What is being put up to satisfy those obligations is the debtor's assets and undertaking *in total*; in other words, the debtor in essence is taken as having sold everything. There would be no residual assets and undertaking to pay off any obligations which would not be encompassed by the phrase "all of his obligations, due and accruing due". Surely, there cannot be "orphan" obligations which are left hanging unsatisfied. It seems to me that the intention of "due and accruing due" was to cover off all obligations of whatever nature or kind and leave nothing in limbo.

51 S. 121(1) and (2) of the BIA, which are incorporated by reference in s. 12 of the CCAA, provide in respect to provable claims:

S. 121(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The determination whether a contingent or unliquidated claim is a provable claim and the valuation of such claim shall be made in accordance with s. 135.

52 Houlden and Morawetz 2004 Annotated supra at p. 537 (G28(3)) indicates:

The word "liability" is a very broad one. It includes all obligations to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which he becomes bankrupt except for contingent and unliquidated claims which are dealt with in s. 121(2).

However contingent and unliquidated claims would be encompassed by the term "obligations".

In *Gardner v. Newton* (1916), 29 D.L.R. 276 (Man. K.B.), Mathers C.J.K.B. observed at p. 281 that "contingent claim, that is, a claim which may or may not ripen into a debt, according as some future event does or does not happen." See *A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), Re*, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) at p. 268 for the definition of a "liquidated sum" which is an amount which can be readily ascertained and hence by corollary an "unliquidated claim" would be one which is not easily ascertained, but will have to be valued. In *Gagnier, Re* (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74 (Ont. S.C.), there appears to be a conflation of not only the (a) test with the (c) test, but also the invocation of the judicial discretion not to grant the receiving order pursuant to a bankruptcy petition, notwithstanding that "[the judge was] unable to find the debtor is bankrupt". The debtor was able to survive the (a) test as he had the practice (accepted by all his suppliers) of providing them with post dated cheques. The (c) test was not a problem since the judge found that his assets should be valued at considerably more than his obligations. However, this case does illustrate that the application of

the tests present some difficulties. These difficulties are magnified when one is dealing with something more significantly complex and a great deal larger than a haberdashery store - in the case before us, a giant corporation in which, amongst other things, is engaged in a very competitive history including competition from foreign sources which have recently restructured into more cost efficient structures, having shed certain of their obligations. As well, that is without taking into account that a sale would entail significant transaction costs. Even of greater significance would be the severance and termination payments to employees not continued by the new purchaser. Lastly, it was recognized by everyone at the hearing that Stelco's plants, especially the Hamilton-Hilton works, have extremely high environmental liabilities lurking in the woodwork. Stephen observed that these obligations would be substantial, although not quantified.

54 It is true that there are no appraisals of the plant and equipment nor of the assets and undertaking of Stelco. Given the circumstances of this case and the complexities of the market, one may realistically question whether or not the appraisals would be all that helpful or accurate.

55 I would further observe that in the notional or hypothetical exercise of a sale, then all the obligations which would be triggered by such sale would have to be taken into account.

All liabilities, contingent or unliquidated would have to be taken into account. See *King Petroleum Ltd.*, *supra* p. 81; *Salvati*, *supra* pp. 80-1; *Maybank Foods Inc.* (*Trustee of*) v. *Provisioners Maritimes Ltd.* (1989), 45 B.L.R. 14 (N.S. T.D.) at p. 29; *Challmie*, *Re* (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78 (B.C. S.C.), at pp. 81-2. In *Challmie* the debtor ought to have known that his guarantee was very much exposed given the perilous state of his company whose liabilities he had guaranteed. It is interesting to note what was stated in *Maybank Foods Inc.* (*Trustee of*), even if it is rather patently obvious. Tidman J. said in respect of the branch of the company at p. 29:

Mr. MacAdam argues also that the \$4.8 million employees' severance obligation was not a liability on January 20, 1986. The *Bankruptcy Act* includes as obligations both those due and accruing due. Although the employees' severance obligation was not due and payable on January 20, 1986 it was an obligation "accruing due". The Toronto facility had experienced severe financial difficulties for some time; in fact, it was the major, if not the sole cause, of Maybank's financial difficulties. I believe it is reasonable to conclude that a reasonably astute perspective buyer of the company has a going concern would have considered that obligation on January 20, 1986 and that it would have substantially reduced the price offered by that perspective buyer. Therefore that obligation must be considered as an obligation of the company on January 20, 1986.

57 With the greatest of respect for my colleague, I disagree with the conclusion of Ground J. in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc., supra* as to the approach to be taken to "due and accruing due" when he observed at pp. 139-140:

It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the principle amount of the Notes constitutes an obligation "due or accruing due" as of the date of this application.

There is a paucity of helpful authority on the meaning of "accruing due" for purposes of a definition of insolvency. Historically, in 1933, in *P. Lyall & Sons Construction Co. v. Baker*, [1933] O.R. 286 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal, in determining a question of set-off under the *Dominion Winding-Up Act* had to determine whether the amount claimed as set-off was a debt due or accruing due to the company in liquidation for purposes of that Act. Marsten J. at pp. 292-293 quoted from Moss J.A. in *Mail Printing Co. v. Clarkson* (1898), 25 O.R. 1 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 8:

A debt is defined to be a sum of money which is certainly, and at all event, payable without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. And an accruing debt is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation: Per Lindley L.J. in *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.D.D. at p. 529.

Whatever relevance such definition may have had for purposes of dealing with claims by and against companies in liquidation under the old winding-up legislation, it is apparent to me that it should not be applied to definitions of insolvency. To include every debt payable at some future date in "accruing due" for the purposes of insolvency tests

would render numerous corporations, with long term debt due over a period of years in the future and anticipated to be paid out of future income, "insolvent" for the purposes of the BIA and therefore the CCAA. For the same reason, I do not accept the statement quoted in the Enterprise factum from the decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in *Centennial Textiles Inc., Re, 220 B.R. 165* (U.S.N.Y.D.C. 1998) that "if the present saleable value of assets are less than the amount required to pay existing debt as they mature, the debtor is insolvent". In my view, the obligations, which are to be measured against the fair valuation of a company's property as being obligations due and accruing due, must be limited to obligations currently payable or properly chargeable to the accounting period during which the test is being applied as, for example, a sinking fund payment due within the current year. Black's Law Dictionary defines "accrued liability" as "an obligation or debt which is properly chargeable in a given accounting period, but which is not yet paid or payable". The principal amount of the Notes is neither due nor accruing due in this sense.

There appears to be some confusion in this analysis as to "debts" and "obligations", the latter being much broader than debts. Please see above as to my views concerning the floodgates argument under the BIA and CCAA being addressed by judicially exercised discretion even if "otherwise warranted" applications were made. I pause to note that an insolvency test under general corporate litigation need not be and likely is not identical, or indeed similar to that under these insolvency statutes. As well, it is curious to note that the cut off date is the end of the current fiscal period which could have radically different results if there were a calendar fiscal year and the application was variously made in the first week of January, mid-summer or the last day of December. Lastly, see above and below as to my views concerning the proper interpretation of this question of "accruing due".

59 It seems to me that the phrase "accruing due" has been interpreted by the courts as broadly identifying obligations that will "become due". See *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd.* below at pp. 163-4 - at least at some point in the future. Again, I would refer to my conclusion above that *every obligation* of the corporation in the hypothetical or notional sale must be treated as "accruing due" to avoid orphan obligations. In that context, it matters not that a wind-up pension liability may be discharged over 15 years; in a test (c) situation, it is crystallized on the date of the test. See *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc. supra* at pp. 756-7; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 164-63-4; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re* (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 163. In *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re* (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 163. In *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Spencer J.* at pp. 162-3 stated:

In my opinion, a futures broker is not in that special position. The third definition of "insolvency" may apply to a futures trader at any time even though he has open long positions in the market. Even though Consolidated's long positions were not required to be closed on 10th December, the chance that they might show a profit by March 1981 or even on the following day and thus wipe out Consolidated's cash deficit cannot save it from a condition of insolvency on that day. The circumstances fit precisely within the third definition; if all Consolidated's assets had been sold on that day at a fair value, the proceeds would not have covered its obligations due and accruing due, including its obligations to pay in March 1981 for its long positions in rapeseed. The market prices from day to day establish a fair valuation....

The contract to buy grain at a fixed price at a future time imposes a present obligation upon a trader taking a long position in the futures market to take delivery in exchange for payment at that future time. It is true that in the practice of the market, that obligation is nearly always washed out by buying an offsetting short contract, but until that is done the obligation stands. The trader does not know who will eventually be on the opposite side of his transaction if it is not offset but all transactions are treated as if the clearing house is on the other side. It is a present obligation due at a future time. It is therefore an obligation accruing due within the meaning of the third definition of "insolvency".

The possibility of an expectancy of future profits or a change in the market is not sufficient; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.* at p. 162 emphasizes that the test is to be done on that day, the day of filing in the case of an application for reorganization.

I see no objection to using Exhibit C to Stephen's affidavit as an aid to review the balance sheet approach to test (c). While Stephen may not have known who prepared Exhibit C, he addressed each of its components in the text of his affidavit and as such he could have mechanically prepared the exhibit himself. He was comfortable with and agreed with each of its components. Stelco's factum at paragraphs 70-1 submits as follows:

70. In Exhibit C to his Affidavit, Mr. Stephen addresses a variety of adjustments to the Shareholder's Equity of Stelco necessary to reflect the values of assets and liabilities as would be required to determine whether Stelco met the test of insolvency under Clause C. In cross examination of both Mr. Vaughan and Mr. Stephen only one of these adjustments was challenged - the "Possible Reductions in Capital Assets."

71. The basis of the challenge was that the comparative sales analysis was flawed. In the submission of Stelco, none of these challenges has any merit. Even if the entire adjustment relating to the value in capital assets is ignored, the remaining adjustments leave Stelco with assets worth over \$600 million less than the value of its obligations due and accruing due. This fundamental fact is not challenged.

62 Stelco went on at paragraphs 74-5 of its factum to submit:

74. The values relied upon by Mr. Stephen if anything, understate the extent of Stelco's insolvency. As Mr. Stephen has stated, and no one has challenged by affidavit evidence or on cross examination, in a fairly conducted sale under legal process, the value of Stelco's working capital and other assets would be further impaired by: (i) increased environmental liabilities not reflected on the financial statements, (ii) increased pension deficiencies that would be generated on a wind up of the pension plans, (iii) severance and termination claims and (iv) substantial liquidation costs that would be incurred in connection with such a sale.

75. No one on behalf of the USWA has presented any evidence that the capital assets of Stelco are in excess of book value on a stand alone basis. Certainly no one has suggested that these assets would be in excess of book value if the related environmental legacy costs and collective agreements could not be separated from the assets.

63 Before turning to that exercise, I would also observe that test (c) is also disjunctive. There is an insolvency condition if the total obligation of the debtor exceed either (i) a fair valuation of its assets or (ii) the proceeds of a sale fairly conducted under legal process of its assets.

As discussed above and confirmed by Stephen, if there were a sale under legal process, then it would be unlikely, especially in this circumstance that values would be enhanced; in all probability they would be depressed from book value. Stephen took the balance sheet GAAP calculated figure of equity at November 30, 2003 as \$804.2 million. From that, he deducted the loss for December 2003 - January 2004 of \$17 million to arrive at an equity position of \$787.2 million as at the date of filing.

From that, he deducted, reasonably in my view, those "booked" assets that would have no value in a test (c) sale namely: (a) \$294 million of future income tax recourse which would need taxable income in the future to realize; (b) \$57 million for a write-off of the Platemill which is presently hot idled (while Locker observed that it would not be prohibitive in cost to restart production, I note that neither Stephen nor Vaughn were cross examined as to the decision not to do so); and (c) the captialized deferred debt issue expense of \$3.2 million which is being written off over time and therefore, truly is a "nothing". This totals \$354.2 million so that the excess of value over liabilities before reflecting obligations not included in the financials directly, but which are, substantiated as to category in the notes would be \$433 million.

On a windup basis, there would be a pension deficiency of \$1252 million; however, Stephen conservatively in my view looked at the Mercer actuary calculations on the basis of a going concern finding deficiency of \$656 million. If the \$1252 million windup figure had been taken, then the picture would have been even bleaker than it is as Stephen has calculated it for test (c) purposes. In addition, there are deferred pension costs of \$198.7 million which under GAAP accounting calculations is allowed so as to defer recognition of past bad investment experience, but this has no realizable

Stelco Inc., Re, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211

2004 CarswellOnt 1211, [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [2004] O.T.C. 284...

value. Then there is the question of Employee Future Benefits. These have been calculated as at December 31, 2003 by the Mercer actuary as \$909.3 million but only \$684 million has been accrued and booked on the financial statements so that there has to be an increased provision of \$225.3 million. These off balance sheet adjustments total \$1080 million.

Taking that last adjustment into account would result in a *negative* equity of (\$433 million minus \$1080 million) or *negative* \$647 million. On that basis without taking into account possible reductions in capital assets as dealt with in the somewhat flawed Exhibit E nor environmental and other costs discussed above, Stelco is insolvent according to the test (c). With respect to Exhibit E, I have not relied on it in any way, but it is entirely likely that a properly calculated Exhibit E would provide comparators (also being sold in the U.S. under legal process in a fairly conducted process) which tend to require a further downward adjustment. Based on test (c), Stelco is significantly, not marginally, under water.

In reaching my conclusion as to the negative equity (and I find that Stephen approached that exercise fairly and constructively), please note my comments above regarding the possible assumption of pension obligations by the purchaser being offset by a reduction of the purchase price. The 35% adjustment advocated as to pension and employee benefits in this regard is speculation by the Union. Secondly, the Union emphasized cash flow as being important in evaluation, but it must be remembered that Stelco has been negative cash flow for some time which would make that analysis unreliable and to the detriment of the Union's position. The Union treated the \$773 million estimated contribution to the shortfall in the pension deficiency by the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund as eliminating that as a Stelco obligation. That is not the case however as that Fund would be subrogated to the claims of the employees in that respect with a result that Stelco would remain liable for that \$773 million. Lastly, the Union indicated that there should be a \$155 million adjustment as to the negative equity in Sub Applicants when calculating Stelco's equity. While Stephen at Q. 181-2 acknowledged that there was no adjustment for that, I agree with him that there ought not to be since Stelco was being examined (and the calculations were based) on an unconsolidated basis, not on a consolidated basis.

69 In the end result, I have concluded on the balance of probabilities that Stelco is insolvent and therefore it is a "debtor company" as at the date of filing and entitled to apply for the CCAA initial order. My conclusion is that (i) BIA test (c) strongly shows Stelco is insolvent; (ii) BIA test (a) demonstrates, to a less certain but sufficient basis, an insolvency and (iii) the "new" CCAA test again strongly supports the conclusion of insolvency. I am further of the opinion that I properly exercised my discretion in granting Stelco and the Sub Applicants the initial order on January 29, 2004 and I would confirm that as of the present date with effect on the date of filing. The Union's motion is therefore dismissed.

I appreciate that all the employees (union and non-union alike) and the Union and the International have a justifiable pride in their work and their workplace - and a human concern about what the future holds for them. The pensioners are in the same position. Their respective positions can only be improved by engaging in discussion, an exchange of views and information reasonably advanced and conscientiously listened to and digested, leading to mutual problem solving, ideas and negotiations. Negative attitudes can only lead to the detriment to all stakeholders. Unfortunately there has been some finger pointing on various sides; that should be put behind everyone so that participants in this process can concentrate on the future and not inappropriately dwell on the past. I understand that there have been some discussions and interchange over the past two weeks since the hearing and that is a positive start. *Motion dismissed.*

APPENDIX

End of Document

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2004 CarswellOnt 2936 Ontario Court of Appeal

Stelco Inc., Re

2004 CarswellOnt 2936, [2004] O.J. No. 1903

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, As Amended

In the Matter of a Proposed Plan of Compromise or Arrangement with Respect to Stelco Inc. and the other Applicants Listed on Schedule "A" Application under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, As Amended

Doherty J.A., Laskin J.A., Moldaver J.A.

Judgment: May 5, 2004 Docket: CA M31129

Counsel: David P. Jacobs, for Moving Party Michael E. Barrack, for Responding Party

Per Curiam:

1 Leave to appeal refused. Costs to the respondents Stelco in the amount by \$2,000 and to the "primary lender" in the amount of \$1000.

2004 CarswellOnt 5200 Supreme Court of Canada

Stelco Inc., Re

2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336, 338 N.R. 196 (note)

Local Union No. 1005 United Steelworkers of America, Local Union No. 5328 United Steelworkers of America, Local Union No. 8782 United Steelworkers of America v. Stelco Inc., CHT Steel Company Inc., Stelpipe Ltd., Stelwire Ltd., and Welland Pipe Ltd. (collectively "STELCO"), CIT Business Credit Canada Inc., GE Commercial Finance, Fleet Capital Canada (collectively the "Senior Lenders")

Binnie J., Charron J., McLachlin C.J.C.

Judgment: December 9, 2004 Docket: 30447

Proceedings: Leave to appeal refused, 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.); Leave to appeal refused, 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

Counsel: None given

Headnote Bankruptcy and insolvency

Per Curiam:

1 The application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Number M31129, dated May 5, 2004, is dismissed with costs.

TAB 22

2013 ONSC 5461 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Tamerlane Ventures Inc., Re

2013 CarswellOnt 12213, 2013 ONSC 5461, 232 A.C.W.S. (3d) 32, 6 C.B.R. (6th) 328

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Tamerlane Ventures Inc. and Pine Point Holding Corp.

Newbould J.

Heard: August 23, 2013 Judgment: August 28, 2013 Docket: CV-13-10228-00CL

Counsel: S. Richard Orzy, Derek J. Bell, Sean H. Zweig for Applicants Robert J. Chadwick, Logan Willis for Proposed Monitor, Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc. Joseph Bellissimo for Renvest Mercantile Bankcorp Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Contracts; Corporate and Commercial

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally - referred to

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Newbould J*.:

Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd. (2011), 74 C.B.R. (5th) 300, 2011 ONSC 1007, 2011 CarswellOnt 896 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to Cinram International Inc., Re (2012), 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46, 2012 CarswellOnt 8413, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - considered Crystallex International Corp., Re (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 7329, 2012 ONCA 404, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 207, 293 O.A.C. 102, 4 B.L.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) - referred to Sino-Forest Corp., Re (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 4117, 2012 ONSC 2063 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) considered SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re (2013), 2013 CarswellOnt 2785, 2013 ONSC 1500 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) considered Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re (2010), (sub nom. Century Services Inc. v. Canada (A.G.)) [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, [2010] G.S.T.C. 186, 12 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada) 2011 G.T.C. 2006 (Eng.), (sub nom. Century Services Inc. v. A.G. of Canada) 2011 D.T.C. 5006 (Eng.), (sub nom. Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re) 503 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. Leroy (Ted) Trucking Ltd., Re) 296 B.C.A.C. 1, 2010 SCC 60, 2010 CarswellBC 3419, 2010 CarswellBC 3420, 409 N.R. 201, (sub nom. Ted LeRoy Trucking Ltd., Re) 326 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 170, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 383 (S.C.C.) — considered Statutes considered: Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 Generally - referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] — considered *Personal Property Security Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 s. 63 — considered

APPLICATION by insolvent corporations for initial order and stay under s. 11 of *Companies' Creditors Arrangement* Act.

Newbould J.:

1 The applicants applied on August 23, 2013 for protection under the CCAA, at which time an Initial Order was granted containing several provisions. These are my reasons for the granting of the order.

Tamerlane business

At the time of the application, Tamerlane Ventures Inc. ("Tamerlane") was a publicly traded company whose shares were listed and posted for trading on the TSX Venture Exchange. Tamerlane and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Tamerlane Group"), including Pine Point Holding Corp. ("Tamerlane Pine Point"), Tamerlane Ventures USA Inc. ("Tamerlane USA") and Tamerlane Ventures Peru SAC ("Tamerlane Peru") are engaged in the acquisition, exploration and development of base metal projects in Canada and Peru.

3 The applicants' flagship property is the Pine Point Property, a project located near Hay River in the South Slave Lake area of the Northwest Territories of Canada. It at one time was an operating mine. The applicants firmly believe that there is substantial value in the Pine Point Property and have completed a NI 43-101 Technical Report which shows 10.9 million tonnes of measured and indicated resources in the "R-190" zinc-lead deposit. The project has been determined to be feasible and licences have been obtained to put the first deposit into production. All of the expensive infrastructure, such as roads, power lines and railheads, are already in place, minimizing the capital cost necessary to commence operations. The applicants only need to raise the financing necessary to be able to exploit the value of the project, a task made more difficult by, among other things, the problems experienced generally in the mining sector thus far in 2013.

4 The Tamerlane Group's other significant assets are the Los Pinos mining concessions south of Lima in Peru, which host a historic copper resource. The Tamerlane Group acquired the Los Pinos assets in 2007 through one of its subsidiaries, Tamerlane Peru, and it currently holds the mining concessions through another of its subsidiaries, Tamerlane Minera.

5 The Los Pinos deposit is a 790 hectare porphyry (a type of igneous rock) copper deposit. Originally investigated in the 1990s when the price of copper was a quarter of its price today, Los Pinos has historically been viewed as a valuable property. With rising copper prices, it is now viewed as being even more valuable.

6 The exploration and development activities have been generally carried out by employees of Tamerlane USA. The applicants' management team consists of four individuals who are employees of Tamerlane USA, which provides management services by contract to the applicants.

As at March 31, 2013 the Tamerlane Group had total consolidated assets with a net book value of \$24,814,433. The assets included consolidated current assets of \$2,007,406, and consolidated non-current assets with a net book value of \$22,807,027. Non-current assets included primarily the investment in the Pine Point property of \$20,729,551 and the Los Pinos property of \$1,314,936.

8 Tamerlane has obtained valuations of Los Pinos and the Pine Point Property. The Los Pinos valuation was completed in May 2013 and indicates a preliminary valuation of \$12 to \$15 million using a 0.3% copper cut-off grade, or \$17 to

2013 ONSC 5461, 2013 CarswellOnt 12213, 232 A.C.W.S. (3d) 32, 6 C.B.R. (6th) 328

\$21 million using a 0.2% copper cut-off grade. The Pine Point valuation was completed in July 2013 and indicates a valuation of \$30 to \$56 million based on market comparables, with a value as high as \$229 million considering precedent transactions.

Secured and unsecured debt

9 Pursuant to a credit agreement between Tamerlane and Global Resource Fund, a fund managed by Renvest Mercantile Bancorp Inc. ("Global Resource Fund" or "secured lender") made as of December 16, 2010, as amended by a first amending agreement dated June 30, 2011 and a second amending agreement dated July 29, 2011, Tamerlane became indebted to the Secured Lender for USD \$10,000,000. The secured indebtedness under the credit agreement is guaranteed by both Tamerlane Pine Point and Tamerlane USA, and each of Tamerlane, Tamerlane Pine Point and Tamerlane USA has executed a general security agreement in favour of the secured lender in respect of the secured debt.

10 The only other secured creditors are the applicants' counsel, the Monitor and the Monitor's counsel in respect of the fees and disbursements owing to each.

11 The applicants' unsecured creditors are principally trade creditors. Collectively, the applicants' accounts payable were approximately CAD \$850,000 as at August 13, 2013, in addition to accrued professional fees in connection with issues related to the secured debt and this proceeding.

Events leading to filing

12 Given that the Tamerlane Group is in the exploration stage with its assets, it does not yet generate cash flow from operations. Accordingly, its only potential source of cash is from financing activities, which have been problematic in light of the current market for junior mining companies.

13 It was contemplated when the credit agreement with Global Resource Fund was entered into that the takeout financing would be in the form of construction financing for Pine Point. However Tamerlane was unsuccessful in arranging that. Tamerlane was successful in late 2012 in arranging a small flow-through financing from a director and in early 2013 a share issuance for \$1.7 million dollars. Negotiations with various parties for to raise more funds by debt or asset sales have so far been unsuccessful.

14 As a result of liquidity constraints facing Tamerlane in the fall of 2012, it failed to make regularly scheduled monthly interest payments in respect of the secured debt beginning on September 25, 2012 and failed to repay the principal balance on the maturity date of October 16, 2012, each of which was an event of default under the credit agreement with the secured lender Global Resource Fund.

15 Tamerlane and Global Resource Fund then entered into a forbearance agreement made as of December 31, 2012 in which Tamerlane agreed to make certain payments to Global Resource Fund, including a \$1,500,000 principal repayment on March 31, 2013. As a result of liquidity constraints, Tamerlane was unable to make the March 31 payment, an event of default under the credit and forbearance agreements. On May 24, 2013, Tamerlane failed to make the May interest payment, and on May 29, 2013, the applicants received a letter from Global Resource Fund's counsel enclosing a NITES notice under the BIA and a notice of intention to dispose of collateral pursuant to section 63 of the PPSA. The total secured debt was \$11,631,948.90.

16 On June 10, 2013, Global Resource Fund and Tamerlane entered into an amendment to the forbearance agreement pursuant to which Global Resource Fund withdrew its statutory notices and agreed to capitalize the May interest payment in exchange for Tamerlane agreeing to pay certain fees to the Global Resource Fund that were capitalized and resuming making cash interest payments to the Secured Lender with the June 25, 2013 interest payment. Tamerlane was unable to make the July 25 payment, which resulted in an event of default under the credit and forbearance amendment agreements. 17 On July 26, 2013, Global Resource Fund served a new NITES notice and a notice of intention to dispose of collateral pursuant to section 63 the PPSA, at which time the total of the secured debt was \$12,100,254.26.

18 Thereafter the parties negotiated a consensual CCAA filing, under which Global Resource Fund has agreed to provide DIP financing and to forbear from exercising its rights until January 7, 2014. The terms of the stay of proceedings and DIP financing are unusual, to be discussed.

Discussion

19 There is no doubt that the applicants are insolvent and qualify for filing under the CCAA and obtaining a stay of proceedings. I am satisfied from the record, including the report from the proposed Monitor, that an Initial Order and a stay under section 11 of the CCAA should be made.

20 The applicants request that the stay apply to Tamerlane USA and Tamerlane Peru, non-parties to this application. The business operations of the applicants, Tamerlane USA and Tamerlane Peru are intertwined, and the request to extend the stay of proceedings to Tamerlane USA and Tamerlane Peru is to maintain stability and value during the CCAA process.

21 Courts have an inherent jurisdiction to impose stays of proceedings against non-applicant third parties where it is important to the reorganization and restructuring process, and where it is just and reasonable to do so. See Farley J. in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) and Pepall J. (as she then was) in *Canwest Publishing Inc.*/*Publications Canwest Inc., Re* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). Recently Morawetz J. has made such orders in *Cinram International Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), *Sino-Forest Corp., Re*, 2012 ONSC 2063 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re*, 2013 ONSC 1500 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). I am satisfied that it is appropriate that the stay of proceedings extend to Tamerlane USA, which has guaranteed the secured loans and to Tamerlane Peru, which holds the valuable Los Pinos assets in Peru.

22 Under the Initial Order, PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate Finance Inc. is to be appointed a financial advisor. PWC is under the oversight of the Monitor to implement a Sale and Solicitation Process, under which PWC will seek to identify one or more financiers or purchasers of, and/or investors in, the key entities that comprise the Tamerlane Group. The SISP will include broad marketing to all potential financiers, purchasers and investors and will consider offers for proposed financing to repay the secured debt, an investment in the applicants' business and/or a purchase of some or all of the applicants' assets. The proposed Monitor supports the SIST and is of the view that it is in the interests of the applicants' stakeholders. The SISP and its terms are appropriate and it is approved.

The Initial Order contains provisions for an administration charge for the Monitor, its counsel and for counsel to the applicants in the amount of \$300,000, a financial advisor charge of \$300,000, a directors' charge of \$45,000 to the extent the directors are not covered under their D&O policy and a subordinated administration charge subordinated to the secured loans and the proposed DIP charge for expenses not covered by the administration and financial advisor charges. These charges appear reasonable and the proposed Monitor is of the same view. They are approved.

DIP facility and charge

The applicants' principal use of cash during these proceedings will consist of the payment of ongoing, but minimized, day-to-day operational expenses, such as regular remuneration for those individuals providing services to the applicants, office related expenses, and professional fees and disbursements in connection with these *CCAA* proceedings. The applicants will require additional borrowing to do this. It is apparent that given the lack of alternate financing, any restructuring will not be possible without DIP financing. The DIP lender is Global Resource Fund, the secured lender to the applicants. The DIP loan is for a net \$1,017,500 with simple 12% interest. It is to mature on January 7, 2014, by which time it is anticipated that the SISP process will have resulted in a successful raising of funds to repay the secured loan and the DIP facility.

Section 11.2(4) of the CCAA lists factors, among other things, that the court is to consider when a request for a DIP financing charge is made. A review of those factors in this case supports the DIP facility and charge. The facility is required to continue during the CCAA process, the assets are sufficient to support the charge, the secured lender supports the applicants' management remaining in possession of the business, albeit with PWC being engaged to run the SISP, the loan is a fraction of the applicants' total assets and the proposed Monitor is of the view that the DIP facility and charge are fair and reasonable. The one factor that gives me pause is the first listed in section 11.2(4), being the period during which the applicants are expected to be subject to the CCAA proceedings. That involves the sunset clause, to which I now turn.

Sunset clause

During the negotiations leading to this consensual CCAA application, Global Resource Fund, the secured lender, expressed a willingness to negotiate with the applicants but firmly stated that as a key term of consenting to any CCAA initial order, it required (i) a fixed "sunset date" of January 7, 2014 for the CCAA proceeding beyond which stay extensions could not be sought without the its consent and the consent of the Monitor unless both the outstanding secured debt and the DIP loan had been repaid in full, and (ii) a provision in the initial order directing that a receiver selected by Global Resource Fund would be appointed after that date.

The Initial Order as drafted contains language preventing the applicants from seeking or obtaining any extension of the stay period beyond January 7, 2014 unless it has repaid the outstanding secured debt and the DIP loan or received the consent of Global Resource Fund and the Monitor, and that immediately following January 7, 2013 (i) the CCAA proceedings shall terminate, (ii) the Monitor shall be discharged, (iii) the Initial Order (with some exceptions) shall be of no force and effect and (iv) a receiver selected by Global Resource Fund shall be appointed.

Ms. Kent, the executive chair and CFO of Tamerlane, has sworn in her affidavit that Global Resource Fund insisted on these terms and that given the financial circumstances of the applicants, there were significant cost-savings and other benefits to them and all of the stakeholders for this proceeding to be consensual rather than contentious. Accordingly, the directors of the applicants exercised their business judgment to agree to the terms. The proposed Monitor states its understanding as well is that the consent of Global Resource Fund to these CCAA proceedings is conditional on these terms.

30 Section 11 of the CCAA authorizes a court to make any order "that it considers appropriate in the circumstances." In considering what may be appropriate, Deschamps J. stated in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 (S.C.C.):

70. ...Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

There is no doubt that CCAA proceedings can be terminated when the prospects of a restructuring are at an end. In *Century Services*, Deschamps J. recognized this in stating:

71. It is well established that efforts to reorganize under the CCAA can be terminated and the stay of proceedings against the debtor lifted if the reorganization is "doomed to failure" (see *Chef Ready*, at p. 88; *Philip's Manufacturing*

2013 ONSC 5461, 2013 CarswellOnt 12213, 232 A.C.W.S. (3d) 32, 6 C.B.R. (6th) 328

Ltd., *Re* (1992), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 25 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 6-7). However, when an order is sought that does realistically advance the CCAA's purposes, the ability to make it is within the discretion of a CCAA court.

32 The fact that the board of directors of the applicants exercised their business judgment in agreeing to the terms imposed by Global Resource Fund in order to achieve a consensual outcome is a factor I can and do take into account, with the caution that in the case of interim financing, the court must make an independent determination, and arrive at an appropriate order, having regard to the factors in s. 11.2(4). The court may consider, but not defer to or be fettered by, the recommendation of the board. See *Crystallex International Corp.*, *Re* (2012), 91 C.B.R. (5th) 207 (Ont. C.A.) at para 85.

It is apparent from looking at the history of the matter that Global Resource Fund had every intention of exercising its rights under its security to apply to court to have a receiver appointed, and with the passage of time during which there were defaults, including defaults in forbearance agreements, the result would likely have been inevitable. See *Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd.* (2011), 74 C.B.R. (5th) 300 (Ont. S.C.J.) and the authorities therein discussed. Thus it is understandable that the directors agreed to the terms required by Global Resource Fund. If Global Resource Fund had refused to fund the DIP facility or had refused to agree to any further extension for payment of the secured loan, the prospects of financing the payout of Global Resource Fund through a SISP process would in all likelihood not been available to the applicants or its stakeholders.

What is unusual in the proposed Initial Order is that the discretion of the court on January 7, 2014 to do what it considers appropriate is removed. Counsel have been unable to provide any case in which such an order has been made. I did not think it appropriate for such an order to be made. At my direction, the parties agreed to add a clause that the order was subject in all respects to the discretion of the Court. With that change, I approved the Initial Order.

Application granted.

End of Document

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TAB 23

2015 ONSC 303 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Target Canada Co., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 620, 2015 ONSC 303, [2015] O.J. No. 247, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323, 248 A.C.W.S. (3d) 753

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC.

Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: January 15, 2015 Judgment: January 16, 2015 Docket: CV-15-10832-00CL

Counsel: Tracy Sandler, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants, Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC Jay Swartz for Target Corporation

Alan Mark, Melaney Wagner, Jesse Mighton for Proposed Monitor, Alvarez and Marsal Canada ULC ("Alvarez") Terry O'Sullivan for Honourable J. Ground, Trustee of the Proposed Employee Trust

Susan Philpott for Proposed Employee Representative Counsel, for Employees of the Applicants

Subject: Insolvency; Property

Table of Authorities

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s. 2 "insolvent person" — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally - referred to

s. 11 — considered

s. 11.02 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 11.02(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - considered

s. 11.7(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 36 — considered

Rules considered:

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194

Generally — referred to

Words and phrases considered:

insolvent

"Insolvent" is not expressly defined in the [*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (CCAA)]. However, for the purposes of the CCAA, a debtor is insolvent if it meets the definition of an "insolvent person" in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* . . . or if it is "insolvent" as described in Stelco Inc. (Re), [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [Stelco], leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336, where Farley, J. found that "insolvency" includes a corporation "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within [a] reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring".

APPLICATION for relief under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

Morawetz R.S.J.:

Target Canada Co., Re, 2015 ONSC 303, 2015 CarswellOnt 620

2015 ONSC 303, 2015 CarswellOnt 620, [2015] O.J. No. 247, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323...

1 Target Canada Co. ("TCC") and the other applicants listed above (the "Applicants") seek relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA"). While the limited partnerships listed in Schedule "A" to the draft Order (the "Partnerships") are not applicants in this proceeding, the Applicants seek to have a stay of proceedings and other benefits of an initial order under the CCAA extended to the Partnerships, which are related to or carry on operations that are integral to the business of the Applicants.

2 TCC is a large Canadian retailer. It is the Canadian operating subsidiary of Target Corporation, one of the largest retailers in the United States. The other Applicants are either corporations or partners of the Partnerships formed to carry on specific aspects of TCC's Canadian retail business (such as the Canadian pharmacy operations) or finance leasehold improvements in leased Canadian stores operated by TCC. The Applicants, therefore, do not represent the entire Target enterprise; the Applicants consist solely of entities that are integral to the Canadian retail operations. Together, they are referred as the "Target Canada Entities".

3 In early 2011, Target Corporation determined to expand its retail operations into Canada, undertaking a significant investment (in the form of both debt and equity) in TCC and certain of its affiliates in order to permit TCC to establish and operate Canadian retail stores. As of today, TCC operates 133 stores, with at least one store in every province of Canada. All but three of these stores are leased.

4 Due to a number of factors, the expansion into Canada has proven to be substantially less successful than expected. Canadian operations have shown significant losses in every quarter since stores opened. Projections demonstrate little or no prospect of improvement within a reasonable time.

5 After exploring multiple solutions over a number of months and engaging in extensive consultations with its professional advisors, Target Corporation concluded that, in the interest of all of its stakeholders, the responsible course of action is to cease funding the Canadian operations.

6 Without ongoing investment from Target Corporation, TCC and the other Target Canada Entities cannot continue to operate and are clearly insolvent. Due to the magnitude and complexity of the operations of the Target Canada Entities, the Applicants are seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to accomplish a fair, orderly and controlled wind-down of their operations. The Target Canada Entities have indicated that they intend to treat all of their stakeholders as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow, particularly the approximately 17,600 employees of the Target Canada Entities.

7 The Applicants are of the view that an orderly wind-down under Court supervision, with the benefit of inherent jurisdiction of the CCAA, and the oversight of the proposed monitor, provides a framework in which the Target Canada Entities can, among other things:

a) Pursue initiatives such as the sale of real estate portfolios and the sale of inventory;

b) Develop and implement support mechanisms for employees as vulnerable stakeholders affected by the winddown, particularly (i) an employee trust (the "Employee Trust") funded by Target Corporation; (ii) an employee representative counsel to safeguard employee interests; and (iii) a key employee retention plan (the "KERP") to provide essential employees who agree to continue their employment and to contribute their services and expertise to the Target Canada Entities during the orderly wind-down;

c) Create a level playing field to ensure that all affected stakeholders are treated as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow; and

d) Avoid the significant maneuvering among creditors and other stakeholders that could be detrimental to all stakeholders, in the absence of a court-supervised proceeding.

2015 ONSC 303, 2015 CarswellOnt 620, [2015] O.J. No. 247, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323...

8 The Applicants are of the view that these factors are entirely consistent with the well-established purpose of a CCAA stay: to give a debtor the "breathing room" required to restructure with a view to maximizing recoveries, whether the restructuring takes place as a going concern or as an orderly liquidation or wind-down.

9 TCC is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Target Corporation and is the operating company through which the Canadian retail operations are carried out. TCC is a Nova Scotia unlimited liability company. It is directly owned by Nicollet Enterprise 1 S. à r.l. ("NE1"), an entity organized under the laws of Luxembourg. Target Corporation (which is incorporated under the laws of the State of Minnesota) owns NE1 through several other entities.

10 TCC operates from a corporate headquarters in Mississauga, Ontario. As of January 12, 2015, TCC employed approximately 17,600 people, almost all of whom work in Canada. TCC's employees are not represented by a union, and there is no registered pension plan for employees.

11 The other Target Canada Entities are all either: (i) direct or indirect subsidiaries of TCC with responsibilities for specific aspects of the Canadian retail operation; or (ii) affiliates of TCC that have been involved in the financing of certain leasehold improvements.

12 A typical TCC store has a footprint in the range of 80,000 to 125,000 total retail square feet and is located in a shopping mall or large strip mall. TCC is usually the anchor tenant. Each TCC store typically contains an in-store Target brand pharmacy, Target Mobile kiosk and a Starbucks café. Each store typically employs approximately 100 -150 people, described as "Team Members" and "Team Leaders", with a total of approximately 16,700 employed at the "store level" of TCC's retail operations.

13 TCC owns three distribution centres (two in Ontario and one in Alberta) to support its retail operations. These centres are operated by a third party service provider. TCC also leases a variety of warehouse and office spaces.

14 In every quarter since TCC opened its first store, TCC has faced lower than expected sales and greater than expected losses. As reported in Target Corporation's Consolidated Financial Statements, the Canadian segment of the Target business has suffered a significant loss in every quarter since TCC opened stores in Canada.

15 TCC is completely operationally funded by its ultimate parent, Target Corporation, and related entities. It is projected that TCC's cumulative pre-tax losses from the date of its entry into the Canadian market to the end of the 2014 fiscal year (ending January 31, 2015) will be more than \$2.5 billion. In his affidavit, Mr. Mark Wong, General Counsel and Secretary of TCC, states that this is more than triple the loss originally expected for this period. Further, if TCC's operations are not wound down, it is projected that they would remain unprofitable for at least 5 years and would require significant and continued funding from Target Corporation during that period.

16 TCC attributes its failure to achieve expected profitability to a number of principal factors, including: issues of scale; supply chain difficulties; pricing and product mix issues; and the absence of a Canadian online retail presence.

17 Following a detailed review of TCC's operations, the Board of Directors of Target Corporation decided that it is in the best interests of the business of Target Corporation and its subsidiaries to discontinue Canadian operations.

Based on the stand-alone financial statements prepared for TCC as of November 1, 2014 (which consolidated financial results of TCC and its subsidiaries), TCC had total assets of approximately \$5.408 billion and total liabilities of approximately \$5.118 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC's financial situation.

Mr. Wong states that TCC's operational funding is provided by Target Corporation. As of November 1, 2014, NE1 (TCC's direct parent) had provided equity capital to TCC in the amount of approximately \$2.5 billon. As a result of continuing and significant losses in TCC's operations, NE1 has been required to make an additional equity investment of \$62 million since November 1, 2014.

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NE1 has also lent funds to TCC under a Loan Facility with a maximum amount of \$4 billion. TCC owed NE1 approximately \$3.1 billion under this Facility as of January 2, 2015. The Loan Facility is unsecured. On January 14, 2015, NE1 agreed to subordinate all amounts owing by TCC to NE1 under this Loan Facility to payment in full of proven claims against TCC.

As at November 1, 2014, Target Canada Property LLC ("TCC Propco") had assets of approximately \$1.632 billion and total liabilities of approximately \$1.643 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC Propco's financial situation. TCC Propco has also borrowed approximately \$1.5 billion from Target Canada Property LP and TCC Propco also owes U.S. \$89 million to Target Corporation under a Demand Promissory Note.

TCC has subleased almost all the retail store leases to TCC Propco, which then made real estate improvements and sub-sub leased the properties back to TCC. Under this arrangement, upon termination of any of these sub-leases, a "make whole" payment becomes owing from TCC to TCC Propco.

23 Mr. Wong states that without further funding and financial support from Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities are unable to meet their liabilities as they become due, including TCC's next payroll (due January 16, 2015). The Target Canada Entities, therefore state that they are insolvent.

Mr. Wong also states that given the size and complexity of TCC's operations and the numerous stakeholders involved in the business, including employees, suppliers, landlords, franchisees and others, the Target Canada Entities have determined that a controlled wind-down of their operations and liquidation under the protection of the CCAA, under Court supervision and with the assistance of the proposed monitor, is the only practical method available to ensure a fair and orderly process for all stakeholders. Further, Mr. Wong states that TCC and Target Corporation seek to benefit from the framework and the flexibility provided by the CCAA in effecting a controlled and orderly wind-down of the Canadian operations, in a manner that treats stakeholders as fairly and as equitably as the circumstances allow.

25 On this initial hearing, the issues are as follows:

a) Does this court have jurisdiction to grant the CCAA relief requested?

a) Should the stay be extended to the Partnerships?

b) Should the stay be extended to "Co-tenants" and rights of third party tenants?

c) Should the stay extend to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims that are derivative of claims against the Target Canada Entities?

d) Should the Court approve protections for employees?

e) Is it appropriate to allow payment of certain pre-filing amounts?

f) Does this court have the jurisdiction to authorize pre-filing claims to "critical" suppliers;

g) Should the court should exercise its discretion to authorize the Applicants to seek proposals from liquidators and approve the financial advisor and real estate advisor engagement?

h) Should the court exercise its discretion to approve the Court-ordered charges?

²⁶ "Insolvent" is not expressly defined in the CCAA. However, for the purposes of the CCAA, a debtor is insolvent if it meets the definition of an "insolvent person" in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") or if it is "insolvent" as described in *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), [*Stelco*], leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 Target Canada Co., Re, 2015 ONSC 303, 2015 CarswellOnt 620

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(S.C.C.), where Farley, J. found that "insolvency" includes a corporation "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within [a] reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring" (at para 26). The decision of Farley, J. in *Stelco* was followed in *Priszm Income Fund, Re*, [2011] O.J. No. 1491 (Ont. S.C.J.), 2011 and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 4286 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Canwest*].

27 Having reviewed the record and hearing submissions, I am satisfied that the Target Canada Entities are all insolvent and are debtor companies to which the CCAA applies, either by reference to the definition of "insolvent person" under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA") or under the test developed by Farley J. in *Stelco*.

I also accept the submission of counsel to the Applicants that without the continued financial support of Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities face too many legal and business impediments and too much uncertainty to wind-down their operations without the "breathing space" afforded by a stay of proceedings or other available relief under the CCAA.

I am also satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction over the proceeding. Section 9(1) of the CCAA provides that an application may be made to the court that has jurisdiction in (a) the province in which the head office or chief place of business of the company in Canada is situated; or (b) any province in which the company's assets are situated, if there is no place of business in Canada.

30 In this case, the head office and corporate headquarters of TCC is located in Mississauga, Ontario, where approximately 800 employees work. Moreover, the chief place of business of the Target Canada Entities is Ontario. A number of office locations are in Ontario; 2 of TCC's 3 primary distribution centres are located in Ontario; 55 of the TCC retail stores operate in Ontario; and almost half the employees that support TCC's operations work in Ontario.

The Target Canada Entities state that the purpose for seeking the proposed initial order in these proceedings is to effect a fair, controlled and orderly wind-down of their Canadian retail business with a view to developing a plan of compromise or arrangement to present to their creditors as part of these proceedings. I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that although there is no prospect that a restructured "going concern" solution involving the Target Canada Entities will result, the use of the protections and flexibility afforded by the CCAA is entirely appropriate in these circumstances. In arriving at this conclusion, I have noted the comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Ted Leroy Trucking Ltd., Re*, 2010 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) ("*Century Services*") that "courts frequently observe that the CCAA is skeletal in nature", and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred". The flexibility of the CCAA, particularly in the context of large and complex restructurings, allows for innovation and creativity, in contrast to the more "rules-based" approach of the BIA.

32 Prior to the 2009 amendments to the CCAA, Canadian courts accepted that, in appropriate circumstances, debtor companies were entitled to seek the protection of the CCAA where the outcome was not going to be a going concern restructuring, but instead, a "liquidation" or wind-down of the debtor companies' assets or business.

The 2009 amendments did not expressly address whether the CCAA could be used generally to wind-down the business of a debtor company. However, I am satisfied that the enactment of section 36 of the CCAA, which establishes a process for a debtor company to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business while under CCAA protection, is consistent with the principle that the CCAA can be a vehicle to downsize or wind-down a debtor company's business.

In this case, the sheer magnitude and complexity of the Target Canada Entities business, including the number of stakeholders whose interests are affected, are, in my view, suited to the flexible framework and scope for innovation offered by this "skeletal" legislation.

- 35 The required audited financial statements are contained in the record.
- 36 The required cash flow statements are contained in the record.

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³⁷ Pursuant to s. 11.02 of the CCAA, the court may make an order staying proceedings, restraining further proceedings, or prohibiting the commencement of proceedings, "on any terms that it may impose" and "effective for the period that the court considers necessary" provided the stay is no longer than 30 days. The Target Canada Entities, in this case, seek a stay of proceedings up to and including February 13, 2015.

38 Certain of the corporate Target Canada Entities (TCC, TCC Health and TCC Mobile) act as general or limited partners in the partnerships. The Applicants submit that it is appropriate to extend the stay of proceedings to the Partnerships on the basis that each performs key functions in relation to the Target Canada Entities' businesses.

39 The Applicants also seek to extend the stay to Target Canada Property LP which was formerly the sub-leasee/ sub-sub lessor under the sub-sub lease back arrangement entered into by TCC to finance the leasehold improvements in its leased stores. The Applicants contend that the extension of the stay to Target Canada Property LP is necessary in order to safeguard it against any residual claims that may be asserted against it as a result of TCC Propco's insolvency and filing under the CCAA.

40 I am satisfied that it is appropriate that an initial order extending the protection of a CCAA stay of proceedings under section 11.02(1) of the CCAA should be granted.

41 Pursuant to section 11.7(1) of the CCAA, Alvarez & Marsal Inc. is appointed as Monitor.

42 It is well established that the court has the jurisdiction to extend the protection of the stay of proceedings to Partnerships in order to ensure that the purposes of the CCAA can be achieved (see: *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.*, *Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Priszm Income Fund, Re*, 2011 ONSC 2061 (Ont. S.C.J.); *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Canwest Publishing*") and *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("*Canwest Global*").

43 In these circumstances, I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to extend the stay to the Partnerships as requested.

The Applicants also seek landlord protection in relation to third party tenants. Many retail leases of non-anchored tenants provide that tenants have certain rights against their landlords if the anchor tenant in a particular shopping mall or centre becomes insolvent or ceases operations. In order to alleviate the prejudice to TCC's landlords if any such nonanchored tenants attempt to exercise these rights, the Applicants request an extension of the stay of proceedings (the "Co-Tenancy Stay") to all rights of these third party tenants against the landlords that arise out of the insolvency of the Target Canada Entities or as a result of any steps taken by the Target Canada Entities pursuant to the Initial Order.

The Applicants contend that the authority to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay derives from the broad jurisdiction under sections 11 and 11.02(1) of the CCAA to make an initial order on any terms that the court may impose. Counsel references *T. Eaton Co., Re*, 1997 CarswellOnt 1914 (Ont. Gen. Div.) as a precedent where a stay of proceedings of the same nature as the Co-Tenancy Stay was granted by the court in Eaton's second CCAA proceeding. The Court noted that, if tenants were permitted to exercise these "co-tenancy" rights during the stay, the claims of the landlord against the debtor company would greatly increase, with a potentially detrimental impact on the restructuring efforts of the debtor company.

In these proceedings, the Target Canada Entities propose, as part of the orderly wind-down of their businesses, to engage a financial advisor and a real estate advisor with a view to implementing a sales process for some or all of its real estate portfolio. The Applicants submit that it is premature to determine whether this process will be successful, whether any leases will be conveyed to third party purchasers for value and whether the Target Canada Entities can successfully develop and implement a plan that their stakeholders, including their landlords, will accept. The Applicants further contend that while this process is being resolved and the orderly wind-down is underway, the Co-Tenancy Stay is required to postpone the contractual rights of these tenants for a finite period. The Applicants contend that any prejudice to the Target Canada Co., Re, 2015 ONSC 303, 2015 CarswellOnt 620

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third party tenants' clients is significantly outweighed by the benefits of the Co-Tenancy Stay to all of the stakeholders of the Target Canada Entities during the wind-down period.

47 The Applicants therefore submit that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay in these circumstances.

48 I am satisfied the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time. To the extent that the affected parties wish to challenge the broad nature of this stay, the same can be addressed at the "comeback hearing".

49 The Applicants also request that the benefit of the stay of proceedings be extended (subject to certain exceptions related to the cash management system) to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims against these entities that are derivative of the primary liability of the Target Canada Entities.

I am satisfied that the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time and the stay is granted, again, subject to the proviso that affected parties can challenge the broad nature of the stay at a comeback hearing directed to this issue.

51 With respect to the protection of employees, it is noted that TCC employs approximately 17,600 individuals.

52 Mr. Wong contends that TCC and Target Corporation have always considered their employees to be integral to the Target brand and business. However, the orderly wind-down of the Target Canada Entities' business means that the vast majority of TCC employees will receive a notice immediately after the CCAA filing that their employment is to be terminated as part of the wind-down process.

53 In order to provide a measure of financial security during the orderly wind-down and to diminish financial hardship that TCC employees may suffer, Target Corporation has agreed to fund an Employee Trust to a maximum of \$70 million.

54 The Applicants seek court approval of the Employee Trust which provides for payment to eligible employees of certain amounts, such as the balance of working notice following termination. Counsel contends that the Employee Trust was developed in consultation with the proposed monitor, who is the administrator of the trust, and is supported by the proposed Representative Counsel. The proposed trustee is The Honourable J. Ground. The Employee Trust is exclusively funded by Target Corporation and the costs associated with administering the Employee Trust will be borne by the Employee Trust, not the estate of Target Canada Entities. Target Corporation has agreed not to seek to recover from the Target Canada Entities estates any amounts paid out to employee beneficiaries under the Employee Trust.

In my view, it is questionable as to whether court authorization is required to implement the provisions of the Employee Trust. It is the third party, Target Corporation, that is funding the expenses for the Employee Trust and not one of the debtor Applicants. However, I do recognize that the implementation of the Employee Trust is intertwined with this proceeding and is beneficial to the employees of the Applicants. To the extent that Target Corporation requires a court order authorizing the implementation of the employee trust, the same is granted.

56 The Applicants seek the approval of a KERP and the granting of a court ordered charge up to the aggregate amount of \$6.5 million as security for payments under the KERP. It is proposed that the KERP Charge will rank after the Administration Charge but before the Directors' Charge.

57 The approval of a KERP and related KERP Charge is in the discretion of the Court. KERPs have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings, including *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 1330 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) [*Nortel Networks (KERP)]*, and *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4699 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). In *U.S. Steel Canada Inc., Re*, 2014 ONSC 6145 (Ont. S.C.J.), I recently approved the KERP for employees whose continued services were critical to the stability of the business and for the implementation of the marketing process and

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whose services could not easily be replaced due, in part, to the significant integration between the debtor company and its U.S. parent.

In this case, the KERP was developed by the Target Canada Entities in consultation with the proposed monitor. The proposed KERP and KERP Charge benefits between 21 and 26 key management employees and approximately 520 store-level management employees.

59 Having reviewed the record, I am of the view that it is appropriate to approve the KERP and the KERP Charge. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account the submissions of counsel to the Applicants as to the importance of having stability among the key employees in the liquidation process that lies ahead.

The Applicants also request the Court to appoint Koskie Minsky LLP as employee representative counsel (the "Employee Representative Counsel"), with Ms. Susan Philpott acting as senior counsel. The Applicants contend that the Employee Representative Counsel will ensure that employee interests are adequately protected throughout the proceeding, including by assisting with the Employee Trust. The Applicants contend that at this stage of the proceeding, the employees have a common interest in the CCAA proceedings and there appears to be no material conflict existing between individual or groups of employees. Moreover, employees will be entitled to opt out, if desired.

I am satisfied that section 11 of the CCAA and the *Rules of Civil Procedure* confer broad jurisdiction on the court to appoint Representative Counsel for vulnerable stakeholder groups such as employee or investors (see *Nortel Networks Corp., Re,* 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) (Nortel Networks Representative Counsel)). In my view, it is appropriate to approve the appointment of Employee Representative Counsel and to provide for the payment of fees for such counsel by the Applicants. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account:

(i) the vulnerability and resources of the groups sought to be represented;

(ii) the social benefit to be derived from the representation of the groups;

(iii) the avoidance of multiplicity of legal retainers; and

(iv) the balance of convenience and whether it is fair and just to creditors of the estate.

62 The Applicants also seek authorization, if necessary, and with the consent of the Monitor, to make payments for pre-filing amounts owing and arrears to certain critical third parties that provide services integral to TCC's ability to operate during and implement its controlled and orderly wind-down process.

63 Although the objective of the CCAA is to maintain the status quo while an insolvent company attempts to negotiate a plan of arrangement with its creditors, the courts have expressly acknowledged that preservation of the status quo does not necessarily entail the preservation of the relative pre-stay debt status of each creditor.

64 The Target Canada Entities seek authorization to pay pre-filing amounts to certain specific categories of suppliers, if necessary and with the consent of the Monitor. These include:

a) Logistics and supply chain providers;

b) Providers of credit, debt and gift card processing related services; and

c) Other suppliers up to a maximum aggregate amount of \$10 million, if, in the opinion of the Target Canada Entities, the supplier is critical to the orderly wind-down of the business.

In my view, having reviewed the record, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant this requested relief in respect of critical suppliers.

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In order to maximize recovery for all stakeholders, TCC indicates that it intends to liquidate its inventory and attempt to sell the real estate portfolio, either en bloc, in groups, or on an individual property basis. The Applicants therefore seek authorization to solicit proposals from liquidators with a view to entering into an agreement for the liquidation of the Target Canada Entities inventory in a liquidation process.

TCC's liquidity position continues to deteriorate. According to Mr. Wong, TCC and its subsidiaries have an immediate need for funding in order to satisfy obligations that are coming due, including payroll obligations that are due on January 16, 2015. Mr. Wong states that Target Corporation and its subsidiaries are no longer willing to provide continued funding to TCC and its subsidiaries outside of a CCAA proceeding. Target Corporation (the "DIP Lender") has agreed to provide TCC and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Borrower") with an interim financing facility (the "DIP Facility") on terms advantageous to the Applicants in the form of a revolving credit facility in an amount up to U.S. \$175 million. Counsel points out that no fees are payable under the DIP Facility and interest is to be charged at what they consider to be the favourable rate of 5%. Mr. Wong also states that it is anticipated that the amount of the DIP Facility will be sufficient to accommodate the anticipated liquidity requirements of the Borrower during the orderly wind-down process.

The DIP Facility is to be secured by a security interest on all of the real and personal property owned, leased or hereafter acquired by the Borrower. The Applicants request a court-ordered charge on the property of the Borrower to secure the amount actually borrowed under the DIP Facility (the "DIP Lenders Charge"). The DIP Lenders Charge will rank in priority to all unsecured claims, but subordinate to the Administration Charge, the KERP Charge and the Directors' Charge.

69 The authority to grant an interim financing charge is set out at section 11.2 of the CCAA. Section 11.2(4) sets out certain factors to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant the DIP Financing Charge.

The Target Canada Entities did not seek alternative DIP Financing proposals based on their belief that the DIP Facility was being offered on more favourable terms than any other potentially available third party financing. The Target Canada Entities are of the view that the DIP Facility is in the best interests of the Target Canada Entities and their stakeholders. I accept this submission and grant the relief as requested.

Accordingly, the DIP Lenders' Charge is granted in the amount up to U.S. \$175 million and the DIP Facility is approved.

Section 11 of the CCAA provides the court with the authority to allow the debtor company to enter into arrangements to facilitate a restructuring under the CCAA. The Target Canada Entities wish to retain Lazard and Northwest to assist them during the CCCA proceeding. Both the Target Canada Entities and the Monitor believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration to be paid to Lazard and Northwest is fair and reasonable. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to approve the engagement of Lazard and Northwest.

73 With respect to the Administration Charge, the Applicants are requesting that the Monitor, along with its counsel, counsel to the Target Canada Entities, independent counsel to the Directors, the Employee Representative Counsel, Lazard and Northwest be protected by a court ordered charge and all the property of the Target Canada Entities up to a maximum amount of \$6.75 million as security for their respective fees and disbursements (the "Administration Charge"). Certain fees that may be payable to Lazard are proposed to be protected by a Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

74 In *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 ONSC 222 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Pepall J. (as she then was) provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in approving an administration charge, including:

a. The size and complexity of the business being restructured;

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b. The proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

c. Whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. Whether the quantum of the proposed Charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

e. The position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the Charge; and

f. The position of the Monitor.

75 Having reviewed the record, I am satisfied, that it is appropriate to approve the Administration Charge and the Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

The Applicants seek a Directors' and Officers' charge in the amount of up to \$64 million. The Directors Charge is proposed to be secured by the property of the Target Canada Entities and to rank behind the Administration Charge and the KERP Charge, but ahead of the DIP Lenders' Charge.

Pursuant to section 11.51 of the CCAA, the court has specific authority to grant a "super priority" charge to the directors and officers of a company as security for the indemnity provided by the company in respect of certain obligations.

⁷⁸ I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that the requested Directors' Charge is reasonable given the nature of the Target Canada Entities retail business, the number of employees in Canada and the corresponding potential exposure of the directors and officers to personal liability. Accordingly, the Directors' Charge is granted.

79 In the result, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the Initial Order in these proceedings.

80 The stay of proceedings is in effect until February 13, 2015.

A comeback hearing is to be scheduled on or prior to February 13, 2015. I recognize that there are many aspects of the Initial Order that go beyond the usual first day provisions. I have determined that it is appropriate to grant this broad relief at this time so as to ensure that the status quo is maintained.

82 The comeback hearing is to be a "true" comeback hearing. In moving to set aside or vary any provisions of this order, moving parties do not have to overcome any onus of demonstrating that the order should be set aside or varied.

83 Finally, a copy of Lazard's engagement letter (the "Lazard Engagement Letter") is attached as Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report. The Applicants request that the Lazard Engagement Letter be sealed, as the fee structure contemplated in the Lazard Engagement Letter could potentially influence the structure of bids received in the sales process.

Having considered the principles set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* (2002), 211 D.L.R.
(4th) 193, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.), I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to seal Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report.

85 The Initial Order has been signed in the form presented.

Application granted.

End of Document

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TAB 24

2015 ONSC 1028 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Target Canada Co., Re

2015 CarswellOnt 3274, 2015 ONSC 1028, 23 C.B.R. (6th) 303, 252 A.C.W.S. (3d) 11

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC

Geoffrey Morawetz R.S.J.

Heard: February 11, 2015 Judgment: February 18, 2015 Docket: CV-15-10832-00CL

Counsel: Jeremy Dacks, John MacDonald, Shawn Irving for Applicants, Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC Jay Swartz for Target Corporation

William Sasso, Sharon Strosberg, Jacqueline Horvat for Pharmacy Franchisee Association of Canada Susan Philpott for employees of the Applicants

Alan Mark, Melaney Wagner, Graham Smith, Francy Kussner for Monitor, Alvarez & Marsal Inc.

J. Dietrich for Merchant Retail Solutions ULC, Gordon Brothers Canada ULC and G.A. Retail Canada ULC

Andrew Hodhod for Bell Canada

Harvey Chaiton for Directors and Officers

Subject: Insolvency

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Geoffrey Morawetz R.S.J.:

Timminco Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 CarswellOnt 10568, 2012 ONSC 4471, 93 C.B.R. (5th) 326 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 32 — considered

s. 32(1) — considered

s. 32(2) — considered

s. 32(4) — considered

s. 32(7) — considered

Forms considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

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Form 4 — referred to

MOTION by pharmacists for order under s. 32(2) of *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* that franchise agreements not be disclaimed, and other relief.

Geoffrey Morawetz R.S.J.:

1 The Pharmacy Franchisee Association of Canada ("PFAC") brought this motion for the following relief:

a. appointing PFAC as the representative of the Pharmacists and Franchisees (collectively, the "Pharmacists") under the Pharmacy Franchise Agreements ("Franchise Agreements");

b. appointing Sutts, Strosberg LLP as the Pharmacists' Representative Counsel (the "Representative Counsel");

c. appointing BDO Canada ("BDO") as the Pharmacists' financial advisor;

d. directing that the Pharmacists' reasonable legal and other professional expenses be paid from the estate of the Target Canada Entities with appropriate administrative charges to secure payment;

e. directing that the "Disclaimer of Franchise Agreements" dated January 26, 2015 by the Franchisor, Target Pharmacy Franchising LP ("Target Pharmacy") be set aside;

f. declaring that the Franchise Agreements and/or related agreements may not be disclaimed without court order; and

g. directing that Target Pharmacy cannot deny the Pharmacists access to premises, discontinue supplies or otherwise interfere with a Pharmacist's operations without that Pharmacist's consent or a court order.

2 On January 26, 2015, Target Pharmacy delivered Disclaimers of Franchise Agreements and related agreements to each of the Pharmacists operating the pharmacies at 93 locations across Canada (outside Quebec), seeking to shut down these pharmacies in the Target Canada store locations within 30 days.

3 The Pharmacists ask the court to deny Target Pharmacy's Disclaimer of the Franchise Agreements because (i) the Disclaimers will not enhance the prospects of a viable arrangement being made; and (ii) the Pharmacists will suffer significant financial hardship as a consequence of the disclaimer, with insolvency and/or bankruptcy awaiting many of them.

4 Under the proposed wind-down, Target Pharmacy is not responsible for pharmacy shut-down costs. Instead, the Pharmacists are responsible for (i) the payment of salaries, severance pay and other obligations to their own employees, suppliers and contractors; (ii) the relocation costs of their pharmacies; and (iii) the continuation of services to their patients in accordance with professional standards.

5 The Pharmacists recognize that they face numerous challenges as a result of Target store closures. In relocating, or winding-down pharmacy operations, the Pharmacists are required to comply with applicable legislation, regulations and standards governing the conduct of pharmacists in Canada, including such matters as: notice of pharmacy closure; notice of intention to open a new pharmacy; the safe-guarding of personal health records; providing notice to patients respecting their personal health information; and safeguarding and disposing of narcotics and controlled substances.

6 The Pharmacists seem to accept that when a Target store closes, the pharmacy within that store will also close. They state that they require "breathing space" that may be afforded to them by an order that the Franchise Agreements are not to be disclaimed at this time. They ask the court to direct Target Pharmacy and its Affiliates not to deny them access to their licenced space or otherwise interfere with the Pharmacist's operations without the consent of or on terms Target Canada Co., Re, 2015 ONSC 1028, 2015 CarswellOnt 3274

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directed by the court. Practically speaking, the Pharmacists want to postpone the effect of the disclaimer in the hope of obtaining a continuation of support payments from Target Canada for an unspecified time.

7 There is no doubt that the closure or pending closure of Target Canada is causing and will cause significant dislocation for a number of parties. For the most part, Target Employees will lose their jobs. Representative Counsel have been appointed to assist employees in a process that includes an Employee Trust.

8 The closure of Target Canada also impacts suppliers to Target, especially sole suppliers. The insolvency of Target Canada and its filing under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (CCAA) has no doubt resulted in Target defaulting on a number of contractual relationships. These suppliers will have claims against Target Canada that will be filed in due course.

9 The closure of Target Canada also affects the Pharmacists. The insolvency of Target and its filing under the CCAA has resulted in Target defaulting on its contractual relationships with the Pharmacists. Target wishes to disclaim the Franchise Agreements. The Monitor approved the proposed disclaimer and, as noted, disclaimer notices were sent on January 26, 2015.

10 The Pharmacists are challenging the disclaimer and seek an order under s. 32(2) of the CCAA that the Franchise Agreements not be disclaimed. Section 32(4) of the CCAA references a section 32(2) order and provides:

Factors to be considered — In deciding whether to make the order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) whether the monitor approved the proposed disclaimer or resiliation;

(b) whether the disclaimer or resiliation would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company; and

(c) whether the disclaimer or resiliation would likely cause significant financial hardship to a party to the agreement.

11 The reality that the Target stores will be closing provides, in my view, the starting point to analyze the issue being brought forward by the Pharmacists.

12 Following the closing of a particular Target Store, it is unrealistic for the Pharmacist to carry on the operation of the pharmacy. As noted by counsel to the Applicants, as soon as operations cease at a particular location, the store will "go dark" and there will no longer be employee or security support that would permit the Franchisees to continue to operate. Further, counsel to the Applicants submits it would not be either commercially reasonable or practical for the Franchisees to continue to operate in a closed store, nor would it be reasonable or in the interests of stakeholders to require these locations to remain open in order to serve the interests of the Franchisees.

13 It is in this context that the issue of the disclaimer has to be considered.

14 Counsel to the Pharmacists seem to appreciate the reality of the situation, as reflected in the following references in their factum.

49. It is cold comfort for the Pharmacists to be advised that their losses in relation to the disclaimer of the Franchise Agreement are provable claims in the CCAA proceedings. The Pharmacists must pay their employees now. It is problematic that a provable claim may result in the possible recovery of some part of those payments, at a future uncertain date, if the funds are available in the Target Pharmacy Estate.

50. Evidence that simply provides that a debtor company will be more profitable with the disclaimer contracts is insufficient. Setting aside the disclaimers in this case will provide the Pharmacists with flexibility and time to make

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informed decisions and carry out their own relocation and/or wind-down in a manner that causes the least amount of damages to themselves and those who depend on them. ...

53. Respectfully, such disclaimer should not be permitted until the court receives an independent report of the circumstances of each of the Pharmacists and directs the orderly wind-down and/or relocation of such operations on terms that are fair and reasonable. ...

55. In no respect is the 30-day termination of the Franchise Agreements fair, reasonable and equitable to the Pharmacists, their employees and the public they serve. For many Pharmacists, it minimizes their capacity to relocate, [and] will leave them without funds to pay their employees, or the capacity to meet their ongoing obligations to their patients.

15 It seems to me, having considered these submissions, that the Pharmacists recognize that it is inevitable that the pharmacies will be shut down.

16 With respect to the factors to be considered as set out in s. 32(4), the disclaimer notices were approved by the Monitor. The Pharmacists complain that no reasons were provided in the notice approved by the Monitor. However, there is no requirement in s. 32(1) for the Monitor to provide reasons for its approval. This is reflected in Form 4 — Notice by Debtor Company to Disclaim or Resiliate an Agreement.

17 However, the absence of reasons does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that the Monitor did not consider certain factors prior to providing its approval.

18 The Monitor has made reference to the issues affecting the pharmacies in its Reports.

19 The pharmacies were specifically the subject of comment in the Monitor's First Report at sections 8.2 - 8.5, and in the Second Report at section 6. Section 6.1 (h) of the Second Report specifically comments on the disclaimer notices. A summary of the reasons is provided at section 6.2.

20 The information contained in the Monitor's reports establishes that there was communication as between Target Canada, the Monitor and the Franchisees such that it was clear that the stores were being closed. Specific reference to the communication is set out in the Monitor's Report at section 6.1(f), which in turn references the second Wong affidavit, filed by the Applicants.

21 I am satisfied that the Monitor considered a number of relevant factors prior to approving the disclaimer notices.

22 With respect to the second factor to be considered, namely whether the disclaimer would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company, the Applicants have indicated they may be filing a plan of arrangement. I note that a plan may be required to ensure an orderly distribution of assets to the creditors.

23 The Applicants seek to achieve an orderly wind-down and maximization of realizations to the benefit of all unsecured creditors. It seems to me that if the disclaimers are set aside it would delay this process because it would extend the time period for Target Canada to make payments to one group of creditors (the Pharmacists) to the detriment of the creditors generally. Further, in the absence of an effective disclaimer, the Target Entities will continue to incur significant ongoing administrative costs which would be detrimental to the estate and all stakeholders.

The interests of all creditors must be taken into account. In this case, store closures and liquidation are inevitable. The Applicants should focus on an asset realization and a maximization of return to creditors on a timely basis. Setting aside the disclaimer might provide limited assistance to the Pharmacists, but it would come at the expense of other creditors. This is not a desirable outcome. I expressed similar views in *Timminco Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 4471 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraph 62 as follows: [62] I have also taken into account that the effect of acceding to the argument put forth by counsel to Mr. Timmins would result in an improvement to his position relative to, and at the expense of, the unsecured creditors and other stakeholders of the Timminco Entities. If the Agreement is disclaimed, however, the monthly amounts that would otherwise be paid to Mr. Timmins would be available for distribution to all of Timminco's unsecured creditors, including Mr. Timmins. This equitable result is dictated by the guiding principles of the CCAA.

I am satisfied that the disclaimer will be beneficial to the creditors generally because it will enable the Applicants to move forward with their liquidation plan without a further delay to accommodate the Pharmacists.

26 The third factor is whether the disclaimer would likely cause significant financial hardship to a party to the agreement. This factor is addressed by Counsel to the Monitor at paragraph 27 of its factum.

27. On its own terms the CCAA effectively imposes a high threshold, beyond economic or financial loss, for the consideration under section 32(4): there must be evidence of financial *hardship*, it must be *significant* financial hardship, and it must be *likely* to be caused by the disclaimer. Financial loss or damage, without more, is not sufficient, in the Monitor's submission. It appears that Section 32 itself recognizes the distinction, providing expressly in ss. 32(7) that where a party suffers "a loss" in relation to the disclaimer the consequence is that such party "is considered to have a provable claim."

(emphasis in original)

27 In these circumstances, the pharmacies will inevitably close in the very near future whether or not the Franchise Agreements are disclaimed. I accept the submission of counsel to the Monitor to the effect that no Franchisee has adduced evidence that disallowing the Disclaimer and continuing to operate in otherwise dark, vacated premises would improve its financial circumstances.

28 The situation facing the Pharmacists is not pleasant. However, in my view, setting aside the disclaimer will not improve their situation. Extending the time before the disclaimers take effect has the consequence of requiring Target Canada to allocate additional assets to the Pharmacists in priority to other unsecured creditors. This is not a desirable outcome.

29 The Target Canada Entities, in consultation and with the support of the Monitor, have offered a degree of accommodation to the Pharmacists. The details are set out at paragraphs 64-66 of the affidavit of Mark Wong sworn February 16, 2015:

64. As outlined above, in consultation with and with the support of the Monitor, on February 9, 2015 the Target Canada Entities' legal advisors delivered an accommodation to PFAC's counsel intended to address the primary concern expressed by PFAC, namely that franchisees require additional time to transfer patient files and drug inventory and to relocate their respective pharmacy businesses. Under the terms of the accommodation, TCC will permit the pharmacists to continue to operate at their respective existing TCC locations until the earlier of March 30, 2015 and three days following written notice by TCC to the pharmacist of the anticipated store closure at such pharmacist's location. The accommodation provides that the Notices of Disclaimer will continue in effect and the franchise agreements will be disclaimed on February 25, 2015, but the pharmacists will be entitled to remain on the premises for an additional period of time.

64. Under the terms of the accommodation, pharmacists will be able to continue operating in TCC stores for longer than the 30-day period contemplated. Depending on the date the Agent decides to vacate certain TCC stores, many pharmacists may be able to continue operating for 60 days or more following delivery of the Notices of Disclaimer and approximately 75 days following the date of the Initial Order. As I described above, at any time after the third anniversary of the opening date of the pharmacy, TCC Pharmacy would have the right to terminate the franchise agreement for any reason on 60 days' notice.

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66. The March 30, 2015 date indicated in the accommodation made by Target Canada Entities is intended to be a reasonable compromise whereby pharmacist franchisees will get additional time to transfer patient files and inventory and relocate their businesses, while at the same time permitting the Target Canada Entities to undertake the orderly wind down of TCC pharmacy operations and the TCC retail stores as a whole. As I described above, in order to accommodate the continued operations of the pharmacies during the wind down process, TCC Pharmacy and TCC have not yet delivered notices of disclaimer to a number of third-party providers such as McKesson, Kroll and others, which TCC Pharmacy has maintained at considerable cost. The March 30, 2015 outside date for the operation of all TCC pharmacies will allow TCC Pharmacy to time the delivery of disclaimer notices to these third-party providers so as to avoid incurring additional unnecessary costs. The certainty provided by the firm outside date is also to the benefit of the pharmacies themselves, each of whom will be required to win down their operations and make alternate arrangements in the very short term as a result of the imminent closures of TCC retail stores.

30 In the circumstances of this case, this accommodation represents, in my view, a constructive, practical and equitable approach to address a difficult issue.

Having considered the factors set out in section 32(4) of the CCAA, the motion of PFAC for a direction that the disclaimer of the Franchise Agreements be set aside is dismissed, together with ancilliary relief related to the disclaimers. It is not necessary to address the standing issue raised by the Monitor.

32 I turn now to the request of PFAC that it be appointed representative of the Franchisees and that Sutts, Strosberg LLP be appointed as the Pharmacists' Representative Counsel, and BDO as the Pharmacists' financial advisor.

33 In view of my decision relating to the disclaimers, the scope of legal and financial services required by the Pharmacists may be limited. However, there are many transitional issues that remain to be addressed. First and foremost is dealing with the patient records and ensuring uninterrupted delivery of prescription drugs to all such patients. There is also interaction required between Target Pharmacy, the Franchisees, and the regulators, concerning the relocation or shut down of pharmacies and the return of certain products to suppliers. This is not a simple case where the Franchisee receiving the disclaimer notice can simply walk away from the scene. From a professional and regulatory standpoint, they still have to participate in the process.

In addressing these transition issues and recognizing that similar circumstances exist for the Franchisees, there would appear to be some benefit in having a limited form of representation for the Franchisees. This would assist in ensuring that a consistent approach is followed not only in the wind-down or relocation aspect of the process, but also in the claims process. In my view, the estate could benefit if this process was coordinated.

The Monitor and the Applicants would have a single point of contact which would likely result in a reduction in administrative time and costs during the liquidation and the claims process. I am satisfied that PFAC has the support of the majority of franchisees. PFAC is appointed as the Representative of the Pharmacists. Sutts, Strosberg LLP is appointed Representative Counsel and BDO is appointed as the Pharmacists financial advisor.

The funding of this representational role is to be limited. The Applicants are to make available up to \$100,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, to PFAC to be used for legal and financial advisory services to be provided by Sutts, Strosberg, as Representative Counsel and BDO as financial advisor in these proceedings. PFAC can provide copies of invoices to the Monitor, who can arrange for payment of same. Any surplus funds at the conclusion of the representation are to be returned to the Applicants. The contribution to PFAC can be used only to cover legal and financial advisory services provided to date in these proceedings as well as to assist on the going forward matters, subject to the following parameters.

37 Such assistance is to be limited to:

a. corresponding with the regulators concerning the wind-down process and the relocation process;

- b. return of inventory; and
- c. participating in the claims process.

38 If the individual franchisees decide not to participate in PFAC, they should not expect any further accommodation in a financial sense.

39 In arriving at this accommodation, I have taken into account that this limited funding will provide benefits to the Applicants under CCAA protection insofar as the legal and financial advisory services provided by Representative Counsel and BDO should reduce the overall administrative cost to the estate and will avoid a multiplicity of legal retainers. The representation and funding will also benefit the franchisees so that they can effectively shut-down or relocate their business and prepare any resulting claim in the CCAA proceedings.

40 Given the limited nature of the Applicants' financial contribution, an administrative charge is not, in my view, required.

41 In the result, PFAC's motion for representation status is granted, with limitations set out above. The motion in respect of the disclaimers is dismissed.

Motion granted in part.

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TAB 25

1991 CarswellPEI 116 Prince Edward Island Supreme Court (Trial Division)

Royal Bank v. Perfection Foods Ltd.

1991 CarswellPEI 116, 280 A.P.R. 302, 90 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 302

Royal Bank of Canada, Prince Edward Island Development Agency, Prince Edward Island Opportunities Fund Limited, New Brunswick Milk Marketing Board and Prince Edward Island Milk Marketing Board, Applicants and Perfection Foods Limited, Perfection Dairy Group Limited, Ideal Dairy Limited, Perfection Des Iles Inc., McKay's Dairy Ltd., Perfection Dairy Foods Limited, Milk Properties Limited, 031706 N.B. Ltd., Shediac Dairy (1968) Ltd., McKay's Dairy Shoppes Ltd., Perfection Group Trust, Respondents

MacDonald C.J.T.D.

Heard: January 17, 1991 Heard: January 18, 1991 Judgment: January 22, 1991 Docket: GSC-10428

Counsel: Maureen M. Gregory for Applicant Royal Bank.

Alan K. Scales, Q.C. and *Shawn A. Murphy* for Applicants PEI Development Agency and Opportunity Fund Inc. *J. Gordon MacKay* for Applicants New Brunswick Milk Marketing Board and PEI Milk Marketing Board. *M. Jane Ralling* and *Alex MacFarlane* for Respondents.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

MacDonald, C.J.:

1 On January 9, 1991, I granted an *ex parte* order placing the respondent companies under the protection of the *Companies' Creditor Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36. Since that time, the various applicants have filed motions requesting various forms of relief. The relief sought has ranged from a request that I set aside my order to a variation of all or parts of my order. In dealing with these motions, it will become necessary to refer to each separately.

The Facts

I will deal briefly with the background facts that initially brought this matter before the Court. Perfection Foods Limited ("Perfection") found itself in financial difficulties in 1990. As a result of its difficulties, it sought further financial assistance from the Prince Edward Island Development Agency ("PEIDA"). As a result of negotiations, an agreement was reached between Perfection; Perfection Dairy Group Limited, which is the shareholder of Perfection; and Jack Simmonds and John Simmonds, shareholders of Perfection Dairy Group Limited; and PEIDA. Under this agreement, Perfection agreed to certain management changes whereby William H. Richardson was appointed Chief Executive Officer of Perfection for the period of September 18, 1990 to January 11, 1991. He was also given full authority to manage all Perfection subsidiaries ("Perfection Group") and to make whatever decisions he deemed to be in the best interests of the companies.

3 The Perfection Group produces and distributes fluid milk, ice cream, evaporated milk, sweetened condensed milk and cheese. The Perfection Group is the largest operation of its kind in the Maritime provinces, having annual sales of \$75 million. Its operation extends to New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and the Magdalen Islands in Quebec. Immediately upon assuming office, Mr. Richardson commenced to put into effect cost cutting measures and other management practices to improve the position of the Perfection Group. In an affidavit of January 9, 1991, on the *ex parte* motion, Mr. Richardson stated that the Perfection Group continues to lose money, however, his projections showed that the Perfection Group could show a profit by the end of 1991.

4 On January 4, 1991, PEIDA demanded repayment of the sum of \$627,680.58 by February 1, 1991. Additionally, certain other secured creditors commenced to make demands upon Perfection in early January. In order to prevent any movement against the Perfection Group, the application for protection under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* was made. I will address further facts as they pertain to each motion.

The Law

5 The *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* is designed to protect companies in financial hardship while attempts are made to alleviate their difficulties and submit a proposal of compromise or arrangement. The British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, an unreported decision of November 16, 1990, quoted from an article by Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 C.B.R. 587 at p. 592 as follows:

It is important in applying the C.C.A.A. to keep in mind its purpose and several fundamental principles which may serve to accomplish that purpose. Its object, as one Ontario judge has stated in a number of cases, is to keep a company going despite insolvency. Hon. C.H. Cahan when he introduced the bill into the House of Commons indicated that it was designed to permit a corporation, through reorganization, to continue its business, and thereby to prevent its organization being disrupted and its goodwill lost. It may be that the main value of the assets of a company is derived from their being fitted together into one system and that individually they are worth little. The trade connections associated with the system and held by the management may also be valuable. In the case of a large company it is probable that no buyer can be found who would be able and willing to buy the enterprise as a whole and pay its going concern value. The alternative to reorganization then is often a sale of the property piecemeal for an amount which would yield little satisfaction to the creditors and none at all to the shareholders.

6 The legislation is to prevent discontinuance of companies, to prevent loss of jobs, to protect investors and, hopefully, in doing so seeing that secured creditors will not suffer any major losses. Under the legislation, the Court is allowed to make orders that will maintain the status quo until such time as the company is ordered to make an arrangement with its creditors.

7 Referring again to the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Quintette*, the court stated that the courts have tended to avoid a microscopic parsing of the words and phrases of s. 11 of the *C.C.A.A.* in favour of a broader "purposes" approach. At page 18 of the decision, Gibbs, J.A. for the court stated:

To the extent that a general principle can be extracted from the few cases directly on point, and the others in which there is persuasive obiter, it would appear to be that the courts have concluded that under s. 11 there is a discretionary power to restrain judicial or extra judicial conduct against the debtor company the effect of which is, or would be, seriously to impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business during the compromise or arrangement negotiating period. The power is discretionary and therefore to be exercised judicially....

8 I next turn to the separate motions that are before me.

Royal Bank of Canada ("the Bank")

9 The Royal Bank asks that my order of January 9th be set aside in its entirety. The bank is a secured creditor in the sum of approximately \$7,000,000. This seven million includes a revolving line of credit with an overall maximum approved level of \$4,000,000, subject to a limitation as determined by a margin formula. Currently the outstanding amount is \$3,919,000. It is with the latter amount that the bank is most concerned.

10 As security for its loans, the bank holds a general assignment under s. 178 of the *Bank Act* from Perfection which secures all inventory and packaging goods. It also has a general assignment of book debts. The bank also hold guarantees from various companies of the Perfection Group and a guarantee from the Prince Edward Island Development Agency for \$3,000,000.

11 The bank's concerns fall under three areas. First, the bank states that if the *ex parte* order is continued its security will be eroded. Its security for the four million line of credit is covered by so-called "quick assets", which are inventory and accounts receivable. The bank points out that because of legislation that came into effect on January 1st of this year and because of the present situation with Perfection, the company's supply of milk has drastically decreased. The loss of the milk supply will mean less production, less sales, less receipts and less inventory. To continue to operate, the bank states, Perfection will have to resort to inventory and accounts receivable.

12 These are justifiable concerns of the bank. However, there was no evidence placed before me that the bank's security has as yet begun to erode. The bank stated that it had requested from Perfection up to date information but had not received anything since December 31, 1990. Counsel for Perfection indicated that it was difficult to obtain the status of the accounts receivable or inventory and that status of the inventory had always been given on a month end basis. Information on the accounts receivable will be ready on January 22nd.

13 Dealing with the prejudice that may befall a creditor, Wachowich, J. in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 stated at p. 219:

This order is in accord with the general aim of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. The intention was to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among creditors during the interim period which would give the aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who were less aggressive, and would further undermine the financial position of the company, making it less likely that the eventual arrangement would succeed.

14 In *Icor Oil and Gas Co. Ltd. et al v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce* (1989), 102 A.R. 161, Marshall, J. of the Alberta Queens Bench dealt with a similar situation in which it was being alleged by the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce that the continued operation of the company was being financed by the accounts receivable that had been assigned to the Bank of Commerce.

15 In *Icor*, Marshall, J. pointed out that the order must in its effect balance as far as possible the interests of the creditors and the company while permitting the company a period of time to be resuscitated and reorganize its affairs. Marshall, J. recognized that his order under the *C.C.A.A.* could result in some hardship to the Bank of Commerce. The greater immediate goal was the preservation of the company for the future benefit of all creditors. I am of the same opinion. It is still not evident that the bank's security will deteriorate. The first indication will be on January 22nd when the status of the accounts receivable will be reported upon. The position of the bank under this particular agreement is not convincing at this time.

16 Secondly, the bank stated that the order should be set aside because it lacked clarity as to how it will affect the bank. If, in fact, the bank is unclear as to how the order pertains to it such can be cleared up and the order varied.

17 Finally, the bank states that the order should be set aside due to the failure of the respondents to make full disclosure on the *ex parte* application. Sufficient information was before me to allow the respondents to qualify under the *C.C.A.A.* The fact that Mr. Richardson has now filed a more extensive affidavit does not mean that there was an attempt to hide anything from the Court on the *ex parte* application and I do not find that any attempt was so made.

18 In the alternative, the bank asks for the appointment of an interim receiver and manager under Rule 41 of the *Civil Procedure Rules* or s. 34 of the *Supreme Court Act*, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap. S-10. To appoint a receiver at this point in time would not be warranted. The company continues to operate and to have a receiver take over would only mean further delay in determining whether or not an arrangement can be put forth and agreed upon. Mr. Richardson has been named as Chief Executive Officer of Perfection pursuant to an agreement between Perfection, PEIDA and the Government of Prince Edward Island. He has now been in that position for some four months and is well aware of the problems of Perfection. His initial contract ran to January 11, 1991 and it has since been renewed by Perfection. Mr. Richardson states that he considers himself as carrying out the functions of a court appointed monitor. I do not see any serious challenge from the applicants as to his impartiality. Any concerns that the applicants may have may be addressed in a varied order.

19 I dismiss the bank's motion to strike out the *ex parte* order and the motion to appoint a receiver.

Prince Edward Island Development Agency ("PEIDA") Prince Edward Island Opportunities Fund Inc. ("PEIOFI")

I next turn to the motions made on behalf of the above two applicants. The main request under their motion is an order pursuant to the *Frauds on Creditors Act*, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap. F-15 setting aside the following transfers:

(a) the transfer of the shares in Perfection Dairy Foods Limited from Perfection to McKay's Dairy Ltd.;

(b) the transfer of shares in 031706 N.B. Ltd. from Perfection to McKay's Dairy Ltd.;

(c) the transfer of shares in McKay's Dairy Ltd. from Perfection to Perfection Group Trust;

(d) the purchase from Jack Simmonds and Donald Simmonds of all the common and preferred shares in Perfection Properties Ltd.

The manner in which these transactions occurred is set forth by Mr. Richardson as follows: After his appointment, he had various meetings with various parties in the Maritimes who were interested in purchasing or investing in certain companies of the Perfection Group. Mr. Richardson came to the conclusion that in order to attract new investors or purchasers, it would be necessary to streamline the operations of the Perfection Group of companies. He decided that the companies that operated principally in New Brunswick should be integrated together with one company. On December 31, 1990, the transfers in (a) and (b) above were effected along with the transfer of Milk Properties Ltd. (formerly Perfection Properties Ltd.). The consideration for the transfer of (a) and (b) was based on the net book value of the companies as of December 31st.

The applicants state that as a result of transfers (a) and (b) the two companies are no longer wholly owned subsidiaries of Perfection, thereby placing these shares entirely out of the reach of the secured and unsecured creditors of Perfection and deprives Perfection of its distribution network in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. There is no question that Perfection no longer has any control over the transferred companies.

The applicants put great emphasis on the fact that the valuation was based on net book value, which resulted in no monetary consideration. In his affidavit of January 16th, Mr. Richardson indicates some confusion as to why the net book valuation was used. In any event, he also states that Mr. Jack-Mulligan, an experienced chartered accountant, stated that net book value is not an unusual or unreasonable pricing mechanism by which to value the shares.

24 On the matter of alleged fraudulent conveyance of shares, s. 2(1) of the *Frauds on Creditors Act* states that a transfer shall be void if it is made with an "... intent to defeat, hinder, delay or prejudice" a creditor.

In the *Royal Bank of Canada v. Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick* (1975), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 458, Cowan C.J.T.D. at p. 368 stated:

With regard to the burden of proof that the transfer of the property in question was made with intent to defeat, hinder, delay or prejudice the plaintiff creditor, it is clear that, if the effect of the transfer might be expected to be, and has, in fact, been to defeat, hinder, delay or prejudice the creditor, the Court will attribute the fraudulent intentions to the settlor.

A further account of what is meant by a fraudulent conveyance is found in *Hayden et al v. Monteith et al* (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 721 (N.B.C.A.). There the court stated the question is not whether valuable consideration was advanced in return for security but whether *bona fide* conveyances were given for *bona fide* advances of money.

27 From time to time certain "badges of fraud" have been mentioned as evidence of bad faith. These indicators include secrecy, continuance of possession, some benefit retained under the settlement to the settlor, and gross excess of value of property over the price paid.

In looking at the facts of the present transfers, it was in my opinion a *bona fide* transaction. Mr. Richardson was only doing what he had set out to do, that is, to reorganize the Perfection Group so that the companies could be put on a firm footing. While it may be said that Richardson was not at the time acting under an order made pursuant to the *C.C.A.A.*, I find nothing to indicate that he was doing anything other than making a *bona fide* transaction. It was not a transaction that would reasonably arouse suspicion once the facts were known.

29 The question of valuable consideration must also be dealt with. I have already indicated the problem the applicants have with the lack of consideration and the valuation method that was used. The term valuable consideration may mean an approximate or adequate consideration. The adequacy of consideration is an element to be considered in deciding whether fraud exists. Here it is admitted that there was no consideration due to the fact that the net book value was used to determine what consideration might be paid. Further, there was no credible evidence produced that the net book value method of valuing the shares was not acceptable. The evidence is that the shares transferred were valueless.

30 Neither do I find that the transfer was made with an intent to defeat, hinder, delay or prejudice the creditors of Perfection. The intent was to aid the Perfection Group of companies to stay in existence. It must be remembered that, pursuant to the agreement made by Perfection, Perfection Dairy Group Limited, the Simmonds' and PEIDA, Richardson was to be given full authority by Perfection to manage the affairs of Perfection.

The applicants further stated that the transfer of the shares had the effect of giving a preference to Burns Fry Inc. The latter company had given a loan to Perfection when Perfection had purchased the shares of McKay's Dairy Ltd. and, as security, Burns Fry Inc. received a pledge on the shares of McKay's Dairy Ltd. and Shediac Dairy (1968) Limited. If the shares that were transferred to McKay's Dairy Ltd., namely, Perfection Dairy Foods Limited and 031706 N.B. Ltd., have a value then Burns Fry Inc. might benefit. However, I once again refer to the fact that the value of the shares transferred was nil and, if the shares did have a value, I am unaware of their value. The applicants state that there was an intent to give Burns Fry Inc. an unjust preference. I am unable to make such a finding. There is no evidence whatsoever that there was any reason, purpose or intent in giving Burns Fry Inc. a preference.

32 I dismiss the motion to set aside the transfers to McKay's Dairy Ltd. As further facts become known, the opportunity for the applicants to again bring forth their motion will be present.

33 The third transfer that is sought to be set aside, (c), is the transfer of McKay's Dairy Ltd. shares from Perfection to Perfection Group Trust. This trust was created by Richardson to purchase the outstanding shares of McKay's and its related subsidiaries. The sole trustee is John A. Simmonds. The purchase was for fair market value, to be determined by Coopers & Lybrand Limited. The purchase was paid for by a non-interest bearing promissory note executed by the Trust in favour of Perfection. The note is payable five business days after the Trustee notifies Perfection of its intention to assign the Agreement of Purchase and Sale to an interested purchaser or on demand by Perfection from and including April 1, 1991.

Again referring to the affidavit of Richardson of January 16th, he states that the transfer of the shares was undertaken with a view to make "the internal structure of the Perfection Group more cohesive and divisible along regional lines between Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick....". I do not believe the transaction was made with any intent to hinder, delay, defeat or prejudice any creditor. The shares are not beyond the reach of Perfection and if the shares could be sold at fair market value Perfection would receive that value. 35 I would not set aside this transfer. It was a legitimate transaction for the benefit of Perfection.

The final transaction that the applicant seeks to set aside, (d), is the purchase by McKay's from Jack Simmonds and Donald Simmonds of all the common and preferred shares in Perfection Properties Limited. This transaction took place on December 31st, 1990. The consideration was their net book value, plus accumulated depreciation and \$20,000. The applicants state that the transfer was in direct contravention of the agreement entered into between Perfection, Perfection Dairy Group Limited, Jack Simmonds and John Simmonds and PEIDA. In that agreement, it was stated that all assets that were covered by Perfection Dairy Group Limited or by any party to the agreement would be immediately transferred to Perfection.

First, according to the organization chart filed by the applicants, Perfection Properties Limited, prior to December 31, 1990, was owned by the Perfection Group Limited. Perfection Group Limited was not a party to the aforesaid agreement. There was nothing that required Perfection Group Limited to transfer its shares in Perfection Properties Limited to Perfection.

Secondly, even if the transfer of the shares of Perfection Properties Limited was to be made to Perfection, there is nothing in the agreement preventing the ultimate transfer to McKay's. Since these were the only objections to this transaction, I do not find any weight to the submission.

The final part of the applicants' motion is to appoint Ernst & Young Inc. as a court monitor. I have already dealt with such an appointment under the Royal Bank motion and I dismiss such a submission.

While I have not found any evidence to suggest that I should allow any part of the applicants' motion, at this time I will not dismiss the motion outright but allow it to stand so that I may retain jurisdiction over the matters.

New Brunswick Milk Marketing Board ("NBMMB")

This applicant states that my *ex parte* order should be amended to declare that it does not apply to McKay's or to Perfection Dairy Foods Limited or to their creditors. These latter companies are ones that operate in the Province of New Brunswick. In effect, the applicant is asking for clarification of my *ex parte* order as to whether or not it applies to New Brunswick.

39 Section 9 of the C.C.A.A. reads:

9 (1) Any application under this Act may be made to the court that has jurisdiction in the province within which the head office or chief place of business of the company in Canada is situated, or, if the company has no place of business in Canada, in any province within which any assets of the company are situated.

(2) The powers conferred by this Act on a court may, subject to appeal as provided for in this Act, be exercised by a single judge thereof, and those powers may be exercised in chambers during term or in vacation.

40 As can be seen, the Court has jurisdiction if the head office or chief place of business is located within the Province. Here the registered head office of the companies is in New Brunswick and that is the province where the produce of the companies is sold. On the other hand, all of the business of the companies is conducted through the Perfection office in Charlottetown.

In my opinion, the "head office" of the companies means its registered head office. The situation here is identical to the facts in *Re Smith Transportation Co. Ltd.* (1928), 60 O.L.A. 203. As to a company's "chief place of business", I was not cited any cases where this term has been explored. Determining a chief place of business is a question of fact and those facts concerning the companies and the businesses they conduct must be considered. The number of employees, the goods being sold, the length of time each aspect of the business has been carried on and the location where that has

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been done, the income and expenses of the company and its allocation between different aspects of the company are, I am sure, a few of the considerations to be dealt with.

42 The respondents have stated that because the *C.C.A.A.* is a federal statute weight must be given to making orders applicable on a wider basis than that of a single province. I do not give weight to that submission for the reason that s. 9 of the *Act* makes it clear that provincial jurisdiction is of prime importance.

43 It is for the respondents to establish that the sought after order under the *C.C.C.A.* is within jurisdiction. I do not believe that they have laid before me sufficient facts to establish that the affected companies come within the jurisdiction of this province. Accordingly, any order of this Court in this matter will not affect McKay's or Perfection Dairy Foods Limited.

Prince Edward Island Milk Marketing Board ("the Board")

The Board asks that my *ex parte* order be varied to allow the applicant to halt milk deliveries to Perfection in the event Perfection defaults on payment to the applicant for milk sold to Perfection or if Perfection fails to provide the Board with security acceptable to the Board. The applicant concedes to the *ex parte* order.

45 In the *Quintette* case, the Court of Appeal of British Columbia stated:

...It would be a reasonable expectation that it would be extremely unlikely that the power would be exercised where the result would be to enforce the continued supply of goods and services to the debtor company without payment for current deliveries, whereas it would not be unlikely when the result would be to enforce payment for goods thereafter taken from or services thereafter received from the debtor company, as is the case here. In cases not involving the supply or receipt of goods or services, no doubt judicial exercise of the discretion would produce a result appropriate to the circumstances.

It seems reasonable that the Board should be paid for ongoing milk supplies that it sells to Perfection, especially in view of the fact that the weekly sales amount to in excess of \$100,000. I am inclined to make such an order as part of a varied order. However, before doing so, I would require further evidence as to the effect such an order would have on Perfection and whether or not Perfection could make such a payment at the time. The question of security can be dealt with later.

47 In accordance with the result of my decision, I would ask the parties to make suggestions that might be included in a varied order.

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IN THE MATTER OF the <i>Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act</i> , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF IMPERIAL TOBACCO CANADA LIMITED AND IMPERIAL TOBACCO COMPANY LIMITED APPLICANTS	Court File No:
	ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST) PROCEEDING COMMENCED AT TORONTO
	BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANTS
	OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP Box 50, 1 First Canadian Place Toronto, Canada M5X 1B8 Deborah Glendinning (LSO# 31070N) Marc Wasserman (LSO# 44066M) John Macdonald (LSO# 44066M) Michael De Lellis (LSO# 48038U) Michael De Lellis (LSO# 48038U) Tel: (416) 362-2111 Fax: (416) 862-6666 Lawyers to the Applicants Matter No: 1144377